Questions of Cultural Identity

Edited by STUART HALL and PAUL DU GAY

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I, 'I', being assume that one can derive from an account of notions of the human domain. How should we do the history of the person? What might be the social and political theory with such issues as identity, self, body, relationship between such an historical endeavour and current concerns desire? More significantly, perhaps, what light might historical investigations of human beings as subjects of autonomy and freedom, or alternatively, as bound to programmes, strategies and techniques to which they are linked? National, ethnic, cultural or territorial identity, and the political programmes, strategies and techniques to which they are linked?


To breed an animal with the right to make promises. How much all this presupposes! A man who wishes to dispose of his future in this manner must first have learned to separate necessary from accidental acts; to think causally; to see distant things as though they were near at hand; to distinguish means from ends. In short, he must have become not only calculating but himself calculable, regular even to his own perception, if he is to stand pledge for his own future.


How should we do the history of the person? What might be the relationship between such an historical endeavour and current concerns in social and political theory with such issues as identity, self, body, desire? More significantly, perhaps, what light might historical investigations cast upon current ethical preoccupations with human beings as subjects of autonomy and freedom, or alternatively, as bound to a national, ethnic, cultural or territorial identity, and the political programmes, strategies and techniques to which they are linked?

I would like to suggest a particular approach to this issue, an approach which I term 'the genealogy of subjectification'. The phrasing is awkward but, I think, important. Its importance lies, in part, in indicating what such an undertaking is not. On the one hand, it is not an attempt to write the history of changing ideas of the person, as they have figured within philosophy, literature, culture, etc. Historians, philosophers and anthropologists have long engaged in the writing of such narratives, and no doubt they are significant and instructive (e.g. Taylor, 1989 and cf. the very different approach advocated in Tully, 1993). But it is unwise to assume that one can derive, from an account of notions of the human being, that functions as a regulatory ideal in so many aspects of our contemporary forms of life – not merely in our passionate relations with one another, but in our projects of life planning, our ways of managing industrial and other organizations, our systems of consumption, many of our genres of literature and aesthetic production – a kind of 'irreal' plan of projection, put together somewhat contingently and haphazardly at the intersection of a range of distinct histories – of forms of thought, techniques of regulation, problems of organization and so forth.

Dimensions of our 'relation to ourselves'

A genealogy of subjectification is a genealogy of what one might term, following Michel Foucault, 'our relation to ourselves'. Its field of investigation comprises the kinds of attention that humans have directed towards themselves and others in different places, spaces and times. To put this rather more grandly, one might say that this was a genealogy of 'being's relation to itself' and the technical forms that this has assumed. The human being, that is to say, is that kind of creature whose ontology is historical. And the history of human being, therefore, requires an investigation of the intellectual and practical techniques that have comprised the instruments through which being has historically constituted itself: it is a matter of analysing 'the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and the practices on

the history of the person or self as a psychological entity, to see how different ages produce humans with different psychological characteristics, different emotions, beliefs, pathologies. Such a project for a history of the self is certainly imaginable and something like this aspiration shapes a number of recent studies, of which I discuss below. But such analyses presuppose a way of thinking that is itself an outcome of history, one that emerges only in the nineteenth century. For it is only at this historical moment, and in a limited and localized geographical space, that a way of thinking emerges in which human being is understood in terms of persons each equipped with an inner domain, a 'psychology', which is structured by the interaction of biographical experience with certain laws or processes characteristic of human psychology.

A genealogy of subjectification takes this individualized, interiorized, totalized and psychologized understanding of what it is to be human as delineating the site of a historical problem, not providing the grounds for a historical narrative. Such a genealogy works towards an account of the ways in which this modern 'regime of the self' emerges, not as the outcome of any gradual process of enlightenment, in which humans, aided by the endeavours of science, come at last to recognize their true nature, but out of a number of contingent and altogether less refined and dignified practices and processes. To write such a genealogy is to seek to unpick the ways in which 'the self' that functions as a regulatory ideal in so many aspects of our contemporary forms of life – not merely in our passionate relations with one another, but in our projects of life planning, our ways of managing industrial and other organizations, our systems of consumption, many of our genres of literature and aesthetic production – a kind of 'irreal' plan of projection, put together somewhat contingently and haphazardly at the intersection of a range of distinct histories – of forms of thought, techniques of regulation, problems of organization and so forth.
the basis of which these problematizations are formed' (Foucault, 1986a: 11; Jambet, 1992). The focus of such a genealogy, therefore, is not 'the historical construction of the self' but the history of the relations which human beings have established with themselves. These relations are constructed and historical, but they are not to be understood by locating them in some amorphous domain of culture. On the contrary, they are addressed from the perspective of 'government' (Foucault, 1991; d. Burchell et al., 1991). Our relation with ourselves, that is to say, has assumed the form it has because it has been the object of a whole variety of more or less rationalized schemes, which have sought to shape our ways of understanding and enacting our existence as human beings in the name of certain objectives – manliness, femininity, honour, modesty, propriety, civility, discipline, distinction, efficiency, harmony, fulfilment, virtue, and cultural transformations – modernity, late modernity, the risk society from a number of recent analyses that have, explicitly or implicitly, viewed addressed from the perspective of 'government' (Foucault, 1991; d. Burchell et al., 1991). Our relation with ourselves, that is to say, has assumed the form it has because it has been the object of a whole variety of more or less rationalized schemes, which have sought to shape our ways of understanding and enacting our existence as human beings in the name of certain objectives – manliness, femininity, honour, modesty, propriety, civility, discipline, distinction, efficiency, harmony, fulfilment, virtue, pleasure – the list is as diverse and heterogeneous as it is interminable.

One of the reasons for stressing this point is to distinguish my approach from a number of recent analyses that have, explicitly or implicitly, viewed changing forms of subjectivity or identity as consequences of wider social and cultural transformations – modernity, late modernity, the risk society (Bauman, 1991; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Lash and Friedman, 1992). Of course, this work continues a long tradition of narratives, stretching back at least to Jacob Burckhardt, that have written histories of the rise of the individual as a consequence of a general social transformation from tradition to modernity, feudalism to capitalism, Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, mechanical to organic solidarity and so forth (Burckhardt, 1990). These kinds of analysis regard changes in the ways in which human beings understand and act upon themselves as the outcome of 'more fundamental' historical events located elsewhere – in production regimes, in technological change, in alterations in demography or family forms, in 'culture'. No doubt events in each of these areas have significance in relation to the problem of subjectification. But however significant they may be, it is important to insist that such changes do not transform ways of being human by virtue of some 'experience' that they produce. Changing relations of subjectification, I want to argue, cannot be established by derivation or interpretation of other cultural or social forms. To explicitly or implicitly assume that they can is to presume the continuity of human beings as the subjects of history, essentially equipped with the capacity for enduring meaning (Dean, 1994). But the ways in which human beings give meaning to experience have their own history. Devices of 'meaning production' – grids of visualization, vocabularies, norms and systems of judgement – produce experience; they are not themselves produced by experience (Joyce, 1994). These intellectual techniques do not come ready made, they have to be invented, refined and stabilized, they have to be disseminated and implanted in different ways in different practices – schools, families, streets, workplaces, courtrooms. If we use the term 'subjectification' to designate all those heterogeneous processes and practices by means of which human beings come to relate to themselves and others as subjects of a certain type, then subjectification has its own history. And the history of subjectification is more practical, more technical and less unified than sociological accounts allow.

Thus a genealogy of subjectification would focus directly upon the practices within which human beings have been located in particular regimes of the person'. This would not be a continuous history of the self, but rather an account of the diversity of languages of 'personhood' that have taken shape – character, personality, identity, reputation, honour, citizen, individual, normal, lunatic, patient, client, husband, mother, daughter. . . and the norms, techniques and relations of authority within which these have circulated in legal, domestic, industrial and other practices for acting upon the conduct of persons. Such an investigation might proceed along a number of linked pathways:

**Problematisations**

Where, how and by whom are aspects of the human being rendered problematic, according to what systems of judgement and in relation to what concerns? To take some pertinent examples, one might consider the ways in which the language of constitution and character comes to operate within the themes of urban decline and degeneracy articulated by psychiatrists, urban reformers and politicians in the last decades of the nineteenth century, or the ways in which the vocabulary of adjustment and maladjustment comes to be used to problematize conduct in sites as diverse as the workplace, the courtroom and the school in the 1920s and 1930s. To pose the matter in this way is to stress the primacy of the pathological over the normal in the genealogy of subjectification – our vocabularies and techniques of the person, by and large, have not emerged in a field of reflection on the normal individual, the normal character, the normal personality, the normal intelligence, but rather, the very notion of normality has emerged out of a concern with types of conduct, thought, expression deemed troublesome or dangerous (Rose, 1985). This is a methodological as much as an epistemological point – in the genealogy of subjectification, pride of place is not occupied by the philosophers reflecting in their studies on the nature of the person, the will, the conscience, morality and the like, but in the mundane practices where conduct has become problematic to others or the self, and in the mundane texts and programmes – on asylum management, medical treatment of women, advisable regimes of child-rearing, new ideas in workplace management, improving one's self-esteem – seeking to render these problems intelligible and, at the same time, manageable.

**Technologies**

What means have been invented to govern the human being, to shape or fashion conduct in desired directions, and how have programmes sought
to embody these in certain technical forms? The notion of technology may seem antithetical to the domain of human being, such that claims about the inappropriate technologization of humanity form the basis of many critiques. However, our very experience of ourselves as certain sorts of persons - creatures of freedom, of liberty, of personal powers, of self-realization - is the outcome of a range of human technologies, technologies that take modes of being human as their object. Technology, here, refers to any assembly structured by a practical rationality governed by a more or less conscious goal. Human technologies are hybrid assemblages of knowledges, instruments, persons, systems of judgement, buildings and spaces, underpinned at the programmatic level by certain presuppositions about, and objectives for, human beings. One can regard the school, the prison, the asylum as examples of one species of such technologies, those which Foucault termed disciplinary and which operate in terms of a detailed structuring of space, time and relations amongst individuals, through procedures of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgement, through attempts to enfold these judgements into the procedures and judgements which the individual utilizes in order to conduct their own conduct (Foucault, 1977; cf. Markus, 1993 for an examination of the spatial form of such assemblies). A second example of a mobile and multivalent technology is that of pastoral technology, a relation of spiritual guidance between an authority and each member of their flock, embodying techniques such as confession and self-disclosure, exemplarity and discipleship, enfolded into the person through a variety of schemas of self-inspection, self-suspicion, self-disclosure, self-decipherment and self-nurturing. Like discipline, this pastoral technology is capable of articulation in a range of different forms, in the relation of priest and parishioner, therapist and patient, social worker and client and in the relation of the 'educated' subject to itself. We should not see the disciplinary and pastoral relations of subjectification as opposed historically or ethically - the regimes enacted in schools, asylums and prisons embody both. Perhaps the insistence upon an analytic of human technologies is one of the most distinctive features of the approach I am advocating, an analysis which does not start from the view that the technologizing of human conduct is malign, but rather examines the ways in which human beings have been simultaneously capacitated and governed by their organization within a technological field.

Authorities

Who is accorded or claims the capacity to speak truthfully about humans, their nature and their problems, and what characterizes the truths about persons that are accorded such authority? Through which apparatuses are such authorities authorized - universities, the legal apparatus, churches, politics? To what extent does the authority of authority depend upon a claim to a positive knowledge, to wisdom and virtue, to experience and practical judgement, to the capacity to resolve conflicts? How are authorities themselves governed - by legal codes, by the market, by the protocols of bureaucracy, by professional ethics? And what then is the relation between authorities and those who are subject to them - priest/parishioner; doctor/patient, manager/employee, therapist/patient . . . ? This focus upon authorities (rather than 'power'), upon the diverse persons, things, devices, associations, modes of thought, types of judgement that seek, claim, acquire or are accorded authority, and upon the diversity of ways in which authority is authorized again seems to me to be a distinctive feature of this kind of investigation.

Teleologies

What forms of life are the aims, ideals or exemplars for these different practices for working upon persons: the professional persona exercising a vocation with wisdom and dispassion; the manly warrior pursuing a life of honour through a calculated risking of the body; the responsible father living a life of prudence and moderation; the labourer accepting his or her lot with a docility grounded in a belief in the inviolability of authority or a reward in a life to come; the good wife fulfilling her domestic duties with quiet efficiency and self-effacement; the entrepreneurial individual striving after secular improvements in 'quality of life'; the passionate lover skilled in the arts of pleasure . . . ? What codes of knowledge support these ideals, and to what ethical valorization are they tied? Against those who suggest that a single model of the person comes to prominence in any specific culture, it is important to stress the heterogeneity and specificity of the ideals or models of personhood deployed in different practices, and the ways in which they are articulated in relation to specific problems and solutions concerning human conduct. It is only from this perspective, I think, that one can identify the peculiarity of those programmatic attempts to install a single model of the individual as the ethical ideal across a range of different sites and practices. For example, the Puritan sects discussed by Weber were unusual in their attempts to ensure that the mode of individual comportment in terms of sobriety, duty, modesty, self and so forth applied to practices as diverse as the enjoyment of popular entertainment, labour and comportment within the home. In our own times, both economics, in the form of a model of economic rationality, and psychology, in the form of a model of the psychological individual, have provided the basis for similar attempts at the unification of life conduct around a single model of appropriate subjectivity. But unification of subjectification has to be seen as an objective of particular programmes, or a presupposition of particular styles of thinking, not a feature of human cultures.

Strategies

How are these procedures for regulating the capacities of persons linked into wider moral, social or political objectives concerning the undesirable
and desirable features of populations, workforce, family, society, etc.? Of particular significance here are the divisions and relations established between modalities for the government of conduct accorded the status of 'political', and those enacted through forms of authority and apparatus deemed non-political – whether these be the technical knowledge of experts, the judicial knowledge of the courts, the organizational knowledge of managers or the 'natural' knowledge of the family and the mother. Typical of those rationalities of government that consider themselves 'liberal' is the simultaneous delimitation of the sphere of the political by reference to the right of other domains – the market, civil society and the family being the three most commonly deployed – and the invention of a range of techniques that would try to act on events in these domains without breaching their autonomy. It is for this reason that knowing and forms of expertise concerning the internal characteristics of the domains to be governed assume particular importance in liberal strategies and programmes of rule, for these domains are not to be 'dominated' by rule, but must be known, understood and related to in such a way that events within them – productivity and conditions of trade, the activities of civil associations, ways of rearing children and organizing conjugal relations and financial support within household – support, and do not oppose, political objectives. In the case that we are discussing here, the characteristics of persons, as those 'free individuals' upon whom liberalism depends for its political legitimacy and functionality, assume a particular significance. Perhaps one could say that the general strategic field of all those programmes of government that regard themselves as liberal has been defined by the problem of how free individuals can be governed such that they enact their freedom appropriately.

The government of others and the government of oneself

Each of these directions for investigation is inspired, in large measure, by the writings of Michel Foucault. In particular, of course, they arise from Foucault's suggestions concerning a genealogy of the arts of government – where government is conceived of, most generally, as encompassing all those more or less rationalized programmes and strategies for 'the conduct of conduct' – and his conception of governmentality – which refers to the emergence of political rationalities, or mentalities of rule, where rule becomes a matter of the calculated management of the affairs of each and of all in order to achieve certain desirable objectives (Foucault, 1991; see the discussion of the notion of government in Gordon, 1991). Government, here, does not indicate a theory, but rather a certain perspective from which one might make intelligible the diversity of attempts by authorities of different sorts to act upon the actions of others in relation to objectives of national prosperity, harmony, virtue, productivity, social order, discipline, emancipation, self-realization and so forth. And this perspective is significant also because it directs our attention to the ways in which strategies for the conduct of conduct so frequently operate through trying to shape what Foucault also termed 'technologies of the self' – 'self-steering mechanisms', or the ways in which individuals experience, understand, judge and conduct themselves (Foucault, 1986a, 1986b, 1988). Technologies of the self take the form of the elaboration of certain techniques for the conduct of one's relation with oneself, for example requiring one to relate to oneself epistemologically (know yourself), despotically (master yourself) or in other ways (care for yourself). They are embodied in particular technical practices (confession, diary writing, group discussion, the twelve-steps programme of Alcoholics Anonymous). And they are always practised under the actual or imagined authority of some system of truth and of some authoritative individual, whether these be theoretical and priestly, psychological and therapeutic or disciplinary and tutelary.

A number of issues arise from these considerations.

The first concerns the issue of ethics itself. In his later writings, Foucault utilized the notion of 'ethics' as a general designation for his investigations into the genealogy of our present forms of 'concern' for the self (Foucault, 1979, 1986a, 1986b; cf. Minson, 1993). Ethical practices, for Foucault, were distinguished from the domain of morality, in that moral systems are, by and large, systems of injunction and interdiction – thou shalt do this or thou shalt not do that – and are most frequently articulated in relation to some relatively formalized code. Ethics, on the other hand, refers to the domain of practical advice as to how one should concern oneself with oneself, make oneself the subject of solicitude and attention, conduct oneself in the world of one's everyday existence. Different cultural periods, Foucault argued, differed in the respective weight that their practices for the regulation of conduct placed upon codified moral injunctions and the practical repertoires of ethical advice. However, one might undertake a genealogy of our contemporary ethical regime which, Foucault suggested, encouraged human beings to relate to themselves as the subject of a 'sexuality', and were enjoined to 'know themselves' through a hermeneutics of the self, to explore, discover, reveal and live in the light of the desires that comprised one's truth. Such a genealogy would disturb the appearance of enlightenment which clothed such a regime, by exploring the way in which in certain forms of spiritual practice which could be found in Greek, Roman and early Christian ethics had become incorporated into priestly power, and later into the practices of the educational, medical and psychological type (Foucault, 1986a: 11).

Clearly the approach I have outlined above has derived much from Foucault's arguments on these issues. However, I would wish to develop this argument in a number of respects. First, as has been pointed out
elsewhere, the notion of 'techniques of the self' can be somewhat misleading. The self does not form the transhistorical object of techniques for being human but only one way in which humans have been enjoined to understand and relate to themselves (Hadot, 1992). In different practices, these relations are cast in terms of individuality, character, constitution, reputation, personality and the like which are neither merely different versions of a self, nor do they sum into a self. Further, the extent to which our contemporary relation to ourselves - inwardness, self-exploration, self-fulfilment and the like - does indeed take the issue of sexuality and desire as its fulcrum must remain an open question for historical investigation. Elsewhere I have suggested that the self, itself, has become the object of valorization, a regime of objectification in which desire has become freed from its dependence upon the law of an inner sexuality and been transformed into a variety of passions to discover and realize the identity of the self itself (Rose, 1989).

Further, I would suggest, one needs to extend an analysis of the relations between government and subjectification beyond the field of ethics, if by that one means all those styles of relating to oneself that are structured by the divisions of truth and falsity, the permitted and the forbidden. One needs to examine, also, the government of this relation along some other axes.

One of these axes concerns the attempt to incultate a certain relation to oneself through transformations in 'mentality' or what one might term 'intellectual techniques' - reading, memory, writing, numeracy and so forth (see, for some powerful examples, Eisenstein, 1979 and Goody and Watt, 1963). For example, especially over the course of the nineteenth century in Europe and the United States, one sees the development of a host of projects for the transformation of the intellect in the service of particular objectives, each of which seeks to enjoin a particular relation to the self through the implantation of certain capacities of reading, writing and calculating. One example here would be the way in which, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, Republican educators in the United States promoted numeracy, in particular the numerical capacities that they argued would be facilitated by decimalization, in order to generate a particular kind of relation to themselves and their world in those so equipped. A numerate self would be a calculating self, who would establish a prudent relation to the future, to budgeting, to trade, to politics and to life conduct in general (Cline-Cohen, 1982: 148-9).

A second axis would concern corporealties or body techniques. Of course, anthropologists and others have remarked upon the cultural shaping of bodies - comportment, expression of emotion and the like as they differ from culture to culture, and within cultures between genders, ages, status groups and the like. Marcel Mauss provides the classic account of the ways in which the body, as a technical instrument, is organized differently in different cultures - different ways of walking, sitting, digging, marching and so forth (Mauss, 1979; cf. Bourdieu, 1977).

However, a genealogy of subjectification is not concerned with the general problem of the cultural relativity of bodily capacities, but with the ways in which different corporeal regimes have been devised and implanted in rationalized attempts to enjoin a particular relation to the self and to others. Norbert Elias has given many powerful examples of the ways in which explicit codes of bodily conduct - manners, etiquette and the self-monitoring of bodily functions and actions - were enjoined upon individuals in different positions within the apparatus of the court (Elias, 1983; cf. Elias, 1978; Osborne, 1996). Foucault's own studies of the asylum and the prison explore programmes in which the disciplining of the body of the pathological individual not only involved the catching up of that body within an external regime of hierarchical surveillance and normalizing judgement, and the imbrication of the body in a molecular regime governing movement in time and space, but also sought to enjoin an internal relation between the pathological individual and his or her body, in which bodily comportment would both manifest and maintain a certain disciplined mastery exercised by the person over themselves (Foucault, 1967, 1977; see also Smith, 1992 for a history of the notion of 'inhibition' and its relation to the manifestation of steadfastness and self-mastery through the exercise of control over the body). An analogous, though substantively very different, relation to the body was a key element in the self-sculpting of a certain aesthetic persona in nineteenth century Europe, embodied in certain styles of dress but also in the cultivation of certain body techniques such as swimming that would produce and display a particular relation to the natural (Sprawson, 1992). Historians of gender have begun to analyse the ways in which the appropriate performance of sexual identity has historically been linked to the inculcation of certain regimes of the body (Butler, 1990). Certain ways of holding oneself, walking, running, holding the head and positioning the limbs, are not merely culturally relative or acquired through gender socialization, but are regimes of the body which seek to subjectify in terms of a certain truth of gender, inscribing a particular relation to oneself in a corporeal regime: prescribed, rationalized and taught in manuals of advice, etiquette and manners, and enjoined by sanctions as well as seductions.

These comments should indicate something of the heterogeneity of the links between the government of others and the government of the self. It is important to stress two further aspects of this heterogeneity. The first concerns the diversity of modes in which a certain relation to oneself is enjoined. There is a temptation to stress the elements of self-mastery and restrictions over one's desires and instincts that are entailed in many regimes of subjectification - the injunction to control or civilize an inner nature that is excessive. Certainly one can see this theme in many nineteenth-century debates on ethics and character for both the ruling order and in the respectable labouring classes - a paradoxical 'despotism of the self' at the heart of liberal doctrines of liberty of the subject (I derive this formulation from Valverde, 1996). But there are many other modes in
which this relation to oneself can be established and, even within the
exercise of mastery, a variety of configurations through which one can be
encouraged to master oneself. To master one's will in the service of
character by the inculcation of habits and rituals of self-denial, prudence
and foresight, for example, is different from mastering one's desire by
bringing its roots to awareness through a reflexive hermeneutics in order to
free oneself from the self-destructive consequences of repression,
projection and identification.

Further, the very form of the relation can vary. It can be one of knowl-
edge, as in the injunction to know oneself, which Foucault traces back to
the Christian confession and forward to the techniques of psychothera-
peutics; here the codes of knowledge are inevitably supplied not by pure
introspection but by rendering one's introspection in a particular vocabu-
lar of feelings, beliefs, passions, desires, values or whatever and accord-
ing to a particular explanatory code derived from some source of
authority. Or it can be one of concern and solicitude, as in contemporary
projects for the care of the self in which the self is to be nurtured,
protected, safeguarded by regimes of diet, stress minimization and self-
esteele. Equally, the relation to authority can vary. Consider, for example,
some of the changing authority configurations in the government
of madness and mental health: the relation of mastery that was exercised
between asylum doctor and mad person in late eighteenth century moral
medicine; the relation of discipline and institutional authority that ob-
tained between the nineteenth century asylum doctor and the inmate; the
relation of pedagogy that obtained between the mental hygienists of the
first half of the twentieth century and the children and parents, pupils
and teachers, workers and managers, generals and soldiers upon whom
they sought to act; the relation of seduction, conversion and exemplarity
that obtains between the psychotherapist and the client today.

As will be evident from the above discussion, whilst the relations to
oneself enjoined at any one historical moment may resemble one another
in various ways - for example the Victorian notion of character was
widely dispersed across many different practices - the extent to which
this is the case is a matter for empirical investigation. It is not a matter,
therefore, of narrating a general history of the idea of the person or self,
but of tracing the technical forms accorded to the relation to oneself in
various practices - legal, military, industrial, familial, economic. And
even within any practice, heterogeneity must be assumed to be more
common than homogeneity - consider, for example, the very different
configurations of personhood in the legal apparatus at any one moment -
the difference between the notion of status and reputation as it
functioned in civil proceedings in the nineteenth century and the
simultaneous elaboration of a new relation to the law-breaker as a
pathological personality in the criminal courts and the prison system

If our own present is marked by a certain levelling of these differences,
such that presuppositions concerning human beings in diverse practices
share a certain family resemblance - humans as subjects of autonomy,
equipped with a psychology aspiring to self-fulfilment and actually or
potentially running their lives as a kind of enterprise of themselves - then
this is precisely the point of departure for a genealogical investigation. In
what ways was this regime of the self put together, under what conditions
and in relation to what demands and forms of authority? We have certainly
seen a proliferation of expertise of human conduct over the last hundred
years: economists, managers, accountants, lawyers, counsellors, ther-
pists, medics, anthropologists, political scientists, social policy experts
and the like. But I would argue that the 'unification' of regimes of
subjectification has much to do with the rise of one particular form of
positive expertise of human being - that of the psy disciplines - and their
'generosity'. By their 'generosity' I mean that, contrary to conventional
views of the exclusivity of professional knowledge, psy has been happy,
indeed eager, 'to give itself away' - to lend its vocabularies, explanations
and types of judgement to other professional groups and to implant them
within its clients (Rose, 1992b). The psy disciplines, partly as a conse-
uence of their heterogeneity and lack of a single paradigm, have
acquired a peculiar penetrative capacity in relation to practices for the
conduct of conduct. They have been able to supply a whole variety of
models of selfhood and recipes for action in relation to the government
of persons by professionals in different locales. Their potency has been
increased by their ability to supplement these practicable qualities with a
legitimacy deriving from their claims to tell the truth about human beings.
They have disseminated themselves further through their ready
translatability into programmes for reshaping the self-steering mechan-
isms of individuals. It is, of course, true that the psy disciplines are not held
publicly in particularly high esteem, and their practitioners are often
figures of fun. But one should not be misled by this - it has become
impossible to conceive of personhood, to experience one's own or
another's personhood, or to govern oneself or others without 'psy'.

Let me return to the issue of the diversity of regimes of subjectification.
A further dimension of heterogeneity arises from the fact that ways of
governing others are linked not only to the subjectification of the
governed, but also to the subjectification of those who would govern
conduct. Thus Foucault argues that the problematization of sex between
men for the Greeks was linked to the demand that one who would
exercise authority over others should first be able to exercise dominion
over his own passions and appetites - for only if one was not a slave to
oneself was one competent to exercise authority over others (Foucault,
required of a young man of the privileged classes in the Roman Empire of
the second century, who was advised to remove from himself all aspects of
'softness' and 'womanishness' - in his gait, in his rhythms of speech, in
his self-control - in order to manifest himself as capable of exercising
authority over others (Brown, 1989: 11). Gerhard Oestreich suggests that the revival of Stoic ethics in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe was a response to the criticism of authority as ossified and corrupt: the virtues of love, trust, reputation, gentleness, spiritual powers, respect for justice and the like were to become the means for authorities to renew themselves (Oestreich, 1982: 87). Stephan Collini has described the novel ways in which the Victorian intellectual classes problematized themselves in terms of such qualities as steadfastness and altruism: they interrogated themselves in terms of a constant anxiety about and infirmity of the will, and found, in certain forms of social and philanthropic work, an antidote to self-doubt (Collini, 1991, discussed in Osborne, 1996). Whilst these same Victorian intellectuals were problematizing all sorts of aspects of social life in terms of moral character, threats to character, weakness of character and the need to promote good character, and arguing that the virtues of character - self-reliance, sobriety, independence, self-restraint, respectability, self-improvement - should be inculcated in others through positive actions of the state and the statesman, they were making themselves the subject of a related, but rather different, ethical work (Collini, 1979: 29ff.). Similarly, throughout the nineteenth century, one sees the emergence of quite novel programmes for the reform of secular authority within the civil service, the apparatus of colonial rule and the organizations of industry and politics, in which the persona of the civil servant, the bureaucrat, the colonial governor will become the target of a whole new ethical regime of disinterest, justice, respect for rules, distinction between the performance of one's office and one's private passions and much more (Weber, 1978: cf. Hunter, 1993a, b, c; Minson, 1993; du Gay, 1994; Osborne, 1994).

And, of course, many of those who were subject to the government of these authorities - indigenous officials in the colonies, housewives of the respectable classes, parents, schoolteachers, working men, governors - were themselves called upon to play their part in the making up of others and to inculcate in them a certain relation to themselves.

From this perspective, it is no longer surprising that human beings often find themselves resisting the forms of personhood that they are enjoined to adopt. 'Resistance' - if by that one means opposition to a particular regime for the conduct of one's conduct - requires no theory of agency. It needs no account of the inherent forces within each human being that love liberty, seek to enhance their own powers or capacities, or strive for emancipation, that are prior to and in conflict with the demands of civilization and discipline. One no more needs a theory of agency to account for resistance than one needs an epistemology to account for the production of truth effects. Human beings are not the unified subjects of some coherent regime of domination that produces persons in the form in which it dreams. On the contrary, they live their lives in a constant movement across different practices that address them in different ways.

Within these different practices, persons are addressed as different sorts of human being, presupposed to be different sorts of human being, acted upon as if they were different sorts of human being. Techniques of relating to oneself as a subject of unique capacities worthy of respect run up against practices or relating to oneself as the target of discipline, duty and docility. The humanist demand that one decipher oneself in terms of the authenticity of one's actions runs up against the political or institutional demand that one abides by the collective responsibility of organizational decision-making even when one is personally opposed to it. The ethical demand to suffer one's sorrows in silence and find a way of 'going on' is deemed problematic from the perspective of a passion ethic that obliges the person to disclose themselves in terms of a particular vocabulary of emotions and feelings.

Thus the existence of contestation, conflict and opposition in practices which conduct the conduct of persons is no surprise and requires no appeal to the particular qualities of human agency - except in the minimal sense that human being, like all else, exceeds all attempts to think it, simply because, whilst it is necessarily thought it does not exist in the form of thought. Thus, in any one site or locale, humans turn programmes intended for one end to the service of others. One way of relating to oneself comes into conflict with others. For example, psychologists, management reformers, unions and workers have turned the vocabulary of humanistic psychology to account in a criticism of practices of management based upon a psycho-physiological or disciplinary understanding of persons. Reformers of the practices of welfare and medicine have, over the last two decades, turned the notion that human beings are subjects of rights against practices that presuppose human beings as the subjects of care. Out of this complex and contested field of oppositions, alliances and disparities of regimes of subjectification come accusations of inhumanity, criticisms, demands for reform, alternative programmes and the invention of new regimes of subjectification.

To designate some dimensions of these conflicts 'resistance' is itself perspectival: it can only ever be a matter of judgement. It is fruitless to complain, here, that such a perspective gives one no place to stand in the making of ethical critique and in the evaluation of ethical positions - the history of all those attempts to ground ethics that do appeal to some transcendental guarantor is plain enough - they cannot close conflicts over regimes of the person, but simply occupy one more position within the field of contestation (MacIntyre, 1981).

**Folds in the soul**

But the question may be asked: are not the kinds of phenomena that I have been discussing of interest precisely because they produce us as human beings with a certain kind of subjectivity? This is certainly the path followed by many who have investigated these issues, from Norbert Elias...
to contemporary feminist theorists who rely upon psychoanalysis to ground an account of the ways in which certain practices of the self become inscribed within the body and soul of the gendered subject (e.g. Butler, 1993; Probyn, 1993). For some, this path is advocated unproblematically. Elias, for example, did not doubt that human beings were the type of creatures inhabited by a psychoanalytic psychodynamics, and that this would provide the material basis for the inscription of civility into the soul of the social subject (Elias, 1978). I have already suggested that such a view is paradoxical, for it requires us to adopt a particular way of understanding the human being – that carved out at the end of the nineteenth century – as the basis for an investigation of the historicity of being human. For many others, this pathway is required if one is to avoid representing the human being as merely the passive and interminably malleable object of historical processes, if one is to have an account of agency and of resistance, and if one is to be able to find a place to stand in order to evaluate one regime of personhood over and above another (for one example of this argument, see Fraser, 1989). I have suggested that no such theory is required to account for conflict and contestation, and the stable ethical ground apparently provided by any given theory of the nature of human beings is illusory – one has no choice but to enter into a debate which cannot be closed by appeal to the nature of the human being as a subject of rights, of freedom, of autonomy or whatever. Is it possible, then, that one might write a genealogy of subjectification without a meta-psychology? I think it is.

Such a genealogy, I suggest, requires only a minimal, weak or thin conception of the human material on which history writes (Patton, 1994). We are not concerned here with the social or historical construction of ‘the person’ or with the narration of the birth of modern ‘self-identity’. Our concern is with the diversity of strategies and tactics of subjectification that have taken place and been deployed in diverse practices at different moments and in relation to different classifications and differentiations of persons. The human being, here, is not an entity with a history, but the target of a multiplicity of types of work, more like a latitude or a longitude at which different vectors of different speeds intersect. The ‘interiority’ which so many feel compelled to diagnose is not that of a psychological system, but of a discontinuous surface, a kind of infolding of exteriority.

I draw this notion of folding loosely from the work of Gilles Deleuze (1988, 1990, 1992; cf. Probyn, 1993: 128ff.). The concept of the fold or the pleat suggests a way in which we might think of human being without postulating any essential interiority, and thus without binding ourselves to a particular version of the law of this interiority whose history we are seeking to disturb and diagnose. The fold indicates a relation without an essential interior, one in which what is ‘inside’ is merely an infolding of an exterior. We are familiar with the idea that aspects of the body which we commonly think of as part of its interiority – the digestive tract, the lungs – are no more than the invagination of an outside. This does not prevent them from being valorized in terms of an apparently immutable body image taken as the norm for our perception of the contours and limits of our corporeality. Perhaps, then, we might think of the grasp that modes of subjectification have upon human beings in terms of such an infolding. Folds incorporate without totalizing, internalize without unifying, collect together discontinuously in the form of pleats making surfaces, spaces, flows and relations.

Within a genealogy of subjectification, that which would be infolded would be anything that can acquire authority: injunctions, advice, techniques, little habits of thought and emotion, an array of routines and norms of being human – the instruments through which being constitutes itself in different practices and relations. These infoldings are partially stabilized to the extent that human beings have come to imagine themselves as the subjects of a biography, to utilize certain ‘arts of memory’ in order to render this biography stable, to employ certain vocabularies and explanations to make this intelligible to themselves. However, this exposes the limits of the metaphor of the fold. For the lines of these folds do not run through a domain coterminal with the fleshly bounds of the human individual. Human being is emplaced, enacted through a regime of devices, gazes, techniques which extend beyond the limits of the flesh into spaces and assemblies. Memory of one’s biography is not a simple psychological capacity, but is organized through rituals of storytelling, supported by artefacts such as photograph albums and so forth. The regimes of bureaucracy are not merely ethical procedures infolded into the soul, but occupy a matrix of offices, files, typewriters, habits of time-keeping, conversational repertoires, techniques of notation. The regimes of passion are not merely affective folds in the soul, but are enacted in certain secluded or valorized spaces, through sensualized equipment of beds, drapes and silks, routines of dressing and undressing, aestheticized devices for providing music and light, regimes of partitioning of time and so forth (Ranum, 1989).

We might thus counterpose a spatialization of being to the narrativization of being undertaken by sociologists and philosophers of modernity and postmodernity. That is to say, we need to render being intelligible in terms of the localization of routines, habits and techniques within specific domains of action and value: libraries and studies; bedrooms and bathhouses; courtrooms and schoolrooms, consulting rooms and museum galleries; markets and department stores. The five volumes of The History of Private Life compiled under the general editorship of Philippe Aries and George Duby provide a wealth of examples of the way in which novel human capacities such as styles of writing or sexuality depend upon and give rise to particular forms of spatial organization of the human habitat (Veyne, 1987; Duby, 1988; Chartier, 1989; Perrot, 1990; Prost and Vincent 1991). However, there is nothing privileged about what has come to be termed ‘private life’ for the emplacement of regimes of subjectification – it is in the factory as much as the kitchen, in the military...
as much as the study, in the office as much as the bedroom, that the modern subject has been required to identify his or her subjectivity. To the apparent linearity, unidirectionality and irreversibility of time, we can counterpose the multiplicity of places, planes and practices. And in each of these spaces, repertoires of conduct are activated that are not bounded by the enclosure formed by the human skin on its back in a stable form in the interior of an individual: they are rather webs of tension across a space that accord human beings capacities and powers to the extent that they catch them up in hybrid assemblages of knowledge, instruments, vocabularies, systems of judgement and technical artefacts.

To this extent a genealogy of subjectification needs to think human beings as a kind of machination, a hybrid of flesh, knowledge, passion and technique (Haraway, 1991). One of the characteristics of our current regime of the self is a way of reflecting upon and acting upon all these diverse domains, practices and assemblages in terms of a unified ‘personality’ to be revealed, discovered or worked on in each: a machination of the self that today forms the horizon of the thinkable. But this machination needs to be recognized as a specific regime of subjectification of recent origin — and the aim of a genealogy of subjectification is to unsettle it sufficiently to reveal the fragility of the lines that have made it up and hold it in place.

**Subjectification today: a new configuration?**

Those who stress the ‘postmodern’ features of our present suggest that subjectivity, today, has characteristic and novel features such as uncertainty, reflexivity, self-scrutiny, fragmentation and diversity. From the perspective I have outlined in this chapter, the questions about ourselves and our present should be posed rather differently. Are we witnessing a transformation in the ontology through which we think ourselves, a mutation in the techniques through which we conduct ourselves, a reconfiguration of the relations of authority by means of which we divide ourselves and identify ourselves as certain kinds of person, exercise certain kinds of concern in relation to ourselves, are governed and govern ourselves as human beings of a particular sort? Does the diversity of authorities of the self in our present, the pluralization of moral codes, the apparent attenuation of the links between political government and the regulation of conduct, the heterogeneity of forms of life, the valorization of choices and freedom in the shaping of a style of life, the simultaneous celebration of individuality and proliferation of techniques of group identification and segmentation — does all this signify that new modes of subjectification have appeared today?

My aim in this chapter has been to suggest that investigations of such questions should concern themselves with the intersection of practices for the government of others and practices for the government of the self. This is not the place to undertake a detailed exploration of them; however, let me make a few points in conclusion.

Autonomy, freedom, choice, authenticity, enterprise, lifestyle — this new ethical vocabulary should neither be derided with an aristocratic disdain, nor interpreted as the sign of cultural malaise or the death of God, but be understood in terms of new rationalities of government and new technologies of the conduct of conduct (Rose, 1992b; cf. Rieff, 1966, 1987). In a whole variety of different locales — not just in sexuality, diet or the promotion of goods and services for consumption, but also in labour and in the construction of political subjects — the person is presumed to be an active agent, wishing to exercise informed, autonomous and secular responsibility in relation to his or her own destiny. The language of autonomy, identity, self-realization and the search for fulfillment forms a grid of regulatory ideals, not making up an amorphous cultural space, but traversing the doctor’s consulting room, the factory floor and the personnel manager’s office, and organizing such diverse programmes as those for the training of unemployed youth and those for the electoral competition of political parties.

A critical analysis of these new ethical vocabularies and their governmental inscription might examine the ways in which they establish new ‘dividing practices’ within and between subjects. Thus the language of responsible self-advancement is linked to a new perception of those outside civility — the excluded or marginalized who through willfulness, incapacity or ignorance cannot or will not exercise such responsibility. On the one hand, pathologies are re-individualized, removed from a ‘social’ determination into a moral order, thus providing the basis for new and harsher strategies of surveillance and control of those who, after all, bear the responsibility for their fate within their own hands — exemplary is the way in which, in the UK, the unemployed person has become a ‘job seeker’ and the homeless person a ‘rough sleeper’. On the other hand, these new sectors of the population are opened up to new forms of intervention by experts, which would re-educate or ‘empower’ them, equipping them with the techniques of life planning and personal conduct to cope as autonomous subjects, deploying psychological techniques from social skills training to group relations.

Further, it is important to draw attention to the emergence of new modalities for folding authority into the soul associated in particular with the psyche of expertise. The diverse techniques of the psycho-sciences — those of assessment, classification and discipline, those which produce a knowledge of social dispositions, those which deal with motivations, attitudes and desires — generate a multiplicity of techniques of reformative intervention upon persons and groups. As I have already argued, the psychic disciplines provide an array of techniques for the practical government of conduct in local sites, providing professionals of human conduct with a way of exercising their authority in keeping with, and not in opposition to, the valorization of autonomous subjectivity. In suggesting
ways in which those who have authority can exercise it in relation to a knowledge of the inner nature of those subject to authority, psy accords authority a novel ethical justification as a kind of therapeutic activity.

Further, a whole new array of authorities of subjectivity have taken shape, in the form of broadcast images of dilemmas for the self, self-conduct and self-formation no longer in the realm of romance or adventure but in quotidian narratives of 'everyday life'. This public habitat of images and stories presupposes certain repertoires of personhood as the a priori of the forms of life they display. It is amplified by a relation with the technologies of marketing and the shaping of consumption. These consumption technologies, themselves informed by the theories and techniques of the psy sciences, propagate images of conduct, in terms of new relations between the purchase of goods and services and the shaping of the self. New modes, techniques and images of self-formation and self-problematization are disseminated, spatialized in new ways according to market segments and lifestyle choices, and operating according to the objectives of profit or pleasure, rather than national well-being. They presuppose a certain kind of freedom in those whose subjectivity they engage, freedom here as the desire by each individual to conduct his or her existence as a project for the maximization of quality of life. And, in a kind of reverse move, the technologies of subjectification through advertising and marketing become the basis of a whole new regime for the government of conduct in relation to health, education and security: these too will be enjoined, by both public bodies such as health promotion agencies, and private organizations such as those selling health insurance, not as a matter of morality or public duty, but in the service of the prudent running of the enterprise of one's life and the maximization of its quality.

Finally, one can point to the consonance of the changes that I have noted with the revised problematizations of political rule that can be termed 'advanced liberal'. Advanced liberal programmes of rule seek to dismantle the apparatus of welfare and install novel governmental technologies: extending the rationalities of contracts, consumers and competition to domains where social logics previously reigned; breaking up bureaucracies and governing professionals 'at a distance' through budgets, audits, codes, market demands; making individuals themselves 'interested' in their own government (Rose, 1994). Advanced liberal programmes of rule presuppose the activity of subjects, and seek to act upon that activity to establish a consonance between the self-promoting endeavours of those who are to be the subjects of rule, and the objectives of those who are to exercise rule. Such transformations have been much criticized, especially from the Left. However, perhaps the ascendency of these new technologies of rule, and the ways in which they have been taken up in so many different national political contexts by political forces of many different complexions, indicates that they have a versatility and a potency not recognized by their critics. This potency lies, in part at least, in their relentless inventiveness, their ability to find formulas for rule that will allow subjects to come to recognize themselves in the practices that govern them. If we are to gain a critical purchase upon these contemporary strategies for the conduct of conduct, it will be, in part, through historical investigations which can unsettle and de-value the regime of subjectification to which they are inextricably linked.

Notes

1 Versions of this chapter have been given at the following places: Department of Sociology, Open University; School of African and Asian Studies, University of London; Conference on "De-Traditionalization", University of Lancaster; Department of Political Science, Australian National University. It has greatly benefited from all the comments I have received. A rather different version of some of this argument is published in S. Lash, P. Heelas and P. Morris (eds), De-Traditionalization: Critical Reflections on Authority and Identity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1996. This version was written while I was a Visiting Fellow in the Political Science Programme of the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, Canberra, and I would like to thank this institution and all its staff for their generous hospitality and intellectual support.

2 To avoid any confusion, I can point out that subjectification is not used here to imply domination by others, or subordination to an alien system of powers: it functions here not as term of 'critique' but as a device for critical thought - simply to designate processes of being 'made up' as a subject of a certain type. As will be evident, my argument throughout this chapter is dependent upon Michel Foucault's analyses of subjectification.

3 It is important to understand this in the reflexive, rather than the substantive mode. In what follows, the phrase always designates this relation, and implies no substantive 'self' as the object of that relation.

4 Of course, this is to overstate the case. One needs to look, on the one hand, at the ways in which philosophical reflections have themselves been organized around problems of pathology - think of the functioning of the image of the statue deprived of all sensory inputs in sensationalist philosophers such as Condillac - and also of the ways in which philosophy is animated by and articulated with, problems of the government of conduct (on Condillac, see Rose, 1985; on Locke see Tully, 1993; on Kant see Hunter, 1994).

5 Similar arguments about the necessity for analysing 'the self' as technological have been made in a number of quarters recently. See especially the discussion in Elspeth Probyn's recent book (Probyn, 1993). Precisely what is meant by 'technological' in this context is, however, less clear. As I suggest later, an analysis of the technological forms of subjectification needs to develop in terms of the relation between technologies for the government of conduct and the intellectual, corporeal and ethical devices that structure being's relation to itself at different moments and sites. I develop this argument further in Rose (1996).

6 This is not, of course, to suggest that knowledge and expertise do not play a crucial role in non-liberal regimes for the government of conduct - one only has to think of the role of doctors and administrators in the organization of the mass extermination programmes in Nazi Germany, or of the role of party workers in the pastoral relations of East European states prior to their 'democratization', or the role of planning expertise in centralized planning regimes such as GOSPLAN in the USSR. However, the relations between forms of knowledge and practice designated political and those claiming a non-political grasp of their objects were different in each case.

7 This is not the place to argue this point, so let me just assert that only rationalists, or believers in God, imagine that 'reality' exists in the discursive forms available to thought. This is not a question to be addressed by reviving the old debates on the distinction between


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knowledge of the 'natural' and 'social' worlds - it is merely to accept that this must be the case unless one believes in some transcendental power that has so shaped human thought that it is homologous with that which it thinks of. Nor is it to rehearse the old problem of epistemology, which poses an ineffable divide between thought and its object and then perplexes itself as to how one can 'represent' the other. Rather, perhaps one might say that thought makes up the real, but not as a 'realization' of thought.

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