Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Can the Subaltern Speak?

The original title of this paper was "Power, Desire, Interest." Indeed, whatever power these meditations command may have been earned by a politically interested refusal to push to the limit the founding presuppositions of my desires, as far as they are within my grasp. This vulgar three-stroke formula, applied both to the most resolutely committed and to the most ironic discourse, keeps track of what Althusser so aptly named "philosophies of denegation." I have invoked my positionality in this awkward way so as to accentuate the fact that calling the place of the investigator into question remains a meaningless piety in many recent critiques of the sovereign subject. Thus, although I will attempt to foreground the precariousness of my position throughout, I know such gestures can never suffice.

This paper will move, by a necessarily circuitous route, from a critique of current Western efforts to problematize the subject to the question of how the third-world subject is represented within Western discourse. Along the way, I will have occasion to suggest that a still more radical decentering of the subject is, in fact, implicit in both Marx and Derrida. And I will have recourse, perhaps surprisingly, to an argument that Western intellectual production is, in many ways, complicit with Western international economic interests. In the end, I will offer an alternative analysis of the relations between the discourses of the West and the possibility of speaking of (or for) the subaltern woman. I will draw my specific examples from the case of India, discussing at length the extraordinarily paradoxical status of the British abolition of widow sacrifice.

Some of the most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized "subject-effects" gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has "no geo-political determina-
tions.” The much-publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. I will argue for this conclusion by considering a text by two great practitioners of the critique: “Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze.”

I have chosen this friendly exchange between two activist philosophers of history because it undoes the opposition between authoritative theoretical production and the unguarded practice of conversation, enabling one to glimpse the track of ideology. The participants in this conversation emphasize the most important contributions of French poststructuralist theory: first, that the networks of power/desire/interest are so heterogeneous that their reduction to a coherent narrative is counterproductive—a persistent critique is needed; and second, that intellectuals must attempt to disclose and know the discourse of society’s Other. Yet the two systematically ignore the question of ideology and their own implication in intellectual and economic history.

Although one of its chief presuppositions is the critique of the sovereign subject, the conversation between Foucault and Deleuze is framed by two monolithic and anonymous subjects-in-revolution: “A Maoist” (FD, 205) and “the workers’ struggle” (FD, 217). Intellectuals, however, are named and differentiated; moreover, a Chinese Maoism is nowhere operative. Maoism here simply creates an aura of narrative specificity, which would be a harmless rhetorical banality were it not that the innocent appropriation of the proper name “Maoism” for the eccentronic phenomenon of French intellectual “Maoism” and subsequent “New Philosophy” symptomatically renders “Asia” transparent.

Deleuze’s reference to the workers’ struggle is equally problematic; it is obviously a genuflection: “We are unable to touch [power] is any point of its application without finding ourselves confronted by this diffuse mass, so that we are necessarily led . . . to the desire to blow it up completely. Every partial revolutionary attack or defense is linked in this way to the workers’ struggle” (FD, 217). The apparent banality signals a disavowal. The statement ignores the international division of labor, a gesture that often marks poststructuralist political theory. The invocation of the workers’ struggle is baleful in its very innocence; it is incapable of dealing with global capitalism; the subject-production of worker and unemployed within nation-state ideologies in its Center; the increasing subtraction of the working class in the Periphery from the realization of surplus value and thus from “humanist” training in consumerism; and the large-scale presence of paracapitalist labor as well as the heterogeneous structural status of agriculture in the Periphery. Ignoring the international division of labor, rendering “Asia” (and on occasion “Africa”) transparent (unless the subject is ostensibly the “Third World”); reestablishing the legal subject of socialized capital—these are problems as common to much poststructuralist as to structuralist theory. Why should such occlusions be sanctioned in precisely those intellectuals who are our best prophets of heterogeneity and the Other?

The link to the workers’ struggle is located, simply, in desire. Elsewhere, Deleuze and Guattari have attempted an alternative definition of desire, revising the one offered by psychoanalysis: “Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is lacking in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject except by repression. Desire and its object are a unity: it is the machine, as a machine of a machine. Desire is machine, the object of desire also a connected machine, so that the product is lifted from the process of producing, and something detaches itself from producing to product and gives a leftover to the vagabond, nomad subject.”

This definition does not alter the specificity of the desiring subject (or leftover subject-effect) that attaches to specific instances of desire or to production of the desiring machine. Moreover, when the connection between desire and the subject is taken as irrelevant or merely reversed, the subject-effect that surreptitiously emerges is much like the generalized ideological subject of the theorist. This may be the legal subject of socialized capital, neither labor nor management, holding a “strong” passport, using a “strong” or “hard” currency, with supposedly unquestioned access to due process. It is certainly not the desiring subject as Other.

The failure of Deleuze and Guattari to consider the relations between desire, power, and subjectivity renders them incapable of articulating a theory of interests. In this context, their indifference to ideology (a theory of which is necessary for an understanding of interests) is striking but consistent. Foucault’s commitment to “genealogical” speculation prevents him from locating, in “great names” like Marx and Freud, watersheds in some continuous stream of intellectual history. This commitment has treated an unfortunate resistance in Foucault’s work to “mere” ideological critique. Western speculations on the ideological reproduction of social relations belong to that mainstream, and it is within this tradition that Althusser writes: “The reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of
exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class ‘in and by words’ [par la parole].”

When Foucault considers the pervasive heterogeneity of power, he does not ignore the immense institutional heterogeneity that Althusser attempts to schematize. Similarly, in speaking of alliances and systems of signs, the state and war-machines (mille plateaux), Deleuze and Guattari are opening up that very field. Foucault cannot, however, admit that he developed theory of ideology recognizes its own material production and institutionality, as well as in the “effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge” (PK, 102). Because these philosophers seem obliged to reject all arguments naming the concept of ideology as only schematic rather than textual, they are equally obliged to produce a mechanically schematic opposition between interest and desire. Thus they align themselves with bourgeois sociologists who fill the place of ideology with a continuistic “unconscious” or a parasubjective “culture.” The mechanistic relation between desire and interest is clear in such sentences as: “We never desire against our interests, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it” (FD, 215). An undifferentiated desire is the agent and power slips in to create the effects of desire: “power... produces positive effects at the level of desire—and also at the level of knowledge” (PK, 59).

This parasubjective matrix, cross-hatched with heterogeneity in the unnamed Subject, at least for those intellectual workers influenced by the new hegemony of desire. The race for “the last instance” now between economics and power. Because desire is tacitly defined on an orthodox model, it is unitarily opposed to “being deceived.” Ideology as “false consciousness” (being deceived) has been called into question by Althusser. Even Reich implied notions of collective will rather than a dichotomy of deception and undeceived desire: “We must accept the scream of Reich: no, the masses were deceived; at a particular moment, they actually desired a fascist regime” (FD, 215).

These philosophers will not entertain the thought of constitutive contradiction—that is where they admitted party company from the Left. In the name of desire, they reintroduce the undivided subject into the discourse of power. Foucault often seems to conflate “individual” and “subject”; and the impact on his own metaphors is perhaps intensified in his followers. Because of the power of the word “power,” Foucault admits to using the “metaphor of the point which progressively irradiates its surroundings.” Such slips become the rule rather than the exception in less careful hands. And that radiating point, animating an effectively heliocentric discourse, fills the empty place of the agent with the historical sun of theory, the Subject of Europe.

Foucault articulates another corollary of the disavowal of the role of ideology in reproducing the social relations of production: an unquestioned valorization of the oppressed as subject, the “object being,” as Deleuze admiringly remarks, “to establish conditions where the prisoners themselves would be able to speak.” Foucault adds that the masses “know perfectly well, clearly”—once again the thematics of being deceived—“they know far better than [the intellectual] and they certainly say it very well” (FD, 206, 207).

What happens to the critique of the sovereign subject in these pronouncements? The limits of this representationalist realism are reached

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with Deleuze: “Reality is what actually happens in a factory, in a school, in barracks, in a prison, in a police station” (FD, 212). This foreclosing of the necessity of the difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological production has not been salutary. It has helped positivist empiricism—the justifying foundation of advanced capitalist neocolonialism—to define its own arena as “concrete experience,” “what actually happens.” Indeed, the concrete experience that is the guarantor of the political appeal of prisoners, soldiers, and schoolchildren is disclosed through the concrete experience of the intellectual, the one who diagnoses the episteme. Neither Deleuze nor Foucault seems aware that the intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help consolidate the international division of labor.

The unrecognized contradiction within a position that valorizes the concrete experience of the oppressed, while being so uncritical about the historical role of the intellectual, is maintained by a verbal slippage. Thus Deleuze makes this remarkable pronouncement: “A theory is like a box of tools. Nothing to do with the signifier” (FD, 208). Considering that the verbalism of the theoretical world and its access to any world defined against it as “practical” is irreducible, such a declaration helps only the intellectual anxious to prove that intellectual labor is just like manual labor. It is when signifiers are left to look after themselves that verbal slippages happen. The signifier “representation” is a case in point. In the same dismissive tone that severs theory’s link to the signifier, Deleuze declares, “There is no more representation; there’s nothing but action”—“action of theory and action of practice which relate to each other as relays and form networks” (FD, 206-7). Yet an important point is being made here: the production of theory is also a practice; the opposition between abstract “pure” theory and concrete “applied” practice is too quick and easy. If this is indeed, Deleuze’s argument, his articulation of it is problematic. Two senses of representation are being run together: representation as “speaking for,” as in politics, and representation as “re-presentation,” as in art or philosophy. Since theory is also only “action,” the theoretician does not represent (speak for) the oppressed group. Indeed, the subject is not seen as a representative consciousness (one re-presenting reality adequately). These two senses of representation—within state formation and the law, on the one hand, and in subject-predication, on the other—are related but irreducibly discontinuous. To cover over the discontinuity with an analogy that is presented as a proof reflects again a paradoxical subject-privileging. Because “the person who speaks and acts is always a multiplicity,” no “theorizing intellectual...[or] party or...union” can represent “those who act and struggle” (FD, 206). Are those who act and struggle mute, as opposed to those who act and speak (FD, 206)? These immense problems are buried in the differences between the “same” words: consciousness and conscience (both conscience in French), representation and re-presentation. The critique of ideological subject-constitution within state formations and systems of political economy can now be efficacious, as can the active theoretical practice of the “transformation of consciousness.” The banality of leftist intellectuals’ lists of self-knowledge, politically canny subaltern stands revealed; representing them, the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent.

If such a critique and such a project are not to be given up, the shifting distinctions between representation within the state and political
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Not be represented. Their representative must appear simultaneously as an
master, as an authority over them, as unrestricted governmental power
protects them from the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine
above. The political influence (in the place of the class interest, since
there is no unified class subject) of the small peasant proprietors therefore
fits its last expression [the implication of a chain of substitutions—
Vertragen—is strong here] in the executive force [Exekutivgewalt—less per-
sonal in German] subordinating society to itself."

Not only does such a model of social indirection—necessary gaps
within the source of “influence” (in this case the small peasant proprietors),
as “representative” (Louis Napoleon), and the historical-political phenom-
emon (executive control)—imply a critique of the subject as individual agent
but a critique even of the subjectivity of a collective agency. The necessarily
allocated machine of history moves because “the identity of the interests”
of these proprietors “fails to produce a feeling of community, national links,
or a political organization.” The event of representation as Vertretung (in
the constellation of rhetoric-as-persuasion) behaves like a Darstellung (or
rhetoric-as-trope), taking its place in the gap between the formation of a
descrative class and the nonformation of a (transformation) class. “In so far
as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that
separate their mode of life … they form a class. In so far as … the identity
of their interests fails to produce a feeling of community … they do not
form a class.” The complicity of Vertreten and Darstellen, their identity-in-
sufficiency as the place of practice—since this complicity is precisely what
Marxists must expose, as Marx does in The Eighteenth Brumaire—can only
be appreciated if they are not conflated by a slight of word.

It would be merely tendentious to argue that this textualizes Marx
so much, making him inaccessible to the common “man,” who, a victim
of common sense, is so deeply placed in a heritage of positivism that Marx’s
reducible emphasis on the work of the negative, on the necessity for de-
neutralizing the concrete, is persistently wrested from him by the strongest
adversary, “the historical tradition” in the air. I have been trying to point
out that the common “man,” the contemporary philosopher of practice,
sometimes exhibits the same positivism.

The gravity of the problem is apparent if one agrees that the
development of a transformative class “consciousness” from a descriptive
class “position” is not in Marx a task engaging the ground level of con-
sciousness. Class consciousness remains with the feeling of community that
belongs to national links and political organizations, not to that other feeling
of community whose structural model is the family. Although not identified
with nature, the family here is constellation with what Marx calls “natural
exchange,” which is, philosophically speaking, a “placeholder” for use value.
“Natural exchange” is contrasted to “intercourse with society,” where the
word “intercourse” (Verkehr) is Marx’s usual word for “commerce.” This
intercourse thus holds the place of the exchange leading to the production
of surplus value, and it is in the area of this intercourse that the feeling of
community leading to class agency must be developed. Full class agency (if
there were such a thing) is not an ideological transformation of conscious-
ness on the ground level, a desiring identity of the agents and their interest—
the identity whose absence troubles Foucault and Deleuze. It is a contro-
sorary replacement as well as an appropriation (a supplementation) of some-

economy, on the one hand, and within the theory of the Subject, on the
other, must not be obliterated. Let us consider the play of vertreten (“rep-
resent” in the first sense) and darstellen (“re-present” in the second sense)
in a famous passage in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, where
Marx touches on “class” as a descriptive and transformative concept in a
manner somewhat more complex than Althusser’s distinction between class
instinct and class position would allow.

Marx’s contention here is that the descriptive definition of a class
can be a differential one—its cutting off and difference from all other classes:
“in so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence
that cut off their mode of life, their interest, and their formation from
those of the other classes and place them in no mediation [mehrals, gan
genüberstellen], they form a class.” There is no such thing as a “class
instinct” at work here. In fact, the collectivity of familial existence, which
might be considered the arena of “instinct,” is discontinuous with, though
operated by, the differential isolation of classes. In this context, one far more
pertinent to the France of the 1970s than it can be to the international
periphery, the formation of a class is artificial and economic, and the eco-

nomic agency or interest is impersonal because it is systematic and heter-
genous. This agency or interest is tied to the Hegelian critique of the
individual subject, for it marks the subject’s empty place in that process
without a subject which is history and political economy. Here the capitalist
are defined as “the conscious bearer [Träger] of the limitless movement of
capital.” My point is that Marx is not working to create an unified subject
where desire and interest coincide. Class consciousness does not operate
toward that goal. Both in the economic area (capitalist) and in the
political (world-historical agent), Marx is obliged to construct models of
divided and dislocated subject whose parts are not continuous or coherent
with each other. A celebrated passage like the description of capital as the
Faustian monster brings this home vividly.

The following passage, continuing the quotation from The Eigh-
teenth Brumaire, is also working on the structural principle of a dispersed
and dislocated class subject: the (absent collective) consciousness of the
small peasant proprietor class finds its “bearer” in a “representative” who
appears to work in another’s interest. The word “representative” here is not
darstellen; this sharpens the contrast Foucault and Deleuze slide over,
the contrast, say, between a proxy and a portrait. There is, of course, a
relationship between them, one that has received political and ideological
exacerbation in the European tradition at least since the poet and the sophis-
tic, the actor and the orator, have both been seen as harmful. In the guise of
the post-Marxist description of the scene of power, we thus encounter a much
older debate: between representation or rhetoric as tropology and as per-
suasion. Darstellen belongs to the first constellation, vertreten—with strong
suggestions of substitution—to the second. Again, they are related, but run-
ning them together, especially in order to say that beyond both is when
oppressed subjects speak, act, and know for themselves, leads to an essen-
tialist, utopian politics.

Here is Marx’s passage, using “vertreten” where the English us
“represent,” discussing a social “subject” whose consciousness and Vertre-
tung (as much a substitution as a representation) are dislocated and inco-
erent: The small peasant proprietors “cannot represent themselves; the
thing that is “artificial” to begin with—“economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life.” Marx’s formulations show a cautious respect for the nascent critique of individual and collective subjective agency. The projects of class consciousness and of the transformation of consciousness are discontinuous issues for him. Conversely, contemporary invocations of “libidinal economy” and desire as the determining interest, combined with the practical politics of the oppressed (under socialized capital), “speaking for themselves,” restore the category of the sovereign subject within the theory that seems most to question it.

No doubt the exclusion of the family, albeit a family belonging to a specific class formation, is a part of the masculine frame within which Marxism marks its birth. Historically as well as in today’s global political economy, the family’s role in patriarchal social relations is so heterogeneous and contested that merely replacing the family in this problematic is not going to break the frame. Nor does the solution lie in the positivist inclusion of a monolithic collectivity of “women” in the list of the oppressed whose unfractured subjectivity allows them to speak for themselves against an equally monolithic “same system.”

In the context of the development of a strategic, artificial, and second-level “consciousness,” Marx uses the concept of the patronymic always within the broader concept of representation as Vertretung. The small peasant proprietors “are therefore incapable of making their class interest valid in their proper name [im eigenen Namen], whether through a parliament or through a convention.” The absence of the nonfamilial artificial proper name is supplied by the proper name “historical tradition” can offer—the patronymic itself—the Name of the Father. It is to “his” occurrence, that a man named Napoleon would restore all their glory. And an individual?—the untranslatable “es fand sich” (there found itself with his interest—who gave himself out to be that man”) (this pretense is by contrast, his only proper agency) “because he carried [trägt—the word for the capitalist’s relationship to capital] the Napoleon Code, which commands” that “inquiry into paternity is forbidden.” While Marx here seems to be working within a patriarchal metaphoric, one should note the textual subtlety of the passage. It is the Law of the Father (the Napoleon Code) that paradoxically prohibits the search for the natural father. Thus, it is according to a strict observance of the historical Law of the Father that the formed yet unformed class’s faith in the natural father is gainsaid.

I have dwelt so long on this passage in Marx because it spells out the inner dynamics of Vertretung, or representation in the political context. Representation in the economic context is Darstellung, the philosophical concept of representation as staging or, indeed, signification, which is well known: “In the exchange relationship/Austauschverhältnis/ of commodities makes their exchange-value appeared to us totally independent of the use-value. But if we subtract their use-value from the product of labor, we obtain their value, as it was just determined [bestimmt]. The common element which represents itself [sich darstellt] in the exchange relation, or the exchange value of the commodity, is thus its value.”

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According to Marx, under capitalism, value, as produced in necessary and surplus labor, is computed as the representation/sign of objective labor (which is rigorously distinguished from human activity). Conversely, in the absence of a theory of exploitation as the extraction, appropriation, and realization of (surplus) value as representation of labor power, capitalist exploitation must be seen as a variety of domination (the mechanics of power as such). “The thrust of Marxism,” Deleuze suggests, “was to determine the problem [that power is more diffuse than structure of exploitation and state formation] essentially in terms of interests (power is held by a ruling class defined by its interests)” (FD, 1991, 1).

One cannot object to this minimalist summary of Marx’s project, as one cannot ignore that, in parts of the Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Spivak build their case on a brilliant if “poetic” grasp of Marx’s theory of money form. Yet we might consolidate our critique in the following way: the relationship between global capitalism (exploitation in economies) and nation-state alliances (domination in geopolitics) is so macrological that we cannot account for the micrological texture of power. To move toward an accounting one must move toward theories of ideology—of subject formations that micrologically and often erratically operate the interests that emerge as the macrologies. Such theories cannot afford to overlook the category of representation in its two senses. They must note how the staging of the world in representation—its scene of writing, its Darstellung—dissimulates the choice of and need for “heroes,” paternal proxies, agents of power—Vertretung.

My view is that radical practice should attend to this double vision of representations rather than reintroduce the individual subject through totalizing concepts of power and desire. It is also my view that, in keeping the area of class practice on a second level of abstraction, Marx was in effect keeping open the (Kantian and) Hegelian critique of the individual subject as agent. This view does not oblige me to ignore that, by explicitly defining the family and the mother tongue as the ground level where culture and convention seem nature’s own way of organizing “her” own subversion, Marx himself rehearses an ancient subterfuge. In the context of poststructuralist claims to critical practice, this seems more recuperable than the clandestine restoration of subjective essentialism.

The reduction of Marx to a benevolent but dated figure most often serves the interest of launching a new theory of interpretation. In the Foucault-Deleuze conversation, the issue seems to be that there is no representation, no signifier (Is it to be presumed that the signifier has already been dispatched? There is, then, no sign-structure operating experience, and thus might one lay semiotics to rest?); theory is a relay of practice (thus laying problems of theoretical practice to rest) and the oppressed can know and speak for themselves. This reintroduces the constitutive subject on at least two levels: the Subject of desire and power as an irreducible methodological presupposition; and the self-proximate, if not self-identical, subject of the oppressed. Further, the intellectuals, who are neither of these S/subjects, become transparent in the relay race, for they merely report on the nonrepresented subject and analyze (without analyzing) the workings of the (unnamed Subject irreducibly presupposed by) power and desire. The produced “transparency” marks the place of “interest”; it is maintained by
vehement denegation: “Now this role of referee, judge, and universal witness is one which I absolutely refuse to adopt.” One responsibility of the critic might be to read and write so that the impossibility of such individualistic refusals of the institutional privileges of power bestowed on the subject is taken seriously. The refusal of the sign-system blocks the way to a developed theory of ideology. Here, too, the peculiar tone of denegation is heard. To Jacques-Alain Miller’s suggestion that “the institution is itself discursive,” Foucault responds, “Yes, if you like, but it doesn’t much matter for my notion of the apparatus to be able to say that this is discursive and this conflation of language and discourse from the master of discourse analysis?”

Edward W. Said’s critique of power in Foucault as a captivating and mystifying category that allows him “to obliterate the role of classes the role of economics, the role of insurgency and rebellion,” is most pertinent here.24 I add to Said’s analysis the notion of the surreptitious subject of power and desire marked by the transparency of the intellectual. Curiously enough, Paul Bové faults Said for emphasizing the importance of the intellectual, whereas “Foucault’s project essentially is a challenge to the leading role of both hegemonic and oppositional intellectuals.”25 I have suggested that this “challenge” is deceptive precisely because it ignores what Said emphasizes—the critic’s institutional responsibility.

This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of the Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could catch, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary—not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. However reductionistic an economic analysis might seem, the French intellectuals forget at their peril that this entire overdetermined enterprise was in the interest of a dynamic economic situation requiring that interests, motives (desires), and power (of knowledge) be ruthlessly dislocated. To invoke that dislocation now as a radical discovery that should make us diagnose the economic (conditions of existence that separate out “classes” descriptively) as a piece of dated analytic machinery may well be to continue the work of that dislocation and unwittingly to help in securing “a new balance of hegemonic relations.”26 I shall return to this argument shortly. In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intellectual would be to put the economic “under erasure,” to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperceptibly, when it is claimed to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified.27

II

The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the

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The cultural subject as Other. This project is also the asymmetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subject-ivity. It is well known to Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century.28 But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two objects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged parts of a vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative of imperialism be recognized as subjugated knowledge, “a whole set of knowledges that have been disavowed as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of critical self-reflection or scientistic.” (PK, 82).

This is not to describe “the way things really were” or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history.29 It is rather, to offer an account of how the explanations and narrative of reality were established as the normative one. To elaborate on this, let us consider briefly the underpinnings of the British codification of Hindu Law.

First, a few disclaimers: In the United States the third-worldism currently afloat in humanistic disciplines is often openly ethnic. I was born in India and received my primary, secondary, and university education there, including two years of graduate work. My Indian example could thus be seen as a nostalgic investigation of the lost roots of my own identity. Yet even as I know that one cannot freely enter the thickets of “motions,” I would maintain that my chief project is to point out the positivist-dualist variety of such nostalgia. I turn to Indian material because, in the absence of advanced disciplinary training, that accident of birth and education has provided me with a sense of the historical canvas, a hold on the language and cultural production, but also by the institution of the law. However reductionistic an economic analysis might seem, the French intellectuals forget at their peril that this entire overdetermined enterprise was in the interest of a dynamic economic situation requiring that interests, motives (desires), and power (of knowledge) be ruthlessly dislocated. To invoke that dislocation now as a radical discovery that should make us diagnose the economic (conditions of existence that separate out “classes” descriptively) as a piece of dated analytic machinery may well be to continue the work of that dislocation and unwittingly to help in securing “a new balance of hegemonic relations.” I shall return to this argument shortly. In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intellectual would be to put the economic “under erasure,” to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperceptibly, when it is claimed to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified.

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The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the
The narrative of the stabilization and codification of Hindu law is less well known than the story of Indian education, so it might be well to start there. Consider the often-quoted programmatic lines from Macaulay’s famous “Minute on Indian Education” (1835): “We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the people.” The education of colonial subjects complements their production in law. One effect of establishing a version of the British system was the development of a more separatist between disciplinarian forms of Sanskrit and the native, now alternative, tradition of Sanskrit “high culture.” Within the former, the cultural explanations generated by authoritative scholars matched the epistemic violence of the legal project.

I locate here the founding of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784, the Indian Institute at Oxford in 1883, and the analytic and taxonomic work of scholars like Arthur Macdonnell and Arthur Berriedale Keith, who were both colonial administrators and organizers of the matter of Sanskrit. From their confound entiritarian-hegemonic plans for students and scholars of Sanskrit, it is impossible to guess at either the aggressive repression of Sanskrit in the general educational framework or the increasing “futurization” of its conservative use in Sanskrit in the everyday life of Brahmanic-hegemonic India. A version of history was gradually established in which the Brahmins were shown to have the same intentions as (thus providing the legitimation for) the codifying British: “In order to preserve Hindu society intact [the] successors of the original Brahman had to reduce everything to writing and make them more and more rigid. And that is what has preserved Hindu society in spite of a succession of political upheavals and foreign invasions.”

This is the 1925 verdict of Mahatmarkshipadyaya Haraprasad Shastri, learned Indian Sanskritist, a brilliant representative of the indigenous elite within colonial production, who was asked to write several chapters of a “History of Bengal” projected by the private secretary to the governor general of Bengal in 1916. To signal the asymmetry in the relationship between authority and explanation (depending on the race-class of the authority), compare this 1928 remark by Edward Thompson, English intellectual: “Hinduism was what it seemed to be... It was a higher civilization than anything else, both with Akbar and the English.” And add this, from a letter by an English soldier-scholar in the 1890s: “The study of Sanskrit, the language of the gods, has afforded so intense a cultivation of the last 25 years of my life in India, but it has not. I am thankful to say, led me, as it has some, to give up a hearty belief in our own grand religion.”

These authorities are the very best of the sources for the non-specialist French intellectual’s entry into the civilization of the Other. I am, however, not referring to intellectuals and scholars of postcolonial production, like Shastri, when I say that the Other as Subject is inaccessible to Foucault and Deleuze. I am thinking of the general non-specialist, non-academic population across the class spectrum, for whom the episteme operates as a silent function. Without considering the map of exploitation, on what grid of “oppression” would they place this motley crew?

Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban proletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier eco- nomic text, can the subaltern speak?

Antonio Gramsci’s work on the “subaltern classes” extends the class-position/class-consciousness argument isolated in The Eighteenth Brumaire. Perhaps because Gramsci criticizes the vanguardist position of the Leninist intellectual, he is concerned with the intellectual’s role in the subaltern’s cultural and political movement into the hegemonic. This movement must be made to determine the production of history as narrative (of truth). Let us see how some texts such as “The Southern Question,” Gramsci considers the movement of historical-political economy in Italy within what can be seen as an allegory of reading taken from or prefiguring an international division of labor. Yet in account of the phased development of the subaltern is thrown out of joint when his cultural macrology is operated, however remotely, by the epistemic interference with legal and disciplinary definitions accompanying the imperialist project. When I move, at the end of this essay, to the question of women as subaltern, I will suggest that the possibility of collectivity itself is persistently foreclosed through the manipulation of female agency.

The first part of my proposition—that the phased development of the subaltern is complicated by the imperialist project—is confronted by a collective of intellectuals who may be called the “Subaltern Studies” group. They must ask, Can the subaltern speak? Here we are within Foucault’s own discipline of history and with people who acknowledge his influence. Their project is to rethink Indian colonial historiography from the perspective of the discontinuous chain of peasant insurrections during the colonial occupation. This is indeed the problem of “the permission to narrate” discussed by Said. As Ranajit Guha argues,

The historiography of Indian nationalism has for a long time been dominated by elitism—colonialist elitism and bourgeoisie-nationalist elitism... shar[ing] the prejudice that the making of the Indian nation and the development of the consciousness-nationalism—which confirmed this process were exclusively or predominantly elite achievements. In the colonialist and neo-colonialist historiographies these achievements are credited to British colonial rulers, administrators, policies, institutions, and culture; in the nationalist and
Certain varieties of the Indian elite are at best native informants for first-world intellectuals interested in the voice of the Other. But one must nevertheless insist that the colonized subaltern subject is irrevocably heterogeneous.

Against the indigenous elite we may set what Guha calls "the politics of the people," both outside ("this was an autonomous domain, for it neither originated from elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter") and inside ("it continued to operate vigorously in spite of [colonialism], adjusting itself to the conditions prevailing under the Raj and in many respects developing entirely new strains in both form and content") the circuit of colonial production.\(^4^2\) I cannot entirely endorse this insistence on determinate energy and full autonomy, for practical historiographic exigencies will not allow such endorsements to privilege subaltern consciousness. Against the possible charge that his approach is essentialist, Guha constructs a definition of the people (the place of that essence) that can be only an identity-in-differential. He proposes a dynamic stratification that describes colonial social production at large. Even the third group on the list, the buffer group, as it were, between the people and the great macrostructural dominant groups, is itself defined as a place of in-betweenness, what Derrida has described as an "antre":\(^4^3\)

1. Dominant foreign groups.
2. Dominant indigenous groups on the all-India level.
3. Dominant indigenous groups at the regional and local levels.
4. The terms "people" and "subaltern classes" have been used as synonymous throughout this note. The social groups and elements included in this category represent the demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those whom we have described as the "elite."

Consider the third item on this list—the antre of situational indeterminacy these careful historians presuppose as they grapple with the question, Can the subaltern speak? "Taken as a whole and in the abstract this ... category ... was heterogeneous in its composition and thanks to the uneven character of regional economic and social developments, differed from area to area. The same class or element which was dominant in one area ... could be among the dominated in another. This could and did create many ambiguities and contradictions in attitudes and alliances, especially among the lowest strata of the rural gentry, impoverished landlords, rich peasants and upper middle class peasants all of whom belonged, ideally speaking, to the category of people or subaltern classes."\(^4^4\)

"The task of research" projected here is "to investigate, identify and measure the specific nature and degree of the deviation of [the] element [constituting item 3] from the ideal and situate it historically." "Investigate, identify, and measure the specific": a program could hardly be more essen-

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... and taxonomic. Yet a curious methodological imperative is at work. I have argued that, in the Foucault-Deleuze conversation, a postpresenationalist vocabulary hides an essentialist agenda. In subaltern studies, because of the violence of imperialist epistemic, social, and disciplinary inscription, a project understood in essentialist terms must traffic in a radical Practice of differences. The object of the group's investigation, in the case not even of the people as such but of the floating buffer zone of the regional elite-subaltern, is a deviation from an ideal—the people or subaltern—which is itself defined as a difference from the elite. It is toward this structure that the research is oriented, a predicament rather different from the self-diagnosed transparency of the first-world radical intellectual. What autonomy can fix such a space? Whether or not they themselves perceive it, in fact Guha sees his definition of "the people" within the master-slave dialectic—"their text articulates the difficult task of rewriting its own conditions of impossibility as the conditions of its possibility."

"At the regional and local levels [the dominant indigenous groups] ... if belonging to social strata hierarchically inferior to those of the dominant all-Indian groups acted in the interests of the latter and not in community to interests corresponding truly to their own social being." When these writers speak, in their essentializing language, of a gap between interest and action in the intermediate group, their conclusions are closer to Marx than to the self-conscious naivete of Deleuze's pronouncement on the issue. Guha, like Marx, speaks of interest in terms of the social rather than the individual being. The Name-of-the-Father imagery in The Eighteenth Brumaire can help to emphasize that, on the level of class or group action, "true correspondence to own being" is as artificial or social as the patricular.

So much for the intermediate group marked in item 3. For the "true" subaltern group, whose identity is its difference, there is no representable subaltern subject that can know and speak itself; the intellectual's solution is not to abstain from representation. The problem is that the subject's itinerary has not been traced so as to offer an object of seduction to the representing intellectual. In the slightly dated language of the Indian group, the question becomes, How can we touch the consciousness of the people, even as we investigate their politics? With what voice-consciousness can the subaltern speak? Their project, after all, is to rewrite the development of the consciousness of the Indian nation. The planned discontinuity of imperialist rigorously distinguishes this project, however old-fashioned its articulation, from "rendering visible the medical and juridical mechanisms that surrounded the story [of Pierre Riviere]." Foucault is correct in suggesting that "to make visible the unseen can also mean a change of level, addressing oneself to a layer of material which had hitherto had no pertinence for history and which had not been recognized as having any material, aesthetic or historical value." It is the slippage from rendering visible the mechanism to rendering vocal the individual, both avoiding "any kind of analysis of [the subject] whether psychological, psychoanalytical or linguistic," that is consistently troublesome (PK, 49-50).

The critique by Ajit K. Chaudhury, a West Bengal Marxist, of Guha's search for the subaltern consciousness can be seen as a moment of the production process that includes the subaltern. Chaudhury's perception that the Marxist view of the transformation of consciousness involves the
knowledge of social relations seems to me, in principle, astute. Yet the heritage of the positivist ideology that has appropriated orthodox Marxism obliges him to add this rider: “This is not to belittle the importance of understanding peasants’ consciousness or workers’ consciousness in its pure form. This enriches our knowledge of the peasant and the worker and possibly, throws light on how a particular mode takes on different forms in different regions, which is considered a problem of second-order importance in classical Marxism.”

This variety of “internationalist” Marxism, which believes in a pure, retrievable form of consciousness only to dismiss it, thus closing off what in Marx remain moments of productive bafflement, can at once be the object of Foucault’s and Deleuze’s rejection of Marxism and the source of the critical motivation of the Subaltern Studies group. All three are united in the assumption that there is a pure form of consciousness. On the French scene, there is a shuffling of signifiers: “the unconscious” or “the subject in-oppression” clandestinely fills the space of “the pure form of consciousness.” In orthodox “internationalist” intellectual Marxism, whether in the First World or the Third, the pure form of consciousness remains an idealistic bedrock which, dismissed as a second-order problem, often earns it the reputation of racism and sexism. In the Subaltern Studies group it needs development according to the unacknowledged terms of its own articulation.

For such an articulation, a developed theory of ideology can again be most useful. In a critique such as Chaudhury’s, the association of “consciousness” with “knowledge” omits the crucial middle term of “ideological production”: “Consciousness, according to Lenin, is associated with a knowledge of the interrelationships between different classes and groups. i.e., a knowledge of the materials that constitute society. . . These definitions acquire a meaning only within the problematic within a definite knowledge object—to understand change in history, or specifically, change from one mode to another, keeping the question of the specificity of a particular mode out of the focus.”

Pierre Macherey provides the following formula for the interpretation of ideology: “What is important in a work is what it does not say. This is not the same as the careless notation ‘what it refuses to say,’ although that would in itself be interesting; a method might be built on it, with the task of measuring silences, whether acknowledged or unacknowledged. But rather this, what the work cannot say is important, because there the elaboration of the utterance is carried out, in a sort of journey to silence.”

Macherey’s ideas can be developed in directions he would be unlikely to follow. Even as he writes, ostensibly, of the literariness of the literature of European provenance, he articulates a method applicable to the social text of imperialism, somewhat against the grain of his own argument. Although the notion “what it refuses to say” might be careless for a literary work, something like a collective ideological refusal can be diagnosed for the codifying legal practice of imperialism. This would open the field for a political-economic and multidisciplinary ideological reinscription of the terrain. Because this is a “worlding of the world” on a second level of abstraction, a concept of refusal becomes plausible here. The archival, historiographic, disciplinary-critical, and, inevitably, interventionist work involved here is indeed a task of “measuring silences.” This can be a description of “invis-

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The contemporary international division of labor is a displacement of the divided field of nineteenth-century territorial imperialism. Put simply, a group of countries, generally first-world, are in the position of investing capital; another group, generally third-world, provide the field for investment, both through the comprador indigenous capitalists and through their ill-protected and shifting labor force. In the interest of maintaining the circulation and growth of industrial capital (and of the concomitant task of administration within nineteenth-century territorial imperialism), transport, law, and standardized education systems were developed—even as local industries were destroyed, land distribution was rearranged, and raw material was transferred to the colonizing country. With so-called decolo-
nization, the growth of multinational capital, and the relief of the admin-
istrative charge, “development” does not now involve wholesale legislation
and establishing educational systems in a comparable way. This impedes
the growth of consumerism in the compadred countries. With modern tele-
communications and the emergence of advanced capitalist economies at
the two edges of Asia, maintaining the international division of labor serves
to keep the supply of cheap labor in the compadred countries.

Human labor is not, of course, intrinsically “cheap” or “expensive.” An absence of labor laws (or a discriminatory enforcement of them),
a totalitarian state (often entailed by development and modernization in
the periphery), and minimal subsistence requirements on the part of
the worker will ensure it. To keep this crucial item intact, the urban proletariat
in compadred countries must not be systematically trained in the ideology
of consumerism (parading as the philosophy of a classless society) that,
against all odds, prepares the ground for resistance through the coalition
politics Foucault mentions (FD, 216). This separation from the ideology
of consumerism is increasingly exacerbated by the proliferating phenomena
of international subcontracting. “Under this strategy, manufacturers based
in developed countries subcontract the most labor intensive stages of produc-
tion, for example, sewing or assembly, to the Third World nations where
labor is cheap. Once assembled, the multinational re-imports the goods—
under generous tariff exemptions—to the developed country instead of selling
them to the local market.” Here the link to training in consumerism is almost
snapped. “While global recession has markedly slowed trade and investment
worldwide since 1979, international subcontracting has boomed. . . . In these
cases, multinationals are freer to resist militant workers, revolutionary up-
heavals, and even economic downturns.”

Class mobility is increasingly lethargic in the compadred theaters.
Not surprisingly, some members of indigenous dominant groups in com-
padred countries, members of the local bourgeoisie, find the language of
alliance politics attractive. Identifying with forms of resistance plausible in
advanced capitalist countries is often of a piece with that elitist bent of
bourgeois historiography described by Ranajit Guha.

Belief in the plausibility of global alliance politics is prevalent
among women of dominant social groups interested in “international fem-
inism” in the compadred countries. At the other end of the scale, those most
separated from any possibility of an alliance among “women, prisoners,
conscripted soldiers, hospital patients, and homosexuals” (FD, 216) are the
females of the urban subproletariat. In their case, the denial and withholding
of consumerism and the structure of exploitation is compounded by pa-
triarchal social relations. On the other side of the international division of
labor, the subject of exploitation cannot know and speak the text of female
exploitation, even if the absurdity of the nonrepresenting intellectual making
space for her to speak is achieved. The woman is doubly in shadow.

Yet even this does not encompass the heterogeneous Other. Out-
side (though not completely so) the circuit of the international division of
labor, there are people whose consciousness we cannot grasp if we close off
our benevolence by constructing a homogeneous Other referring only to our
own place in the seat of the Same or the Self. Here are subsistence farmers,
unorganized peasant labor, the tribal, and the communities of zero workers
on the street or in the countryside. To confront them is not to represent

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bitteren) them but to learn to represent (darstellen) ourselves. This argu-
ment would take us into a critique of a disciplinary anthropology and the
relationship between elementary pedagogy and disciplinary formation. It
would also question the implicit demand, made by intellectuals who choose
a “naturally articulate” subject of oppression, that such a subject come
to us through history as a foreshortened mode-of-production narrative.

That Deleuze and Foucault ignore both the epistemic violence of
imperialism and the international division of labor would matter less if
they did not, in closing, touch on third-world issues. But in France it is
impossible to ignore the problem of the tier monde, the inhabitants of the
african colonies. Deleuze limits his consideration of the
Third World to these old local and regional indigenous elite who are, ideally,
subaltern. In this context, references to the maintenance of the surplus army
of labor fall into reverse-ethnic sentimentalism. In any case, he is speaking of
the heritage of nineteenth-century territorial imperialism, his reference is to
the nation-state rather than the globalizing center: “French capitalism needs
not only a floating signifier of unemployment. In this perspective, we begin
to see the unity of the forms of repression: restrictions on immigration, once
it is acknowledged that the most difficult and thankless jobs go to immigrant
workers; repression in the factories, because the French must reacquire the
“taste” for increasingly harsh work; the struggle against youth and the repres-
sion of the educational system” (FD, 211-12). This is an acceptable analysis.

Yet it shows again that the Third World can enter the resistance program
of an alliance politics directed against a “unified repression” only when it
is conflated to the third-world groups that are directly accessible to the First
World. This benevolent first-world appropriation and reinscription of the
Third World as an Other is the founding characteristic of much third-world-
ism in the U.S. human sciences today.

Foucault continues the critique of Marxism by invoking geo-
graphical discontinuity. The real mark of “geographical (geopolitical) dis-
continuity” is the international division of labor. But Foucault uses the term
to distinguish between exploitation (extraction and appropriation of surplus
value; read, the field of Marxist analysis) and domination (“power” studies)
and to suggest the latter’s greater potential for resistance based on alliance
politics. He cannot acknowledge that such a monist and unified access to
a conception of “power” (methodologically presupposing a Subject-of-power)
is made possible by a certain stage in exploitation, for his vision of geo-
graphical discontinuity is geopolitically specific to the First World:

This geographical discontinuity of which you speak
might mean perhaps the following: as soon as we strug-
gle against exploitation, the proletariat not only leads
the struggle but also defines its targets, its methods,
its places and its instruments; and to ally oneself with
the proletariat is to consolidate with its positions, its
ideology, it is to take up again the motives for their
combat. This means total immersion [in the Marxist
project]. But if it is against power that one struggles,
then all those who acknowledge it as intolerable can
begin the struggle wherever they find themselves and
in terms of their own activity (or passivity). In engaging in this struggle that is their own, whose objectives they clearly understand and whose methods they can determine, they enter into the revolutionary process. As allies of the proletariat, to be sure, because power is exercised the way it is in order to maintain capitalist exploitation. They genuinely serve the cause of the proletariat by fighting in those places where they find themselves oppressed. Women, prisoners, conscripted soldiers, hospital patients, and homosexuals have now begun a specific struggle against the particular form of power, the constraints and controls, that are exercised over them. (FD, 216)

This is an admirable program of localized resistance. Where possible, this model of resistance is not an alternative to, but can complement, macrological struggles along “Marxist” lines. Yet if its situation is universalized, it accommodates unacknowledged privileging of the subject. Without a theory of ideology, it can lead to a dangerous utopianism.

Foucault is a brilliant thinker of power-in-spacing, but the awareness of the topographical reinscription of imperialism does not inform his presuppositions. He is taken in by the restrictive version of the West produced by that reinscription and thus helps to consolidate its effects. Notice the omission of the fact, in the following passage, that the new mechanism of power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the extraction of surplus value without extra-economic coercion is in Marx’s description) is secured by means of territorial imperialism—the Earth and its products—“elsewhere.” The representation of sovereignty is crucial in those theaters: “In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have the production of an important phenomenon, the emergence, or rather the invention, of a new mechanism of power possessed of highly specific procedural techniques... which is also, I believe, absolutely incompatible with the relations of sovereignty. This new mechanism of power is more dependent upon bodies and what they do than the Earth and its products” (PK, 104).

Because of a blind spot regarding the first wave of “geographical discontinuity,” Foucault can remain impervious to its second wave in the middle decades of our own century, identifying it simply “with the collapse of Fascism and the decline of Stalinism” (PK, 87). Here is Mike Davis’s alternative view: “It was rather the global logic of counter-revolutionary violence which created conditions for the peaceful economic interdependence of a chastened Atlantic imperialism under American leadership... It was multi-national military integration under the slogan of collective security against the USSR which preceded and quickened the interpenetration of the major capitalist economies, making possible the new era of commercial liberalism which flowered between 1958 and 1973.”

It is within the emergence of this “new mechanism of power” that we must read the fixation on national scenes, the resistance to economics, and the emphasis on concepts like power and desire that privilege micrology. Davis continues: “This quasi-absolutist centralization of strategic military power by the United States was to allow an enlightened and flexible subordinancy for its principal satraps. In particular, it proved highly accommodating to the residual imperialist pretensions of the French and British... with each keeping up a strident ideological mobilization against communism all the while.” While taking precautions against such unitary notions as “France,” it must be said that such unitary notions as “the working struggle,” or such unitary pronouncements as “like power, resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global strategies” (PK, 142), seem interpretable by way of Davis’s narrative. I am not suggesting, as does Paul Bove, that “for a displaced and homeless people [the Palestinians] assaulted militarily and culturally... a question [such as Foucault’s ‘to engage in politics... is to try to know with the greatest possible honesty whether the revolution is desirable’] is a foolish luxury of Western wealth.” I am suggesting, rather, that to buy a self-contained version of the West is to ignore its production by the imperialist project.

Sometimes it seems as if the very brilliance of Foucault’s analysis of the centuries of European imperialism produces a miniature version of that heterogeneous phenomenon: management of space—but by doctors; development of administrations—but in asylums; considerations of the periphery—but in terms of the insane, prisoners, and children. The clinic, the hospital, the prison, the university—all seem to be screen-allegories that foreclose a reading of the broader narratives of imperialism. (One could open a similar discussion of the ferocious motif of “deterritorialization” in Deleuze and Guattari.) “One can perfectly well not talk about something because one doesn’t know about it,” Foucault might murmur (PK, 66). Yet we have already spoken of the sanctioned ignorance that every critic of imperialism must chart.

III

On the general level on which U.S. academics and students take “influence” from France, one encounters the following understanding: Foucault deals with real history, real politics, and real social problems; Derrida is inaccessible, esoteric, and textualistic. The reader is probably well acquainted with this received idea. “That [Derrida’s] own work,” Terry Eagleton writes, “has been grossly unhistorical, politically evasive and in practice oblivious to language as ‘discourse’ [language in function] is not to be denied.”87 Eagleton goes on to recommend Foucault’s study of “discursive practices.” Perry Anderson constructs a related history: “With Derrida, the self-cancellation of structuralism latent in the recourse to music or madness in Lévi-Straussian or Foucault is consummated. With no commitment to exploration of social realities at all, Derrida had little compunction in undoing the constructions of these two, convicting them both of a ‘nostalgia of origins’—Rousseauist or pre-Socratic, respectively—and asking what right either had to assume, on their own premises, the validity of their discourses.”

This paper is committed to the notion that, whether in defense of Derrida or not, a nostalgia for lost origins can be detrimental to the exploration of social realities within the critique of imperialism. Indeed, the brilliance of Anderson’s misreading does not prevent him from seeing precisely the problem I emphasize in Foucault: “Foucault struck the characteristically prophetic note when he declared in 1966: ‘Man is in the process of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever more brightly upon our horizon.’ But who is the ‘we’ to perceive or possess such a ho-
rizon?” Anderson does not see the encroachment of the unacknowledged Subject of the West in the later Foucault, a Subject that presides by dispensation. He sees Foucault’s attitude in the usual way, as the disappearance of the knowing Subject as such; and he further sees in Derrida the final development of that tendency: “In the hollow of the pronoun [we] lies the aporia of the programme.” Consider, finally, Said’s plangent aphorism, which betrays a profound misapprehension of the notion of “textuality”: “Derrida’s criticism moves us into the text, Foucault’s in and out.”

I have tried to argue that the substantive concern for the politics of the oppressed which often accounts for Foucault’s appeal can hide a privileging of the intellectual and of the “concrete” subject of oppression that, in fact, compounds the appeal. Conversely, though it is not my intention here to counter the specific view of Derrida promoted by these influential writers, I will discuss a few aspects of Derrida’s work that retain a long-term usefulness for people outside the First World. This is not an apology. Derrida is hard to read; his real object of investigation is classical philosophy. Yet he is less dangerous when understood than the first-world intellectual masquerading as the absent nonrepresentor who lets the oppressed speak for themselves.

I will consider a chapter that Derrida composed twenty years ago: “Of Grammatology As a Positive Science” (OG, 74-93). In this chapter Derrida confronts the issue of whether “deconstruction” can lead to an adequate practice, whether critical or political. The question is how to keep the ethnocratic Subject from establishing itself by selectively defining an Other. This is not a program for the Subject as such; rather, it is a program for the benevolent Western intellectual. For those of us who feel that the “subject” has a history and that the task of the first-world subject of knowledge in our historical moment is to resist and critique “recognition” of the Third World through “assimilation,” this specificity is crucial. In order to advance a factual rather than a pathetical critique of the European intellectual’s ethnocratic impulse, Derrida admits that he cannot ask the “first” questions that must be answered to establish the grounds of his argument. He does not declare that grammatology can “rise above” (Frank Lentricchia’s phrase) mere empiricism; for, like empiricism, it cannot ask first questions. Derrida thus aligns “grammatological” knowledge with the same problems as empirical investigation. “Deconstruction” is not, therefore, a new word for “ideological demystification.” Like “empirical investigation . . . placing shelter in the field of grammatical knowledge” obliges “operating through ‘examples’” (OG, 75).

The examples Derrida lays out—to show the limits of grammarology as a positive science—come from the appropriate ideological self-justification of an imperialist project. In the European seventeenth century, he writes, there were three kinds of “prejudices” operating in histories of writing which constituted a “symptom of the crisis of European consciousness” (OG, 75): the “theological prejudice,” the “Chinese prejudice,” and the “hieroglyphist prejudice.” The first can be indexed as God wrote a primitive or natural script: Hebrew or Greek. The second: Chinese is a perfect blueprint for philosophical writing, but it is only a blueprint. True philosophical writing is “independently with regard to history” (OG, 79) and will sublate Chinese into an easy-to-learn script that will supersede actual Chinese. The third: that Egyptian script is too sublime to be de-

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The concept of Chinese writing thus functioned as a sort of European hallucination . . . This functioning obeyed a rigorous necessity . . . It was not disturbed by the knowledge of Chinese script . . . which was then available . . . A “hieroglyphist prejudice” had produced the same effect of interested blindness. Far from proceeding . . . from ethnocentric scorn, the occultation takes the form of an hyperbolical admiration. We have not finished demonstrating the necessity of this pattern. Our century is not free from it; each time that ethnocentrism is precipitately and ostentatiously reversed, some effort silently hides behind all the spectacular effects to consolidate an inside and to draw from it some domestic benefit. (OG, 80; Derrida italicizes only “hieroglyphist prejudice”)

Derrida proceeds to offer two characteristic possibilities for solutions to the problem of the European Subject, which seeks to produce an Other that would consolidate an inside, its own subject status. What follows is an account of the complicity between writing, the opening of domestic and civil society, and the structures of desire, power, and capitalization. Derrida then discloses the vulnerability of his own desire to conserve something that is, paradoxically, both ineffable and nontranscendental. In critiquing the production of the colonial subject, this ineffable, nontranscendental (“historical”) place is caught by the subaltern subject.

Derrida closes the chapter by showing again that the project of grammatology is obliged to develop within the discourse of presence. It is not just a critique of presence but an awareness of the itinerary of the discourse of presence in one’s own critique, a vigilance precisely against too great a claim for transparency. The word “writing” as the name of the object and model of grammatology is a practice “only within the historical closure, that is to say within the limits of science and philosophy” (OG, 93).

Derrida here makes Nietzschean, philosophical, and psychoanalytic, rather than specifically political, choices to suggest a critique of European ethnocentrism in the constitution of the Other. As a postcolonial intellectual, I am not troubled that he does not lead me (as Europeans inevitably seem to do) to the specific path that such a critique makes necessary. It is more important to me that, as a European philosopher, he articulates the European Subject’s tendency to constitute the Other as marginal to ethnocentrism and locates that as the problem with all logocentric and therefore also all grammatological endeavors (since the main thesis of the chapter is the complicity between the two). Not a general problem, but a European problem. It is within the context of this ethnocentrism that he tries so desperately to demote the Subject of thinking or knowledge as
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in this area seems historically, disciplinarily, and practically forbidden by right and Left alike. It is not just a question of a double displacement, as it is not simply the problem of finding a psychoanalytic allegory that can accommodate the third-world woman with the first.

The cautions I have just expressed are valid only if we are speaking of the subaltern woman’s consciousness—or, more acceptably, subject, reporting on, or better still, participating in, antiserist work among women of color or women in class oppression in the First World or the Third World is undeniably on the agenda. We should also welcome all the information retrieval in these silenced areas that is taking place in anthropology, political science, history, and sociology. Yet the assumption and construction of a consciousness or subject sustains such work and will, in the long run, cohere with the work of imperialist subject-constitution, mingling epistemic violence with the advancement of learning and civilization. And the subaltern woman will be as mute as ever.59

In so fraught a field, it is not easy to ask the question of the consciousness of the subaltern woman; it is thus all the more necessary to remind pragmatic radicals that such a question is not an idealist red herring. Though all feminist or antiserist projects cannot be reduced to this one, to ignore it is an unacknowledged political gesture that has a long history and collaborates with a masculine radicalism that renders the place of the investigator transparent. In seeking to learn to speak to (rather than listen to or speak for) the historically muted subject of the subaltern woman, the postcolonial intellectual systematically “unlearns” female privilege. This systematic unlearning involves learning to critique postcolonial discourse with the best tools it can provide and not simply substituting the lost figure of the colonized. Thus, to question the unquestioned muting of the subaltern woman even within the anti-imperialist project of subaltern studies is not, as Jonathan Culler suggests, to “produce difference by differing” or to “ appeal... to a sexual identity defined as essential and privilege experiences associated with that identity.”60

Culler’s version of the feminist project is possible within what Elizabeth Fox-Genovese has called “the contribution of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions to the social and political individualism of women.”61 Many of us were obliged to understand the feminist project as Culler now describes it when we were still agitating as U.S. academics.62 It was certainly a necessary stage in my own education in “unlearning” and has consolidated the belief that the mainstream project of Western feminism both continues and displaces the battle over the right to individualism between women and men in situations of upward class mobility. One suspects that the debate between U.S. feminism and European “theory” (as theory is generally represented by women from the United States or Britain) occupies a significant corner of that very terrain. I am generally sympathetic with the call to make U.S. feminism more “theoretical.” It seems, however, that the problem of the muted subject of the subaltern woman, though not solved by an “essentialist” search for lost origins, cannot be served by the call for more theory in Anglo-America either.

That call is often given in the name of a critique of “positivism,” which is seen here as identical with “essentialism.” Yet Hegel, the modern inauguratior of “the work of the negative,” was not a stranger to the notion of essences. For Marx, the curious persistence of essentialism within the
dialectic was a profound and productive problem. Thus, the stringent binary opposition between positivism/essentialism (read, U.S.) and “theory” (read, French or Franco-German via Anglo-American) may be spurious. Apart from repressing the ambiguous complicity between essentialism and critiques of positivism (acknowledged by Derrida in “Of Grammatology As a Positive Science”), it also errs by implying that positivism is not a theory. This move allows the emergence of a proper name, a positive essence, Theory. Once again, the position of the investigator remains unquestioned. And, if this territorial debate turns toward the Third World, no change in the question of method is to be discerned. This debate cannot take into account that, in the case of the woman as subaltern, no ingredients for the constitution of the itinerary of the trace of a sexed subject can be gathered to locate the possibility of dissemination.

Yet I remain generally sympathetic in aligning feminism with the critique of positivism and the defetishization of the concrete. I am also far from aversive to learning from the work of Western theorists, though I have come to insist on marking their positionality as investigating subjects. Given these conditions, and as a literary critic, I have learned to confront the immense problem of the consciousness of the woman as subaltern. I have reinvented the problem in a sentence and transformed it into the object of a simple semiosis. What does this sentence mean? The analogy here is the ideological victimization of the Freud and the positionality of the postcolonial intellectual as investigating subject.

As Sarah Kofman has shown, the deep ambiguity of Freud's use of women as a scapegoat is a reaction-formation to an initial and continuing desire to give the hysteric a voice, to transform her into the subject of hystera. The masculine-imperialist ideological formation that shaped that desire into “the daughter's seduction” is part of the same formation that constructs the monolithic “third-world woman.” As a postcolonial intellectual, I am influenced by that formation as well. Part of our “unlearning” project is to articulate that ideological formation—by measuring silences, if necessary—into the object of investigation. Thus, when confronted with the questions, Can the subaltern speak? and Can the subaltern (as woman) speak?, our efforts to give the subaltern a voice in history will be doubly open to the dangers run by Freud's discourse. As a product of these considerations, I have put together the sentence “White men are saving brown women from brown men” in a spirit not unlike the one to be encountered in Freud's investigations of the sentence “A child is being beaten.”

The use of Freud here does not imply an isomorphic analogy between subject-formation and the behavior of social collectives, a frequent practice, often accompanied by a reference to Reich, in the conversation between Deleuze and Foucault. So I am not suggesting that “White men are saving brown women from brown men” is a sentence indicating a collective fantasy symptomatic of a collective itinerary of sadomasochistic repression in a collective imperialist enterprise. There is a satisfying symmetry in such an allegory, but I would rather invite the reader to consider it a problem in “wild psychoanalysis” than a clinching solution. Just as Freud's insistence on making the woman the scapegoat in “A child is being beaten” and elsewhere discloses his political interests, however imperfectly, so my insistence on imperialist subject-production as the occasion for this sentence discloses my politics.

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Further, I am attempting to borrow the general methodological turn of Freud's strategy toward the sentence he constructed as a sentence out of the many similar substantive accounts his patients gave him. This does not mean I will offer a case of transference-in-analysis as an isomorphic model for the transaction between reader and text (my sentence). The analogy between transference and literary criticism or historiography is no more than a productive catchphrase. To say that the subject is a text does not authorize the converse pronouncement: the verbal text is a subject.

I am fascinated, rather, by how Freud predicates a history of repression that produces the final sentence. It is a history with a double origin, one hidden in the annals of the infant, the other lodged in our archaic past, assuming by implication a preoriginary space where human and animal were not yet differentiated. We are driven to impose a homolog of this Freudian strategy on the Marxist narrative to explain the ideological dissimulation of imperialist political economy and outline a history of repression that produces a sentence like the one I have sketched. This history also has a double origin, one hidden in the maneuvers behind the British abolition of widow sacrifice in 1829, the other lodged in the classical and Vedic past of Hindu India, the Rg-Veda and the Dharmasutra. No doubt there is also an undifferentiated preoriginary space that supports this history.

The sentence I have constructed is one among many displacements describing the relationship between brown and white men (sometimes brown and white women worked in). It takes its place among some sentences of “hyperbolic admiration” or of pious guilt that Derrida speaks of in connection with the “hieroglyphist prejudice.” The relationship between the imperial subject and the subject of imperialism is at least ambiguous.

The Hindu widow ascends the pyre of the dead husband and immolates herself upon it. This is widow sacrifice. (The conventional transcription of the Sanskrit word for the widow would be suti. The early colonial British transcribed it sutee.) The rite was not practiced universally and was not caste- or class-fixed. The abolition of this rite by the British has been generally understood as a case of “White men saving brown women from brown men.” White women—from the nineteenth-century British Missionary Registers to Mary Daly—have not produced an alternative understanding. Against this is the Indian nativist argument, a parody of the nostalgia for lost origins: “The women actually wanted to die.”

The two sentences go a long way to legitimize each other. One never encounters the testimony of the women's voice-consciousness. Such a testimony would not be ideology-transcendent or “fully” subjective, of course, but it would have constituted the ingredients for producing a countersentence. As one goes down the grotesquely mistranscribed names of these women, the sacrificed widows, in the police reports included in the records of the East India Company, one cannot put together a “voice.” The most one can sense is the immense heterogeneity breaking through such a skeletal and ignorant account (castes, for example, are regularly described as tribes). Faced with the dialectically interlocking sentences that are constructible as “White men are saving brown women from brown men” and “The women wanted to die,” the postcolonial woman intellectual asks the question of simple semiosis—What does this mean?—and begins to plot a history.
To mark the moment when not only a civil but a good society is born out of domestic confusion, singular events that break the letter of the law to instill its spirit are often invoked. The protection of women by men often provides such an event. If we remember that the British boasted of their absolute equity toward and noninterference with native custom/ law, an invocation of this sanctioned transgression of the letter for the sake of the spirit may be read in J. M. Derrett's remark: "The very first legislation upon Hindu Law was carried through without the assent of a single Hindu." The legislation is not named here. The next sentence, where the measure is named, is equally interesting if one considers the implications of the survival of a colonially established "good" society after decolonization: "The recurrence of sati in independent India is probably an obscurantist revival which cannot long survive even in a very backward part of the country." 68

Whether this observation is correct or not, what interests me is that the protection of woman (today the "third-world woman") becomes a signifier for the establishment of a good society which must, at such inaural moments, transgress mere legality, or equity of legal policy. In this particular case, the process also allowed the redefinition as a crime of what had been tolerated, known, or sanctioned as ritual. In other words, this one item in Hindu law jumped the frontier between the private and the public domain.

Although Foucault's historical narrative, focusing solely on Western Europe, sees merely a tolerance for the criminal actuating the development of criminology in the late eighteenth century (PK, 41), his theoretical description of the "episteme" is pertinent here: "The episteme is the apparatus, which makes possible the separation not of the true from the false, but of what may not be characterized as scientific" (PK, 197)—ritual as opposed to crime, the one fixed by superstition, the other by legal science.

The leap of suttee from private to public has a clear and complex relationship with the changeover from a mercantile and commercial to a territorial and administrative British presence; it can be followed in correspondence among the police stations, the lower and higher courts, the courts of directors, the prince regent's court, and the like. (It is interesting to note that, from the point of view of the native "colonial subject," also emergent from the feudalism-capitalism transition, sati is a signifier with the reverse social charge: "Groups rendered psychologically marginal by their exposure to Western impact..."

If this is the first historical origin of my sentence, it is evident lost in the history of humankind as work, the story of capitalist expansion, the slow freeing of labor power as commodity, that narrative of the mode of production, the transition from feudalism via mercantilism to capitalism. Yet the precarious normativity of this narrative is sustained by the putatively changeless stopgap of the "Asiatic" mode of production, which steps in to sustain it whenever it might become apparent that the story of capital logic is the story of the West, that imperialism establishes the universality of the mode of production narrative, that to ignore the subaltern today is, willy-nilly, to continue the imperialist project. The origin of my sentence is thus lost in the shuffle between other, more powerful discourses. Given that the abolition of sati was in itself admirable, is it still possible to wonder if a perception of the origin of my sentence might contain interventionist possibilities?

Imperialism’s image as the establisher of the good society is marked by the espousal of the woman as object of protection from her own kind. How should one examine the dissimulation of patriarchal strategy, which apparently grants the woman free choice as subject? In other words, how does one make the move from "Britain" to "Hinduism"? Even the attempt shows that imperialism is not identical with chromatism, or mere prejudice against people of color. To approach this question, I will touch briefly on the Dharmasāstra (the sustaining scriptures) and the Rg-Veda (Praise Knowledge). They represent the archaic origin in my homology of freud. Of course, my treatment is not exhaustive. My readings are, rather, an interested and inexpert examination, by a postcolonial woman, of the fabrication of repression, a constructed counter-narrative of woman's consciousness, thus woman’s being, thus woman’s being good, thus the good woman’s desire, thus woman’s desire. Paradoxically, at the same time we witness the unfixed place of woman as a signifier in the inscription of the social individual.

The two moments in the Dharmasāstra that I am interested in are the discourse on sanctioned suicides and the nature of the rites for the dead.69 Framed in these two discourses, the self-immolation of widows seems an exception to the rule. The general scriptural doctrine is that suicide is reprehensible. Room is made, however, for certain forms of suicide which, as formulaic performance, lose the phenomenal identity of being suicide. The first category of sanctioned suicides arises out of tatavajñana, or the knowledge of truth. Here the knowing subject comprehends the insubstantiality or mere phenomenality (which may be the same thing as nonphenomenality) of its identity. At a certain point in time, tat tvā was interpreted as "that you," but even without that, tatva is thatness or quiddity. Thus, this enlightened self truly knows the "that"-ness of its identity. Its demotion of that identity is not atmabhāta (a killing of the self). The paradox of knowing of the limits of knowledge is that the strongest assertion of agency, to negate the possibility of agency, cannot be an example of itself. Curiously enough, the self-sacrifice of gods is sanctioned by natural ecology, useful for the working of the economy of Nature and the Universe, rather than by self-knowledge. In this logically anterior stage, inhabited by gods rather than human beings, of this particular chain of displacements, suicide and sacrifice (atmabhāta and atmadāna) seem as little distinct as an "interior" (self-knowledge) and an "exterior" (ecology) sanction.

This philosophical space, however, does not accommodate the self-immolating woman. For her we look where room is made to sanction suicides that cannot claim truth-knowledge as a state that is, at any rate, easily verifiable and belongs in the area of shruti (what was heard) rather than smṛiti (what is remembered). This exception to the general rule about suicide annuls the phenomenal identity of self-immolation if performed in certain places rather than in a certain state of enlightenment. Thus, we move from an interior sanction (truth-knowledge) to an exterior one (place of pilgrimage). It is possible for a woman to perform this type of (non)suicide.70
Yet even this is not the proper place for the woman to annul the proper name of suicide through the destruction of her proper self. For her alone is sanctioned self-immolation on a dead spouse's pyre. (The few male examples cited in Hindu antiquity of self-immolation on another's pyre, being proofs of enthusiasm and devotion to a master or superior, reveal the structure of domination within the rite). This suicide that is not suicide may be read as a simulacrum of both truth-knowledge and piety of place. If the former, it is as if the knowledge in a subject of its own insubstantiality and mere phenomenality is dramatized so that the dead husband becomes the exteriorized example and place of the extinguished subject and the widow becomes the (non)agent who "acts it out." If the latter, it is as if the metonym for all sacred places is now that burning bed of wood, constructed by elaborate ritual, where the woman's subject, legally displaced from herself, is being consumed. It is in terms of this profound ideology of the displaced place of the female subject that the paradox of free choice comes into play. For the male subject, it is the felicity of the suicide, a felicity that will annul rather than establish its status as such, that is noted. For the female subject, a sanctioned self-immolation, even as it takes away the effect of "fall" (pataka) attached to an unsanctioned suicide, brings praise for the act of choice on another register. By the inexorable ideological production of the sexed subject, such a death can be understood by the female subject as an exceptional signifier of her own desire, exceeding the general rule for a widow's conduct.

In certain periods and areas this exceptional rule became the general rule in a class-specific way. Ashis Nandy relates its marked prevalence in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Bengal to factors ranging from population control to communal misogyny. Certainly its prevalence there in the previous centuries was because in Bengal, unlike elsewhere in India, widows could inherit property. Thus, what the British see as poor victimized women going to the slaughter is in fact an ideological battleground. As P. V. Kane, the great historian of the Dharmasastra, has correctly observed: "In Bengal, [the fact that] the widow of a sonless member even in a joint Hindu family is entitled to practically the same rights over joint family property which her deceased husband would have had... must have frequently induced the surviving members to get rid of the widow by appealing at a most distressing hour to her devotion to and love for her husband" (HD II.2, 635).

Yet benevolent and enlightened males were and are sympathetic with the "courage" of the woman's free choice in the matter. They thus accept the production of the sexed subaltern subject: "Modern India does not justify the practice of sati, but it is a warped mentality that rebukes modern Indians for expressing admiration and reverence for the cool and unfaltering courage of Indian women in becoming satis or performing the jauhar for cherishing their ideals of womankind conduct" (HD II.2, 636). What Jean-Francois Lyotard has termed the "differend," the inaccessibility of, or untranslatable from, one mode of discourse in a dispute to another, is vividly illustrated here. As the discourse of which the British perceive as heathen ritual is sublated (but not, Lyotard would argue, translated) into what the British perceive as crime, one diagnosis of female free will is substituted for another.

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Of course, the self-immolation of widows was not invariable ritual prescription. If, however, the widow does decide thus to exceed the letter of ritual, to turn back is a transgression for which a particular type of penance is prescribed. With the local British police officer supervising the immolation, to be dissuaded after a decision was, by contrast, a mark of real free choice, a choice of freedom. The ambiguity of the position of the indigenous colonial elite is disclosed in the nationalistic romanticization of the purity, strength, and love of these self-sacrificing women. The two set pieces are Rabindranath Tagore's paean to the "self-renouncing paternal grandmothers of Bengal" and Ananda Coomaraswamy's eulogy of suttee as "this last proof of the perfect unity of body and soul."19

Obviously I am not advocating the killing of widows. I am suggesting that, within the two contending versions of freedom, the constitution of the female subject in life is the place of the differend. In the case of widow self-immolation, ritual is not being redefined as superstition but as crime. The gravity of sati was that it was ideologically cast as "reward," just as the gravity of imperialism was that it was ideologically cast as "social mission." Thompson's understanding of sati as "punishment" is thus far off the mark:

It may seem unjust and illogical that the Moguls, who freely impaled and flayed alive, or nationals of Europe, whose countries had such ferocious penal codes and had known, scarcely a century before suttee began to shock the English conscience, orgies of witch-burning and religious persecution, should have felt as they did about suttee. But the differences seemed to them this—the victims of their cruelties were tortured by a law which considered them offenders, whereas the victims of suttee were punished for no offense but the physical weakness which had placed them at man's mercy. The rite seemed to prove a depravity and arrogance such as no other human offense had brought to light.20

All through the mid- and late-eighteenth century, in the spirit of the codification of the law, the British in India collaborated and consulted with learned Brahmins to judge whether suttee was legal by their homogenized version of Hindu law. The collaboration was often idiosyncratic, as in the case of the significance of being dissuaded. Sometimes, as in the general Sāstric prohibition against the immolation of widows with small children, the British collaboration seems confused. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British authorities, and especially the British in England, repeatedly suggested that collaboration made it appear as if the British condemned this practice. When the law was finally written, the history of the long period of collaboration was effaced, and the language celebrated the noble Hindu who was against the bad Hindu, the latter given to savage atrocities:

The practice of Suttee... is revolting to the feeling of human nature... In many instances, acts of atrocity have been perpetrated, which have been shocking to
the Hindoos themselves. . . . Actuated by these considerations the Governor-General in Council, without intending to depart from one of the first and most important principles of the system of British Government in India that all classes of the people be secure in the observance of their religious usages, so long as that system can be adhered to without violation of the paramount dictates of justice and humanity, has deemed it right to establish the following rules. . . .

(HD II.2, 624-25)

That this was an alternative ideology of the graded sanctioning of suicide as exception, rather than its inscription as sin, was of course not understood. Perhaps sati should have been read with martyrdom, with the dead husband standing in for the transcendent One; or with war, with the husband standing in for sovereign or state, for whose sake an intoxicating ideology of self-sacrifice can be mobilized. In actuality, it was categorized with murder, infanticide, and the lethal exposure of the very old. The dubious place of the free will of the constituted sexed subject as female was successfully effaced. There is no itinerary we can retrace here. Since the other sanctioned suicides did not involve the scene of this constitution, they entered neither the ideological battleground at the archaic origin—the tradition of the Dharmasastras—nor the scene of the reinscription of ritual as crime—the British abolition. The only related transformation was Mahatma Gandhi's reinscription of the notion of satyagraha, or hunger strike, as resistance. But this is not the place to discuss the details of that sea-change. I would merely invite the reader to compare the auras of widow sacrifice and Gandhian resistance. The root in the first part of satyagraha and sati are the same.

Since the beginning of the Puranic era (ca. A.D. 400), learned Brahmanas debated the doctrinal appropriateness of sati as of sanctioned suicides in sacred places in general. (This debate still continues in an academic way.) Sometimes the cast provenance of the practice was in question. The general law for widows, that they should observe brahmacharya, was, however, hardly ever debated. It is not enough to translate brahmacharya as "celibacy." It should be recognized that, of the four ages of being in Hindu (or Brahmanical) regulative psychobiography, brahmacharya is the social practice anterior to the kinship inscription of marriage. The man—widower or husband—graduates through vānaprastha (forest life) into the mature celibacy and renunciation of samnyāsa (laying aside). The woman as wife is indispensable for gṛhasthya, or householdership, and may accompany her husband into forest life. She has no access (according to Brahmanical sanction) to the final celibacy of asceticism, or samnyāsa. The woman as widow, by the general law of sacred doctrine, must regress to an anteriority transformed into stasis. The institutional evils attendant upon this law are well known; I am considering its asymmetrical effect on the ideological formation of the sexed subject. It is thus of much greater significance that there was no debate on this nonexceptional fate of widows—either among Hindus or between Hindus and British—than that the exceptional prescription of self-immolation was actively contended. Here the possibility of

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recovering a (sexually) subaltern subject is once again lost and overdetermined.

This legally programmed asymmetry in the status of the subject, which effectively defines the woman as object of one husband, obviously operates in the interest of the legally symmetrical subject-status of the male. The self-immolation of the widow thereby becomes the extreme case of the general law rather than an exception to it. It is not surprising, then, to read of heavenly rewards for the sāti, where the quality of being the object of a unique possessor is emphasized by way of rivalry with other females, those ecstatic heavenly dancers, paragons of female beauty and male pleasure who sing her praise: "In heaven she, being soley devoted to her husband, and praised by groups of apsarās [heavenly dancers], sports with her husband as long as fourteen Indras rule" (HD II.2, 631).

The profound irony in locating the woman's free will in self-immolation is once again revealed in a verse accompanying the earlier passage: "As long as the woman [as wife: srī] does not burn herself in fire on the death of her husband, she is never released [mucyate] from her female body [strīsārtr—i.e., in the cycle of births]." Even as it operates the most stable general release from individual agency, the sanctioned suicide peculiar to woman draws its ideological strength by identifying individual agency with the supraindividual: kill yourself on your husband's pyre now, and you may kill your female body in the entire cycle of birth.

In a further twist of the paradox, this emphasis on free will establishes the peculiar misfortune of holding a female body. The word for the self that is actually burned is the standard word for spirit in the noblest sense (atmaṇ), while the verb "release," through the root for salvation in the noblest sense (muc → moska) is in the passive (mucyate), and the word for that which is annulled in the cycle of birth is the everyday word for the body. The ideological message writes itself in the benevolent twentieth-century male historian's admiration: "The Jauhar [group self-immolation of aristocratic Rajput war-widows or imminent war-widows] practiced by the Rajput ladies of Chitor and other places for saving themselves from unspeakable atrocities at the hands of the victorious Moslems are too well known to need any lengthy notice" (HD II.2, 629).

Although jauhar is not, strictly speaking, an act of sati, and though I do not wish to speak for the sanctioned sexual violence of conquering male armies, "Moslem" or otherwise, female self-immolation in the face of it is a legitimation of rape as "natural" and acts, in the long run, in the interest of unique genital possession of the female. The group rape perpetrated by the conquerors is a metonymic celebration of territorial acquisition. Just as the general law for widows was unquestioned, so this act of female heroism persists among the patriotic tales told to children, thus operating on the crudest level of ideological reproduction. It has also played a tremendous role, precisely as an overdetermined signifier, in acting out Hindu communalism. Simultaneously, the broader question of the constitution of the sexed subject is hidden by foregrounding the visible violence of sati. The task of recovering a (sexually) subaltern subject is lost in an institutional textuality at the archaic origin.

As I mentioned above, when the status of the legal subject as property-holder could be temporarily bestowed on the female relict, the self-immolation of widows was stringently enforced. Raghunandana, the late
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good woman’s desire, thus woman’s desire. This slippage can be seen in the fracture inscribed in the very word sati, the feminine form of sat. Sat transcends any gender-specific notion of masculinity and moves up not only into human but spiritual universality. It is the present participle of the verb “to be” and as such means not only being but the True, the Good, the Right. In the sacred texts it is essence, universal spirit. Even as a prefix it indicates appropriate, felicitous, fit. It is noble enough to have entered the most privileged discourse of modern Western philosophy: Heidegger’s meditation on Being. Sati, the feminine of this word, simply means “good wife.”

It is now time to disclose that sati or sutee as the proper name of the rite of widow self-immolation commemorates a grammatical error on the part of the British, quite as the nomenclature “American Indian” commemorates a factual error on the part of Columbus. The word in the various Indian languages is “the burning of the sati” or the good wife, who thus escapes the regressive stasis of the widow in brahmacarya. This exemplifies the race-class-gender overdeterminations of the situation. It can perhaps be caught even when it is flattened out: white men, seeking to save brown women from brown men, impose upon those women a greater ideological constrictions by absolutely identifying, within discursive practice, good-wifehood with self-immolation on the husband’s pyre. On the other side of thus constituting the object, the abolition (or removal) of which will provide the occasion for establishing a good, as distinguished from merely civil, society, is the Hindu manipulation of female subject-constitution which I have tried to discuss.

(Here I have already mentioned Edward Thompson’s Sutee, published in 1928. I cannot do justice here to this perfect specimen of the justification of imperialism as a civilizing mission. Nowhere in his book, written by someone who avowedly “loves India,” is there any questioning of the “beneficial ruthlessness” of the British in India as motivated by territorial expansionism or management of industrial capital. The problem with his book is, indeed, a problem of representation, the construction of a continuous and homogeneous “India” in terms of heads of state and British administrators, from the perspective of “a man of good sense” who would be the transparent voice of reasonable humanity. “India” can then be represented, in the other sense, by its imperial masters. The reason for referring to sutee here is Thompson’s finessing of the word sati as “faithful” in the very first sentence of his book, an inaccurate translation which is nonetheless an English permit for the insertion of the female subject into twentieth-century discourse.)

Consider Thompson’s praise for General Charles Harvey’s appreciation of the problem of sati: “Harvey has a passage which brings out the pity of the system which looked only for prettiness and constancy in woman. He obtained the names of satis who had died on the pyres of Bikanir Rajas; they were such names as: Ray Queen, Sun-ray, Love’s Delight, Garland, Virtue Found, Echo, Soft Eye, Comfort, Moonbeam, Love-Jorn, Dear Heart, Eye-play, Arbour-born, Smile, Love-bud, Glad Omen, Mist-clad, or Cloud-sprung—the last a favourite name.” Once again, imposing the upper-class Victorian’s typical demands upon “his woman” (his preferred phrase), Thompson appropriates the Hindu woman as his to save against the “system.” Bikaner is in Rajasthan; and any discussion of widow-burnings of...
Rajasthan, especially within the ruling class, was intimately linked to the positive or negative construction of Hindu (or Aryan) communalism.

A look at the pathetically misspelled names of the satis of the artisanal, peasant, village-priestly, moneylender, clerical, and comparable social groups in Bengal, where satis were most common, would not have yielded such a harvest (Thompson’s preferred adjective for Bengalis is “imbecilic”), Or perhaps it would. There is no more dangerous pastime than transposing proper names into common nouns, translating them, and using them as sociological evidence. I attempted to reconstruct the names on that list and began to feel Hervey-Thompson’s arrogance. What, for instance, might “Comfort” have been? Was it “Shanti”? Readers are reminded of the last line of T. S. Eliot’s Waste Land. There the word bears the mark of India—the grandeur of the ecumenical Upanishads. Or was it “Swasti”? Readers are reminded of the swastika, the Brahmanic ritual mark of domestic comfort (as in “God Bless Our Home”) stereotyped into a criminal parody of Aryan hegemony. Between these two appropriations, where is our pretty and constant burnt widow? The aura of the names owes more to writers like Edward FitzGerald, the “translator” of the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam who helped to construct a certain picture of the Oriental woman through the supposed “objectivity” of translation, than to sociological exactitude. (Said’s Orientalism, 1978, remains the authoritative text here.) By this sort of reckoning, the translated proper names of a random collection of contemporary French philosophers or boards of directors of prestigious southern U.S. corporations would give evidence of a ferocious investment in an archangelic and hagiocentric theology. Such sleights of pen can be perpetuated on “common nouns” as well, but the proper name is most susceptible to the trick. And it is the British trick with sati that we are discussing. After such a taming of the subject, Thompson can write, under the heading “The Psychology of the ‘Sati,’” “I had intended to try to examine this; but the truth is, it has ceased to seem a puzzle to me.”

Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but into a violent shutting which is the displaced figuration of the “third-world woman” caught between tradition and modernization. These considerations would revise every detail of judgments that seem valid for a history of sexuality in the West: “Such would be the property of repression, that which distinguishes it from the prohibitions maintained by simple penal law: repression functions well as a sentence to disappear, but also as an injunction to silence, affirmation of non-existence; and consequently states that of all this there is nothing to say, to see, to know.” The case of suttee as exemplum of the woman-in-imperialism would challenge and deconstruct this opposition between subject (law) and object-of-knowledge (repression) and mark the place of “disappearance” with something other than silence and nonexistence, a violent aporia between subject and object status.

Sati as a woman’s proper name is in fairly widespread use in India today. Naming a female infant “a good wife” has its own proleptic irony, and the irony is all the greater because this sense of the common noun is not the primary operator in the proper name. Behind the naming of the infant is the Sati of Hindu mythology, Durga in her manifestation as a good wife. In part of the story, Sati—she is already called that—arrives at her father’s court uninvited, in the absence, even, of an invitation for her divine husband Siva. Her father starts to abuse Siva and Sati dies in pain. Siva arrives in a fury and dances over the universe with Sati’s corpse on his shoulder. Visnu dismembers her body and bits are strewn over the earth. Around each such relic bit is a great place of pilgrimage.

Figures like the goddess Athena—“father’s daughters self-possessedly uncontaminated by the womb”—are useful for establishing women’s ideological self-debasement, which is to be distinguished from a deconstructive attitude toward the essentialist subject. The story of the mythic Sati, reversing every narrateme of the rite, performs a similar function: the living husband avenges the wife’s death, a transaction between great male gods fails the destruction of the female body and thus inscribes the earth as sacred geography. To see this as proof of the feminism of classical Hinduism or of Indian culture as goddess-centered and therefore feminist is as ideologically contaminated by nativism or reverse ethnocentrism as it was imperialist to erase the image of the luminous fighting Mother Durga and invest the proper noun Sati with no significance other than the ritual burning of the helpless widow as sacrificial offering who can then be saved. There is no space from which the sexed subaltern subject can speak.

If the oppressed under socialized capital have no necessarily unmediated access to “correct” resistance, can the ideology of sati, coming from the history of the periphery, be slotted into any model of interventionist practice? Since this essay operates on the notion that all such clear-cut nostalgias for lost origins are suspect, especially as grounds for counterhegemonic ideological production, I must proceed by way of an example. (The example I offer here is not a plea for some violent Hindu sisterhood of self-destruction. The definition of the British Indian as Hindu in Hindu law is one of the marks of the ideological war of the British against the Islamic Mughal rulers of India; a significant skirmish in that as yet unfinished war was the division of the subcontinent. Moreover, in my view, individual examples of this sort are tragic failures as models of interventionist practice, since I question the production of models as such. On the other hand, as objects of discourse analysis for the non-self-abdicating intellectual, they can illuminate a section of the social text, in however haphazard a way.)

A young woman of sixteen or seventeen, Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri, hanged herself in her father’s modest apartment in North Calcutta in 1926. The suicide was a puzzle since, as Bhuvaneswari was menstruating at the time, it was clearly not a case of illicit pregnancy. Nearly a decade later, it was discovered that she was a member of one of the many groups involved in the armed struggle for Indian independence. She had finally been entrusted with a political assassination. Unable to confront the task and yet aware of the practical need for trust, she killed herself.

Bhuvaneswari had known that her death would be diagnosed as the outcome of illegitimate passion. She had therefore waited for the onset of menstruation. While waiting, Bhuvanesari, the brahmacharini who was no doubt looking forward to good wifehood, perhaps rewrote the social text of sati-suicide in an interventionist way. (One tentative explanation of her inexplicable act had been a possible melancholia brought on by her brother-in-law’s repeated taunts that she was too old to be not-yet-a-wife.) She gen-
eralized the sanctioned motive for female suicide by taking immense trouble to displace (not merely deny), in the physiological inscription of her body, its imprisonment within legitimate passion by a single male. In the immediate context, her act became absurd, a case of delirium rather than sanity. The displacing gesture—waiting for menstruation—is at first a reversal of the interdict against a menstruating widow’s right to immolate herself; the unclothed widow must wait, publicly, until the cleansing bath of the fourth day, when she is no longer menstruating, in order to claim her dubious privilege.

In this reading, Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri’s suicide is an unemphatic, ad hoc, subaltern rewriting of the social text of sati-suicide as much as the hegemonic account of the blazing, fighting, familial Durga. The emergent dissenting possibilities of that hegemonic account of the fighting mother are well documented and popularly well remembered through the discourse of the male leaders and participants in the independence movement. The subaltern as female cannot be heard or read.

I know of Bhuvaneswari’s life and death through family connections. Before investigating them more thoroughly, I asked a Bengali woman, a philosopher and Sanskritist whose early intellectual production is almost identical to mine, to start the process. Two responses: (a) Why, when her two sisters, Sati swari and Raseswari, led such full and wonderful lives, are you interested in the hapless Bhuvaneswari? (b) I asked her niece.

It appears that it was a case of illicit love.

I have attempted to use and go beyond Derridean deconstruction, which I do not celebrate as feminism as such. However, in the context of the problematic I have addressed, I find his morphology much more painstaking and useful than Foucault’s and Deleuze’s immediate, substantive involvement with more “political” issues—the latter’s invitation to “become woman”—which can make their influence more dangerous for the U.S. academic as enthusiastic radical. Derrida marks radical critique with the danger of appropriating the other by assimilation. He reads catastrophe at the origin. He calls for a rewriting of the utopian structural impulse as “rendering delirious that interior voice that is the voice of the other in us.” I must here acknowledge a long-term usefulness in Jacques Derrida which I seem no longer to find in the authors of The History of Sexuality and Mille Plateaux.

The subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with “woman” as a pious item. Representation has withered away. The female intellectual as intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disown with a flourish.

**Notes**

1. I am grateful to Khachig Tololyan for a painstaking first reading of this essay.
3. Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 205-17 (hereafter cited as FD). I have modified the English version of this, as of other English translations, where faultiness remained to the original seemed to demand it.
4. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
   It is important to note that the greatest “influence” of Western European intellectuals upon U.S. professors and students happens through collections of essays rather than long books in translation. And, in those collections, it is understandably the more topical pieces that are given the currency. (Derrida’s “Structure, Sign, and Play” is a case in point.) From the perspective of theoretical production and ideological reproducion, therefore, the conversation under consideration has not necessarily been superseded.
   This is part of a much broader symptom, as Eric Wolf discusses in Europe and the People without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
   The exchange with Jacques-Alain Miller in PK ("The Confession of the Flitch") is revealing in this respect.
   Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, pp. 132-33.
   For one example among many see PK, p. 98.
   It is not surprising, then, that Foucault’s work, early and late, is supported by too simple a notion of repression. Here the impression that the antagonist is Freud, not Marx. "I have the impression that the notion of repression is wholly inadequate to the analysis of the mechanisms and effects of power that it so pervasively used to characterize today (PK, 92)." The delicacy and subtlety of Freud’s suggestion—that under repression the phenomenal identity of effects is individual—implies that something unpleasant can be desired as pleasure, thus radically reinscribing the relationship between desire and interest—seems quite defeated here. For an elaboration of this notion of repression, see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 88f. (hereafter cited as OG), and Derrida, Limited Inc.: abc, trans. Samuel Weber, Glyph 2 (1977), p. 215.
   Althusser’s version of this particular situation may be too schematic, but it nevertheless seems more careful in its program than the argument under study. "Class-institution," Althusser writes, "is subjective and spontaneous. Class-position is objective and rational. To arrive at proletarian class positions, the class instinct of proletarians only needs to be educated; the class instinct of the petty bourgeoisie, and hence of intellectuals, has, on the contrary, to be revolutionized" (Lenin and Philosophy, p. 13).
   Foucault’s subsequent explanation (PK, 145) of this Deleuzian statement comes closer to Derrida’s notion that theory cannot be an exhaustive taxonomy and is always formed by practice.
   Cf. the surprisingly uncritical notions of representation entertained in PK, pp. 141, 188. My remarks concluding this paragraph, criticizing intellectuals’ representations of subaltern groups, should be rigorously distinguished from a coalition politics that takes into account its framing within socialized capital and unifies people not because they are oppressed but because they are exploited. This model works best within a parliamentary democracy, where representation is not only enhanced but elaborately staged.
   Marx, Capital, I, p. 302.
   See the excellent short definition and discussion of common sense in Errol Lawrence, "Just Plain Common Sense: The 'Roots' of Racism," in Havel Z. Carby et al., The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1982), p. 48.
   "Use value" in Marx can be shown to be a "theoretical fiction"—as much of a potential oxymoron as "natural exchange." I have attempted to develop this in Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value; a manuscript under consideration by Diacritics.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).
Guha, Studies, I, p. 4.
Guha, Studies, I, p. 8 (all but the first set of italics are the author's).

This violence in the general sense that is the possibility of an episteme is what Derrida calls "writing" in the general sense. The relationship between writing in the general sense and writing in the narrow sense (marks upon a surface) cannot be cleanly articulated. The task of grammar (deconstruction) is to provide a notation upon this shifting relationship in a certain way, then, the critique of imperialism is deconstruction as such.
"Contracting Poverty," Multinational Monitor, 4, no. 8 (Aug. 1983), p. 8. This report was contributed by John Cavanaugh and Joy Hackel, who work on the international Corporations Project at the Institute for Policy Studies (itals are mine).
The mechanics of the invention of the Third World as signifier are susceptible to the type of analysis effected by the constitutes of race as a signifier in Carby, Empire.
Anderson, In the Tracks, p. 52.
Even in such excellent texts of reportage and analysis as Gail Omvedt's We Will Smash This Pratol Indian Women in Struggle (London: Zed Press, 1980), the assumption that a group of Mahasarakshen women in an urban proletarian situation, reacting to a radical white woman who had "thrown in like a hired hand with the Indian destiny," is representative of "Indian women" or touches the question of "female consciousness in India" is not harmless when taken up within a first-world social formation where the proliferation of communication in an internationally hegemonic language makes alternative accounts and testimonies instantly accessible even to underdoubtedly.
Norma Chinchilla's observation, made at a panel on "Third World Feminisms: Differences in Form and Content," (UCLA, Mar. 8, 1983), that antiaesthetics work in the Indian context is not genuinely counterculture but anfeudal, is another case in point. This permits definitions of sexism to emerge only after a society has entered the capitalistic mode of production, thus making capitalism and patriarchy continuously continuous. It also invokes the vexed question of the role of the "Asian" mode of production in sustaining the explanatory power of the Western narrativization of history through the account of modes of production, in however sophisticated a manner history is construed.
The curious role of the proper name "Asia" in this matter does not remain confined to profit or disposal of the empirical existence of the actual mode (a problem that became the object of intense maneuvering within international communism) but remains crucial even in the work of such theoretical subtlety and importance as Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst's Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production (London: Routledge, 1975) and Fredric Jameson's Political Unconscious. Especially in Jameson, where the morphologies of modes of production is rescued from all suspicion of historical determinism and anchored to a post-

21 Marx, Capital, I, p. 128.
22 I am aware that the relationship between Marxism and neo-Kantianism is a politically fraught one. I do not myself see how a concrete line can be established between Marx's own texts and the Kantian ethical moment. It does seem to me, however, that Marx's questioning of the human as agent of history should be read in the context of the breakup of the individual subject inaugurated by Kant's critique of Descartes.
25 Paul Bové, "Intelligentsia at War: Michel Foucault and the Analysis of Power," Sub-Stance, 30/37 (1983), p. 44.
26 Carby, Empire, p. 34.
27 This argument developed further in Spivak, 'Scattered Speculations.' Once again, he Anaxagorus did not ignore the economic text, although the treatment was perhaps to allegorical. In this respect, the move from schizo- to psychoanalysis is Millet plateau (Paris: Seuil, 1980) has not been salutary.
29 Although I consider Fredric Jameson's Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Social Symbol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) to be a text of great critical weight, or perhaps because I do so, I would like my program here to be distinguished from one of restoring the relics of a privileged narrative: "It is in detecting the traces of that interrupted narrative, in restoring to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamentally historical, that the doctrine of a political unconscious finds its function and its necessity." (p. 20).
32 Keir, one of the compilers of the Vedic index, author of Sanskrit Drama in its Origin, Development, Theory, and Practice, and the learned editor of the Kritayavajya for Harvard University Press, was also the editor of four volumes of Selected Speeches and Documents of British Colonial Policy (1763 to 1937), of International Affairs (1918 to 1937), and of the British Dominions (1918 to 1931). He wrote books on the sovereignty of British dominions and on the theory of state succession, with special reference to English and colonial law.
36 Holographic letter from G. A. Jacob to an unnamed correspondent) attached to inside front cover of the Memorial Library (Yale University) copy of Colonel G. A. Jacob, ed., The Maharashtraya-Upanishad of the Athanasia-Veda. With the Dipika of Narnaya (Bombay: Government Central Books Department, 1868); italics mine. The dark implication of this learning by way of anonymous aberrants consolidates the asymmetry.
39 Their publications are: Subaltern Studies I: Writing on South Asian History and Society, ed. Ranajit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982). Subaltern Studies II: Writings on South Asian History and Society, ed. Ranajit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press), 1983; and Ranajit
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Here, as well as for the Brahman debate over sesi, see Mani, “Production;” pp. 71f.

We are speaking here of the regulative norms of Brahmanism, rather than “things as they were.” See Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India, trans. J. D. M. Dorret (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 46.

Both the vestigial possibility of widow remarriage in ancient India and the legal institution of widow remarriage in 1856 are transactions among men. Widow remarriage is very much an exception, perhaps because it left the program of subject-formation untouched. In all the “true” cases of widow remarriage, it is the father and the husband who are appurtenant for their reformist courage and selflessness.

Sir Monier Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), p. 552. Historians are often impatient if modernists seem to be attempting to import “feminist” judgments into ancient patriarchies. The real question is, of course, why structures of patriarchal domination should be unquestioningly recorded. Historical sanctions for collective action toward social justice can only be developed if people outside of the discipline question standards of “objectivity” preserved as such by the hegemonic tradition. It does not seem appropriate to notice that so “objective” an instrument as a dictionary can use the deeply sexist expression “rise up to a deceased husband.”


I am grateful to Professor Alison Finley of Trinity College (Hartford, Conn.) for discussing the passage with me. Professor Finley is an expert on the Rg-veda. I hasten to add that she would find my readings as irresponsibly “erito-critical” as the ancient historian would find it “modernist” (see note 60).


Thompson, Suttee, p. 37.

Thompson, Suttee, p. 15. For the status of the proper name as “mark,” see Derrida, “Taking Chances.”

Thompson, Suttee, p. 137.


The fact that the word was also used as a form of address for a well-born woman (“lady”) complicates matters.

It should be remembered that this account does not exhaust her many manifestations within the text.

A position against nostalgia as a basis of counterhegemonic ideological production does not endorse its negative use. Within the complexity of contemporary political economy, it would, for example, be highly questionable to urge that the current Indian working-class crime of burning brides who bring insufficient dowries and of subsequent disposal of the murdered bride is suicide is either a use or abuse of the tradition of sat-suicide. The most that can be claimed is that it is a displacement on a chain of semiosis with the female subject as signifier, which would lead us back into the narrative we have been unraveling. Clearly, one must work to step the crime of bride burning in every way. If, however, that work is accomplished by unexamined nostalgia or its opposite, it will assist actively in the substitution of race/ethnicity or sheer genitalism as a signifier in the place of the female subject.

I had not read Peter Dews, “Power and Subjectivity in Foucault,” New Left Review, 144 (1984), until I finished this essay. I look forward to his book on the same topic. There are many points in common between his critique and mine. However, as far as I can tell from the bourgeois historians, they write from a perspective unconditioned by critical theory, and not interested in the norm that can all too easily exchange “individual” for “subject” in its siting of the “epistemological subject.” Dews’s reading of the connection between “Marxist tradition” and the “autonomous subject” is not mine. Further, his account of “the impasse of the second phase of poststructuralism as a whole” is vitiated by his nonconsideration of Derrida, who is against the privileging of language from his earliest work, the “Introduction” in Edmund Husserl, The Origin of Geometry, trans. John Leavy (Stony Brook, N.Y.: Nicolas Hays, 1969). What sets his excellent analysis apart from my concern is, of course, that the Subject within whose History he places Foucault’s work is the Subject of the European tradition (pp. 87, 94).

diminished expectations’ of social democracy, neo-corporatism and social partnership, is the construction at the national level of what Streeck (1996, p. 311) terms ‘coalitions to modernize’ the national economy, with all other political objectives subordinate to that of increasing national competitiveness.

Post-social democratic coalition building can draw on the institutionalism and economic nationalism of labour movements prevented from acting at the supranational level by lack of state capacity and employer interlocutors. It may also count on the employers, whose main interest is to forestall supranational state formation and economic intervention; who therefore benefit from labour being contained in national political circuits; and who can be certain that, in the face of external competitive pressures and because of their capacity to exit, they will be the alliance’s senior partners. Finally, national governments can hope to increase their support from both business and labour for defending joint national interests in the international arena, thereby defending their own legitimacy as well as further reinforcing the national organization of politics and the intergovernmental character of international economic governance. (Streeck 1996a: 311)

Despite their obvious differences, these two governmental responses are by no means mutually exclusive. For one thing, it is still the case that the globalization hypothesis provides a discursive framework in relation to which both sets of policies are pursued. As Streeck has argued in another context, the globalization hypothesis ‘discriminates against modes of economic governance that require public intervention ... it favours national systems like those in the United States and Britain that historically relied less on public–political and more on private–contractual economic governance’ (quoted in Milner 1996).

To this extent, it comes as no surprise to learn that the competitive coalition-building model is in many respects as dependent on the voluntarism of the marketplace as the neo-liberal deregulation model.

Under both, national governments refrain from imposing obligations on market participants, especially business, as much as possible, either because they believe that market intervention is by its very nature dysfunctional, or because they are legally obliged by international treaty to restrict such public intervention to the creation of incentives and the removal of deterrents for mobile investors. At the same time, nationally based democracy in both models is constrained by a presumed need not only to respond to competitive pressures before responding to citizen’s democratic demands – or to interpret the latter in terms of a technically correct response to the former – but also to make sure that it stays within the boundaries of the rules and regulations imposed on national economic decision-making by intergovern-

mental agreement. As constraints on national economic intervention become more severe, ‘national governments ... become dependent on the voluntarism of the marketplace, having lost recourse to the “hard law” that used to be the main tool of state interventionism in the past’ (Streeck 1996b, p. 311).

While the main tenets of this discourse of economic globalization have been subject to extensive and largely convincing critique, important economic and political decisions continue to be taken in their name. The effect of this is to make the system of international economic governance that is developing – one dominated, in Streeck’s terms, by ‘the voluntarism of the marketplace’ – increasingly difficult to buck. Far from increasing the likelihood of an alternative system of governance emerging, one capable of civilizing and domesticking rampant market forces, current developments seem to be effectively negating this possibility. The danger, as Stuart Hall (1997b) has indicated on a number of occasions, is that what we’ve got is what we may be stuck with for the foreseeable future and that this is far less than is needed to ensure that contemporary economies are viable social as well as economic entities.

Notes

1. In sociology and cultural studies, as Doreen Massey (1996: 8) has argued, the most characteristic presence of this discourse is as an iconic summary of ‘economic globalization’ in the opening paragraphs of a treatise on something more ‘social’ or ‘cultural’. At its worst it becomes something of a mantra: CNN, McDonald’s, Sony, time/space compression, local/global, information flows, the internet, all these characteristic names, words and phrases make an obligatory appearance.

What is puzzling and disturbing about this is the case with which scholars otherwise committed to various forms of contractionist analysis grant a particular vision of globalization the status of ‘fact’. As Massey (1996: 9) points out, it is almost as if the ‘economic’ has once again become the essential, if now largely unacknowledged, backdrop to other stories. There is, we assume, before going on to recount the complex results of our own researches, this sort of economic globalization. This is a dodgy move. Not only because it involves the re-introduction, by omission, of a sort of economism, but also because the acceptance by omission of a particular version of economic globalization brings other effects in its wake. Most notably, it bestows authority and validity upon a vision of globalization that is not so much a description of the way things are as an image in which the world is being remade.

2. The texts I draw upon and refer to here are largely Anglo-American in origin. However, the discourses they articulate can be observed to have structured policy initiatives in national contexts from Canada to Australia and to