Contents

1 Identity Blues
   Ien Ang
   1

2 Sociology and the Metaphorical Tiger
   Michèle Barrett
   14

3 Resisting Left Melancholia
   Wendy Brown
   21

4 Agencies of Style for a Liminal Subject
   Judith Butler
   30

5 The State of War and the State of Hybridization
   Néstor García Canclini
   38

6 Critical Dialogues on Chicana/o Cultural Studies
   Angie Chabram-Dernersesian
   53

7 At the End of This Sentence a Sail Will Unfurl . . .
   Modernities, Musics and the Journey of Identity
   Iain Chambers
   67

8 Unfinished Business? Struggles over the Social in Social
   Welfare
   John Clarke
   83

9 Taking Identity Politics Seriously: 'The Contradictory,
   Stony Ground . . .'
   James Clifford
   94

10 Representing 'Globalization': Notes on the Discursive
   Orderings of Economic Life
   Paul du Gay
   113

11 The Sugar You Stir . . .
   Paul Gilroy
   126
teaches us anything it is that culture is involved in all those practices and processes that carry meaning for us, that need to be meaningfully interpreted by others, or that depend upon meaning for their effective operation.

So does this exclude the ‘economic’? Of course it does not. For ‘economic’ processes and practices, in all their plurality, whether we refer to management techniques for restructuring the conduct of business, contemporary strategies for advertising goods and services, or everyday interactions between service employees and their customers, depend upon meaning for their effects and have particular cultural conditions of existence (Hall 1997a; du Gay et al. 1996; du Gay 1996, 1997). Meaning is produced at ‘economic’ sites (at work, in shops) and circulated through economic processes and practices (through economists’ models of how economies or organizations work, through adverts, marketing materials and the very design of products) no less than in other domains of existence in contemporary societies.

Let us think for a moment about that object we refer to as ‘the economy’. How do we actually go about managing that entity? Obviously, one of the first things we need to do is to build a clear(ish) picture of what an economy looks like. We need to ask ourselves what are its main components and how do these work? In other words, before one can seek to manage something called an ‘economy’, it is first necessary to conceptualize or represent a set of processes as an ‘economy’ that are amenable to management. We need, therefore, a discourse of the economy and this discourse, like any other, will depend upon a particular mode of representation: the elaboration of a language for conceiving of and hence constructing an object in a certain way so that that object can then be deliberated about and acted upon. Discourses of the economy, like any other sort, carry meaning.

In this piece, I want briefly to try to ‘do’ the sort of ‘cultural economy’ that Stuart Hall has undertaken to such effect. I take as my object a particular discourse of economic globalization and seek to explore, in a suitably ramified manner, how this discourse problematizes the ways in which economic security is to be obtained under conditions of extreme uncertainty. In particular, I focus on the ways in which this discourse of economic globalization simultaneously defines the circumstances in which states, organizations and persons find themselves and advocates particular mechanisms through which their economic security might conceivably be obtained under those circumstances.

**Imagining ‘Economic Globalization’**

‘Globalization’ has become possibly the most fashionable concept in the social sciences, a core axiom in the prescriptions of management consultants, and a central element of contemporary political debate. As Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996: 1) have indicated, it is widely asserted that we live in an era in which the greater part of social life is determined by global processes, in which national cultures, national economies and national borders are dissolving. Central to this assertion is the notion of a truly globalized economy. The emergence of such an entity, it is claimed, makes distinct national economies and, therefore, domestic strategies of national economic management irrelevant. The world economy is increasingly globalized in its basic dynamics, it is dominated by uncontrollable market forces, and it has as its principal economic actors and strategic agents of change truly transnational corporations, which owe allegiance to no nation-state and locate wherever in the world that market advantage dictates (Angell 1995; Ohmae 1990, 1993; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Reich 1990, 1992). This representation of ‘globalization’ connects with the most diverse outlooks and social interests. It covers the political spectrum from left to right, and it is endorsed in several, diverse academic disciplines – from international relations to management science, and from sociology to cultural studies.1

Indeed, the concept of ‘globalization’ has achieved such widespread exposure and has become such a powerful explanatory device and guide to action that it sometimes appears almost unquestionable. Certainly its effects have been pronounced. As Hirst and Thompson (1996) have also suggested, one effect of the dominance of this representation of contemporary economic life has been the effective paralysis of racial reforming national strategies, which have been seemingly unavoidable in the face of the judgement and sanction of global markets.

Although there continues to be considerable academic debate about precisely how far and in what respects economic and other activities are actually ‘globalizing’ (as opposed to ‘internationalizing’, for example) (Boyer and Drache 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Lane 1995) there can be no doubt that this dominant conception of the problem of globalization has played a crucial role in transforming the character of Western governments’ perceptions of the ways in which their own national economies should be managed, with consequent changes in these governments’ understandings of the relations between economic activity and other aspects of the life of a national community.
In other words, regardless of what one might think of this ‘globalization’ hypothesis, an awful lot of things are being done in its name.

In the rest of this chapter I want briefly to delineate some of the ways in which this particular discourse of ‘globalization’ comes to problematize conduct in a diverse range of sites, and to indicate some of the mechanisms through which authorities of various sorts seek to shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct of institutions and persons in the name of making ‘globalization’ manageable.²

Globalization and National Economic Security

If the widespread consensus of the 1950s and 1960s was that the future belonged to a capitalism without losers, securely managed by national governments acting in concert, then the late 1980s and 1990s have been dominated by a consensus based on the opposite set of assumptions: namely, that global markets are basically uncontrollable and that ‘the only way to avoid becoming a loser – whether as a nation, an organization, or an individual – is to be as competitive as possible’ (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 6; see also Krugman 1996).

This zero-sum conception has serious implications for the ways in which states are encouraged to view their own security, for example. Of course, security, and security of economic activity in particular, is a primary concern for any state. What the discourse of ‘globalization’ problematizes is the ways in which security is to be obtained under conditions of extreme uncertainty. Indeed, the discourse of globalization both defines the circumstances in which states find themselves and advocates particular mechanisms through which security might conceivably be obtained under those circumstances.

Simply stated, nation-states embedded in (what is represented as) an increasingly competitive global market and hence exposed to (what are represented as) supranationally ungovernable economic forces are encouraged to guarantee their survival through devolving responsibility for the ‘economy’ to ‘the market’ – using what remains of their public powers of intervention to limit, as it were constitutionally, the claims that politics can make on the economy, and citizens on the polity. Wolfgang Streeck (1996a: 307), for example, testifies to the power of the discourse of globalization when he writes that ‘in many countries today, disengagement of politics from the economy is defended with reference to constraints of economic internationalization that would frustrate any other economic strategy’.

In place of a representation of the national economy as a resource, and therefore as contributing to the well-being of the national com-
Representing ‘Globalization’:
Notes on the Discursive Orderings
of Economic Life
Paul du Gay

In the early days of her first government Margaret Thatcher spelled out the evangelical ambition of her political programme. ‘Economics is the method,’ she said. ‘The aim is to change the soul.’ In The Hard Road to Renewal (1988), Stuart Hall traced the imbrication of these economic and moral strands that produced the ‘enterprise culture’ as the symbol and goal of Thatcherism. In so doing, he indicated how the discursive, or meaning, dimension is one of the constitutive conditions for the operation of economic strategies. That the ‘economic’, so to speak, could not operate or have ‘real’ effects without ‘culture’ or outside of meaning or discourse.

Despite Stuart’s (1996) insistence – and the example provided by his own work – that the (positive) rejection of ‘economism’ attendant on taking the ‘cultural’ or ‘discursive’ turn does not need to and, indeed, must not result in a flight from the ‘economic’ (or, by the same token, presage a return to a thoroughly acultural ‘political economy’), something akin to such a flight does appear to have taken place in recent years. At one level, this is not too surprising. The move towards a greater engagement with the cultural turn within the social and human sciences was obviously bound to pass over its own logics of inclusion and exclusion, just as economism had. However, in an era in which economics has been heralded as offering an approach capable in principle of addressing the totality of human behaviour and in which more and more domains of existence have found themselves reimagined as forms of the economy, the costs of such marginalization seem increasingly difficult to bear.

And, what’s more, there are no good reasons why they should be borne. As Stuart (1997a) has consistently argued, if the ‘cultural turn’
philosophical logic that is one piece of the conceptual groundwork of cultural studies. This logic not only erases the real but defines every possibility as a social construction.

The logic of temporality is perhaps the most powerfully articulated and the most resonant logic constitutive of modern thought. Not only does the modern embody a specific temporalising logic and a specific temporality, the relationship goes deeper, for at the heart of modern thought and power lie two assumptions: that space and time are separable, and that time is more fundamental than space. While many would locate the beginning of modern philosophy in the Cartesian problematic of the relation between the individual and reality (or truth) which was ‘solved’ by postulating the existence of a self-reflecting consciousness, it is, I believe, the Kantian solution which opened up the space of modern thought. Kant identified this consciousness with the mediating position of experience (giving rise to both phenomenological and structural theories of culture and knowledge). This privileging of consciousness (beyond Descartes’s) as the ‘space’ (only metaphorically of course) of the mediation of opposition depended upon two identifications: of opposition with mediation (later dialectics, and still later, difference), and of subjectivity with temporality. Only thus was consciousness capable of appropriating the other in order to totalise and transcend consciousness. The unity of the subject depended upon the unity of time. Moreover, this meant that reality itself, at least insofar as it was available in any sense to human beings, and hence in any sense other than purely speculative and metaphysical (which of course was excluded from the domains of knowledge and philosophy), was itself temporal. This was of course only the beginning: Hegel and Marx made reality essentially historical, while Heidegger made it into temporality itself.

Getting out of the modern?

My argument is rather simple: the articulation of these two logics has made it difficult, if not impossible, for modern thought in general and for cultural studies in particular to theorise globalisation as a spatial economy which has its effects in and on the real. Only by challenging these logics can the question of the specificity of contemporary forms of globalisation be raised and theorised. But this requires formulating alternatives to the logics of mediation and of temporality. I propose two related moves: from a logic of mediation to a logic of productivity, and from a logic of temporality to a logic of spatiality. The aim of such a proposal is to suggest that we explore the concrete ways in which different machines or apparatuses of power produce the specific spaces of power that constitute not only specific technologies, conjunctures or formations, but also specific forms of globalisation as well as specific possible articulations of the local and the global.

By a productive logic, I do not simply mean that power, rather than repressing some already existing reality, constitutes its object. Rather I mean that power produces the real, as I shall explain shortly. Thus, even at the level of specific relations of power, ‘The question . . . is not whether the status of women, or those on the bottom, is better or worse, but the type of organisation from which that status results’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Productive machines or apparatuses offer a different view of agency, one which is opposed to mechanical, organic as well as subjective concepts. That is, agency is disarticulated from any notion of subjectivity. Productivity here is neither active nor passive but an indication of what might be called ‘the middle voice’. It is a matter of reality producing itself as the very being of both reality and power. In that sense, the logic of productivity is already deeply implicated in metaphysical questions, for it takes reality to be both real (productive) and contingent (produced). It assumes that the production of reality is the practice of power, that reality is nothing but the effects of its own articulation (as becoming or transformations). And consequently, the logic of productivity means that reality cannot be bracketed out from cultural studies, nor can it be always constructed as mediated by the categories of human intelligibility.

The logic of productivity also addresses what I take to be a significant absence in contemporary cultural studies: namely an elaborated theory of articulation. Articulation is a crucial concept for cultural studies for it embodies its theory and practice of radical contextualism. For the most part, cultural studies has failed to think through the consequences and strategic possibilities of articulation as both an intellectual and a political practice. And as a result, questions about the agencies, effectivities and modalities of articulation (and power) remain largely unexamined. Articulation is not merely another version of a theory of polysemy, or a way of recognising the necessity and possibilities of decoding. Articulation is too often seen merely as cultural studies’ attempt to occupy a middle space between essentialist theories (which can vary from a position which asserts that all relations, insofar as they are real, are necessary, to one which simply asserts that there are
Without Guarantees
In Honour of Stuart Hall

Edited by
Paul Gilroy, Lawrence Grossberg
and Angela McRobbie
4 I am grateful to Doreen Massey (personal conversation) for making this clear. See Massey (1994).
5 For an elaboration of the place of economics in cultural studies, see Grossberg (1995b); McRobbie (1996) and Clarke (1991).
6 For an elaboration of this critique of the centrality of the politics of identity and difference in cultural studies, see Grossberg (1996b). For the critique of the privileging of marginality, see Tony Bennett (1993) on charismatic closure.
7 My own work draws upon a line of philosophy that can be traced back to the premodern philosophy of Spinoza. However, Spinoza's has to be contextualised as part of a regional history of the Mediterranean/Middle East which includes Jewish (e.g. Maimonides) and Arab (Ibn Sina) thinkers. See Alcalay (1993).
8 See Grossberg (forthcoming).
9 Of course, this is a crucial problem with broad implications. Does one need such a position in order to define and mobilise political opposition? Must such a position equate the political and the ethical? How is one to respond to a postmodern relativism which would seem to undermine not only the possibility of such a position, but the possibility of politics itself? What is the relation between ethical and political positions, especially in the context of the United States where ethics tends to dominate politics, even in political discourses?
10 But this emphasis on mobility and marginality is certainly characteristic of a much broader range of discourses within cultural studies, especially postcolonial theory.
11 Obviously, this would seem to raise serious epistemological issues — about how we know, how we constitute the object (event) and the subject. I am reluctant to take these issues up, partly because I think the priority of epistemology is a function of the logics of modern thought.
12 In fact, such notions preceded the emergence of modern thought.
13 I am aware of a certain rhetorical excess here. While it would certainly be reasonable to refer here to a logic of space-time rather than simply space, there are at least two reasons which favour the latter strategy. First, because of the central place of temporality in modernity, space-time is likely to quickly become time or at least, and this is the second reason, the relation between space and time is likely to be conceptualised dimensionally, thus enabling space and time to be radically separated and opening the possibility of a reprivileging of time.
14 There is an obvious implicit reference to Marx here. And after all, Marx as much as Deleuze and Guattari (or Spinoza) can be read as a critique of Kantian modernism. But Marx's critique of Kant was limited: while he made the space of culture into the site of power, he could not problematise that space. He could not recognise that the production of this space itself (in the logic of mediation) was a product/production of power. At the same time, he obviously could neither account for, nor escape the privileging of temporality and history. At the same time, I do not see my position as 'post-Marxist' except in the weakest sense: I am trying to take account of the limitations of Marxism as articulated by Marx produced by the articulation of the apparatuses of modernity and a particular formation of capitalism.
15 One might think here of the work of Homi Bhabha and, as well, of Gauri Viswanathan.
16 One can also question why ethnoscapes are given so much prominence across so many discourses. The answer seems to have to do with the centrality of postcolonial critics in current work, and the fact that the politics of identity and difference is still often taken for granted within the continuing space of both poststructuralism and cultural studies.
17 Another way of viewing this would be to say that fictitious capital has become real and determinant if not dominant.
18 This is connected in powerful ways to the decline of private property, even in the advanced capitalism world: e.g. the collapse of the dream of owning a house and the rise of leasing agreements.
19 Consider here the current celebrations of the exotic.
20 One possible misreading of this argument (globalisation as stratification) is that it basically reproduces a base-superstructure model. This is not correct: first, because the present argument is specific to a particular formation rather than a general theory; and second, because it claims that the relation between expression and content is not expressive since it is produced elsewhere (by the diagram as it were). Thus it is not that content produces expression, but that the stratifying machine (or what Deleuze and Guattari call the abstract machine) produces both always in relationship.
21 This is distinguished from pragmatism which generally assumes the same machines operating on every strata and in every stratification.
22 Obviously, I am questioning the role of the category of text in cultural studies. I would argue that texts have to be reconceived as a particular construction of certain events within discursive alliances.
23 From the perspective of the producers of an apparatus, what is produced is the audience-context relation; from the perspective of the audience, what is produced is the audience-text relation; and from the perspective of cultural studies, what is produced is the space of context.
some necessary relations in the world) and the anti-essentialism of post-structuralist theories (which denies the reality of any relation). I would prefer to read the notion of articulation as cultural studies’ way of avoiding the debate altogether and leaving the field in which the debate is meaningful. It transforms the question of the reality of relations into a matter of practices. Articulation is the practice – and its description – of the making, unmaking and remaking of non-necessary relations and, hence, of contexts. It assumes that relations (whether in the form of identities, effects, etc.) didn’t have to be the way they are (i.e. they are contingent), but the fact that they are that way makes them real (i.e. effective). Articulation, in Foucault’s terms, the relation of a non-relation. A theory of articulation transforms cultural criticism and politics from questions of texts and audiences, to explorations of events and alliances, effects and contexts, and an account of the ways certain practices and apparatuses articulate contexts – as organisations of power – as the lived milieu of everyday life.

The logic of spatiality has to be understood as more than just a move into geography, just as the logic of temporality is more than just a move into history. It involves a shift in the ‘metaphysical’ ground for theorising. It does not mean that we erase time and history but that we see reality as events or, in Deleuze’s terms, becoming which can be mapped only as lines across space, rather than as temporal continuities and discontinuities (whether as questions of reproduction or of deferral). Such lines define the attempt to describe the real as, again in Deleuzian terms, a pragmatics of the multiple. The notion of the multiple (or multiplicity) here refers to the exteriority or otherness of events, to the fact that they cannot be ‘interpreted’ as different (as if they belonged to some already constituted totality) but must be mapped as a ‘geography’. The existence of events can only be measured – and they can be measured as it were – by their effectivity, by their ability to affect and be affected. As such, events can only be located – mapped – in space along the trajectories of the lines of their effectivities. Again, this does not render history meaningless: on the contrary, within certain geographies (including of course the geography of modern power), certain kinds of becomings or lines of effectivity which are marked as history, time and reproduction, can be invested with a great deal of intensity and even power. One can in fact reconstruct the modern as a geography of temporalities. Within a logic of spatiality, the spaces, apparatuses and effects of power have to be understood in terms of mobilities rather than change, of lines of intensities rather than identities. Reality is a

matter of orientations and directions, of entries and exits, rather than processes. More concretely, it means that we have to see cultural practices as ‘busy intersections’ (Rosaldo, 1989), as places where many things happen, where multiple trajectories of effects and investment intersect. As Frow and Morris (1993) suggest, it means that we should take Mauss’s notion of a ‘total social phenomenon’ more seriously, as the point of intersection and negotiation of radically different kinds of vectors of determination – including material, affective, libidinal, semantic, etc.

The theory I am proposing examines ‘machines’ as technologies and organisations of becoming which produce the real as maps of power. These machines impose a particular conduct and organisation, not only on specific multiplicities, but also on particular planes of effects. They define the ‘geometric mechanisms’ by which different kinds of individualities and subjects (implying neither identities nor subjectivities) are produced in and articulated into specific configurations. The notion of geometric mechanisms, introduced by Kellert (1993) in his description of chaos theory, proposes a model of explanation which is neither causal nor predictive. This is similar in fact to Foucault’s (1981) theory of eventalisation, where each event is a singularity, defined within a monism of practices, constituted by trajectories cutting across multiple domains of reference, determination and effects. Foucault defines an apparatus as a programming of behaviour which, at the least, involves the relations between persons, subjections and bodies. It is a heterogeneous ensemble of practices, ‘the said as much as the unsaid’ – the material, the discursive and the semiotic – all of which condition and modify each other’s functions and effects. An apparatus is comprised of regimes or technologies of jurisdiction and of veridication. The former prescribe what can be done (procedures and strategies); the latter define discourses of truth. While particular regimes of veridication are articulated to and for regimes of jurisdiction, they are not necessarily effective. That is, there is no necessary correspondences between strategies, their legitimations, and their effects. Moreover, we cannot assume that various regimes and apparatuses are consistent, either with each other or even among themselves. I am proposing a philosophical perspective that might appropriately be called spatial materialism, and which, I hope, gives both substance and form to the notion of articulation by moving it into a theoretical field defined by something other than the logics of modern thought.
and specific about that economy, within which of these three models must it be located? In some sense, this is obviously an empirical question – not one to be answered out of an already defined theoretical position – but it is also a question that cannot begin to be answered unless we are willing to rethink the philosophical foundations of cultural studies, and to challenge its continued articulation within modern structures of thought.

Conclusion

I want to end by returning to the question of how to do cultural studies in the age of contemporary globalisation, for it is, I believe, necessary to rethink the task of cultural studies. That is, as cultural studies is rearticulated into and by the logics of productivity and spatiality, the very ways it describes its tasks and practices will have to be rethought as well. I want to take a brief stab at that now, although it is obviously premature. It will be easier to start with those ways of describing cultural studies that are clearly inappropriate within a productive and spatial logic, even though some of them may describe things that cultural studies is already in danger of becoming. Cultural studies is not about mapping the aesthetic onto the social, or the theoretical onto the textual, or the social onto the aesthetic. It is not about tracing the trajectories of desire and power, or the inscriptions of the social in the text. It is not about treating theory as a metaphor for social or textual processes, nor treating social and textual processes as metaphors for theory. It is not about rediscovering what we already know – whether about domination or the possibilities of resistance – anywhere in the relations among texts, subjects, and the social. It cannot be described simply in terms of the relations between the production of culture, cultural texts and the consumption of culture, as if merely reproducing Marx’s circuit of production. Nor is it exclusively about the relations of ideology, desire and pleasure. It is not the ethnographic documentation of the local. It is not, at least in the first instance, the embodiment of a grand epistemological revolution, although it may be built on one, and it certainly does challenge traditional notions of ‘rigorous methodologies’. It is not simply a theory of the textual production and/or communication of meaning, or the construction of subject-positions within systems of difference, or the politics of representation. Cultural studies may use all of these things but it will always be on its way to somewhere else.

I think that cultural studies, as it moves outside the determinations of modern thought, is about the relations on articulations between discursive alliances, everyday life and the machineries of power. Discursive alliances are, I believe, the ‘object’ of cultural studies. A discursive alliance is always more than texts and always more than a discursive practice; it is an articulated configuration of practices, a piece of the context as it were, constructed by the critic in his or her attempt to map the real effectivities of cultural relations. Such alliances define not only where and how people ‘live’ specific practices, but also provide cultural studies’ way into the lived experience of power, reality, etc. By everyday life, I want to signal that the ways we live are themselves configurations or structures of power. Here we can, for example, distinguish, with Foucault, between regimes of sovereignty, of discipline, of governmentality and, I might add, of disciplined mobilisation. And finally, by the machineries of power, I mean the apparatuses that mobilise different parameters and aspects of power to organise space and thus, among other things, to produce the possibilities of alliances.

What I am proposing then, finally, is that cultural studies must escape culture. It may start with culture, it may construct culture as its object, but its real task is to describe, understand and project the possibilities of lived material contexts as organisations of power. Its task is to understand the operations of power in the lived reality of human beings, and to help all of us imagine new alternatives for the becoming of that reality. ‘Culture is both its site and its weapon, but it is not the limits of cultural studies’ world. In the end, I am trying to disarticulate cultural studies from the modern ‘discovery’ of the social construction of reality, to find a way, not to get rid of discourse and culture, but to de-imperialise them by bringing back notions of space and material reality.

Notes

1. This chapter draws upon and revises ideas first presented in Grossberg (1996a). It is part of a larger project on the philosophical foundations of cultural studies and the critique of modern thought.

2. For an elaboration of this description, see Grossberg (1995a). Certainly the most common definition of cultural studies at the moment would seem to equate it with theories of power organised around structures of identity and difference: gender, sexuality, race, nationality, ethnicity, etc.

formation of capitalism. There is certainly no reason to assume that this formation would be any more benign than previous articulations of capitalism and globalisation; on the contrary, it shows every promise of becoming the most devastating and exploitative form of social power the world has ever seen, partly because of the second shift in the economy of globalisation which this machine produces.

If this were the only effect of this machine that the theory describes, what Deleuze and Guattari propose would be little more than another version of a postmodernising machine, comparable to Baudrillard, in which everything becomes the same, or in this case, money. But that is not the case, for their argument is the first shift, operating as it were on one strata (the plane of content), is only possible because the machinery of globalisation is also operating simultaneously on a second strata (the plane of expression), and in fact the work of the machine is precisely to produce these strata together by articulating the relation between them.

Turning our attention to the second strata, then, we can remember Hall's claim that capitalism has to work with and across differences. Let us in fact accept this as true, at least in the past. Deleuze and Guattari explain this by arguing that traditionally capitalism attempted to refuse any coding (difference) which tied its productivity to an external code. Hence, they suggest, capitalism always moved ahead by producing decoded flows, but such decodings are never absolute for they are always limited by the recordings of capitalism's own 'axiomatics'. But perhaps this is no longer the case; just as the machine of contemporary globalisation has transformed the value of capitalism from capital to money, perhaps it has also changed the relationship of capitalism to difference. In fact, I would suggest that capitalism no longer works with and across difference but, rather, it works to produce difference itself as the new form of expression. Unlike coding machines, it is not the particular codes of difference that are important; it is not the content but the form of difference that is relevant. It is the form of difference that is being produced everywhere, on everything and that is articulated by the same machine to the production of money. In other words, a new globalising machine is producing differences at the level of expression, as part of and in the service of both a newly emerging re-configuration of capitalism and a reorganization of the spatial economy of global power itself. This machine makes capitalism into a technology of distribution rather than production, by producing a stratification in which differences proliferate in a highly re-territorialised world. Obviously, if

this is the case, it makes the current faith in difference, as the site of resistance and agency, quite problematic. It is not merely a matter of claiming that this new globalising machine is reproducing itself across or even as space; rather, it attempts to produce space as differences and differences as space, a project which, as in all cases of machines of power, may never be entirely realisable. But if difference has become the very geometrical mechanism of a new organisation of power, then the very possibility and meaning of social order is no less at stake than the meaning and possibility of social transformation, resistance and oppositional politics.

I have described this third model as a stratifying machine, which operates by drawing lines, connecting events. It can be understood along the lines of Foucault's notion of a diagram which can be understood as schema for the organisation and exercise of power (Deleuze, 1988). In Foucault, the diagram stratifies or divides reality into the sayable and the visible or, more generally, into the knowable and the known. In more abstract terms, the stratifying machines organise events into two distinct populations or strata. Content describes a 'precise state of intermingling of bodies'; it is a non-passive assemblage of that which is acted upon. Expression describes the functional or transformational individualities which act upon content. Each plane, as well as the diagram itself, embodies a distinct principle of agency. It is important to realise that there is nothing inherent or essential about particular events that guarantee in advance what strata they will be 'assigned' to, as it were. Rather it is by organising and connecting the events that the stratifying machine constructs every reality as the relation of these two strata. Each strata defines a range of possible events or actions, so that together they define a practiced and practice-able (at the organic level, a livable) reality. Moreover each strata has both a form (on which coding machines operate to establish homologies within a strata) and a substance (on which territorialising machines operate). Thus, the stratifying machine (or diagram) is the condition of possibility - in spatial rather than temporal terms - for both coding and territorialising machines.

I have not attempted to adjudicate between these three machines as models of contemporary globalisation, although I have made some observations along the way which certainly suggest my own suspicions. It will be, in the end, impossible to describe the contemporary spatial economy of power without taking all three machines into account, but that still does not solve the problem: insofar as there is something new
today's world...the world we now live in seems rhizomatic—calling for theories of rootlessness, alienation and psychological distance between individuals and groups on the one hand, and fantasies (or nightmares) of electronic propinquity on the other. Although the question of localisation (and hybridisation) is raised, it is given short shrift in the model of globalisation itself. Moreover, Appadurai refuses to identify the economy of globalisation with a map of power (defined by particular places) that merely reproduces the geography of the centre and the periphery, arguing instead that the power relations operating within globalisation are themselves locally specific, a matter of larger nations overpowering smaller ones.

But these issues play a minor role in Appadurai's essay. The major argument transforms the question of global forces, including 'post-industrial [cultural] production', into a description of the dimensions of global flows. Appadurai offers five such flows in his account of contemporary globalisation: ethnoescapes involve the movement of people; technoscapes, the movement of technologies; finanscapes, the movement of money and capital; mediascapes, the movement of images; and ideoscapes, the movement of ideologies and state politics. One might ask about the selection: why is there no 'scape' for information, commodities, the military, etc.? More important, however, is the fact that for Appadurai the world has increasingly come to be dominated by the transition from local to global forces which apparently necessarily operate to produce increasing de-territorialisation and displacement (e.g. in the form of 'disorganized capitalism'). Further, according to Appadurai, what is central to the politics of global culture is not only the fact that the different 'scapes' follow separate non-isomorphic paths, but that the sheer speed, scale and volume of these flows has become so great that the very unpredictabilities of the disjunctions have themselves become determining.

Thus, according to Appadurai, the nature of contemporary globalisation requires new models of cultural organisation and transformation, and he proposes fractals and chaos theory as the solutions. Fractals are scholar phenomena describing shapes which, while possessing no Euclidean boundaries, still exhibit a constant degree of irregularity across different scales. Chaos is a theory of non-linear dynamic systems with 'sensitive dependence on initial conditions'. Both describe transformations within spatial economies or what I will call relations of territoriality. Appadurai's theory offers important insights into contemporary globalisation, partly because it largely succeeds in

separating questions of identity, identification and globalisation, and partly because the organisation of space has become the active site—although still not the agent—of power. But I also think it has serious limitations which are not just accidental but the result of the model on which it is predicated, and in particular of the structural similarities between the model and postmodernism. First, it can tell us nothing about the becomings of and within each of the 'scapes' or, to put it in other terms, like most postmodernisms, it actually tells us very little about the actual, specific operations of power within the particular vectors of global force. Second, it assumes the absolute autonomy of the 'scapes'; each one seems to demand and control its own logic, leaving each completely intact and unable to contact or influence those forces operating alongside it.

Appadurai seems to end up with a position (whether he intends to is a different question) that asserts, like many postmodernisms, that nothing is related to anything. In fact, I think we should consider the possibility that this may actually be a somewhat accurate description of an older form of globalisation in which, while capitalism may have been its driving force, capital was produced as only one value which could still be contradicted by other values, including geographical expansion and empire, ideological values of civilisation, etc. While these values could be and sometimes were articulated to one another, they cannot be assumed to have been—and there is no evidence they were—simply and functionally equated without contradiction. In fact, older forms of globalisation were most likely the result of multiple forces, and even multiple machines, including both coding and territorialising machines (such as Appadurai's model of 'scapes'), operating by simultaneously extending and distributing their logics. Thus, colonialism was not merely a matter of capitalism (which was largely confined within the sphere of the economic); it did not work only in the economic. And it is entirely reasonable to assume that different machines were operating in the different spheres of power on which colonialism was constructed.

I have described Appadurai's theory as built upon the model of a territorialising machine. A territorialising machine is one which is already extended across space. Rather than extending itself by tracing its codes of difference on previously external events, it performs an intensional distribution. It conjunctively links singular events into spatial relations of proximity and distance, defining what is next to what. In other words, it transforms events into places and distributes them as other (rather than different) to each other. As a result, it makes
place the product of space, as it were, and space the milieu of active becoming, or more accurately, of trajectories of becoming. But in the process, it erases the effectiveness of places.

**Globalisation as a stratifying machine**

There is another kind of postmodern machine in which the same logic or force works everywhere, thus erasing all places. Instead of a multiplicity of events in a relationship of otherness (or exteriority) to each other, such a machine denies both differences and distribution in favour of a continuous production of the same. For example, imagine a globalising machine in which everything is reduced to capital or to the image. In fact, the third model proposes that the contemporary form of globalisation is produced by a single machine operating across all of the scapes (spheres, planes or domains): ‘the same machine at work in astrophysics and in microphysics, in the natural and the artificial’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Here the machine operates not to erase all differences, but to produce a particular stratification or division within the real (and thus, to produce the real). It reworks the codings (identities) and distributions (identifications) that already exist, but not by recoding or re-territorialising them. What kind of a machine might this be?

I will take Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of contemporary global capitalism as an example of such a theory of contemporary globalisation. Such a theory suggests at least two significant shifts from older forms of globalisation, and from the above models. First, what global capitalism produces is no longer the form of value (capital) but its substance (money), for it is as money that capital is most productive today; hence, we can take note of the rapid decline in investment. What has become evident, especially since the decade of the 1980s, is the presence and power of an increasing pool of private unregulated stateless money, an ecumenical body, a ‘financial Frankenstein’. According to *The Economist* (April 1993), ‘traditional banking went out the window in the 1980s’ (cited in Wheelwright, 1994) with the rise of the derivatives market, a market defined by various forms of futures contracts, mostly related to foreign exchange, interest rates, etc. Of course, these developments were neither totally accidental nor entirely intentional. They were the result of transformations within the logic of capital which had very specific economic, political, technological and cultural conditions of possibility. *The Economist* claims that:

the foreign exchange market is the world’s slickest. Daily net turnover (including derivatives), was about $900 billion, only $50 billion less than the total foreign currency reserves of all IMF members, and more than the combined reserves of all the great powers. Foreign exchange trading has grown by over a third since April 1989. Less than five per cent relates to underlying trade flows; ten to fifteen percent represents capital movements; most of the remaining eighty percent is the dealing of banks between themselves.

It is not surprising then that this global market in money futures can literally determine the fate of any national economy almost overnight. Nor is it surprising that this continual circulation of money seems to be producing an infinite debt or at least ‘the means for rendering that debt infinite’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), not as an aberration but as the necessary condition for capitalism itself.

Of course, it is possible to argue that this whole situation is merely some kind of temporary aberration of capitalism which needs to be brought under control. But it is just as reasonable to assume, with Deleuze and Guattari, that the ever-spiraling debt, which includes both the poorest and the richest nations, does not represent the failure of industrial capital but capitalism’s unrestricted ability to create more money which is constantly owed to itself. This is perhaps a new development in the history of finance capital, which E. P. Thompson defines as ‘an articulated combination of commercial capital, industrial capital, and banking capital, within which banking capital is dominant, but not determinant’ (Wheelwright, 1994). Other economists have recognised that the power of finance capital is to unify ‘the previously separate spheres of industrial, commercial and bank capital’. It is possible that the particular formation of capitalism which Gramsci referred to as ‘Fordism’ – built on the development of domestic markets, mass production and the simultaneously dominant and determinant role of industrial capital – was the aberration. Then, what we are witnessing today is the realisation of the limit-possibility of finance capital in which banking capital (in the form of money) is not only dominant but also determinant. It is at least possible that the emergence of an international economy of debt financing and of the ecumenical flows of money begetting money, built on the spatial displacement of production and the increasing centrality of services (including cultural production), is not the sign of the failure of capitalism, but the beginning of a cycle of capital rejuvenation that promises the emergence of a new
Three theories of globalisation

I want now to illustrate the possibilities of theorising within these spatial and productive logics by considering three different 'models' of globalisation present to different degrees in cultural studies. I will quite intentionally leave the issue of whether these models are competing descriptions of a single organisation of globalisation, or compatible descriptions of significantly different organisations. Instead I want to do two things with each model: first, I want to consider its utility for understanding the specificity of contemporary forces and structures of globalisation; and second, I want to read each model as presenting globalisation as if it were based on a different mode of articulation, or a different machinic production of the real - coding, territorialising and stratifying.

Globalisation as a coding machine

The most common view of globalisation defines it as a relationship operating in the middle ground between an infinitely small event (the local as a totally isolated place with no lines connecting it either to an outside or to other places) and infinitely large spaces (with no distance possible between places, thus allowing for instantaneous transformations across space). This middle ground is then constituted by a struggle between, on the one hand, the force of globalisation which homogenises, producing the same at every place, and, on the other hand, the force of localisation which heterogenises or hybridises, producing differences by rearticulating the forms of the global into the local. That is, globalisation is a relation between places, and moreover a relation predicated on an assumed distinction between two kinds of places: certain places become the apparent origins of the forces of globalisation which emanate from within them, while other places inevitably become the sites of competing forces of localisation. These different places are traced onto an already existing map of the distribution of power. Globalisation is a power that generally belongs to 'the West' (if not the United States), while localisation is a power that belongs to the so-called peripheral nations or to peripheral communities within the core nations. Too much attention to the global often leads critics to the unearned, pessimistic conclusion that the victory - of capitalism, of American imperialism, etc. - is already sewn up. Too much attention to the local often leads critics to lose sight of the fact that someone is winning the struggle and, as we all know, it is rarely the periphery.

Generally, the contemporary processes (for they are generally understood in temporal terms) of globalisation are assumed to continue 'the every rolling march of the old form of commodification, the old form of globalisation, fully in the keeping of the west, which is simply able to absorb everybody else within its drive' (Hall, 1991). But this makes the question of globalisation into little more than a continuation of earlier debates over cultural imperialism, with its assumption that culture merely follows the circuit of commodities and capital. For the most part, when the debate assumes these terms, it operates on the assumption that the nature of globalisation itself has not changed or that all that has changed is the relative degree, speed, intensity, etc. of the relation. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that this model of globalisation is no longer appropriate as a description of the spatial economy of the contemporary world, although such an argument need not challenge the basic parameters of the model of globalisation.

For example, Stuart Hall (1991) offers one of the most sophisticated and insightful discussions, along these lines, of globalisation. Hall seems to argue that such a model of the continuing and continuous march of capitalism may be inadequate to describe even older forms of globalisation, often encapsulated in notions of mercantilism, colonialism, imperialism and forced diasporas, because

The more we understand about the development of capital itself, the more we understand that ... alongside that drive to commodify everything, which is certainly one part of its logic, is another critical part of its logic which works in and through specificity ... So that the notion of the ever-marching, ongoing, totally rationalizing, has been a very deceptive way of persuading ourselves of the totally integrative and all-absorbing capacities of capital itself ... As a consequence, we have lost sight of one of the most profound insights in Marx's Capital which is that capitalism only advances, as it were, on contradictory terrain. (p.29)

Yet, while Hall also calls for a new and distinct model of contemporary globalisation which recognises that it entails different relations, rhythms and motivations, Hall's description actually does not allow for any significant structural changes in the form of globalisation. And, ultimately, it remains within the basic logic of globalisation as a relation between different places. Or more accurately, it remains within a spatial topography that assumes an absolute difference between the local and the global, and between places and spaces, and that assumes as well an equivalence between these two sets of relations which is then
calculation effectively to sweep aside the anthropological categories and frameworks of the human and social sciences. The great innovation occurs in the conception of the economic agent as an inherently manipulable or ‘flexible’ creation (Gordon 1991: 43; du Gay 1996: Chapter 2).

Gordon argues that whereas homo economicus was originally conceived of as a subject, the wellsprings of whose activity were ultimately ‘untouchable by government’, the subject of enterprise is imagined as an agent ‘who is perpetually responsive to modifications in its environment’. As he suggests, ‘economic government here joins hands with behaviourism’ (Gordon 1991: 43). The resultant subject is in a novel sense not simply an ‘enterprise’ but rather ‘the entrepreneur of himself or herself’. In other words, entrepreneurial rationality makes up the individual as a particular sort of person – as ‘an entrepreneur of the self’ (Gordon 1987: 300).

So what does it mean to conceptualize a human being as an ‘entrepreneur of the self’? This idea of an individual human life as an ‘enterprise’ suggests that, no matter what hand circumstance may have dealt a person, he or she remains always continuously engaged (even if technically ‘unemployed’) in that one enterprise, and that it is ‘part of the continuous business of living to make adequate provision for the preservation, reproduction and reconstruction of one’s own human capital’ (Gordon 1991, p. 44).

Once a human life is conceived of primarily in entrepreneurial terms, the ‘owner’ of that life becomes individually responsible for their own self-advancement and care; within the ideals of enterprise, individuals are charged with managing the conduct of the business of their own lives. The vocabulary of enterprise reimagines activities and agents and their relationship to one another according to its own ideals. Thus, the entrepreneurial language of responsible self-advancement and care, for example, is linked to a new perception of those who are ‘outside civility’ – those who are excluded or marginalized because they cannot or will not conduct themselves in an appropriately ‘entrepreneurial’ and hence ‘responsible’ manner. In the UK, for example, pathologies that were until recently represented and acted upon ‘socially’ – homelessness, unemployment and so forth – have become reindividualized through their positioning within entrepreneurial discourse and hence subject to new, often more intense, forms of surveillance and control. Because they are now represented as responsible individuals with a moral duty to take care of themselves, pathological subjects can blame no one but themselves for the problems they face. This individualization of social problems is evidenced in the UK as elsewhere by the introduction of a new terminology to describe the unemployed person – ‘job seeker’ – and the homeless person – ‘rough sleeper’.

Because a human being is considered to be continuously engaged in a project to shape his or her life as an autonomous, choosing individual driven by the desire to optimize the worth of his or her own existence, life for that person is represented as a single, basically undifferentiated, arena for the pursuit of that endeavour. As previously distinct forms of life are now classified as ‘enterprise forms’, the conceptions and practices of personhood – or forms of identity – they give rise to are remarkably consistent. Thus, as schools, prisons, charities, and government departments, in the UK for example, are re-presented as ‘enterprises’ they all accord an increased priority, in terms of judging their own success, to the development of the ‘enterprising subject’.

Concluding Comments

The main tenets of the globalization hypothesis have been subject to extensive and largely convincing critique. As Hirst and Thompson (1996:199), for example, have argued, even if classical national economic management is now represented as having only limited scope, this does not mean that economic relations at both international and national levels are beyond governance, that is, means of regulation and control. Much, they argue, depends on political will and co-operation between the major economic powers.

In the absence of such will and co-operation, socio-economic analysis indicates that persisting unemployment, recurring financial crises, rising inequalities, underinvestment in productive activities such as education and research, and cumulative asymmetries of information and power are ever more likely outcomes of continuing reliance on ‘pure’ market functioning (Boyer 1996, p. 108).  

So what signs are there that such co-operation and will are emerging? Not many, according to Wolfgang Streeck (1996a), who points to two divergent political responses taking place at the national level. On the one hand, he identifies those nation-states, such as the UK and the USA, that see their principal contribution to competitiveness in handing responsibility for it to ‘market forces’. Such an approach has involved large-scale privatization, retrenchment of social protection, market-driven industrial restructuring, restoration of managerial authority, downwardly flexible wages and working conditions, the disablement of organized interests, particularly trade unions, and the promotion of a low-wage, low-skill sector to absorb some of the unemployed. The alternative response, what might remain in a era of ‘over-
introduction of market-type relationships into ever more spheres of existence.

The notion of ‘enterprise’ occupies an absolutely crucial position in this endeavour. It both provides a critique of ‘big government’ and offers a solution to the problems posed by ‘globalization’ through delineating a new set of ideals and principles for conceiving of and acting upon organizational and personal conduct.

**Enterprising up Organizations and Individuals**

This emphasis on enterprise should come as no surprise, given the foundational place accorded to market forces in the discourse of economic globalization (Ohmae 1990). If the winners and losers in the global economy are to be determined largely, if not exclusively, by their competitiveness, then obviously enterprise is a quality no player in the global market game can afford to be without, whether nation, firm or individual.

Accordingly, the foremost consideration for national governmental players is the necessity of constructing the legal, institutional and cultural conditions that will enable the game of entrepreneurial and competitive conduct to be played to best effect. For these anti-political liberals or neo-liberals, it is a question of extending a model of rational economic conduct beyond the economy itself, of generalizing it as a principle both limiting and rationalizing government activity. National government must work for the game of market competition and as a kind of enterprise itself, and new quasi-entrepreneurial market models of action or practical systems must be invented for the conduct of individuals, groups and institutions within those areas of life hitherto seen as being either outside or even antagonistic to the economic.

Looking briefly at developments in the UK, for example, we can see that, while the concrete ways in which this model of rational economic conduct has been operationalized in the public sector have varied considerably, the forms of action that have been made possible for different institutions and different types of person – schools, general practitioners, housing estates, prisons and so forth – do seem to share a general consistency and style.

One characteristic feature has been the crucial role allocated to ‘contract’ in redefining organizational relationships. The changes affecting schools, hospitals, government departments and so on, in the United Kingdom, have often involved the reconstituting of institutional roles in terms of contracts strictly defined, and even more frequently have involved a contract-like way of representing relationships between institutions, and between individuals and institutions.

An example of the former occurred when fund-holding medical practices contracted with hospital trusts for the provision of health care to particular patients, whereas previously that provision was made directly by the National Health Service. Examples of the latter include the relationships between central government departments and the new executive agencies – where no technical contract as such exists but where the relationship between the two is governed by a contract-like ‘framework document’ which defines the functions and goals of the agency, and the procedures whereby the department will set and monitor performance targets for the agency.

This process, which Jacques Donzelot (1991) has termed one of ‘contractual implication’, typically consists in assigning the performance of a function or an activity to a distinct unit of management – individual or collective – which is regarded as being accountable for the efficient (that is, ‘economic’) performance of that function or conduct of that activity.

By assuming active responsibility for these activities and functions – both for carrying them out and for their outcomes – these units of management are in effect affirming a certain type of identity. This identity is basically entrepreneurial in character because ‘contractualization’ requires these units of management to adopt a certain entrepreneurial form of relationship to themselves ‘as a condition of their effectiveness and of the effectiveness of this type of government’ (Burchell 1991: 276). To put it another way, contractualization makes these units of management function like little businesses or ‘enterprise forms’.

According to Colin Gordon (1991), entrepreneurial forms of governance such as contractualization involve the reimagining of the social as a form of the economic. ‘This operation works’, he argues, ‘by the progressive enlargement of the territory of economic theory by a series of re-definitions of its object.’ He continues, ‘Economics thus becomes an “approach” capable in principle of addressing the totality of human behaviour, and, consequently, of envisaging a coherent, purely economic method of programming the totality of governmental action’ (Gordon 1991: 43).

It would be a mistake, however, to view these developments as simply expressing the latest and purest manifestation of the rise of *homo oeconomicus*. For the subject of entrepreneurial rationality is both ‘a reactivation and a radical inversion’ of traditional representations of ‘economic man’. The reactivation consists in positing a fundamental human faculty of choice, a principle which empowers economic
Cultural studies has entered the fast track of academic success in the United States. But the cost may be too high, for it has placed cultural studies in an untenable position. As more people jump onto the cultural studies bandwagon, it needs to protect some sense of its own specificity as a way into the field of culture and power. Yet the most obvious ways of doing this identify cultural studies with a set of theoretical and political assumptions which make it more difficult for cultural studies to adapt to the challenges facing it. Let me begin, then, by trying to free myself from this dilemma.

To begin, I would argue that cultural studies can only be defined as an intellectual practice, as a way of politicking theory and theorising politics. There are, I believe, six characteristics of this practice. First, cultural studies is disciplined in the sense that it seeks new forms of intellectual authority in the face of relativism; it does not give in to relativism. Second, it is interdisciplinary in the sense that it recognises that questions of culture and power must lead one beyond the realm of culture into fields of inquiry normally constitutive of a number of other disciplines. Third, it is self-reflective, not in terms of individual identities, but rather in terms of institutional and relational structures. Fourth, it is driven by political rather than theoretical concerns; its questions are never derived from its own intellectual practice but from its encounters with the 'real' organisations of power. Fifth, it is committed to the necessity of theory, even while it refuses to define itself in purely theoretical terms. Finally, and most importantly, cultural studies is radically contextual and this is true of its theory, its politics, its questions, its object, its method and its commitments. In fact, I would argue that context is everything and everything is context for cultural studies; cultural studies is perhaps best seen as a contextual theory of contexts.
as the lived milieux of power. This means, at the very least, that cultural studies cannot be identified with any particular problematic or theoretical field, whether it is communication (encoding/decoding), ideology and representation, or identity and subjectivity. By identifying cultural studies with such problematics, cultural studies is locked into the very terms which it must question if it is to face one of the most urgent challenges, namely the issue of globalisation. This is especially difficult since cultural studies has often seen itself rooted in and to particular national formations. Despite the efforts of writers such as Paul Gilroy (1993) and Jim Clifford (1988) to challenge the adequacy of the nation as a bounded unit of analysis, cultural studies has been unable for the most part to escape this spatial economy, except by theorising its transgression (e.g. in images of diaspora and border-crossing). Of course, the challenge of globalisation confronts cultural studies at many levels, not the least urgent of which is the question of how the globalisation of cultural studies should take place. But the level I want to deal with involves the globalisation of contemporary culture, not merely in terms of the proliferation and mobility of texts and audiences, but rather as the movement of culture outside the spaces of any (specific) language or formation. At the very least, this reconstitution of the relation of culture and space undermines our confident assumptions about how cultural practices are working, even within their own 'native' territories. The new global economy of culture entails the de-territorialisation of culture and its subsequent re-territorialisation, but the latter seriously undermines any equation of culture with location or place.

Current thinking about globalisation is too often structured by an assumed opposition between the local and the global, where the local is offered as the intellectual and political corrective of the global. This is captured in the popular demand to 'think globally and act locally'. But I must say that I have my doubts, especially when, according to Wachtel (1986) in The Money Mandarin, something very similar (think globally, act short-term) defines the first two principles of the new capitalism. And I am reminded of Castell's assertion that 'when people find themselves unable to control the world, they simply shrink the world to the size of their community' (cited in Gilroy, 1993: 232). Such celebrations of the local are often under-theorised, based on either a particular definition of knowledge as facts and a model of inductive empiricism, or an assumed identification of the local with the site of agency and resistance. Of course, the latter can only be justified by either a prior identification of subjectivity and agency, an indentification which gives rise to what O'Hanlon (1988) describes as 'the virile figure of the subject-agent', or an assumed equivalence between individual will and social agency. Consequently, following Bruce Robbins (1993), we need to ask why a certain kind of work – work which identifies and celebrates the local, the specific and agency – is valorised. Robbins concludes that this defines a technology of power that legitimates the claim of intellectual work to 'public representativeness'. It creates an apparent anchor in political reality which still leaves the intellectual outside offering a description of the real. It positions them as organic intellectuals speaking for a real population.

This is not, however, to dismiss the importance of 'the local', only its articulation to a particular notion of specificity within various versions of cultural studies. Here, the local as the specific site of agency is taken to be the exemplar of the concrete, located at one extreme of a vertical relation of difference extending all the way to the abstract or the general. That is, in cultural studies, too often, the local equates an epistemological question of generalisation with a pragmatic question of agency. But there is another – geographical – articulation of the local and the specific in which the local is not opposed to the global as the concrete is to the general. Rather, there is a horizontal relation in which the local is always a comparative term, describing the different articulations at different places within a structuring of space. That is, on this model, the local and the global are mutually constitutive, although the exact nature of this 'mutual constitution' remains to be specified, and has yet to be adequately theorised.

As cultural studies responds to the new political terrain opened up by the contemporary globalisation of culture, and transforms itself accordingly, it will have to face a second, equally disruptive challenge. If cultural studies was founded in large part (and certainly in Britain) as a response to the inadequacy of political economic theories of the relations between culture and economics, it has too often given up any attempt to take economic relations seriously. Consequently, it has too often reduced the field of power and politics to the terrain of culture, rather than looking to the relations between what Meaghan Morris (1988) has called the politics of culture and the politics of politics. The globalisation of culture makes the cost of displacing the economic too high. Cultural studies has to return in some way to its original problematic – to rethink the relations between the economy and culture without automatically slotting the economic into the bottom line. Of
course, in such work, the economics of culture cannot be limited to questions about the cultural industries, commodity production, and surplus value. It will have to take account of the changing relations between the different forms of capital (and the different economic sectors), the changing nature of and competing forms of both the modes of production (and their subsequent contradictions) and the formations of capitalism (e.g. Fordism, post-Fordism, etc.), the changing nature of labour and consumption, and the changing nature of the global relations of both political and economic power. It will have to consider how and where people, capital and commodities move in and out of the places and spaces of the global economy.⁵

These problems have become increasingly acute as cultural studies has attempted to confront the apparently new conditions of globalisation, conditions implicating all the people, commodities and cultures of the world. At the very least, the immediate result is that the traditional binary models of political struggle – coloniser/colonised, oppressor/oppressed, domination/resistance, repression/transgression – seem inapplicable to a spatial economy of power which cannot be reduced to simply geographical dichotomies – First World/Third World, metropolitan/peripheral, local/global – nor, at least in the last instance, to questions of personal identity. All this suggests a fairly different idea of what cultural studies will have to look like in the future, for it will have to break with the current tendency to equate culture with location in the form of identity. Such theories of difference not only end up equating political and cultural struggles, they end up making politics entirely into a matter of representation and interpellation. While it is reasonable to start with questions of identity and difference in contemporary politics, it does not follow that we should end up at the same place, for even if we grant that much of contemporary politics is organised around identity, it does not follow that our task is to theorise within the category of identity. After all, it is ironic that just as we discover not only that identities are socially constructed, but that the fact or category of identity is itself socially constructed, we then devote all of our energy to organising a politics around socially constructed categories. In the face of globalisation, we need to chart a trajectory from a politics of identity and difference which leads through an analysis of the geohistorical mechanisms by which relations have been constructed as differences and politics organised by identities, to a politics organised around singularity and otherness. We have to re-theorise the relations between individuation, subjectivity and identity by thinking about the affective dimensions of belonging, affiliation and identification. We have to locate the power of identity as a political force in the broader context of the new spatial economy, in order to ask why identity has become such a privileged site of struggle. Such a politics would have to define the places people can belong to, and the places people can find their way to. It would also have to break with another deeply rooted tradition in cultural studies (and in much of the literature of the Left) which privileges the position of the outsider, the marginal, the émigré as necessarily enabling a uniquely insightful understanding not available to those defined by their position as insiders, as if anyone belonged only in one place.⁶

Cultural studies, globalisation and the modern

The emergent spatial economy of globalisation involves particular forms of internationalisation and globality, and implies as well a new organisation and orientation of both power and space. The terms within which the economy is described are by now both highly predictable and extremely variable. It is generally assumed to be comprised of two opposing vectors, generally corresponding to the local and the global. This new economy is built on the increasingly apparent autonomy and simultaneous interdependence and intersection of local, regional, national and international flows, forces and interests, and its results are the very real and painful relocations and dislocations of contemporary life. Thus, on the one hand, there is the increasing internationalisation of the circuits of mobility of capital, information, manufacturing and service commodities, cultural practices, populations and labour. It is not necessary to assume that all these mobilities are the same, nor that any single circuit is realised in the same way in different places. Moreover, there is no claim here for post-industrialisation; on the contrary, hyper-industrialisation seems a more appropriate description. On the other hand, there are the various articulations of space which interrupt such international flows – various articulations of the local as it is commonly conceived – and which are, in decisive ways, more important than ever. Here we might include not only identity politics, and the reassertion of nationalism (not quite as the nation-state as much as the nation-ethnicity), but also the promotion of new urban, regional and even national identities (and the subsequent reassertion of patriotism) in the global economy.

Obviously, such characterisations of the new spatial economy are
largely commonsensical, descriptive and under-theorised. And yet, for all the talk about globalisation in cultural studies, it has rarely reflected on the theoretical grounds of its models of globalisation. It has, to varying degrees, remained within the commonsense understandings of globalisation. Consequently, it has to a large extent failed to distinguish between the historical and the theoretical questions involved in the study of globalisation. One needs a theoretical understanding of the nature and stakes of globalisation (and a theoretical vocabulary capable of describing different structures and practices of globalisation) if one is to consider whether the contemporary forms of globalisation represent anything new and different in history. Without such a theoretical framework, cultural studies is unable to recognise the multiple ways in which transnational flows and relations, in a variety of different formations of colonialism, imperialism, etc., have been and continue to be constitutive of specific formations of power. But it is not as simple as it may appear on first glance, for it may be that there are very specific reasons why, in an age of hyper-theory, so little theoretical work has been done on questions of globalisation. Thus, in order to consider the nature of contemporary globalisation, one must begin by locating the concern within a broader framework of political and philosophical questions.

The larger question behind this chapter is how one does cultural studies in such global-spatial conditions, conditions in which we intellectuals are implicated, at the very least, by the somewhat involuntary (albeit somewhat pleasurable) nomadic condition of our particular class fraction. I do not believe that the answers can be found simply through some acknowledgement of our locationality, or some renunciation of ethnocentrism, or some attempt to hide our ethnocentrism in more apocalyptic claims of postmodernity. At the very least, it is a situation in which, as Meaghan Morris (1992) describes it, Euro-American culture can 'no longer experience itself as the sole subject of capitalism or as coextensive with it'. One consequence is that globalisation can no longer be confidently described from the formations of Atlantic culture as the assumed centre of the global economy of space.

Consequently, it is necessary to reflect on the philosophical grounds of cultural studies, grounds which have, I believe, made it at least unnecessarily difficult for cultural studies to adequately theorise the concept of the global and to understand the specificity of the contemporary emergent form of globalisation. To put it succinctly, if the philosophies we have don't seem to enable us to describe our reality very well, it is perhaps necessary to imagine a different philosophy, which is not to say a new philosophy since, in many ways, such a philosophy may entail a return to philosophies articulated at other times (e.g. premodern) and other places (e.g. non-Western). Such a philosophy may offer a way of describing and constructing a different reality, a reality which is still ours but perhaps with a different future. Such a project points to the paradoxical position inherent in most contemporary critical theory: wary of first philosophies, it condemns itself to remain within the assumption grounds of the first philosophies constitutive of modern thought. Unable to escape the rationality it condemns, it must be content with asking 'whose rationality is it?', with acknowledging the multiple variations of rationality, with inquiring into the specific articulations by which the inherited discourses of rationality have been accomplished, even while remaining within the broad philosophical terrain it criticises. Nowhere is this more evident than in the immediate response that any effort to begin to move outside of the structures and categories of modern thought is likely to elicit: obviously, modern thought, articulated as it is in complex ways to the modern formations of power, tells us it is impossible, but what else would you expect?

The critique of the conceptual foundations of cultural studies, and of modern thought more generally, is an ongoing collective project, questioning concepts which, if not invented in the formations of modern thought, were radically reconceptualised and repositioned in them. In the past few years, many of the most basic concepts and assumptions of cultural studies have come under attack. Various post-colonial and critical race theorists have questioned not only notions of national cultures and 'whole ways of life', but also the possibility of constructing a singular and limited space of culture, such constructions now being seen as the product of the colonising and imperialising projects of modern Europe. Various intellectual historians and policy theorists have challenged not only nostalgic conceptions of community, but also romantic-aesthetic-ethical conceptions of culture, such conceptions now being seen as the product of specific disciplining and governmental strategies of the modern nation-state. Postmodernists and feminists have argued against the reduction of culture to the domains of meaning and representation, and in a related discussion, cultural theorists and anthropologists have questioned definitions of culture as difference, mediation and supplement. Finally, philosophers and cultural geographers have demonstrated the cost of the assumed temporality of human
existence, namely the erasure of space as a crucial – if not the primary – dimension of power.²

It is these last two which interest me here, but first I want to say something briefly about the less sensationalised critique of cultural studies offered by intellectual historians and policy theorists, for this work portends the need for an even more radical reconsideration of the role of cultural studies in the contemporary age. Although criticisms of culture as a technology of power have had more difficulty getting a hearing (perhaps because they are not the result of marginalised voices), they may ultimately prove to be the most devastating for cultural studies, for they cut to the heart of the two dominant constitutive figures of the discourse of cultural studies itself. The first is the very figure of culture. As Raymond Williams described it, the modern notion of culture, a notion which continues to animate cultural studies, involves, on the one hand, the projection of a position constituted by a temporal displacement from some other (e.g. tradition) from which change can be comprehended and, on the other hand, the equation of that position with a standard of judgement from which one can offer a ‘total qualitative assessment’ of such changes. ‘The idea of culture is a general reaction to a general and major change in the conditions of our common life’ (Williams, 1958). That is, the very concept of culture seems to require the construction of a place which would allow one to both describe and judge the changes in everyday life; that is, it requires at the very least that we find a ‘court of human appeal’, some locatable ‘higher’ standard, to be set over the processes of practical social change, generally located within and identified with some notion of culture. But this is, of course, the very ethical foundation that critics like Tony Bennett (1993) and Ian Hunter (1988) are attacking. Perhaps the solution lies in recognising the reason why Williams did not locate himself within the ‘culture and society tradition’: he argued that the concept of culture was invented, as it were, as a result of the recognition of ‘a practical separation of certain moral and intellectual activities from the driving force of a new kind of society’, i.e. that the modern is partly constituted by the separation of culture and society. For those authors whom Williams located in the culture and society tradition, the separation is taken for granted; culture is simply appropriated and transformed into a position from which that very separation can be described and judged. But Williams refused such a separation. Cultural studies had to reinsert culture into the practical everyday life of people, into the totality of a whole way of life. Yet Williams was never able to actually escape this separation, both in his privileging of certain forms of culture (literature) and in his desire to equate culture with some sort of ethical standard.³

The second figure that has been uniquely constitutive of cultural studies, especially in its British incarnation,⁴ is that which links historical transformation, the experience of mobility, and the position of marginality. That is, unlike many other theories of the emergence of the modern (including the ‘culture and society’ tradition), cultural studies is generally characterised less by a vision of a total qualitative transformation of society (e.g. from the traditional to the modern, or from community to mass society) – cultural studies was never about the destruction of community – than by a concern for the consequences of new forms and degrees of mobility. Implicitly since its emergence, but increasingly over the past decades, for cultural studies, the most significant consequence of the mobilities of postwar capitalist societies has been that it not only created new positions of marginality but that it increasingly brought such marginal positions into the centre of the social formation. It is not surprising, then, that cultural studies has tended to equate marginality with the very position described above, a position which culture itself can no longer define. Too often, as a result, cultural studies has either romanticised marginality or at least fetishised it as a new standard of political and even intellectual judgement.

Nevertheless, I want to postpone such considerations in order to consider the more manageable (which is not to say easily manageable) questions raised by the critique of the logics of mediation and temporality as constitutive of modern thought and of cultural studies. In fact, these two logics are closely articulated together, almost inseparable, and certainly mutually reinforcing. First, the logic of mediation: Bauman (1990) and Rosaldo (1989), for example, have both suggested that the invention and deployment of culture as the necessary mediation by which culture situates itself between the person and reality as the realm of experience and knowledge (and through which all reference to the real is erased except as a semantic category) cannot be separated from the emerging relations of modern power. According to Rosaldo, modern thought conceives of culture within the ‘stark Manichean choice between order and chaos’; culture is the medium of information – the supplement – which substitutes for the lack of genetic coding in human beings. Without culture, reality would be simply unavailable, nothing more than James’s booming buzzing confusion. Lack, mediation and semanticisation are articulated together into a particular
collapsed into a relation between different places. It is a logic of difference in which, ultimately, all differences are equated. Actually, Hall seems to want to move away from such a logic and he makes a promising beginning (into something more like a logic of territorialisation): he describes contemporary globalisation as a structure which is both global and local at the same time, involving new structures of relations between processes of globalisation and the construction of multiple levels of localities which both interrupt and amplify global flows. Thus, Hall points out, the erosion of the nation-state and national identities (the result of new forms of the migration of labour and the flow of capital) is counterbalanced by the even stronger return of 'defensive exclusions', new ecological relations and a new cultural practice which constructs unity through difference. This new culture, what Hall calls the 'global postmodern', does not speak a single language or ideology, or rather, it is unable to construct a single dialect as proper and normal. Instead, in order to be effective, it must both pluralise and deconstruct itself. But as soon as Hall tries to reinsert the question of power and of unequal relations into the model, he returns to something very similar to the logic of difference described here. Thus, he says, we have to recognise that this global postmodern still originates from a position of power in the West, and that it is still constructing a form of homogenisation (and perhaps even hegemony), although now we can say that it is homogenising precisely by working through difference.

I want to suggest that Hall's theory is an example of a model of globalisation which operates by setting up a particular series of differences which are then somehow made equivalent: first, a relation between two places (or more accurately, a relation between one and many places, usually in the form of the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world, or between the Atlantic—capitalist centre and the various peripheries) which takes for granted both the category of place and the existence of specific places; second, a geographical relation between two forms of spatial individuation in the form of a relation between place and space, where the latter is often treated as little more than the empty environment through which forces, defined within specific places, move; and third, an articulated relation between the local and the global, linking different places within a single determining economy of power. In fact, different versions of such a model can be distinguished on the basis of the rhetoric of transformations which establishes the equivalences among these three differences.

I want to describe such a model as a construction of globalization as a coding machine. Coding machines work by expanding or extending themselves into apparently independent realms which they incorporate into or bind to themselves by inscribing codes of identity and difference. They normalise every event by differentiating it from the others, and then identifying it with some. Coding machines produce disjunctive articulations: all relations are of the form 'either/or'. In fact, within such a machine, I think it is actually impossible to distinguish between older forms of globalisation and the contemporary context of globalisation. It may in fact be an accurate description of older forms of globalisation, at least for the period of modern colonialism and imperialism. Such machines of globalisation produced organisations, not only of extension but of the extension of particular forms defined in terms of relations of identity and difference. That is, here globalisation involves decoding existing forms of social and cultural relations according to the operational codes of the colonising power. In this sense, such machines also set fairly simple parameters for the relations of becoming within the space of globalisation: the colonised becoming the colonisers and the colonisers becoming the colonised. Not only does such a theory fail to distinguish between old and new forms of globalisation, it also fails to offer any account of the distinctive relation between 'culture' and capitalism. Instead of seeing both globalisation and localisation as modes of articulation, as two vectors within a specific contextual economy, the former defining a force of mobility, the latter a force of enclosure or boundary production, coding machines establish a series of transformations which always return them to the relations between place and space, and ultimately between different kinds of places.

Globalisation as a territorialising machine

A second model of globalisation identifies it as a relation of space and place, or more accurately a question of movements between places, across a space, although usually this space remains largely empty and powerless. To a large extent, the question of the relation between the local and the global – the most common form in which the question of power is raised – disappears. Such theories, not coincidentally, are often closely connected to some version of postmodernism as a vision of contemporaneity and history. Thus, it is no coincidence that Arjun Appadurai's (1990) theory of globalisation begins by equating globalisation and postmodernisation. Thus, according to Appadurai, globalisation is 'close to the central problematic of cultural processes in