The Scholar in Society

English and literary studies have reached a point in their theoretical development where they've become incapable of communicating to the layman at the very historical moment when they've most needed to justify their existence. The brightest and most innovative young people in literary criticism are as impenetrable as nuclear physicists. The left-wing intelligentsia is trapped in a kind of ghetto that only they understand, and so can't bring leverage to bear on the body politic.
—David Lodge

What kind of "leverage" can literary and linguistic scholarship bring to bear on the "body politic"? What, if anything, has humanistic scholarship to say to the layperson? What is the social function of humanistic research? These questions have been troubling as long as scholarship has existed, but they have acquired a new urgency as scholarship has come to be publicly supported by academic institutions and tied to the mission of democratic higher education. The sentiment by David Lodge (cited in Lyle 57), a well-known novelist and until recently a professor of English himself, succinctly reflects the belief of many today that the distance between the scholar and society is growing.

Complicating the issue is the emergence since the 1960s of the academic "left-wing intelligentsia" referred to by Lodge. Though this intelligentsia claims to put its scholarship in the service of social change, it is often seen to pursue this project in such a way as to be incomprehensible to those who presumably are to benefit from the changes. And yet, the current public battle over the role of the academic humanities is a sign of a certain convergence of interests between scholars and society.

People do not wage war unless they care about the same things, and the erosion of what has been called a "culture war" over the humanities has opened a discussion between scholars and the public that did not exist previously. Though the popular accounts of the new academic trends have often been hazy and inaccurate, the effect has been to make language and literary studies a bit less mysterious to the outside world than they were before. If nothing else, the public at least knows that academic experts on language and literature vigorously disagree about fundamental questions in their discipline.

To make this point is not to minimize the vast and disturbing gulf that still separates the discourses of humanities scholars from those of the public at large as well as the urgent need for humanities to bridge this gulf. But as I argue in this essay, major changes have been taking place in humanities research, changes that call into question long-held assumptions about academic special-
give modern language studies a central place in the college and school curricula. In combining the seemingly opposed impulses of scientific method and romantic cultural nationalism, the new modern language philology promised to reconcile the scholar and society, the professional and the amateur, graduate research and undergraduate education.

As narrow as the early philologists' investigations were, taken together these investigations were thought to compose a grand and inspiring picture of the Western cultural and literary tradition. In theory at least, even the most seemingly trivial research fact was a part of the whole cultural whole; research was thus a force for cultural unity in a nation where such unity had always seemed precarious at best and where it was now threatened by massive European immigration.

In practice, however, the performance of academic philologists fell short of their missionary cultural pretensions. Philologists might describe themselves as cultural leaders, but few outside the academy took their claims seriously, and they themselves were often forced to concede that the industrious accumulation of research facts did not often add up to any edifying cultural meaning. Some of them wondered publicly if their research actually served any larger educational and humanistic purpose.

The distinction hardened between the "scholar," concerned chiefly with more or less quantifiable facts, and the journalistic or belletristic "critic," concerned with more elusive personal interpretations and judgments. That an unbridgeable gulf had grown up between the two became a frequent observation both inside and outside the academy. The scholar, it was said, commanded professionalism, expertise, and authority, but produced few interesting conclusions, while the critic abounded in loose and amateurish generalizations, but lacked solid evidence for them. This schizoid condition was reproduced in the working lives of many professors after being specialists in their research and their graduate seminars, they were expected to become generalists when they entered the undergraduate classroom.

Few made the transition successfully, and their failures left language and literature departments vulnerable to harsh critics, who charged that the very existence of these departments rested on a misconceived attempt to apply rigorously scientific methods to subjects inherently resistant to them. Since the beginnings, then, academic humanistic scholarship had to face public skepticism about its very reason for being. Though research in the sciences is often obscure and highly specialized, it has a commonly assumed social rationale that legitimates it in the public mind. Because humanities research lacks such a rationale, obscurity and specialization in its scholarship can easily seem merely frivolous or perverse.

News articles on the Modern Language Association annual convention that sanctified bewilderingly opaque sessions and paper titles are a relatively benevolent manifestation of this response. But the mood has lately begun to take an angrier turn as the magnitude and the costs of the humanities-research enterprise have
steadily grown without a visible increase in its contribution to the public good. This anger overlays the already long-standing fear that research draws humanities away from the teaching of undergraduates. As Wayne Booth asked in his essay "The Scholar and Society" in the 1981 edition of Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures, "[H]ow can we justify a national educational system that rewards and encourages scholarly specialization...?... on the expense of simple essential matters like teaching the young how to read and write?" (125).

The target of Booth's criticism was not humanities itself but the failure of humanities to make the larger implications of their research clear to students and the general public. Booth went on to argue that "most of our important work deserves also to be translated into a language that will, by its nature, reach the public that we are serious and that what we do can be important to more than a priory cult" (126).

That most humanities research is even worth of being translated has always been questioned, however, by harsher critics, who say that this research is so trivial that it inherently conflicts with the values officially promoted by the humanities. (As one critic called it, playing on a traditional Latin tag, humanities research is a kind of "literae insanitatis" [Foester].) According to such critics, the standard forms of humanities research dampen the creative spirit when they do not stifle it entirely. The implication is that literature and the arts would be better off without an army of academic scholars attached to it.

"When I was an undergraduate in Chicago," Saul Bellow has said, "we were told not to bother with humanist scholars but to study the Great Books themselves" (qtd. in Atlas 83).

The suspicion, moreover, is that academic humanities themselves secretly share this view and that much of their research would not be produced if it were not for the compulsion of publish-or-perish requirements. Even Booth complained that "our profession has, for complex reasons, developed a strange capacity to generate a kind of research that is not only irrelevant to society but irrelevant to the interests of the researcher." (129). The source of this strange capacity, of course, lies in tenure and promotion requirements that measure the competitive ranking of universities by their annual research production rather than their excellence in teaching.

In all these criticisms, the aspect of scholarly research that draws the most persistent condemnation is its supposed specialization. Scholarly specialization, in the title of an official report by Lynne V. Cheney, current chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities, is seen as part of a "syrinx machine," a legacy of the nineteenth-century German university in which "the scholar's proper role lay in producing 'bricks' for the rising temple of knowledge" ("Symmetrical Machines 27"). Research, it is said, not only results in the neglect of teaching and the subversion of the values of the humanities but undermines the common ground of the curriculum and the commonly shared values in the culture. Though the accusation that research specialization subverts "the common culture" goes back at least a century, it has resurfaced as an especially persistent theme in the wave of critical books, reports, and polemical expositions on higher education that have appeared since the mid-1980s.†

As Allan Bloom put it in his 1987 best-seller, The Closing of the American Mind, "most professors are specialists, concerned only with their own fields, interested in the advancement of those fields in their own terms, or in their own personal advancement in a world where all the rewards are on the side of professional distinction" (139). A 1987 editorial in the New Republic put it this way: "the energy needed to chart out the cutting edge of new knowledge means less time and effort devoted to teaching... Once unitary truths are scorned, there's no reason to distinguish between the important and the trivial in education" ("Cae" 7-8).

The implication of such comments is that research is essentially selfish, placing the personal advancement of the researcher and the advancement of the field ahead of education and the common culture. The effect of research is seen as divisive, undermining the "unitary truths" that support and empower (define) them. And as the imagery of cutting edges and rhetorical machines suggests, research is thought of as a mechanism that is impersonal and soullessly "churned out," not in activity with its own forms of skill and creativity.

Certainly a good many of these charges against humanities research have been justified. But in my view they are increasingly misleading as descriptions of the current state of the academic humanities. Booth argued in 1981 that, with respect to institutional expectations about research, "what must be changed are the rules of the house..." ("Scholar 130). Yet the rules of the house were already undergoing significant change at the moment Booth was writing, though it is easier to see this today than it was. Then from glorifying specialization, the humanities for over a generation have regained the narrower forms of specialization with disfavor and have gone in search of large cultural, theoretical, and interdisciplinary overviews.

Here a great deal hinges, of course, on how precise words like specialization and generalization are used. In one sense, as Catherine R. Stimpson points out, "specialization is a feature of every complex organization, be it social or natural, a school system, garden, book, or mammalian body." After all, "no single entity can survive within its environment if it must perform every task that must be done." So the question, Stimpson says, "is not whether we are speciating but how we specialize—in what, for whom, with whom and to what end" (3). As Stimpson also observes, the critics of research confuse at least four distinct terms... and if they were synonymous: specialization, theorization and flight from undergraduate teaching. In other words, specialization has become an ideological buzzword, useful for denigrating new forms of politically oriented theory, scholarship, and teaching. Scholars in women's studies, minority literatures, and multicultural studies are accused of subordinating scholarship to politi-
cal causes and promoting the values of "special interest groups." (See, among others, the essays by Schor, Allen, Gates, and Barthbrick in this volume.) These scholars retort that those who make these charges are themselves a special interest group, despite their claim to speak from a universal viewpoint, and that they have their own kind of investment in the political cause—acceptance of the status quo being as much a cause as desire to change it.

In Tyramical Machines, Cherny adds "the importance of new theoretical approaches" as her primary example of how narrow specialization is taking over the humanities, causing courses in "increasingly narrow topics" to be substituted for ones in broadly general ones. Cherny cites one university that replaced ten courses in Western civilization by three new courses, Discourse and Society, Text and Context, and Knowledge and Power; and another that allows a general requirement to be filled by a course called Sexuality and Writing (31–32). But it is not clear from these titles that the changes to which Cherny refers are indeed toward greater specialization and particularization: what could be more general in scope than "discourse and society," "knowledge and power," and "sexuality and writing?" In so far as those topics may bring together different cultures and their "play," they could be construed as less narrow than the particularistic "Western" civilization. Obviously, whatever is objectionable about the new courses is not a difference in degree of specialization but a difference in ideology.

Plainly, there is a contradiction in current criticism of alleged specialization, for it is clearly the general import of political issues like "knowledge and power" that arouses uneasiness from opponents, not specialization or obscurantism. One suspects that underlying the attacks on the specialization and obscurantism of research dealing with these issues is a fear that the import of this research may become all too clear, that it may bring all too much "leverage to bear on the body politic," in Lodge's phrase, especially if its implications continue to be taught to undergraduates. After all, if the new theories and methods were merely specialized and obscure, it is doubtful that people would be getting so worked up over them.

This is not to suggest there is no truth in Lodge's observation that "the brightest and most innovative young people in literary criticism" are often impeneetrable to the lay person. But that their efforts are stirring up so much public controversy is itself a sign of a certain kind of "leverage," or at least an ability to attract a degree of public attention and debate that is unprecedented for humanities scholarship. When an unfamiliar idiom such as "discourse and society" baffles students and others, this is a problem needing attention. But the problem still cannot be described as a problem of narrow specialization. It is one thing for an academic subject to be so narrow or trivial that no one but another expert can take an interest in it. It is another for a subject to possess potentially broad interest that it fails to receive because it has not been effectively translated into lay terms.

Take, for example, the scholar who writes an article for Critical Inquiry or PMLA on the politics of interpretation in seventeenth-century French painting and the journalist who writes an editorial on spin control as a new feature of the climate of public life—where what has come to matter, it is now often felt, is not just the event itself (a presidential debate, the war in the Persian Gulf) but the "spin" placed on the event by the communications media. The editorialist who writes about spin control is in some ways concerned with the same phenomenon as the scholar—the political struggle to control meaning. Both are treading in their different ways to the proposition that whoever controls language controls much more than language. Insofar as recent humanities scholarship is concerned with drawing out and advancing the implications of this proposition, it is less exotic, raveled, and remote from journalistic interest than it seems to be.

Yet the different discourses of scholars and journalists can easily prevent the two sides from recognizing that their concerns overlap. These discourses are not neutral, entailing as they do very different and often antithetical assumptions about language and the politics of language. For a dialogue may be possible once the terms of the one discourse begin to be translated into those of the other. Academic scholars in the 1990s, who hope to close the gap between themselves and society will need to be more concerned with this sort of translation than were their predecessors. In fact, this project figures to be crucial at a moment when so many of those scholars are coming under unprecedented journalistic attacks.

WHAT COUNTS AS "RESEARCH"?

I have said that recent attacks on the specialization of humanities research echo a litany of complaints that was already well established a century ago. What is usually overlooked is that the litany has not gone completely unheeded. When critics of research like Cherny attack the view that "the scholar's proper role lay in producing 'bricks' for the rising temple of knowledge," it does not occur to them that this model of knowledge, and hence their criticism of it, has been out of date for decades. Though Cherny in her essay for the title of her report the phrase "tyramical machines," from a 1903 essay by William James, she does not consider that what was true of scholarly research in 1903 may no longer be true by 1990. Humanities who only gather "bricks" of information no longer compete effectively with colleagues who can put their knowledge into larger contexts.

It is true, as Stimpson notes, that most professors of literature have continued to concentrate "on a period, figure, nation, or problem" (2). But it is also true that the context has expanded in which a particular scholarly specialty now tends to be considered. Stimpson points out that recent critics of Gertrude Stein's writing range far beyond Stein's texts: "they [have] studied modernism, genre theory, psychoanalysis, linguistics, Parisian society" (3). Not only would an experimental writer like Stein not have been studied at all in a literature.
myth criticism

Gerald Graff

To mention still another type of demonstration, the new forms of textual close reading proved to be applicable to texts that were not considered literature at all. Though the study of film and popular culture would not become prevalent in literary departments until the 1960s, in retrospect one can see how the war for such study was paved by the earlier academic critical revolution, whose techniques of close analytical reading could locate complex meanings in a comic strip or popular film as easily as in a canonical novel of prose (see Barth in this volume). Myth critics like Northrop Frye and Leslie Fiedler pointed out that the same structural and mythical patterns that underlay the Bible and the literary classics could be found in all narratives including those of advertising and popular culture. Fiedler dramatized the point in a 1955 study, in which he gave historical events such as the Rosenbergs' case and the Joseph McCarthy hearings "the same careful scrutiny we have learned to practice on the shorter poems of Dante." The critics of the 1950s thus anticipated the theories of the 1980s in the practice of thinking of historical events as "texts" (Figure 1).

Therefore, though the postwar interpretive methodologies helped to conclude a hierarchical literary canon, there was something about these methodologies that unsatisfactorily subsetted canons and hierarchies. The mere application of the same set of interpretive conventions to a clinical tragedy and a popular film tended to level the major differences between these objects and made them seem conceptually comparable. In this respect, one could argue that it was the critics of the 1940s and 1950s who began to undermine canonical hierarchies of culture long before today's canon revisionists arrived on the scene. It was also the critics of that period, with their interests in anthropalogy and psychology, who initiated the transgression so much lamented by many today in which movies borrowed from the behavioral sciences insinuate an ethos.

None of these changes occurred without a fight, of course. Interpretive criticism and the study of modern literature, creative writing, and popular culture became legitimate research activities only after acrimonious battles. Such battles continue today over the tenure qualifications of teachers of women's and ethnic studies and rhetoric and composition.

As a consequence of the changes I have been tracing, a great part of the research done by humanists today would not have been recognized as "research," as all according to the criteria in force before the war. Once the world research (fiscal) scholarship could mean anything from a philological study of the passive voice in Old Icelandic to a critical reading of Gertrude Stein or a contemporary experimental novel, it became an "administrative catchall for measuring faculty production rather than a precise or meaningful indicator of the kind of work being produced. In this respect, the fate of world literature or research scholarship in the academy resembles the fate of words like art and literature, which have become open-ended categories whose meanings are continually redefined in new and styles emerge. This state of affairs can easily leave administrative review bodies perplexed about the criteria for evaluating research. As in the art world, there are those
who claim that standards have been abandoned in the desperate pursuit of pretend. Though such criticisms are sometimes justified, those who hold up easier forms of research as a model of integrity from which we have fallen forget how often those forms were criticized for their pedantry, intellectual timidity, and irrelevance to contemporary life. In its greater engagement with contemporary culture— even the most avant-garde fields increasingly acknowledge that interpretations of the past inevitably reflect the interests of the interpreter—postwar research has brought the academic humanities potentially closer than they were before to the concerns of students and lay people. Though academic humanists have too often been reluctant to recognize the fact, the university's growth into an institution serving great masses of people necessarily turns it into an agency of cultural popularization. It is even fair to call today's university a form of popular culture, in competition with journalism and other media as an alternative interpretation of experience.

Certainly, the widening of the range of options for professional work means that there is less and less excuse for scholars in the 1990s to feel caught in the forced-labor syndrome described in 1981 by Booth, in which they feel pressure to "produce a kind of research that is not only irrelevant to society but irrelevant to the interests of the researcher." In my own experience, most academics who pursue research and publication do so not because they feel forced but because they feel the excitement—rare in any occupation—of creating an intellectual project and contributing to a research community. To be sure, some scholars still take up projects in which they lack personal conviction. But the point is that there is increasingly less institutional compulsion to do so.6

On the contrary, if there is pressure on humanists today, it is not to specialize narrowly but to transcend specialization—by making large cultural and theoretical claims and transgressing field boundaries. As Bruce Robbins puts it, the highest academic rewards now go to "those who have the vision to rethink professional procedures and protocols in response to or anticipation of great historical shifts and newly emergent visions of the public interest...." Those who "set the professional agenda," according to Robbins, are those who "force professional paradigms-shifts, re-align the competing disciplines among themselves and (in so doing) in new relation to worldly power."

Jonathan Culler makes a similar point in his essay "Literary Theory" in this volume, where he notes that the growth of theorybreaks the emergence of the new "notion of generality as theoretical significance.... As publishers and their blurs tell us, a theoretical point or claim has come to be what you aim for when you are trying to reach a broad audience in literary studies...." [Footnote: of general interest are taken to be theoretical positions even if they do not rely on anything like theoretical argument.] It is this new theoretical generality described by Culler that has made possible the recent interdiscursive mergers of literary studies with philosophy, religion, sociology, popular culture, the history of science, anthropology and ethnography, and the law.7 The recent development of the much discussed new field of legal and literary interpretation

(Levinson and Mailoux) would have been inconceivable had literary studies remained confined within the older specialist discourse. The same general ideas and debates now circulate across the most diverse fields and create possibilities of common discussion that did not exist when positivistic specialization defined the norm (see Gunn in this volume).

Of course, it is one thing to overcome boundaries between the academic disciplines and quite another to overcome the boundary between those academic disciplines and the lay public. The general ideas that circulate freely across law and literature—the debate over "critical legal studies," for example, which has been influenced by deconstruction and poststructuralism—are often mysterious to nonacademics. But the blurring of internal boundaries tends to affect external boundaries as well. Once literary scholars become part of a common discussion with lawyers and legal theorists, they are speaking to concerns that a wider public may come to recognize it has a stake in.

Critics who see the growth of theory, then, as the ultimate surrender to the narcissistic specialization that has supposedly overcome the humanities generally, have things exactly backwards. What these critics mistake for specialization are in fact new languages of generalization, languages that have so far resisted popularization but are not intrinsically incapable of it.

Changes in academic publishing have also had a hand in raising the prestige of generality while devaluing specialization. In the early 1970s, when government support for higher education was markedly curtailed, university presses were forced to think more commercially in deciding what to publish. Previously, the role of the university press had been to subsidize the kind of scholarly work whose prospective market figured to be too small to interest a commercial publisher. Without completely abandoning this role and entering into competition with trade houses for huge sales, university presses began to market their lists more aggressively and to copy-trade press-advertising techniques. The effect of these new conditions was to reduce the publishability of the scholarly book that speaks solely to specialists and to increase that of the book that addresses a wider audience, even if it still usually a predominantly academic one. The book addressed chiefly to specialists could still be published, but only if its author demonstrated larger implications of the subject for readers beyond the immediate field. These conditions obtain less widely in scholarly journal publishing, whose less stringent economic constraints allow it to remain more receptive to field-specific writing.

In the wake of all these changes, then, the graduate student who in 1945 might have written a dissertation on the topic Certain Aspects of Southey's Juventia would be likely in 1990 to write one on Robert Southey and the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Romanticism, in which a claim might be made about the roots of our present views about sexuality. Is this a bad thing, as many believe? There is obviously the danger of confusing profundity with tenderness and hype, and it is unfortunate when premature expectations of a "major contribution" fall on scholars hardly out of graduate school. Further...
The competitive job market and 'the cutting edge' have become so dominant that academics' publications are increasingly driven by the desire for tenure or promotion, rather than by a genuine interest in contributing to knowledge. This has led to a decline in the quality of research, as academics are more concerned with publishing in prestigious journals than with producing work that is truly innovative or original.

The academic community has responded to this pressure by creating a culture of 'publish or perish,' where the number of publications is often more important than the quality or impact of the research. This has resulted in a proliferation of work that is repetitive and unoriginal, and in a decline in the depth and breadth of research that is being conducted.

Moreover, this emphasis on publication has led to a decline in the value placed on teaching and mentoring, as these activities are not rewarded in the same way as research. This has led to a decline in the quality of education, as academics are more focused on their own career advancement than on the needs of their students.

The academic community is now facing a crisis, as the decline in the quality of research and education is undermining the integrity of the discipline. It is time for academics to reevaluate their priorities and to place a greater emphasis on the quality and impact of their work, rather than on the number of publications. Only in this way can the discipline hope to survive and thrive in the future.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

On a topic as vast as the scholar in society, any bibliography must be selective and somewhat arbitrary. One place to begin would be with classic nineteenth-century statements such as John Henry Newman's Idea of a University, Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy, and Thomas Henry Huxley's essays on science, education, and culture. Works that have attempted to bring the issues and reference points that persist in discussions today: the function of the humanistic scholar in a mass democratic society increasingly subject to utilitarian pressures; the extent to which it is possible to reconcile scholarship with being disinterested; the competing cultural and educational claims of the sciences and the humanities.

Raymond Williams's Culture and Society, 1780–1950 remains a masterful summation of the "culture and society" tradition, whose concepts still frame speculation on the social role of the scholar. Questions about the scholar in society have increasingly come to concern the organization of scholars in the modern university. The standard history of the American university is Laurence R. Vesey's Emergence of the American University, which usefully distinguishes three functions whose coalescence and collision shaped the institution: liberal culture (later called humanities), research, and vocationalism. See also Vesey's important forthcoming article, "The Humanities in American Universities since the 1930s." Standard studies of academic professionalism include Burton Blustein, The Culture of Professionalism; Mogilh Safarfi Lanser, The Rise of Professionalism; and Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction. Histories that discuss the social functions envisaged for "English" and other language and literature disciplines by their founders include Stephen Potter, The Muse in Chains; E. M. W. Tillyard, The Muse Unchained; and, the most pertinent today, Chris Balick, The Social Mission of English Critics, 1948–1932. Essays start with William Riley Parker's classic "Where Do English Departments Come From?" See also Michael Warner's "Professionalization and the Rewards of Literature, 1875–1900," and Gerald Graff and Michael Warner's Origins of Literary Studies in America. The 1960s and their aftermath have seen an immense outpouring of work—impossible to acknowledge comprehensively—arguing for the unavoidable political dimensions of scholarly production even when (or especially when) that production is ostensibly unconcerned with questions of politics and power. Much of this work has sought to explain the origins and persistence of the general implications of our work to students and other lay audiences. If humanities scholars of the 1990s will be engaging issues of general public interest to an unprecedented degree, we need to take seriously the possibility that people out there will be listening.

University of Chicago

NOTES

1In a forthcoming essay, "The Humanities in American Universities since the 1930s: The Decline of Grandiosity" Lawrence R. Vesey points out that though we have come to think of the "humanities" as the natural category that lends such subjects as history,
philosophy, and the arts, the use of humanism as an administrative category for subsuming these and other subjects is recent, dating only from the mid-1930s. Vermey observes that the fortunes of humanism as an academic administrative category were paradoxically bound to a sudden burst of letters that humanist critics had been shown as the

Vermey quotes statements by administrators through the 1930s indicating that they did not think of literature, art, history, and philosophy as belonging to any common concept of “humanism” and in fact did not see these subjects as necessarily possessive common ground at all. Yet, it does not quite fit this way, but it does the conclusion from his own, that humanities became a privileged administrative category only when it came to be felt that some term was needed to group departments that did not fit either of the two major divisional groupings, the physical and natural sciences, that developed in the early university. It is as if humanities, that is, answered the need for a name for everything that was left over after sorting out the sectors of the university concerned with technology, money, and political power.

For an early American academic’s eloquent expression of the larger cultural ratio

of philosophy and literary history, see Coolidge for a slightly later testament, see

Cicero. For an excellent study of the very intimately naturalized and moral political attitudes illuminating nineteenth-century Anglo-Saxon philology (as well as many of the ideas of the Victorian Age), see waterfront for their recent study of the political contexts of Anglo-Saxonism in “Old English,” see Travers.

In an MLA address in 1952, a year before Bright declined philology to be national scholars, James T. Farrell complained that language and literary scholars were “largely...

this unspoken message to all the ever-increasing numbers of those who were being assimilated into the mainstream of American society. As a later scholar, Edward C. Armstrong, put it in 1950, though “the aggregate of knowledge” had become “far richer than ever before... but the large questions in this knowledge are far less in number. Leadership has been assumed by the untrained host, which is not helped by no calls as concerns... and therefore finds no inclination to improve its judgment...” (xiv).

For two of the mass cultural attributions, both from the new-humanistic perspective, see Babo and Forester.

Among the pronouncements of the official reports are several from the National Endowment for the Humanities (1978), “To Explain a Legacy” (1984), “The History of the Humanities” (1988) and “President’s Address” (1990). For reports taking a similar line, see the Association of American Colleges, Integrity in the College Curriculum (1985), and Weyer: College: The Undergraduate Experience, a 1987 publication of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

To this day I would add the habit of confusing specialization with departmental competition, something quite different: the fact that on a given campus the professor of literature, foreign languages, philosophy, and history have little regular contact with one another does not necessarily mean that they are too specialized for each other to communicate.

For documentation relevant to this discussion, see my Professing Literature.

"Booth's account of his own scholarly career tends to be the picture of a professor that forces scholars to practice both of research that are inadequate to their real interests. Describing his early years in the profession as work at World War II, Booth says that at the moment of his turn to 124, 125... “Booth wonders if such work constitutes a fitting use of the public's trust...” What is noticeable, however, is that the study of narrative connections that Booth advances as an example of his new specialization would have been the subject of much less interest than the critical, and not sufficiently objective and scholarly, Boo... (book title). (Book title) read and written by people who don't know each other, the physical and the natural sciences, that developed in the early university. It is as if humanities, that is, answered the need for a name for everything that was left over after sorting out the sectors of the university concerned with technology, money, and political power.

For an early American academic’s eloquent expression of the larger cultural ratio... and literature scholars are “largely...” this unspoken message to all the ever-increasing numbers of those who were being assimilated into the mainstream of American society. As a later scholar, Edward C. Armstrong, put it in 1950, though “the aggregate of knowledge” had become “far richer than ever before... but the large questions in this knowledge are far less in number. Leadership has been assumed by the untrained host, which is not helped by no calls as concerns... and therefore finds no inclination to improve its judgment...” (xiv).

For two of the mass cultural attributions, both from the new-humanistic perspective, see Babo and Forester.

Among the pronouncements of the official reports are several from the National Endowment for the Humanities (1978), “To Explain a Legacy” (1984), “The History of the Humanities” (1988) and “President’s Address” (1990). For reports taking a similar line, see the Association of American Colleges, Integrity in the College Curriculum (1985), and Weyer: College: The Undergraduate Experience, a 1987 publication of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

To this day I would add the habit of confusing specialization with departmental competition, something quite different: the fact that on a given campus the professor of literature, foreign languages, philosophy, and history have little regular contact with one another does not necessarily mean that they are too specialized for each other to communicate.
guaranteed them a position and the makings of a small but secure niche in the specialized area they had written about.

The collapse of this quasi-fiscal structure has occurred at an uneven rate from field to field and institution to institution. But as the once tightly defined structure of fields has dissolved, the old key network of job placement has weakened, transforming PhD students from apprentices in a master's shop into wage laborers selling their skills in a deregulated free market. The new conditions briskly liberate students from faculty authority in their choice of subjects and methods—and I doubt that many would choose the older arrangements restored—but they also lie loosely on their own, expected from the vicissitudes of the market.

For a recent work by Hayford; Parker; McCane; Shillingburg; Mahilous; and Tastelle, among others.

For a recent restatement of the "defensive and compensatory" traditional general education philosophy have described, see Boyer.

Undergraduate research has been advanced by the National Conferences for Undergraduate Research, initiated in 1987 by faculty members and administrators at the University of North Carolina, Asheville, and sponsored by the Association of American Colleges.

WORKS CITED


Index

Albom, Craig S., 128, 129, 137
Almasa, M. Li., 246, 250
Ackerson, P. R., 180
Accetta-Bolton, Edna, 300
Adams, Horace, 217, 230
Adams, Japhet, 85, 96
Adams, End, 316
Adreus, Theodore W., 248, 259, 332, 335
Anschutz, 32, 107, 148
Alston, James E., 54, 59, 21, 43
Alonsom, Richard, 160
Allen, Gray Wilson, 137
Allen, J., F. B., 28, 73
Allen, Michael J. B., 50, 135
Allen, Paula Gunn, 220, 227, 242, 264,
300, 316, 312, 321, 348
Allwright, Richard, 58, 72
Althamur, Louis, 220, 238, 240, 248, 256,
327, 333
Ashburn, Charles, 148-49, 152, 156
Amos, Ashley Cranford, 120, 130
Anderson, Roger, 9, 23, 24
Anderson, Albreth, 240
Anderson, John, 229, 230
Anderson, Richard, C., 64, 72
Annesley, Gary, 229, 230
Avery, W. E., 182
Azurdia, Claudia, 226, 228, 306, 315, 316
Aydin, Kevin Anthony, 222, 229, 230,
294, 301
Aymon, Jonathan, 230
Archer, David, 328
Arnott, David, 230, 257, 332
Asen, Katherine, 65, 71, 76
Arazi, Philip, 190
Armenta, L. E., 193
Aron, Jonathan, 193
Arnhart, B., 91, 92, 111, 166, 172, 199,
219, 253, 257
Assmann, Edward C., 356, 360
Audrihan, Richard, 250
Arnold, David, 141, 146, 147, 149, 321,
355, 360, 360
Anson, M. R. E., 26
Auch, Alfred B., 193-94, 196
Aubert, Ellis, 228, 229, 230
Aberg, 79, 92
Aguin, Maxfield de, 293
Atkinson, J. Massin-S, 47, 49
Atkins, James, 246, 356, 360

Arturms, Kemal, 33
Arendt, Derek, 231
Ardern, W. B., 16
Austen, Jane, 163
Austin, J. L., 210, 230
Austin, Roger, 149, 198
Avedon, David A., 46, 72
Babcock, Irving, 357, 358, 360
Bach, Emerson, 25
Bacon, Francis, 146, 255, 257
Bailey, Tom, 239
Baker, Michael, 303, 317
Baker, Kathleen, 69, 72
Baker, Richard W., 47, 48, 49, 51
Baker, Edward, 323
Baker, Ernest A., 140, 156
Baker, Nathan A., Jr., 150, 157, 209, 220,
227, 230, 291, 301
Baker, Josephine Turner, 38, 49
Bakos, Michael, 318, 319
Baldwin, M. Keith, 206, 246, 256, 257, 311
Balms, Beth, 335
Ball, C. R., 129, 130
Baldick, Chris, 356, 357, 360
Baran, Honoré de, 207, 250
Bartlett, Thomas, 309, 319, 317
Barfield, B. J., 82, 92
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 291
Barnes, Andrea A., 117
Barts, Michael, 109, 130
Bates, Gary, 230
Barnard, Philip, 233
Barthes, B., 13, 151
Barthes, Raymond, 190, 193
Barr, James, 233
Barthes, Roland, 130, 133, 134, 154, 156,
161, 179, 227, 242, 243, 246, 247,
253, 256, 265, 266, 282, 305, 311
Barthes, Roland, 239
Barthes, Jean-Pierre, 249, 257
Barthes, Roland, 130, 133, 134, 154, 156,
161, 179, 227, 242, 243, 246, 247,
253, 256, 265, 266, 282, 305, 311
Barthes, Roland, 239
Barthes, Jean-Pierre, 249, 257
Barthes, Roland, 130, 133, 134, 154, 156,
161, 179, 227, 242, 243, 246, 247,
253, 256, 265, 266, 282, 305, 311
Barthes, Roland, 239
Barthes, Jean-Pierre, 249, 257
Barthes, Roland, 130, 133, 134, 154, 156,
161, 179, 227, 242, 243, 246, 247,
253, 256, 265, 266, 282, 305, 311
Barthes, Roland, 239
Barthes, Jean-Pierre, 249, 257
Barthes, Roland, 130, 133, 134, 154, 156,
161, 179, 227, 242, 243, 246, 247,
253, 256, 265, 266, 282, 305, 311
Barthes, Roland, 239
Barthes, Jean-Pierre, 249, 257
Barthes, Roland, 130, 133, 134, 154, 156,
161, 179, 227, 242, 243, 246, 247,
253, 256, 265, 266, 282, 305, 311
Barthes, Roland, 239
Barthes, Jean-Pierre, 249, 257
Barthes, Roland, 130, 133, 134, 154, 156,
161, 179, 227, 242, 243, 246, 247,