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A Brief History
of Neoliberalism

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Introduction

Future historians may well look upon the years 1978–80 as a revolutionary turning-point in the world’s social and economic history. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping took the first momentous steps towards the liberalization of a communist-rulled economy in a country that accounted for a fifth of the world’s population. The path that Deng defined was to transform China in two decades from a closed backwater to an open centre of capitalist dynamism with sustained growth rates unparalleled in human history. On the other side of the Pacific, and in quite different circumstances, a relatively obscure (but now renowned) figure named Paul Volcker took command at the US Federal Reserve in July 1979, and within a few months dramatically changed monetary policy. The Fed thereafter took the lead in the fight against inflation—no matter what its consequences (particularly as concerned unemployment). Across the Atlantic, Margaret Thatcher had already been elected Prime Minister of Britain in May 1979, with a mandate to curb trade union power and put an end to the miserable inflationary stagnation that had enveloped the country for the preceding decade. Then, in 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States and, armed with geniality and personal charisma, set the US on course to revitalize its economy by supporting Volcker’s moves at the Fed and adding his own particular blend of policies to curb the power of labour, dereguile industry, agriculture, and resource extraction, and liberate the powers of finance both internally and on the world stage. From these several epicentres, revolutionary impulses seemingly spread and reverberated to remake the world around us in a totally different image.

Transformations of this scope and depth do not occur by accident. So it is pertinent to enquire by what means and paths the
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new economic configuration—often subsumed under the term 'globalization'—was plucked from the entrails of the old. Volcker, Reagan, Thatcher, and Deng Xiaoping all took minority arguments that had long been in circulation and made them majoritarian (though in no case without a protracted struggle). Yeagern brought to life the minority tradition that stretched back within the Republican Party to Henry Goldwater in the early 1960s, Deng saw the rising tide of wealth and influence in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea and sought to mobilize market socialism instead of central planning to protect and advance the interests of the Chinese state. Volcker and Thatcher both plucked from the shadows of relative obscurity a particular doctrine that went under the name of 'neoliberalism' and transformed it into the central guiding principle of economic thought and management. And it is with this doctrine—its origins, rise, and implications—that I am here primarily concerned.

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (priest) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.

There has everywhere been an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970s.

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Deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision have been both too common. Almost all states, from those newly minted after the collapse of the Soviet Union to old-style social democracies and welfare states such as New Zealand and Sweden, have embraced, sometimes volitionally and in other instances in response to coercive pressures, some version of neoliberal theory and adjusted at least some policies and practices accordingly. Post-apartheid South Africa quickly embraced neoliberalism, and even contemporary China, as we shall see, appears to be headed in this direction. Furthermore, the advocates of the neoliberal way now occupy positions of considerable influence in education (the universities and many 'think tanks'), in the media, in corporate boardrooms and financial institutions, in key state institutions (treasury departments, the central banks), and also in those international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) that regulate global finance and trade. Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse. It has pervasive effects on ways of thinking to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world.

The process of neoliberalization has, however, entailed much 'creative destruction', not only of prior institutional frameworks and powers (even challenging traditional forms of state sovereignty) but also of divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and bodies of the heart. In so far as neoliberalism values market exchange as an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs', it emphasizes the significance of contractual relations in the marketplace. It holds that the social good will be maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market. This requires technologies of information extraction and capacities to accumulate, store, transfer, analyse, and use massive databases to guide decisions in the global marketplace. Hence neoliberalism's intense interest in and pursuit of information technologies (leading some
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to proclaim the emergence of a new kind of (information society). These technologies have compressed the rising density of market transactions in both space and time. They have produced a particularly intense burst of what I have elsewhere called 'time-space compression'. The greater the geographical range (hence the emphasis on 'globalization') and the shorter the term of market contracts the better. This latter preference parallels Lyotard's famous description of the postmodern condition as one where 'the temporary contract' supplants 'permanent institutions in the professional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family and international domains, as well as in political affairs'. The cultural consequences of the dominance of such a market ethic are legion, as I earlier showed in The Condition of Postmodernity. 1

While many general accounts of global transformations and their effects are now available, what is generally missing—and this is the gap this book aims to fill—is the political-economic story of where neoliberalization came from and how it proliferated so comprehensively on the world stage. Critical engagement with that story suggests, furthermore, a framework for identifying and constructing alternative political and economic arrangements.

I have benefited in recent times from conversations with Gerard Duménil, Sam Gindin, and Léo Panitch. I have more long-standing debts to Masao Miyoshi, Giovanni Arrighi, Patrick Bond, Cindi Katz, Neil Smith, Bertell Ollman, Maria Kaika, and Erik Swyngedouw. A conference on neoliberalism sponsored by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Berlin in November 2001 helped spark my interest in this topic. I thank the Provost at the CUNY Graduate Center, Bill Kelly, and my colleagues and students primarily but not exclusively in the Anthropology Program for their interest and support. I absolve everyone, of course, from any responsibility for the results.

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Freedom's Just Another Word...

For any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced that appeals to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our desires, as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit. If successful, this conceptual apparatus becomes so embedded in common sense as to be taken for granted and not open to question. The founding figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom as fundamental, as 'the central values of civilization'. In so doing they chose wisely, for these are indeed compelling and seductive ideals. These values, they held, were threatened not only by fascism, dictatorships, and communism, but by all forms of state intervention that substituted collective judgements for those of individuals free to choose.

Concepts of dignity and individual freedom are powerful and appealing in their own right. Such ideals empowered the dissident movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union before the end of the Cold War as well as the students in Tiananmen-Square. The student movements that swept the world in 1968—from Paris and Chicago to Bangkok and Mexico City—were in part animated by the quest for greater freedoms of speech and of personal choice. More generally, these ideals appeal to anyone who values the ability to make decisions for themselves.

The idea of freedom, long embedded in the US tradition, has played a conspicuous role in the US in recent wars. '9/11' was immediately interpreted by many as an attack on it. 'A peaceful world of growing freedom', wrote President Bush on the first anniversary of that awful day, 'serves American long-term interests, reflects enduring American ideals and unites America's allies.' 'Humanity', he concluded, 'holds in its hands the opportunity to
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Freedom's Just Another Word... called a "capitalist dream" regime upon Iraq. A member of the US-appointed Coalition Provisional Authority forcefully criticized the imposition of "free market fundamentalism", calling it a "flawed logic that ignores history." Though Bremer's rules may have been illegal when imposed by an occupying power, they would become legal if confirmed by a "sovereign" government. The interim government, appointed by the US, that took over at the end of June 2004 was declared "sovereign." But it only had the power to confirm existing laws. Before the handover, Bremer multiplied the number of laws in Iraq's code, making it impossible to navigate. The freedoms in the constitution have been interpreted as minor changes and the same laws remain. The Bush administration's answer to this question was spelled out on 19 September 2003, when Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, promulgated four orders that included full privatization of public enterprises, full ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation of foreign profits, the opening of Iraq's banks to foreign control, national treatment for foreign companies, and the elimination of nearly all trade barriers. The orders were to apply to all areas of the economy, including public services, the media, manufacturing, services, transportation, finance, and construction. Only oil was exempt (presumably because of its special status as revenue producer). The Iraqis were to be strictly regulated. Strikes were effectively forbidden in key sectors and the right to unionize was ruled out. A highly regressive "flat tax" (an ambiguous tax reform plan long advocated for implementation by conservatives in the US) was also imposed.

These orders were, some argued, in violation of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, since as occupying power is mandated to guard the assets of an occupied country and not sell them off. Some Iraqis resisted the imposition of what the London Economist...

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organizations of the left and dismantled all forms of popular organization (such as the community health centres in poorer neighbourhoods). The labour market was 'freed' from regulatory or institutional restraints (trade union power, for example). But how was the stalled economy to be revived? The policies of import substitution (fostering national industries by subsidies or tariff protections) that had dominated Latin American attempts at economic development had fallen into disrepute, particularly in Chile, where they had never worked that well. With the whole world in economic recession, a new approach was called for.

A group of economists known as 'the Chile boys' because of their attachment to the neoliberal theories of Milton Friedman, then teaching at the University of Chicago, was summoned to help reconstruct the Chilean economy. The story of how they were chosen is an interesting one. The US had funded training of Chilean economists at the University of Chicago since the 1950s as part of a Cold War programme to counteract left-wing tendencies in Latin America. Chicago-trained economists came to dominate the private Catholic University in Santiago. During the early 1970s, business elites organized their opposition to Allende through a group called 'the Monday Club' and developed a working relationship with these economists, funding their work through research institutes. After General Gustavo Leigh, Pinochet's rival for power and a Keynesian, was sidelined in 1975, Pinochet brought these economists into the government, where their first job was to negotiate loans with the International Monetary Fund. Working alongside the IMF, they restructuring the economy according to their theories. They reversed the nationalizations and privatized public assets, opened up natural resources (fisheries, timber, etc.) to private and unregulated exploitation (in many cases riding roughshod over the claims of indigenous inhabitants), privatized social security, and facilitated foreign direct investment and freer trade. The right of foreign companies to repatriate profits from their Chilean operations was guaranteed. Export-led growth was favoured over import substitution. The only sector reserved for the state was the key resource of copper (rather like oil in Iraq). This proved crucial to the budgetary viability of the state since copper revenues flowed exclusively into its coffers. The immediate

revival of the Chilean economy in terms of growth rates, capital accumulation, and high rates of return on foreign investments was short-lived. It all went sour in the Latin American debt crisis of 1982. The result was a much more pragmatic and less ideologically driven application of neoliberal policies in the years that followed. All of this, including the pragmatism, provided helpful evidence to support the subsequent turn to neoliberalism is both Britain (under Thatcher) and the US (under Reagan) in the 1980s. Not for the first time, a brutal experiment carried out in the periphery became a model for the formulation of policies in the centre (much as experimentation with the flat tax in Iraq has been proposed under Bremer's decree).

The fact that two such obviously similar restructurings of the state apparatus occurred at such different times in quite different parts of the world under the coercive influence of the United States suggests that the grim reach of US imperial power might lie behind the rapid proliferation of neoliberal state forms throughout the world from the mid-1970s onwards. While this has undoubtedly occurred over the last thirty years, it by no means constitutes the whole story, as the domestic component of the neoliberal turn in Chile shows. It was not the US, furthermore, that forced Margaret Thatcher to take the pioneering neoliberal path she took in 1979. Nor was it the US that forced China in 1978 to set out on a path of liberalization. The partial moves towards liberalization in India in the 1980s and Sweden in the early 1990s cannot easily be attributed to the imperial reach of US power. The uneven geographical development of neoliberalism on the world stage has evidently been a very complex process entailing multiple determinations and not a little chaos and confusion. Why, then, did the neoliberal turn occur, and what were the forces that made it so hegemonic within global capitalism?

Why the Neoliberal Turn?

The restructuring of state forms and of international relations after the Second World War was designed to prevent a return to the catastrophic conditions that had so threatened the capitalist order in the great slump of the 1930s. It was also supposed to
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...propel the re-emergence of inter-state geopolitical rivalries that had led to the war. To ensure domestic peace and tranquility, some sort of class compromise between capital and labour had to be constructed. The thinking at the time is perhaps best represented by an influential text by two eminent social scientists, Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, published in 1953. Both capitalism and communism in their raw forms had failed, they argued. The only way ahead was to construct the right blend of state, market, and democratic institutions to guarantee peace, inclusion, well-being, and stability. Internationally, a new world order was constructed through the Bretton Woods agreements, and various institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, and the Bank of International Settlements in Basel, were set up to help stabilize international relations. Free trade in goods was encouraged under a system of fixed exchange rates anchored by the US dollar’s convertibility into gold at a fixed price. Fixed exchange rates were incompatible with free flows of capital that had to be controlled, but the US had to allow the free flow of the dollar beyond its borders if the dollar was to function as the global reserve currency. This system existed under the umbrella protection of US military power. Only the Soviet Union and the Cold War placed limits on its global reach.

A variety of social democratic, Christian democratic, and dirigiste states emerged in Europe after the Second World War. The US itself turned towards a liberal democratic state form, and Japan, under the close supervision of the US, built a nominally democratic but in practice highly bureaucratic state apparatus empowered to oversee the reconstruction of that country. What all of these various state forms had in common was an acceptance that the state should focus on full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of its citizens, and that state power should be freely deployed, alongside of, or, if necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes to achieve these ends. Fiscal and monetary policies, usually dubbed “Keynesian” were widely deployed to dampen business cycles and to ensure reasonably full employment. A “class compromise” between capital and labour was generally advocated as the key guarantor of domestic peace and tranquility. States actively intervened in industrial policy and...
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Italy and actually acquiring state power in Portugal, France, Spain, and Britain, while retaining power in Scandinavia. Even in the United States, a Congress controlled by the Democratic Party legislated a huge wave of regulatory reform in the early 1970s (signed into law by Richard Nixon, a Republican president, who in the process even went so far as to remark that "we are all Keynesians now"), governing everything from environmental protection to occupational safety and health, civil rights, and consumer protection. But the left failed to go much beyond traditional social democratic and corporatist solutions and these had by the mid-1970s proven inconsistent with the requirements of capital accumulation. The effect was to polarize debate between those ranged behind social democracy and central planning on the one hand (why, when in power, as in the case of the British Labour Party, often ended up trying to curb, usually for pragmatic reasons, the aspirations of their own constituencies), and the interests of all those concerned with facilitating corporate and business power and re-establishing market freedoms on the other. By the mid-1970s, the interests of the latter group came to the fore. But how were the conditions for the resumption of active capital accumulation to be restored? How and why neoliberalism emerged victorious as the single answer to this question is the crux of the problem we have to solve. In retrospect it may seem as if the answer was both inevitable and obvious, but at the time, I think it is fair to say, no one really knew or understood what kind of answer would work and how. The capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalization as the answer through a series of gyrations and chaotic experiments that really only converged as a new orthodoxy with the articulation of what became known as the 'Washington Consensus' in the 1990s. Yet, then both Clinton and Blair could easily have reversed Nixon's earlier statement and simply said "We are all neoliberalists now." The uneven geographical development of neoliberalism, its frequently partial and one-sided application from one state and social formation to another, testifies to the tentativeness of neoliberal solutions and the complex ways in which political forces, historical traditions, and existing institutional arrangements all shaped why and how the process of neoliberalization actually occurred.
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There is, however, one element within this transition that deserves specific attention. The crisis of capital accumulation in the 1970s affected everyone through the combination of rising unemployment and accelerating inflation (Figure 1.1). Dissent was widespread and the conjoining of labour and urban social movements throughout much of the advanced capitalist world appeared to point towards the emergence of a socialist alternative to the social compromise between capital and labour that had grounded capital accumulation so successfully in the post-war period. Communist and socialist parties were gaining ground, if not taking power, across much of Europe and even in the United States popular forces were arguing for widespread reforms and state interventions. There was, in this, a clear political threat to economic elites and ruling classes everywhere, both in the advanced capitalist countries (such as Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal) and in many developing countries (such as Chile, Mexico, and Argentina). In Sweden, for example, what was known as the Vänster-Beandning plan literally offered to gradually buy out the owners' share in their own businesses and turn the country into a workers/share-owners democracy. But, beyond this, the economic threat to the position of ruling elites and classes was now becoming palpable. One condition of the post-war settlement in almost all countries was that the economic power of the upper classes be restrained and that labour be accorded a much larger share of the economic pie. In the US, for example, the share of the national income taken by the top 1 per cent of income earners fell from a peak in the 1920s of 26 per cent to less than 5 per cent by the end of the Second World War, and stayed close to that level for nearly three decades. While growth was strong this restraint seemed not to matter. To have a stable share of an increasing pie is one thing. But when growth collapsed in the 1970s, when real interest rates went negative and pay cheques and profits were the norm, then upper classes everywhere felt threatened. In the US the control of wealth (as opposed to income) by the top 1 per cent of the population had remained fairly stable throughout the twentieth century. But in the 1970s it plunged precipitously (Figure 1.2) as asset values (stocks, property, savings) collapsed. The upper classes had to move decisively if they were to protect themselves from political and economic annihilation.

The coup in Chile and the military takeover in Argentina, promoted instrumentally by the upper classes with US support, provided one kind of solution. The subsequent Chilean experiment with
neoliberalism demonstrated that the benefits of revived capital accumulation were highly skewed under forced privatization. The country and its ruling elites, along with foreign investors, did extremely well in the early stages. Redistributive effects and increasing social inequality have in fact been such a persistent feature of neoliberalism as to be regarded as structural to the whole project. Gerard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, after careful reconstruction of the data, have concluded that neoliberalism was not the beginning a project to achieve the restoration of class power. After the implementation of neoliberal policies in the late 1970s, the share of national income of the top 1% percent of income earners in the US soared, to reach 15% percent (very close to its pre-Second World War share) by the end of the century. The top 0.1% percent of income earners in the US increased their share of the national income from 2% percent in 1978 to over 6% percent by 1999, while the ratio of the median compensation of workers to the salaries of CEOs increased from just over 30 to 1 in 1970 to nearly 500 to 1 by 2000 (Figures 1.3 and 1.4). Almost certainly, with the Bush administration’s tax reforms now taking effect, the concentration of income and wealth in the upper echelons of society is continuing apace because the estate tax (a tax on wealth) is being phased out and taxation on income from investments and capital gains is being diminished, while taxation on wages and salaries is maintained.10

The US is not alone in this: the top 1% percent of income earners in Britain have doubled their share of the national income from 6.5 percent to 13 percent since 1982. And when we look further afield we see extraordinary concentrations of wealth and power emerging all over the place. A small and powerful oligarchy arose in Russia after neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ had been administered there in the 1990s. Extraordinary surges in income inequalities and wealth have occurred in China as it has adopted free-market-oriented practices. The wave of privatization in Mexico after 1992 catalyzed a few individuals (such as Carlos Slim) almost overnight into Fortune’s list of the world’s wealthiest people. Globally, the countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS have registered some of the largest increases ever . . . in social inequality. OECD countries also...
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registered big increases in inequality after the 1980s, while 'the income gap between the fifth of the world's people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, up from 60 to 1 in 1990 and 30 to 1 in 1960.' While there are exceptions to this trend (several East and South-East Asian countries have so far contained income inequalities within reasonable bounds, as has France—see Figure 1.3), the evidence strongly suggests that the neoliberal turn is in some way and to some degree associated with the restoration or reconstruction of the power of economic elites.

We can, therefore, interpret neoliberalism either as a utopian project to realize a theoretical design for the reaffirmation of international capitalism or as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites. In what follows I shall argue that the second of these objectives has in practice dominated. Neoliberalism has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation, but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and China) creating, the power of an economic elite. The theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument has, I conclude, primarily worked as a system of justification and legitimation for whatever needed to be done to achieve this goal. The evidence suggests, moreover, that when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be unrecognizable. This in no way denies the power of ideas to act as a force for historical-geographical change. But it does point to a creative tension between the power of neoliberal ideology and the actual practices of neoliberalization that have transformed how global capitalism has been working over the last three decades.

The Rise of Neoliberal Theory

Neoliberalism as a potential antidote to threats to the capitalist social order and as a solution to capitalism's ills had long been lurking in the wings of public policy. A small and exclusive group of passionate advocates—mainly academic economists, historians, and philosophers—had gathered together around the renowned...
Austrian political philosopher Friedrich von Hayek to create the Mont Pelerin Society (named after the Swiss spa where they first met) in 1947 (the notables included Ludwig von Mises, the econo-
nist Milton Friedman, and even, for a time, the noted philosopher Karl Popper). The founding statement of the society read as follows:

The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth's surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. Even that most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own.

The group hopes that these developments have been fostered by the growth of a set of history which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law. It holds further that they have been fostered by a decline in belief in private property and the competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated with these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be effectively preserved. 11

The group's members depicted themselves as 'liberals' (in the traditional European sense) because of their fundamental commitment to ideals of personal freedom. The neoliberal label signalled their adherence to those free market principles of neo-
classical economics that had emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century (thanks to the work of Alfred Marshall, William Stanley Jevons, and Leon Walras) to displace the classical theories of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and, of course, Karl Marx. Yet they also held to Adam Smith's view that the hidden hand of the market was the best device for mobilizing even the basest of human instincts such as greed, and the desire for wealth and power for the benefit of all. Neoliberal doctrine was therefore deeply opposed to state interventionist theories, such as those of John Maynard Keynes, which rose to prominence in the 1930s in response to the Great Depression. Many policymakers after the Second World War looked to Keynesian theory to guide them as they sought to keep the 'business cycle and recessions under control. The neoliberals were even more fiercely opposed to theories of centralized state planning, such as those advanced by Oscar Lange working close to the Marxist tradition. State decisions, they argued, were bound to be politically biased depending upon the strength of the interest groups involved (such as unions, environmentalists, or trade lobbies). State decisions as matters of investment and capital accumulation were bound to be wrong because the information available to the state could not rival that contained in markets signals.

This theoretical framework is not, as several commentators have pointed out, entirely coherent. 12 The scientific rigour of its neoclassical economics does not sit easily with its political com-
mitment to ideals of individual freedom, nor does it support the distrust of all state power fit with the need for a strong and if necessary coercive state that will defend the rights of private property, individual liberties, and entrepreneurial freedoms. The jurid-
cal trick of defining corporations as individuals before the law introduces its own biases, rendering ironic John D. Rockefeller's personal credo etched in stone in the Rockefeller Center in New York City, where he places 'the supreme worth of the individual' above all else. And there are, as we shall see, enough contradictions in the neoliberal position to render evolving neoliberal doctrine (vis-à-vis issues such as monopoly power and market failures) unrecognized in relation to the seeming purity of neoliberal doc-
trine. We have to pay careful attention, therefore, to the tension between the theory of neoliberalism and the actual pragmatics of neoliberalization.

Hayek, author of key texts such as The Constitution of Liberty, presciently argued that the battle for ideas was key, and that it would probably take at least a generation for that battle to be won, not only against Marxism but against socialism, state planning, and Keynesian interventionism. The Mont Pelerin group gar-
nered financial and political support. In the US in particular, a powerful group of wealthy individuals and corporate leaders who were vociferously opposed to all forms of state intervention and
regulation, and even to internationalism sought to organize opposition to what they saw as an emerging consensus for pursuing a mixed economy. Fearful of how the alliance with the Soviet Union and the command economy constructed within the US during the Second World War might play out politically in a post-war setting, they were ready to embrace anything from McCarthyism to neoliberal think tanks to protect and enhance their power. Yet this movement remained on the margins of both policy and academic influence until the troubled years of the 1970s. At that point it began to move centre-stage, particularly in the US and Britain, nurtured in various well-financed think tanks (offshoots of the Mont Pelerin Society, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs in London and the Heritage Foundation in Washington), as well as through its growing influence within the academy, particularly at the University of Chicago, where Milton Friedman dominated. Neoliberal theory gained academic respectability by the award of the Nobel Prize in economics to Hayek in 1974 and Friedman in 1976. This particular prize, though it assumed the aura of Nobel, had nothing to do with the other prizes and was under the tight control of Sweden’s banking elite. Neoliberal theory, particularly in its monetarist guise, began to exert practical influence in a variety of policy fields. During the Carter presidency, for example, deregulation of the economy emerged as one of the answers to the chronic state of stagnation that had prevailed in the US throughout the 1970s. But the dramatic consolidation of neoliberalism as a new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy at the state level in the advanced capitalist world occurred in the United States and Britain in 1979. In May of that year Margaret Thatcher was elected in Britain with a strong mandate to reform the economy. Under the influence of Keith Joseph, a very active and committed publicist and polemicist with strong connections to the neoliberal Institute of Economic Affairs, she accepted that Keynesianism had to be abandoned and that monetarist ‘supply-side’ solutions were essential to cure the stagflation that had characterized the British economy during the 1970s. She recognized that this meant nothing short of a revolution in fiscal and social policies, and immediately signalled a fierce determination to have done with the institutions and

Freedom's Just Another Word... political ways of the social democratic state that had been consolidated in Britain after 1945. This entailed confronting trade union power, attacking all forms of social solidarity that bind competitive flexibility (such as those expressed through municipal governance, and including the power of many professionals and their associations), demanding or rolling back the commitments of the welfare state, the privatization of public enterprises (including social housing), reducing taxes, encouraging entrepreneurial initiative, and creating a favourable business climate to induce a strong inflow of foreign investment (particularly from Japan). There was, she famously declared, ‘no such thing as society, only individual men and women’—and she subsequently added, their families. All forms of social solidarity were to be dissolved in favour of individualism, private property, personal responsibility, and family values. The ideological assault along these lines that flowed from Thatcher’s rhetoric was relentless. ‘Economics are the method’, she said, ‘but the object is to change the soul.’ And change it she did, though in ways that were by no means comprehensive and complex, let alone free of political costs. In October 1979 Paul Volcker, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank under President Carter, engineered a draconian shift in US monetary policy. The long-standing commitment in the US liberal democratic state to the principles of the New Deal, which meant broadly Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies with full employment as the key objective, was abandoned in favour of a policy designed to quell inflation at all cost whatever the consequences might be for employment. The real rate of interest, which had often been negative during the double-digit inflationary surge of the 1970s, was rendered positive by fiat of the Federal Reserve (Figure 1.5). The nominal rate of interest was raised overnight, and, after a few ups and downs, by July 1981 stood close to 20 per cent. This began a long deep recession that would empty factories and break unions in the US and drive debtor countries to the brink of insolvency, beginning the long era of structural adjustment. This, Volcker argued, was the only way out of the grinding crisis of stagnation that had characterized the US and much of the global economy throughout the 1970s. The Volcker shock, as it has since come to be known, has to be
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'Velker was supported in and repointed to his position as chair of the Federal Reserve. The Reagan administration then provided the requisite political backing through further deregulation, tax cuts, budget cuts, and attacks on trade union and professional power. Reagan faced down PAGCO, the air traffic controllers' union, in a lengthy and bitter strike in 1981. This signalled an all-out assault on the powers of organized labour at the very moment when the Volcker-inspired recession was generating high levels of unemployment (10 per cent or more). But PAGCO was more than an ordinary union: it was a white-collar union which had the character of a skilled professional association. It was, therefore, an icon of middle-class rather than working-class unionism. The effect on the condition of labour across the board was dramatic—perhaps best captured by the fact that the Federal minimum wage, which stood on a par with the poverty level in 1986, had fallen to 30 per cent below that level by 1990. The long decline in real wage levels then began to arrest.

Reagan's appointments to positions of power on issues such as environmental regulation, occupational safety and health, took the

interpreted as a necessary but not sufficient condition for neo-liberalization. Some central banks had long emphasized anti-inflationary fiscal responsibility and adopted policies that were closer to monetarism than to Keynesian orthodoxy. In the West German case this derived from historical memories of the runaway inflation that had destroyed the Weimar Republic in the 1920s (setting the stage for the rise of fascism) and the equally dangerous inflation that occurred at the end of the Second World War. The IMF had long seen itself against excessive debt creation and urged, if not mandated, fiscal restraint and budgetary austerity on client states. But in all these cases this monetarism was paraded by acceptance of strong union power and a political commitment to build a strong welfare state. The turn to neoliberalism then depended not only on adopting monetarism but on the unfolding of government policies in many other areas.

Ronald Reagan's victory over Carter in 1980 proved crucial, even though Carter had shifted necessarily towards deregulation (of airlines and trucking) as a partial solution to the crisis of stagnation. Reagan's advisers were convinced that Volcker's monetarist
campaign against big government to ever higher levels. The deregulation of everything from airlines and telecommunications to finance opened up new zones of unregulated market freedoms for powerful corporate interests. Tax breaks on investment effectively subsidized the movement of capital away from the unionized north-east and midwest and into the non-union and weakly regulated south and west. Finance capital increasingly looked abroad for higher rates of return. Deindustrialization at home and moves to take production abroad became much more common. The market, depicted ideologically as the way to foster competition and innovation, became a vehicle for the consolidation of monopoly power. Corporate taxes were reduced dramatically, and the top personal tax rate was reduced from 70 to 28 per cent in what was billed as 'the largest tax cut in history' (Figure 1.7).

And so began the momentous shift towards greater social inequality and the restoration of economic power to the upper class.

There was, however, one co-conspirator shift that also impelled the movement towards neoliberalization during the 1970s. The OPEC oil price hike that came with the oil embargo of 1973 placed vast amounts of financial power at the disposal of the oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi. We now know from British intelligence reports that the US was actively preparing to invade these countries in 1973 in order to restore the flow of oil and bring down oil prices. We also know that the Saudis agreed at this time, presumably under military pressure if not open threat from the US, to recycle all of their petrodollars through the New York investment banks. The latter suddenly found themselves in command of massive funds for which they needed to find profitable outlets. The options within the US, given the depressed economic conditions and low rates of return in the mid-1970s, were not good. More profitable opportunities had to be sought out abroad. Governments seemed the safest bet because, as Walter Wriston, head of Citibank, famously put it, governments can't move or disappear. And many governments in the developing world, hitherto starved of funds, were anxious enough to borrow. For this to occur required, however, open entry and reasonably secure conditions for lending. The New York investment banks looked to the US imperial tradition both to prise open new investment opportunities and to protect their foreign operations.

The US imperial tradition had been long in the making, and to great degree defined itself against the imperial traditions of Britain, France, Holland, and other European powers. While the US had won with colonial conquest at the end of the nineteenth century, it evolved a more open system of imperialism without colonies during the twentieth century. The paradigm case was worked out in Nicaragua in the 1920s and 1930s, when US marines were deployed to protect US interests but found themselves entangled in a lengthy and difficult guerrilla insurgency led by Sandino. The answer was to find a local strongman—in this case Somozas—and to provide economic and military assistance to him and his family and immediate allies so that they could repress or buy off opposition and accumulate considerable wealth and power for themselves. To return they would always keep their country open to the operations of US capital and support, and if necessary promote US interests, both in the country and in the region (in the Nicaraguan case, Central America) as a whole. This was the model.
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d that was deployed after the Second World War during the phase of global decolonization, imposed upon the European powers at US insistence. For example, the CIA engineered the coup that overthrew the democratically elected Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953 and installed the Shah of Iran, who gave the oil contracts to US companies (and did not return the assets to the British companies that Mossadegh had nationalized). The shah also became one of the key guardians of US interests in the Middle East oil region.

In the post-war period, much of the non-communist world was opened up to US domination by tactics of this sort. This became the method of choice to fight off the threat of communism insurrections and revolution, entailing an anti-democratic (and even more emphatically anti-populist and anti-socialist/communist) strategy on the part of the US that put the US more and more into alliance with repressive military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes (most spectacularly, of course, throughout Latin America). The stories told in John Perkins’s Confessions of an Economic Hit Man are full of the ugly and unsavoury details of how this was all too often done. US interests consequently became more rather than less vulnerable in the struggle against international communism. While the consent of local ruling elites could be purchased easily enough, the need to coerce oppositional or social democratic movements (such as Allende’s in Chile) associated the US with a long history of largely covert violence against popular movements throughout much of the developing world.

It was in this context that the surplus funds being recycled through the New York investment banks were dispensed throughout the world. Before 1973, most US foreign investment was of the direct sort, mainly concerned with the exploitation of raw material resources (oil, minerals, raw materials, agricultural products) or the cultivation of specific markets (telecommunications, automobiles, etc.) in Europe and Latin America. The New York investment banks had always been active internationally, but after 1973 they became even more so, though now far more focused on lending capital to foreign governments. This required the liberalization of international credit and financial markets, and the US government began actively to promote and support this strategy...
Figure 1.8 Extracting surpluses from abroad: rates of return on foreign and domestic investments in the US, 1960-2002
Source: Duménil and Lévy, ‘The Economics of US Imperialism’.

Figure 1.9 The flow of tribute into the US: profits and capital income from the rest of the world in relation to domestic profits
Source: Duménil and Lévy, ‘Neoliberal Dynamics: Towards A New Phase?’.

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from the rest of the world through international flows and structural adjustment practices.

The Meaning of Class Power
But what exactly is meant here by ‘class’? This is always a somewhat shadowy (some would even say dubious) concept. Neoliberalization has, in any case, entailed its redefinition. This poses a problem. If neoliberalization has been a vehicle for the restoration of class power, then we should be able to identify the class forces behind it and those that have benefited from it. But this is difficult to do when ‘class’ is not a stable social configuration. In some cases ‘traditional’ strata have managed to hang on to a consistent power base (often organized through family and kinship). But in other instances neoliberalization has been accompanied by a reconfiguration of what constitutes an upper class. Margaret Thatcher, for example, attacked some of the entrenched forms of class power in Britain. She went against the aristocratic tradition that dominated in the military, the judiciary, and the financial elite in the City of London and many segments of industry, and sided with the brash entrepreneurs and the nouveaux riches. She supported, and was usually supported by, this new class of entrepreneurs (such as Richard Branson, Lord Hanson, and George Soros). The traditional wing of her own Conservative Party was appalled. In the US, the rising power and significance of the financiers and the CEOs of large corporations, as well as the immense burst of activity in wholly new sectors (such as computing and the internet, media, and retailing) changed the locus of upper-class economic power significantly. While neoliberalization may have been about the restoration of class power, it has not necessarily meant the restoration of economic power to the same people.

But, as the contrasting cases of the US and Britain illustrate, ‘class’ means different things in different places, and in some instances (for example in the US) it is often held to have no meaning at all. In addition there have been strong currents of differentiation in terms of class identity formation and re-formation in different parts of the world. In Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, for example, economic power became strongly...
concentrated among a few ethnic-minority Chinese, and the mode of acquisition of that economic power was quite different from that in Augusta or the US (it was heavily concentrated in trading activities and entailed the cornering of markets). And the rise of the seven oligarchs in Russia derived from the unique configuration of circumstances that held in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, there are some general trends that can be identified. The first is for the privileges of ownership and management of capitalist enterprises—traditionally separated—to fuse by paying CEOs (managers) in stock options (ownership yields). Stock values rather than production then become the guiding light of economic activity and, as later became apparent with the collapse of companies such as Enron, the speculative temptations that resulted from this could become overwhelming. The second trend has been to dramatically reduce the historical gap between money capital earning dividends and interest, on the one hand, and production, manufacturing, or merchant capital looking to gain profits on the other. This separation has at various times in the past produced conflicts between financiers, producers, and merchants.

In Britain, for example, government policy in the 1960s catered primarily to the requirements of the financiers in the City of London, often to the detriment of domestic manufacturing, and in the 1960s conflicts in the US between financiers and manufacturing corporations had often surfaced. During the 1970s much of this conflict either disappeared or took new forms. The large corporations became more and more financial in their orientation, even when, as in the automobile sector, they were engaging in production. Since 1980 or so it has not been uncommon for corporations to report losses in production offset by gains from financial operations (everything from CREE and insurance operations to speculating in volatile currency and futures markets). Mergers across sectors combined production, merchandising, real estate, and financial interests in new ways to produce diversified conglomerates.

One substantial core of rising class power under neoliberalism lies, therefore, with the CEOs, the key operators on corporate boards, and the leaders in the financial, legal, and technical apparatus that surrounds this inner sanctum of capitalist activity. The power of the actual owners of capital, the stockholders, has, however, been somewhat diminished unless they can gain a sufficiently large voting interest to affect corporate policy. Shareholders have on occasion been bilked of millions by the operations of the CEOs and their financial advisors. Speculative gains have also made it possible to amass enormous fortunes within a
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very short period of time (examples are Warren Buffet and George Soros).

But it would be wrong to confuse the notion of the super class to this group alone. The opening up of entrepreneurial opportunities, as well as new structures in trading relations, has allowed substantially new processes of class formation to emerge. Fast fortunes were made in new sectors of the economy such as biotechnology and information technologies (for example by Bill Gates and Paul Allen). New market relations opened up many possibilities to buy cheap and sell dear, if not to actually corner markets in such a way as to build fortunes that can either extend horizontally (as in the case of Rupert Murdoch's sprawling global media empire) or be diversified into all manner of businesses, extending backwords into resource extraction and production and forwards from a trading base into financial services, real-estate development, and retailing. In this it frequently happened that a privileged relationship to state power also played a key role. The two businessmen who were closest to Suharto in Indonesia, for example, both fed the Suharto family financial interests but also fed off their connections to that state apparatus to become immensely rich. By 1997 one of them, the Salim Group, was 'reportedly the world's largest Chinese-owned conglomerate, with $20 billion in assets and some five hundred companies'. Starting with a relatively small investment company, Carlos Slim gained control over the newly privatized telecommunications system in Mexico and quickly parlayed that into a huge conglomerate empire that controls not only a huge slice of the Mexican economy but has sprawling interests in US retailing (Circuit City and Barnes and Noble) as well as throughout Latin America. In the US, the Walton family has become immensely rich as Wal-Mart has surged into a dominant position in US retailing and with integration into Chinese production lines as well as retail stores worldwide. While there are obvious links between these sorts of activities and the world of finance, the incredible ability not only to access large personal fortunes but to exercise a controlling power over large segments of the economy confers on these few individuals immense economic power to influence political processes. Small wonder that the net worth of the 358 richest people in 1996 was 'equal to the combined income of the poorest 45 per cent of the world's population—2.3 billion people'. Worse still, 'the world's 206 richest people more than doubled their net worth in the four years to 1998, to more than $1 trillion. The assets of the top three billionaires were by then more than the combined GNP of all least developed countries and their 600 million people."

There is, however, one further consideration to be considered in this process of radical reconfiguration of the economy. The question arises, and has been much debated, as to whether this new class configuration should be considered as transnational or whether it can be still understood as something based exclusively within the parameters of the nation-state. My own position is this. The case that the ruling class anywhere has ever confined its operations and defined its loyalties to any one nation-state has historically been much overstated. It never did make much sense to speak of a distinctively US versus British or French or German or Korean capitalist class. The international links were always important, particularly through colonial and neocolonial activities, but also through transnational connections that go back to the nineteenth century if not before. But there has also been a deepening as well as a widening of these transnational connections during the phase of neoliberal globalization, and it is vital that these connections be acknowledged. This does not mean, however, that the leading individuals within this class do not attach themselves to specific state apparatuses for both the advantages and the protections that this affords them. Where they specifically attach themselves is important, but is not more stable than the capitalist activity they pursue. Rupert Murdoch may begin in Australia then concentrate on Britain before finally taking up citizenship (doubtless on an accelerated schedule) in the US. He is not about or outside particular state powers, but by the same token he wields considerable influence via his media interests in politics in Britain, the US, and Australia. All 247 of the supposedly independent editors of his newspapers worldwide supported the US invasion of Iraq. As a final shorthand, however, it still makes sense to speak about US or British or Korean capitalist class interests because corporate interests like Murdoch's or those of Carlos Slim or the Salim group both feed
off and nurture specific state apparatuses. Each can and typically does, however, exert class power in more than one state simultaneously.

While this disparate group of individuals embedded in the corporate, financial, trading, and developer worlds do not necessarily conspire as a class, and while there may be frequent tensions between them, they nevertheless possess a certain acquaintance of interests that generally recognizes the advantages (and now some of the dangers) to be derived from neoliberalization. They also possess, through organizations like the World Economic Forum at Davos, means of exchanging ideas and of consulting and collaborating with political leaders. They exercise immense influence over global affairs and possess a freedom of action that no ordinary citizen possesses.

Freedom's Prospects

This history of neoliberalization and class formation, and the proliferating acceptance of the ideas of the Mont Pelerin Society as the ruling ideas of the time, makes for interesting reading when placed against the background of counter-agreements laid out by Karl Polanyi in 1944 (shortly before the Mont Pelerin Society was established). In a complex society, he pointed out, the meaning of freedom becomes as contradictory and as fraught as its incitements to action are compelling. There are, he noted, two kinds of freedom, one good and the other bad. Among the latter he listed 'the freedom to exploit one's fellow-', or the freedom to make inordinate gains without commensurate service to the community, the freedom to keep technological inventions from being used for public benefit, or the freedom to profit from public calamities secretly engineered for private advantage! But, Polanyi continued, 'the market economy under which these freedoms thrive also produced freedoms we prize highly. Freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of meeting, freedom of association, freedom to choose one's own job. While we may 'cherish these freedoms for their own sake'—and, surely, many of us do still—they were to a large extent by-products of the same economy that was also responsible for the evil freedoms.' Polanyi's answer to this duality makes strange reading given the current hegemony of neoliberal thinking.

Unfortunately, Polanyi noted, the posture to such a future is blocked by the 'moral obstacle' of liberal utopianism (and more than once he cites Hayek as an exemplar of that tradition):

Planning and control we are being attacked as a denial of freedom. True enterprise and true ownership are declared to be essentials of freedom. No society built on other foundations is said to deserve to be called free. The freedom that regulation creates is denounced as unfreedom; the justice, liberty and welfare it offers are deemed a camouflage of slavery.

The idea of freedom 'thus degenerates into a mere advocacy of free enterprise,' which means 'the fullness of freedom for those whose income, leisure and security need no enhancing, and a more pristine of liberty for the people, who may in vain attempt to make use of their democratic rights to gain shelter from the power of the owners of property.' But if, as is always the case, 'no society is possible in which power and compulsion are absent, nor a world in which force has no function,' then the only way this liberal utopian vision could be sustained is by force, violence, and authoritarianism. Liberal or neoliberal utopianism is doomed, in Polanyi's view, to be frustrated by authoritarianism, or even outright fascism.

The good freedoms are lost, the bad ones take over.

Polanyi's diagnosis appears peculiarly appropriate to our contemporary condition. It provides a powerful vantage point from which to understand what President Bush intones when he asserts that 'as the greatest power on earth we [the US] have an obligation to help the spread of freedom.' It helps explain why neoliberalism
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has turned so authoritarian, forceful, and anti-democratic at the very moment when 'humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to offer freedom's triumph over all its age-old foes.' It makes us focus on how many corporations have profited from withholding the benefits of their technologies (such as AIDS drugs) from the public sphere, as well as from the calamities of war (as in the case of Haliburton), famine, and environmental disaster. It raises the worry as to whether or not many of these calamities or near calamities (arms races and the need to confront both real and imagined enemies) have been secretly engineered for corporate advantage. And it makes it all too clear why those of wealth and power so avidly support certain conceptions of rights and freedoms while seeking to persuade us of their universality and goodness. Thirty years of neoliberal freedoms have, after all, not only restored power in a narrowly defined capitalist class. They have also produced immense concentrations of corporate power in energy, the media, pharmaceuticals, transportation, and even retailing (for example Wal-Mart). The freedom of the market that Bush proclaims as the high point of human aspiration turns out to be nothing more than the convenient means to spread corporate monopoly power and Coca-Cola everywhere without constraint. With disproportionate influence over the media and the political process this class (with Rupert Murdoch and Fox News in the lead) has both the incentive and the power to persuade us that we are all better off under a neoliberal regime of freedoms. For the elite, living comfortably in their gilded ghettos, the world must indeed seem a better place. As Polanyi might have put it, neoliberalism confers rights and freedoms on those 'whose income, leisure and security need no enhancing', leaving a pittance for the rest of us. How is it, then, that 'the rest of us' have so easily acquiesced in this state of affairs?

2

The Construction of Consent

How was neoliberalization accomplished, and by whom? The answer in countries such as Chile and Argentina in the 1970s was as simple as it was swift, brutal, and sure: a military coup backed by the traditional upper classes (as well as by the US government), followed by the fierce repression of all solidarity created within the labour and urban social movements which had so threatened their power. But the neoliberal revolution usually attributed to Thatcher and Reagan after 1979 had to be accomplished by democratic means. For a shift of this magnitude to occur required the prior construction of political consent across a sufficiently large spectrum of the population to win elections. What Gramsci calls 'common sense' (defined as 'the sense held in common') typically grounds consent. Common sense is constructed out of long-standing practices of cultural socialization often rooted deep in regional or national traditions. It is not the same as the 'good sense' that can be constructed out of critical engagement with the issues of the day. Common sense can, therefore, be profoundly misleading, obfuscating or disguising real problems under cultural prejudices. Cultural and traditional values (such as belief in God and country or views on the position of women in society) and fears (of communists, immigrants, strangers, or 'aliens') can be mobilized to mask other realities. Political slogans can be invoked that mask specific strategies beneath vague rhetorical devices. The word 'freedom' resonates so widely within the common-sense understanding of Americans that it becomes 'a button the elites can press to open the door to the masses to justify almost anything.' Thus could Bush retrospectively justify the Iraq war. Gramsci therefore concluded that political questions become 'insoluble' when 'disguised as cultural ones.' No seeking to understand the
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construction of political consent, we must learn to extract political meanings from their cultural investments.

So how, then, was sufficient popular consent generated to legitimise this neoliberal regime? The channels through which this was done were diverse. Powerful ideological influences circulated through the corporations, the media, and the numerous institutions that constitute civil society—such as the universities, schools, churches, and professional associations. The 'long march' of neoliberal ideas through these institutions that Hayek had envisaged back in 1947, the organization of think-tanks (with corporate backing and funding), the capture of certain segments of the media, and the conversation of many intellectuals into neoliberal ways of thinking, created a climate of opinion in support of neoliberalism as the exclusive guarantor of freedom. These movements were later consolidated through the capture of political parties and, ultimately, state power.

Appeals to traditions and cultural values bulked large in all of this. An open project around the restoration of economic power to a small elite would probably not gain much popular support. But a programmatic attempt to advance the cause of individual freedoms could appeal to a mass base and so disguise the drive to restore class power. Furthermore, once the state apparatus made the neoliberal turn it could use its power of persuasion, co-optation, bribery, and threat to maintain the climate of consent necessary to perpetuate its power. This was Thatcher's and Reagan's particular turn, as we shall see.

How, then, did neoliberalism negotiate the turn to so comprehensively displaced embedded liberalism? In some instances, the answer largely lies in the use of force (either military, as in Chile, or financial, as through the operations of the IMF in Mozambique or the Philippines). Coercion can produce a fatalistic, even acquiescent, acceptance of the ideas that there was and is, as Margaret Thatcher kept insisting, 'no alternative'. The active construction of consent has also varied from place to place. Furthermore, as numerous opposing movements attest, consent has often willed or failed in different places. But we must look beyond these infinitely varied ideological and cultural mechanisms—no matter how important they are—to the qualities of 'everyday experience' in order to better

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identify the material grounding for the construction of consent. And it is at that level—through the experience of daily life under capitalism in the 1970s—that we begin to see how neoliberalism penetrated 'common-sense' understandings of the effect that many parts of the world has increasingly been to see it as a necessary, even wholly 'natural', way for the social order to be regulated.

Any political movement that holds individual freedoms to be sacrosanct is vulnerable to incorporation into the neoliberal fold. The worldwide political upheavals of 1968, for example, were strongly influenced with the desire for greater personal freedoms. This was certainly true for students, such as those animated by the Berkeley 'free speech' movement of the 1960s. The kto to the streets in Paris, Berlin, and Bangkok and were so mercilessly shot down in Mexico City shortly before the 1968 Olympic Games. They demanded freedom from parental, educational, corporate, bureaucratic, and state constraints. But the '68 movement also had social justice as a primary political objective.

Values of individual freedom and social justice are not, however, necessarily compatible. Pursuit of social justice presupposes social solidarity and a willingness to submerge individual wants, needs, and desires in the cause of some more general struggle for, say, social equality or environmental justice. The objectives of social justice and individual freedom were uneasily fused in the movement of '68. The tension was most evident in the fraught relationship between the traditional left (organized labour and political parties espousing social solidarity) and the student movement desirous of individual liberties. The suspicion and hostility that separated these two fractions in France (e.g. the Communist Party and the student movement) during the events of 1968 is a case in point. While it is not impossible to bridge such differences, it is not hard to see how a wedge might be driven between them. Neoliberal rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of social justice. It also obscured the quest of state power. It has long proved extremely difficult within the US left, for example, for the collective discipline required for political action to achieve social justice without offending the
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The desire of political actors for individual freedom and for full recognition and expression of particular identities. Neoliberalism did not create these distinctions, but it could easily exploit, if not foment, them.

In the early 1970s those seeking individual freedoms and social justice could make common cause in the face of what many saw as a common enemy. Powerful corporations in alliance with an interventionist state were seen to be running the world is individually oppressive and socially unjust ways. The Vietnam War was the most obvious catalyst for discontent, but the destructive activities of corporations and the state in relation to the environment, the push towards mindless consumerism, the failure to address social issues and respond adequately to diversions, as well as intense restrictions on individual possibilities and personal behaviours by state-managed and 'traditional' controls were also widely resented. Civil rights were an issue, and questions of sexuality and of reproductive rights were very much in play. For almost everyone involved in the movement of '68, the intrusive state was the enemy and had to be reformed. And on that, the neoliberal could easily agree. But capitalist corporations, business, and the market system were also seen as primary enemies requiring redress if not revolutionary transformation: hence the threat to capital's class power. By capturing ideals of individual freedom and turning them against the interventionist and regulatory practices of the state, capitalist class interests could hope to protect and even restore their position. Neoliberalism was well suited to this ideological task. But it had to be backed up by a practical strategy that emphasized the liberty of consumer choice, not only with respect to particular products but also with respect to identities, modes of expression, and a wide range of cultural practices. Neoliberalization required both politically and economically the construction of a neoliberal market-based populist culture of differentiated consumerism, and individual libertarianism. As such it proved more than a little compatible with that cultural impulse called 'postmodernism' which had long been lurking in the wings but could now emerge full-blown as both a cultural and an intellectual dominant. This was the challenge that corporations and class elites set out to finance in the 1980s.
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to $900 million annually (a huge amount at that time) on political matters. Think-tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institute, the Center for the Study of American Business, and the American Enterprise Institute, were formed with corporate backing both to polemicize and, when necessary, as in the case of the National Bureau of Economic Research, to construct serious technical and empirical studies and political-philosophical arguments broadly in support of neoliberal policies. Nearly half the financing for the highly respected NBER came from the leading corporations in the Fortune 300 list. Closely integrated with the academic community, the NBER was to have a very significant impact on thinking in the economics departments and business schools of the major research universities. With abundant finance furnished by wealthy individuals (such as the brewer Joseph Coors, who later became a member of Reagan’s ‘kitchen cabinet’) and their foundations (for example Olin, Scaife, Smith Richardson, Pew Charitable Trust), a flood of tracts and books, with Nozick’s Anarchy State and Utopia perhaps the most widely read and appreciated, emerged espousing neoliberal values. A TV version of Milton Friedman’s Free to Choose was funded with a grant from the Scaife family in 1977. ‘Business was’, Blyth concludes, ‘learning to spend as a class.’

In singling out the universities for particular attention, Powell pointed out an opportunity as well as an issue, for these were indeed centres of anti-corporate and anti-state sentiment (the students at Santa Barbaras had burned down the Bank of America building there and ceremoniously buried a car in the sand). But many students were (and still are) affluent and privileged, or at least middle class, and in the US the values of individual freedom have long been celebrated (in music and popular culture) as primary. Neoliberal themes could hence find fertile ground for propagation. Powell did not argue for extending state power. But business should ‘assiduously cultivate’ the state and when necessary use it ‘aggressively and with determination’. But exactly how was state power to be deployed to reshape common-sense understandings?

One time of response to the double crisis of capital accumulation and class power arose in the trenches of the urban struggles of the 1970s. The New York City fiscal crisis was an ironic case.

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Capitalist restructuring and deindustrialization had for several years been eroding the economic base of the city, and rapid suburbanization had left much of the central city impoverished. The result was explosive social unrest on the part of marginalized populations during the 1960s, defining what came to be known as ‘the urban crisis’ (similar problems emerged in many US cities). The expansion of public employment and public provision—facilitated in part by generous federal funding—was seen as the solution. But, faced with fiscal difficulties, President Nixon simply declared the urban crisis over in the early 1970s. While this was news to many city dwellers, it signalled diminished federal aid. As the recession gathered pace, the gap between revenues and outlays (the New York City budget (already large because of profligate borrowing over many years) increased. At first financial institutions were prepared to bridge the gap, but in 1975 a powerful cabal of investment bankers (led by Walter Wriston of Citibank) refused to roll over the debts and pushed the city into technical bankruptcy. The bail-out that followed entailed the construction of new institutions that took over the management of the city budget. They had first claim on city tax revenues in order to first pay off bondholders: whatever was left went for essential services. The effect was to curb the aspirations of the city’s powerful municipal unions, to implement wage freezes and cutbacks in public employment and social provision (education, public health, transport services), and to impose user fees (pension was introduced into the CUNY university system for the first time). The first indignity was the requirement that municipal unions should invest their pension funds in city bonds. Unions then either moderated their demands or faced the prospect of losing their pension funds through city bankruptcy.

This amounted to a coup by the financial institutions against the democratically elected government of New York City, and it was every bit as effective as the military coup that had earlier occurred in Chile. Wealth was redistributed to the upper classes in the midst of a fiscal crisis. The New York crisis was, Zevin argues, symptomatic of an emerging strategy of dislocation coupled with a regressive redistribution of income, wealth and power. It was ‘an early, perhaps decisive battle in a new war’, the purpose of which was ‘to
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The city. They seized the opportunity to restructure it in ways that suited their agendas. The creation of 'a good business climate' was a priority. This meant using public resources to build appropriate infrastructures for business (particularly telecommunications) coupled with subsidies and tax incentives for capitalist enterprises. Corporate welfare substituted for people welfare. The city's elite institutions were mobilized to sell the image of the city as a cultural centre and tourist destination (inventing the city logo 'I Love New York'). The ruling elites moved, often fractionally, to support the opening up of the cultural field to all manner of diverse cosmopolitan currents. The narcissistic exploration of self, sexuality, and identity became the leitmotif of bourgeois urban culture. Artificial freedom and artistic licence, promoted by the city's powerful cultural institutions, led, in effect, to the neoliberalization of culture. 'Delirious New York' (to use Rem Koolhaas's memorable phrase) erased the collective memory of democratic New York. The city's elites acceded, though not without a struggle, to the demand for lifestyle diversification (including those attached to sexual preference and gender) and increasing consumer niche choices (in areas such as cultural production). New York became the epicentre of postmodern cultural and intellectual experimentation. Meanwhile the investment bankers reconstructed the city economy around financial activities, ancillary services such as legal services and the media (much revived by the financialization then occurring), and diversified consumerism (gentrification and neighbourhood 'restoration' playing a prominent and profitable role). City government was more and more constituted as an entrepreneurial rather than a social democratic or even managerial entity. Intra-urban competition for investment capital transformed government into urban governance through public-private partnerships. City business was increasingly conducted behind closed doors, and the democratic and representative content of local governance diminished. Working-class and ethnic-immigrant New York was thrust back into the shadows, to be ravaged by racism and a crack cocaine epidemic of epic proportions in the 1980s that left many young people either dead, incarcerated, or homeless, only to be bludgeoned again by the AIDS epidemic that carried over into the

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show others that what is happening to New York could and in some cases will happen to them'.

Whether everyone involved in negotiating this fiscal compromise understood it as a strategy to reorder class power is an open question. The need to maintain fiscal discipline is a matter of concern in its own right and does not, like monetarism more generally, necessarily entail regressive redistributions. It is unlikely, for example, that Felix Rohatyn, the merchant banker who brokered the deal between the city, the state, and the financial institutions, had the restoration of class power in mind. The only way he could 'save' the city was by satisfying the investment bankers while diminishing the standard of living of most New Yorkers. But the restoration of class power was almost certainly what investment bankers like Walter Wriston had in mind. He had, after all, equated all forms of government intervention in the U.S. and Britain with communism. And it was almost certainly the sum of Ford's Secretary of the Treasury William Simon (later to become head of the ultra-conservative Olin Foundation). Watching the progress of events in Chile with approval, he strongly advised President Ford to refuse aid to the city (Ford to City: Drop Dead) ran the headline in the New York Daily News. The terms of any bail-out, he said, should be so punitive, the overall experience so painful, that no city, no political subdivision would ever be tempted to go down the same road.

While resistance to the austerity measures was widespread, it could only, according to Freeman, slow the counterrevolution from above, it could not stop it. Within a few years, many of the historic achievements of working class New York were undone. Much of the social infrastructure of the city was diminished and the physical infrastructure (for example the subway system) deteriorated markedly for lack of investment or even maintenance. Daily life in New York became grueling and the civic atmosphere turned mean. The city government, the municipal labour movement, and working-class New Yorkers were effectively stripped of 'much of the power they had accumulated over the previous three decades. Demoralised, working-class New Yorkers reluctantly assented to the new realities.

But the New York investment bankers did not walk away from
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1960s. Redistribution through criminal violence became one of the few serious options for the poor, and the authorities responded by criminalizing whole communities of impoverished and marginalized populations. The victims were blamed, and Giolitani was to claim fame by taking revenge on behalf of an increasingly affluent Manhattan bourgeoisie tired of having to confront the effects of such devastation on their own doorsteps.

The management of the New York fiscal crisis pioneered the way for neoliberal practices both domestically under Reagan and internationally through the IMF in the 1980s. It established the principle that in the event of a conflict between the integrity of financial institutions and bondholders' returns, on the one hand, and the well-being of the citizens on the other, the former was to be privileged. It emphasized that the role of government was to create a good business climate rather than look to the needs and well-being of the population at large. The politics of the Reagan administration of the 1980s, Tabb concludes, became ‘merely the New York scenario’ of the 1970s ‘writ large’.

The translation of these local conclusions of the mid-1970s to the national level was fast-moving. Archibald Maclean (a journalist who covered Washington affairs for many years) published a prescient account in 1985:

‘During the 1970s, business refined its ability to act as a class, submerging competitive instincts in favour of joint, cooperative action in the legislative arena. Rather than individual companies seeking only special favours for themselves, the dominant theme in the political strategy of business became a shared interest in the defeat of bills such as consumer protection and labour law reform, and the best accommodation of favourable tax, regulatory and antitrust legislation.’

In order to realise this goal, businesses needed a political class instrument and a popular base. They therefore actively sought to capture the Republican Party as their own instrument. The formation of powerful political action committees to procure, as the old adage had it, ‘the best government that money could buy’ was an important step. The supposedly ‘progressive’ campaign finance laws of 1971 in effect legalized the financial corruption of politics. A crucial set of Supreme Court decisions began in 1976 when it was first established that the right of a corporation to make unlimited money contributions to political parties and political action committees was protected under the First Amendment guaranteeing the rights of individuals (in this instance corporations) to freedom of speech. Political action committees (PACs) could thereby ensure the financial domination of both political parties by corporate, moneyed, and professional association interests. Corporate PACs, which numbered eighty-nine in 1974, had burgeoned to 1,467 by 1992. While these were willing to fund powerful incumbents of both parties provided their interests were served, they also systematically leaned towards supporting right-wing candidates. In the late 1970s Reagan (then Governor of California) and William Simon (whom we have already encountered) went out of their way to urge the PACs to direct their efforts towards funding Republican candidates with right-wing sympathies. The $5,000 limit on each PAC's contribution to any one individual forced PACs from different corporations and industries to work together, and that meant building alliances based on class rather than particular interests.

The willingness of the Republican Party to become the representative of “its dominant class constituency” during this period contrasted. Edall notes, with the “ideologically ambivalent” attitude of the Democrats which grew out of “the fact that its ties to various groups in society are diffuse, and none of these groups—women, blacks, labour, the elderly, Hispanics, urban political organizations—stands clearly larger than the others.” The dependency of Democrats, furthermore, on ‘big money’ contributions rendered many of them highly vulnerable to direct influence from business interests. While the Democratic Party had a popular base, it could not easily pursue an anti-capitalist or anti-corporate political line without totally severing its connections with powerful financial interests.

The Republican Party needed, however, a solid electoral base if it was to colonize power effectively. It was around this time that Republicans sought an alliance with the Christian right. The latter had not been politically active in the past, but the foundation of Jerry Falwell’s “moral majority” as a political movement in 1978 changed all of that. The Republican Party now had its Christian
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Christian conservatives that constituted the Council for National Policy, founded in 1981, "to strategize how to turn the country to the right."19

The Democratic Party, on the other hand, was fundamentally

by the need to placate, if not succour, corporate and financial

interests while at the same time making some gestures towards

improving the material conditions of life for its popular base. Dur-

ing the Clinton presidency it ended up choosing the former over

the latter and therefore fell directly into the neoliberal fold of

policy prescription and implementation (as, for example, in the

reform of welfare).20 But, as in the case of Felix Rohatyn, it is
doubtful if this was Clinton's agenda from the very beginning.

Faced with the need to overcome a huge deficit and spark eco-

nomic growth, his only feasible economic path was deficit reduc-
tion to achieve low interest rates. That meant either substantially

higher taxation (which amounted to electoral suicide) or cutsbacks

in the budget. Going for the latter meant, as Yergin and Stanislaw
put it, "betraying their traditional constituencies in order to pam-
per the rich" or, as Joseph Stiglitz, once chair of Clinton's Council
of Economic Advisors, later confessed, 'we did manage to tighten
the belts of the poor although we loosened those on the rich'.21 Social

policy was in effect to put in the care of the Wall Street bondholders

(much as had happened in New York City earlier), with predictable
consequences.

The political structure that emerged was quite simple. The
Republican Party could mobilize massive financial resources and
mobilize its popular base to vote against its material interests

on cultural/religious grounds while the Democratic Party could

not afford to attend to the material needs (for example for a

national health-care system) of its traditional popular base for

fear of offending capitalist class interests. Given the asymmetry,
the political hegemony of the Republican Party became more

sure.

Reagan's election in 1980 was only the first step in the long
process of consolidating the political shift necessary to support

Volcker's turn to monetarism and the prioritization of the fight

against inflation. Reagan's policies, Edsall noted at the time,
centred on 'an across the board drive to reduce the scope and
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The moment was propitious to attack all forms of organized labour and to cut back on its privileges as well as its power. Transfer of industrial activity from the unionized north-east and midwest to the non-unionized and 'right-to-work' states of the south, if not beyond to Mexico and South-East Asia, became standard practice (subsidized by favourable taxation for new investment and aided by the shift in emphasis from production to finance as the centrepiece of capitalist class power). Deindustrialization of formerly unionized core industrial regions (the so-called 'rust belt') disempowered labour. Corporations could threaten plant closures, and risk— and usually win— strikes when necessary (for example in the coal industry).

But here too it was not merely the use of the big stick that mattered, for there were a number of carrots that could be offered to workers as individuals to break with collective action. The unions' rigid rules and bureaucractic structures made them vulnerable to attack. The lack of flexibility was often as much a disadvantage for individual workers as it was for capital. The unions' claims for flexible specialization in labour processes and for flexible arrangements could become part of the neoliberal rhetoric that could be persuasive to individual workers, particularly those who had been excluded from the monopoly benefits that strong unionization sometimes conferred. Greater freedom and liberty of action in the labour market could be touted as a virtue for capital and labour alike, and here, too, it was not hard to integrate neoliberal values into the 'common sense' of much of the workforce.

How this active potentiality was converted into a highly exploitative system of flexible accumulation (all the benefits accruing from increasing flexibility in labour allocations in both space and time go to capital) is key to explaining why real wages, except for a brief period during the 1990s, stagnated or fell (see Figure 1.6) and benefits diminished. Neoliberal theory conveniently holds, that unemployment is always voluntary. Labour, the argument goes, has a 'reserve price' below which it prefers not to work. Unemployment arises because the reserve price of labour is too high. Since this reserve price is partly set by welfare payments (and stories of 'welfare queens' driving Cadillacs around) then it seems to reason that the neoliberal reform, carried out by Clinton of 'welfare...
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we know it must be a crucial step towards the reduction of unemployment.

All of this demanded some rationale, and to this end the war of ideas did play an important role. The economic ideas marshalled in support of the neoliberal turn unmasked, Blyth suggests, a complex fusion of monetarism (Friedman), rational expectations (Robert Lucas), public choice (James Buchanan), and Gordon Tullock, and the less respectable but by no means unhistorical 'supply-side' ideas of Arthur Laffer, who went so far as to suggest that the incentive effects of tax cuts would so increase economic activity as to automatically increase tax revenues (Reagan was enamoured of this idea). The more acceptable commonality to these arguments was that government intervention was the problem rather than the solution, and that a 'stable monetary policy, plus radical tax cuts in the top brackets, would produce a healthier economy' by getting the incentives for entrepreneurial activity aligned correctly. The business press, with the Wall Street Journal very much in the lead, took up these ideas, becoming an open advocate for neoliberalism as the necessary solution to all economic ills. Popular currency was given to these ideas by prolific writers such as George Gilder (supported by think-tank funds), and the business schools that arose in prestigious universities such as Stanford and Harvard, generously funded by corporations and foundations, became centres of neoliberal orthodoxy from the very moment they opened. Charting the spread of idees is always difficult, but by 1990 or so most economics departments in the major research universities as well as the business schools were dominated by neoliberal modes of thought. The importance of this should not be underestimated. The US research universities were and are training grounds for many foreigners who take what they learn back to their countries of origin—the key figures in Chile's and Mexico's adaptation to neoliberalism were US-trained economists for example—as well as into international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN.

The conclusion is, I think, clear. 'During the 1970s, the political wing of the nation's corporate sector', writes Edahl, 'staged out of the most remarkable campaigns in the pursuit of power in recent history.' By the early 1980s it had gained a level of influence and leverage approaching that of the boom days of the 1920s. And by the year 2000 it had used that leverage to restore its share of the national wealth and income to levels also not seen since the 1920s. The construction of consent in Britain occurred in a very different way. What happened in Kansas was quite different from what happened in Yorkshire. The cultural and political traditions were very different. In Britain, there is no Christian right to speak of to be mobilized into a moral majority. Corporate power there was little inclined to support overt political activism (its contributions to political parties were minimal), preferring instead to exercise influence through the networks of class and privilege that had long connected government, academia, the judiciary, and the permanent Civil Service (which at that time still maintained its tradition of independence) with the leaders of industry and finance. The political situation was also radically different, given that the Labour Party had largely been constructed as an instrument of working-class power, beholden to strong and sometimes quite militant trade unions. Britain had consequently developed a far more elaborate and all-encompassing welfare state structure than would have ever been dreamed of in the US. The commanding heights of the economy (coal, steel, automobiles) were nationalized, and a large proportion of the housing stock was in the public sector. And the Labour Party had, ever since the 1930s, built significant redoubts of power in the areas of municipal governance, with Herbert Morrison's London County Council being in the vanguard from the 1930s onwards. Social solidarity constructed through the union movement and municipal governance were strongly in evidence. Even when the Conservative Party took power for prolonged periods after the Second World War it largely refrained from any attempt at dismantling the welfare state it had inherited. The Labour government of the 1960s had refused to send troops to Vietnam, thus saving the country from direct domestic trauma and participation in an unpopular war. After the Second World War, Britain had (albeit reluctantly and in some instances not without violent struggle and considerable prodding from the US) agreed to decolonization, and after the abortive Suez venture of 1956 gradually (and again reluctantly) shed much of the
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opposed to the stifling bureaucratic ineptitude of the state apparatus and oppressive trade union power. Such criticisms became widespread in Britain during the 1960s and became even more emphatic during the bleak years of economic stagnation during the 1970s. People then feared that Britain was becoming 'a corporatist state, ground down to a gray mediocrity'.

The undercurrent of thought represented by Hayek constituted a viable opposition and had its advocates in the universities and even more importantly dominated the work of the Institute of Economic Affairs (founded in 1955), where Keith Joseph, later to be a key adviser to Margaret Thatcher, rose to public prominence in the 1970s. The foundation of the Centre for Policy Studies (1974) and the Adam Smith Institute (1976), and the increasing commitment of the press to neoliberalization during the 1970s, significantly affected the climate of public opinion. The earlier rise of a significant youth movement (given to political satire) and the arrival of a freewheeling pop culture in the 'swinging London' of the 1960s both mocked and challenged the traditional structure of networked class relations. Individualism and freedom of expression became an issue and a left-leaning student movement, influenced in many ways by the complexities of coming to terms with Britain's entrenched class system as well as with its colonial heritage, became an active element within British politics, much as it did elsewhere in the movement of '68. Its disrespectful attitude towards class privileges (whether of aristocrats, politicians, or union bureaucrats) was to ground the later radicalism of the postmodern turn. Scepticism about politics was to prepare the way for suspicion of all metanarratives.

While there were many elements out of which consent for a neoliberal turn could be constructed, the Thatcher phenomenon would surely not have arisen, let alone succeeded, if it had not been for the serious crisis of capital accumulation during the 1970s. Stagflation was hurting everyone. In 1975 inflation surged to 26 per cent and unemployment topped one million (see Figure 1.1). The nationalized industries were draining resources from the Treasury. This set up a confrontation between the state and the unions. In 1972, and then again in 1974, the British miners (a nationalized industry) went on strike for the first time since 1926.
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Thatcher had to abolish in order to achieve her broader goals in the 1970s, and Liverpool (where half the local councilors had to be resigned) formed active centres of resistance in which the ideals of a new municipal socialism (incorporating many of the new social movements in the London case) were both pursued and acted upon until they were finally crushed in the mid-1980s. She began by savagely curtailing central government funding to the municipalities, but several of them responded simply by raising property taxes, forcing her to legislate against their right to do so.

Denigrating the progressive labour councils as 'loony lefties' (a phrase the Conservative-dominated press picked up with relish), she then sought to impose neoliberal principles through a reform of municipal finance. She proposed a 'poll tax'—a regressive head tax rather than a property tax—which would rein in municipal expenditures by making every resident pay. This provoked a large political climate that played a role in Thatcher's political demise.

Thatcher also set out to privatize all those sections of the economy that were in public ownership. The sales would boost the public treasury and rid the government of bureaucratic structures towards losing enterprises. These state-run enterprises had to be 'adequately prepared for privatization, and this meant paring down their debt and improving their efficiency and cost structures, often through shedding labour'. Their valuation was also structured to offer considerable incentives to private capital—a process that was liked by opponents to 'giving away the family silver'. In several cases subsidies were hidden in the mode of valuation—water companies, railways, and even state-run enterprises in the automobile and steel industries held high-value land in prime locations that was excluded from the valuation of the enterprise as an ongoing concern. Privatization and speculative gains on the property released went bank in hand. But the aim here was also to change the political culture by extending the field of personal and corporate responsibility and encouraging greater efficiency, individual/corporate initiative, and innovation. British Aerospace, British Telecom, British Airways, steel, electricity and gas, oil, coal, water, bus services, railways, and a host of smaller state enterprises were sold off in a massive wave of privatizations. Britain pioneered the way in showing how to do this in a reasonably orderly and, for capital, profitable way. Thatcher was convinced that once these changes had been made they would become irreversible: hence the haste. The legitimacy of this whole movement was successfully undermined, however, by the extension of selling off public housing to tenants. This vastly increased the number of homeowners within a decade. It satisfied traditional ideals of individual property ownership as a working-class dream and introduced a new, and often speculative, dimension into the housing market that was much appreciated by the middle classes, who saw their asset values rise—at least until the property crash of the early 1990s.

Dismantling the welfare state was, however, quite another thing. Taking on areas such as education, health care, social services, the universities, the state bureaucracy, and the judiciary proved difficult. Here she had to do battle with the entrenched and sometimes traditional upper-middle-class attitudes of her core supporters. Thatcher desperately sought to extend the ideal of personal responsibility (for example through the privatization of health care) across the board and cut back on state obligations. She failed to make rapid headway. There were, in the view of the British public, limits to the neoliberalization of everything. Not until 2003, for example, did a Labour government, against widespread opposition, succeed in introducing a fee-paying structure into British higher education. In all these areas it proved difficult to forge an alliance of consent for radical change. On this her Cabinet (and her supporters) were notoriously divided (between 'wets' and 'drys') and it took several years of brusing confrontations within her own party and in the media to win modest neoliberal reforms. The best she could do was to try to force a culture of entrepreneurialism and impose strict rules of surveillance, financial accountability, and productivity on universities, such as universities, that were ill suited to them.

Thatcher forged consent through the cultivation of a middle class that relished the joys of home ownership, private property, individualism, and the liberation of enterprising entrepreneurs. With working-class solidarities waning under pressure and job structures radically changing through deindustrialization, middle-class values spread more widely to encompass many of those who...
had once had a firm working-class identity. The opening of Britain to freer trade allowed a consumer culture to flourish, and the proliferation of financial institutions brought more and more of a debt culture into the centre of a formerly staid British life. Neoliberalism entailed the transformation of the older British class structure, at both ends of the spectrum. Moreover, by keeping the City of London as a central player in global finance it increasingly turned the heartland of Britain’s economy, London and the south-east, into a dynamic centre of ever-increasing wealth and power. Class power had not so much been restored to any traditional sector but rather had gathered expansively around one of the key global centres of financial operations. Recruits from Oxbridge flooded into London as bond and currency traders, rapidly amassing wealth and power and turning London into one of the most expensive cities in the world.

While the Thatcher revolution was prepared by the organization of consent within the traditional middle classes who bore her to three electoral victories, the whole programme, particularly in her first administration, was far more ideologically driven (thanks largely to Keith Joseph) by neoliberal theory than was ever the case in the US. While from a solid middle-class background herself, she plainly relished the traditionally close contacts between the prime minister’s office and the ‘captains’ of industry and finance. She frequently turned to them for advice and in some instances clearly delivered them favours by undervaluing state assets set for privatization. The project to restore class power—as opposed to dismantling working-class power—probably played a more subconscious role in her political evolution.

The success of Reagan and Thatcher can be measured in various ways. But I think it most useful to stress the way in which they took what had hitherto been minority political, ideological, and intellectual positions and made them mainstream. The alliance of forces they helped consolidate and the majorities they led became a legacy that a subsequent generation of political leaders found hard to dislodge. Perhaps the greatest testimony to their success lies in the fact that both Clinton and Blair found themselves in a situation where their room for manoeuvre was so limited that they could not help but continue the process of restoration of

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class power even against their own better instincts. And once neoliberalism became that deeply entrenched in the English-speaking world it was hard to gain its considerable relevance to how capitalism in general was working internationally. This is not to say, as we shall see, that neoliberalism was merely imposed elsewhere by Anglo-American influence and power. For as these two case studies amply demonstrate, the internal circumstances and subsequent nature of the neoliberal turn were quite different in Britain and the US, and by extension we should expect that internal forces as well as external influences and impositions have played a distinctive role elsewhere.

Reagan and Thatcher seized on the clues they had (from Chile and New York City) and placed themselves at the head of a class movement that was determined to restore its power. Their genius was to create a legacy and a tradition that tugged substantial politicians in a web of constraints from which they could not easily escape. Those who followed, like Clinton and Blair, could do little more than continue the good work of neoliberalization, whether they liked it or not.
The Neoliberal State

The role of the state in neoliberal theory is reasonably easy to define. The practice of neoliberalization has, however, evolved in such a way as to depart significantly from the template that theory provides. The somewhat chaotic evolution and uneven geographical development of state institutions, powers, and functions over the last thirty years suggests, furthermore, that the neoliberal state may be an unstable and contradictory political form.

The Neoliberal State in Theory

According to theory, the neoliberal state should favour strong individual property rights, the rule of law, and institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade. These are the institutional arrangements considered essential to guarantee individual freedoms. The legal framework is that of freely negotiated contractual obligations between juridical individuals in the marketplace. The sanctity of contracts and the individual right to freedom of action, expression, and choice must be protected. The state must therefore use its monopoly of the means of violence to preserve these freedoms at all costs. By extension, the freedom of businesses and corporations (legally regarded as individuals) to operate within this institutional framework of free markets and free trade is regarded as a fundamental good. Private enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative are seen as the keys to innovation and wealth creation. Intellectual property rights are protected (for example, through patents) so as to encourage technological changes. Continuous increases in productivity should then deliver higher living standards to everyone. Under the assumption that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’, or of ‘trickle down’, neoliberal theory holds that the elimination of poverty (both domestically and worldwide) can best be secured through free markets and free trade.

Neoliberals are particularly assiduous in seeking the privatization of assets. The absence of clear private property rights—as in many developing countries—is seen as one of the greatest of all institutional barriers to economic development and the improvement of human welfare. Enclosure and the assignment of private property rights is considered the best way to protect against the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’ (the tendency for individuals to irresponsibly over-exploit common property resources such as land and water). Sectors formerly run or regulated by the state must be turned over to the private sphere and be deregulated (freed from any state interference). Competition—between individuals, between firms, between territorial entities (cities, regions, nations, regional groupings)—is held to be a primary virtue. The ground-rules for market competition must be properly observed, of course. In situations where such rules are not clearly laid out or where property rights are hard to define, the state must use its power to impose or invent market systems (such as trading in pollution rights). Privatization and deregulation combined with competition, it is claimed, eliminate bureaucratic red tape, increase efficiency and productivity, improve quality, and reduce costs, both directly to the consumer through cheaper commodities and services and indirectly through reduction of the tax burden. The neoliberal state should persistently seek out internal reorganizations and new institutional arrangements that improve its competitive position as an entity vis-à-vis other states in the global market.

While personal and individual freedom in the marketplace is guaranteed, each individual is held responsible and accountable for his or her own actions and well-being. This principle extends into the realms of welfare, education, health care, and even pensions (social security has been privatized in Chile and Slovakia, and proposals exist to do the same in the US). Individual success or failure are interpreted in terms of entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings (such as not investing significantly enough in one’s own human capital through education) rather than being
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attributed to any systemic property (such as the class exclusions usually attributed to capitalism)

The free mobility of capital between sectors, regions, and countries is regarded as crucial. All barriers to that free movement (such as tariffs, punitive taxation arrangements, planning and environmental controls, or other locational impediments) have to be removed, except in those areas crucial to 'the national interest', however that is defined. State sovereignty over commodity and capital movements is willingly surrendered to the global market. International competition is seen as healthy since it improves efficiency and productivity, lowers prices, and thereby controls inflationary tendencies. States should therefore collectively seek and negotiate the reduction of barriers to movement of capital across borders and the opening of markets (for both commodities and capital) to global exchange. Whether or not this applies to labour as a commodity is, however, controversial. To the degree that all states must collaborate to reduce barriers to exchange, so co-ordinating structures such as the group of advanced capitalist nations (the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan) known as the G7 (now the G8 with the addition of Russia) must arise. International agreements between states guaranteeing the rule of law and freedoms of trade, such as those now incorporated in the World Trade Organization agreements, are critical to the advancement of the neoliberal project on the global stage.

Neoliberal theorists are, however, profoundly suspicious of democracy. Governance by majority rule is seen as a potential threat to individual rights and constitutional liberties. Democracy is viewed as a luxury, only possible under conditions of relative affluence coupled with a strong middle-class presence to guarantee political stability. Neoliberals therefore tend to favours governance by experts and elites. A strong preference exists for government by executive order and by judicial decision rather than democratic and parliamentary decision-making. Neoliberals prefer to insulate key institutions, such as the central bank, from democratic pressures. Given that neoliberal theory centres on the rule of law and a strict interpretation of constitutionality, it follows that conflict and opposition must be mediated through the courts. Solutions and remedies to any problems have to be sought by individuals through the legal system.

Tensions and Contradictions

There are some shadowy areas as well as points of conflict within the general theory of the neoliberal state. First, there is the problem of how to interpret monopoly power. Competition often results in monopoly or oligopoly, as stronger firms drive out weaker. Most neoliberal theorists consider this unproblematic (it should, they say, maximize efficiency) provided there are no substantial barriers to the entry of competitors (a condition often hard to realize and which the state may therefore have to nurture). The case of so-called 'natural monopolies' is more difficult. It makes no sense to have multiple competing electrical power grids, gas pipelines, water and sewage systems, or rail links between Washington and Boston. State regulation of provision, access, and pricing seems unavoidable in such domains. While partial deregulation may be possible (permitting competing producers to feed electricity into the same grid or run trains on the same tracks, for example) the possibilities for profiteering and abuse, as the California power crisis of 2002 abundantly showed, or for deadly muddle and confusion, as the British rail situation has proven, are very real.

The second major area of controversy concerns market failure. This arises when individuals and firms avoid paying the full costs attributable to them by shedding their liabilities outside the market (the liabilities are, in technical parlance, "externalized"). The classic case is that of pollution, where individuals and firms avoid costs by dumping noxious wastes free of charge in the environment. Productive ecosystems may be degraded or destroyed as a result. Exposure to dangerous substances or physical dangers in the workplace may affect human health and even deplete the pool of healthy labourers in the workforce. While neoliberal admit the problem and some concede the case for limited state intervention, others argue for inaction because the cure will almost certainly be worse than the disease. Most would agree, however, that if there are to be interventions these should work through market
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mechanisms (via tax impositions or incentives, trading rights of pollutants, and the like). Competitive failures are approached in a similar fashion. Rising transaction costs can be incurred as contractual and subcontractual relations proliferate. The vast apparatus of currency speculation, to take just one example, appears more and more costly at the same time as it becomes more and more fundamental to capturing speculative profits. Other problems arise when, say, all competing hospitals in a region buy the same sophisticated equipment that remains underutilized, thus driving up aggregate costs. The case here for cost containment through state planning, regulation, and forced co-ordination is strong, but again neoliberal is deeply suspicious of such interventions.

All agents acting in the market are generally presumed to have access to the same information. There are presumed to be no asymmetries of power or of information that interfere with the capacity of individuals to make rational economic decisions in their own interests. This condition is rarely, if ever, approximated in practice, and there are significant consequences. Better informed and more powerful players have an advantage that can all too easily be parlayed into procuring even better information and greater relative power. The establishment of intellectual property rights (patents), furthermore, encourages ‘rent seeking’. Those who hold the patent rights use their monopoly power to set monopoly prices and to prevent technology transfers except at a very high cost. Asymmetric power relations tend, therefore, to increase rather than diminish over time unless the state steps in to counteract them. The neoliberal presumption of perfect information and a level playing field for competition appears as either innocently utopian or a deliberate obfuscation of precises that will lead to the concentration of wealth and, therefore, the restoration of class power.

The neoliberal theory of technological change relies upon the coercive powers of competition to drive the search for new products, new production methods, and new organizational forms. This drive becomes so deeply embedded in entrepreneurial common sense, however, that it becomes a fetish belief that there is a technological fix for each and every problem. To the degree that this takes hold not only within corporations but also within the state apparatus (in the military in particular), it produces powerful independent trends of technological change that can become destabilizing, if not counterproductive. Technological developments can run amok as sectors dedicated solely to technological innovation create new products and new ways of doing things that as yet have no market (new pharmaceutical products are produced, for which new illnesses are then invented). Talented innovators can, furthermore, mobilize technological innovations to undermine dominant social relations and institutions; they can, through their activities, even reshape common sense to their own pecuniary advantage. There is an inner connection, therefore, between technological dynamism, instability, dissolution of social solidarities, environmental degradation, deindustrialization, rapid shifts in time-space relations, speculative bubbles, and the general tendency towards crisis formation within capitalism.

There are, finally, some fundamental political problems within neoliberalism that need to be addressed. A contradiction arises between a seductive but alienating possessive individualism on the one hand and the desire for a meaningful collective life on the other. While individuals are supposedly free to choose, they are not supposed to choose to construct strong collective institutions (such as trade unions) as opposed to weak voluntary associations (like charitable organizations). They must certainly should not choose to associate to create political parties with the aim of forcing the state to intervene in or eliminate the market. To gauge against their greatest fears—fascism, communism, socialism, authoritarian populism, and even majority rule—the neoliberals have to put strong limits on democratic governance, relying instead upon undemocratic and unaccountable institutions (such as the Federal Reserve or the IMF) to make key decisions. This creates the paradox of intense state interventions and government by elites and ‘experts’ in a world where the state is supposed not to be interventionist. One is reminded of Francis Bacon’s utopian tale New Atlantis (first published in 1626) where a Council of Wisc Elders mandates all key decisions. Faced with social movements that seek collective interventions, therefore, the neoliberal state is itself forced to intervene, sometimes repressively, thus denying the very freedoms it is supposed to uphold. In this situation, however, it can
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marshal one secret weapon: international competition and globalization can be used to discipline movements opposed to the neoliberal agenda within individual states. If that fails, then the state must resort to persuasion, propaganda or, when necessary, raw force and police power to suppress opposition to neoliberalism. This was precisely Polanyi's fear that the liberal (and by extension the neoliberal) utopian project could only ultimately be sustained by resort to authoritarianism. The freedom of the masses would be restricted in favour of the freedoms of the few.

The Neoliberal State in Practice

The general character of the state in the era of neoliberalization is hard to describe for two particular reasons. First, systematic divergences from the template of neoliberal theory quickly become apparent, not all of which can be attributed to the internal contradictions already outlined. Second, the evolutionary dynamic of neoliberalization has been such as to force adaptations that have varied greatly from place to place as well as over time. Any attempt to extract some composite picture of a typical neoliberal state from this unstable and volatile historical geography would seem to be a fool's errand. Nevertheless, it is useful to sketch in some general threads of argument that keep the concept of a distinctively neoliberal state in play.

There are two arenas in particular where the drive to restore class power twists and in some respects even reverses neoliberal theory in its practice. The first of these arises out of the need to create a "good business or investment climate" for capitalistic endeavours. While there are some conditions, such as political stability or full respect for the law and even-handedness in its application, that might plausibly be considered "class neutral", there are others that are manifestly biased. The biases arise in particular out of the treatment of labour and the environment as mere commodities. In the event of a conflict, the typical neoliberal state will tend to side with a good business climate as opposed to either the collective rights (and quality of life) of labour or the capacity of the environment to regenerate itself. The second arena of bias arises because, in the event of a conflict, neoliberal states typically favour

the integrity of the financial system and the solvency of financial institutions over the well-being of the population or environmental quality. These systematic biases are not always easy to discern within the welter of divergent and often wildly disparate state practices. Pragmatic and opportunistic considerations play an important part. President Bush advocates free markets and free trade but imposed steel tariffs in order to bolster his electoral chances (successfully, it turned out) in Ohio. Quotas are arbitrarily placed on foreign imports to assuage domestic discontent. Europeans protect agriculture while insisting upon free trade in everything else for social, political, and even aesthetic reasons. Special interventions of the state favour particular business interests (for example armaments deals), and credits are arbitrarily extended from one state to another in order to gain political access and influence in geopolitically sensitive regions (such as the Middle East). For all these sorts of reasons it would be surprising indeed to find even the most fundamentalist of neoliberal states cleaving to neoliberal orthodoxy all of the time.

In other instances we may reasonably attribute divergences between theory and practice to frictional problems of transition reflecting the different state forms that existed prior to the neoliberal turn. The conditions that prevailed in central and eastern Europe after the collapse of communism were very special, for example. The speed with which privatization occurred under the "shock therapy" that was visited upon those countries in the 1990s created enormous stresses that reverberate to this day. Social democratic states (such as those in Scandinavia or Britain in the immediate post-war period) had long taken key sectors of the economy such as health care, education, and even housing out of the market on the grounds that access to basic human needs should not be mediated through market forces and access limited by ability to pay. While Margaret Thatcher managed to change all that, the Swedes resisted far longer even in the face of strong attempts by capitalist class interests to take over the neoliberal road. Developmental states (such as Singapore and several other Asian countries), for quite different reasons, rely on the public sector and state planning in tight association with domestic and corporate (often
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cite with neoliberal orthodoxy. Neoliberal states typically facilitate the diffusion of influence of financial institutions through deregulation, but then they also hold too often guarantee the integrity and soundness of financial institutions at what cost. This commitment in part derives (legitimately in some versions of neoliberal theory) from reliance upon monetarism as the basis of state policy—the integrity and soundness of money is a central pinion of that policy. But this paradoxically means that neoliberal states cannot tolerate any massive financial defaults even when it is the financial institutions that have made the bad decisions. The state has to step in and replace 'bad' money with its own supposedly 'good' money—which explains the pressure on central banks to maintain confidence in the soundness of state money. State power has often been used to bail out companies or avert financial failure, such as the US savings and loan crisis of 1987–8, which cost US taxpayers an estimated $150 billion, or the collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in 1997–8, which cost $3.5 billion.

Internationally, the core neoliberal states gave the IMF and the World Bank full authority in 1982 to negotiate debt relief, which meant in effect to protect the world's main financial institutions from the threat of default. The IMF in effect covers, to the best of its ability, exposures to risk and uncertainty in international financial markets. This practice is hard to justify according to neoliberal theory, since investors should in principle be responsible for their own mistakes. More fundamentalist-minded neoliberals therefore believe that the IMF should be abolished. This option was seriously considered during the early years of the Reagan administration, and Congressional Republicans raised it again in 1998. James Baker, Reagan's Secretary of the Treasury, breathed new life into the institution when he found himself faced with the potential bankruptcy of Mexico and serious losses for the main New York City investment banks that held Mexican debt in 1982. He used the IMF to impose structural adjustment on Mexico and protect the New York banks from default. This practice of prioritizing the needs of the banks and financial institutions while diminishing the standard of living of the debtor country had already been pioneered during the New York City debt crisis. In the international
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context this meant extracting surpluses from impoverished Third World populations in order to pay off the international bankers. 'What a peculiar world', Stiglitz quizzically remarks, 'in which the poor countries are in effect subsidizing the rich.' Even Chile — the exemplar of 'pure' neoliberal practices after 1975 — got hit in this way in 1982–3, with the result that gross domestic product fell by nearly 14 per cent and unemployment shot up to 20 per cent in one year. The inference that 'pure' neoliberalization does not work failed to be registered theoretically, although the pragmatic adaptations that followed in Chile (as well as in Britain after 1983) opened up a field of compromises that widened the gap even further between theory and practice.

The extraction of tribute via financial mechanisms is an old imperial practice. It has proven very helpful to the restoration of class power, particularly in the world's main financial centres, and it does not always need a structural adjustment crisis to work. When entrepreneurs in developing countries borrow money from abroad, for example, the requirement that their own state should have sufficient foreign exchange reserves to cover their borrowings translates into the state having to invest in, say, US Treasury bonds. The difference between the interest rate on the money borrowed (for example 12 per cent) and the money deposited as collateral in US Treasuries in Washington (for example 4 per cent) yields a strong net financial flow to the imperial centre at the expense of the developing country.

This tendency on the part of the core states like the US to protect financial interests and to stand by as they suck in surpluses from elsewhere both promotes and reflects the consolidation of upper-class power within those states around processes of financialization. But the habit of intervening in the marketplace and bailing out financial institutions when they get into trouble cannot be reconciled with neoliberal theory. Reckless investments should be punished by losses to the lender, but the state makes lenders largely immune to losses. Borrowers have to pay up instead, no matter what the social cost. Neoliberal theory should warn 'Lender, beware', but the practice is 'Borrower, beware'.

There are limits to the capacity to squeeze out surpluses from developing countries' economies. Strapped by austerity measures that lock them into chronic economic stagnation, the prospect of their repaying debts has frequently receded into some distant future. Under these conditions, some measured losses may appear an attractive option. This happened under the Brady Plan of 1989. Financial institutions agreed to write down 35 per cent of their outstanding debt as a loss in exchange for discounted bonds (backed by the IMF and the US Treasury), guaranteeing repayment of the rest (in other words creditors were guaranteed repayment of debts at the rate of 65 cents on the dollar). By 1994 some eighteen countries (including Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Uruguay) had agreed to deals that forgave them some $60 billion in debt. The hopes, of course, was that this debt relief would spark an economic recovery that would permit the rest of the debt to be paid off in a timely way. The trouble was that the IMF also saw to it that all the countries that took advantage of this modicum of debt forgiveness (which many regarded as minimal in relation to what the banks could afford) were also required to swallow the poison pill of neoliberal institutional reforms. The peso crisis in Mexico in 1995, the Brazilian crisis of 1998, and the total collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001 were predictable results.

This brings us, finally, to the problematic issue of the neoliberal state's approach to labour markets. Internally, the neoliberal state is necessarily hostile to all forms of social solidarity that put restraints on capital accumulation. Independent trade unions or other social movements (such as the municipal socialism of the Greater London Council type), which acquired considerable power under embedded liberalism, have therefore to be disciplined, if not destroyed, and this in the name of the supposedly sacrosanct individual liberty of the isolated labourer. 'Flexibility' becomes the watchword with respect to labour markets. It is hard to argue that increased flexibility is all bad, particularly in the face of highly restrictive and sclerotic union practices. There are, therefore, reformists of a left persuasion who argue strongly for 'flexible specialization' as a way forward. While some individual labourers may undoubtedly benefit from this, the asymmetries of information and of power that arise, coupled with the lack of easy and free mobility of labour (particularly across state borders), put labour at
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determining public policies, and setting regulatory frameworks
(which are mainly advantageous to themselves). Patterns of nego-
tiation arise that incorporate business and sometimes professional
interests into governance through loose and sometimes secretive
consultation. The most blatant example of this was the persistent
refusal of Vice-President Cheney to release the names of the con-
sultative group that formulated the Bush administration’s energy
policy document of 2002; it almost certainly included Kenneth
Lay, the head of Enron—a company accused of profiteering by
deberately fostering an energy crisis in California and which then
collapsed in the midst of a huge accounting scandal. The shift from
government (state power on its own) to governance (a broader
configuration of state and key elements in civil society) has there-
fore been marked under neoliberalism.15 In this respect the prac-
tices of the neoliberal and developmental state broadly convey
The state typically produces legislation and regulatory frame-
works that advance corporations, and in some instances specific
interests such as energy, pharmaceuticals, agribusiness, etc. In
many of the instances of public–private partnerships, particularly
at the municipal level, the state assumes much of the risk while the
private sector takes most of the profits. If necessary, furthermore,
the neoliberal state will resort to coercive legislation and policing
tactics (anti-picketing rules, for example) to disperse or repress
collective forms of opposition to corporate power. Forms of sur-
velliance and policing multiply: in the US, incarceration became a
key state strategy to deal with problems arising among undocumented
workers and marginalized populations. The coercive arm of the
state is augmented to protect corporate interests and, if necessary,
to repress dissent. None of this seems consistent with neoliberal
theory. The neoliberal fear that special-interest groups would per-
vert and subvert the state is nowhere better realized than in Wash-
ington, where armies of corporate lobbyists (many of whom have
taken advantage of the ‘revolving door’ between state employment
and far more lucrative employment by the corporations) effectively
dictate legislation to match their special interests. While some
states continue to respect the traditional independence of the Civil
Service, this condition has everywhere been under threat in the
course of neoliberalization. The boundary between the state and

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corporate power has become more and more potent. What remains of representative democracy is overwhelmed, if not totally thwarts legally corrupted by money power.

Since access to the judiciary is nominally egalitarian but in practice extremely expensive (be it an individual suing over negligent practices or a country suing the US for violation of WTO rules—a procedure that can cost up to a million dollars, a sum equivalent to the annual budget of some small, impoverished countries), the outcomes are often strongly biased towards those with money power. Class bias in decision-making within the judiciary is, in any case, pervasive if not assured. 12 It should not be surprising that the primary collective means of action under neoliberalism are then defused and articulated through non-elected (and in many instances elite-led) advocacy groups for various kinds of rights. In some instances, such as consumer protections, civil rights, or the rights of handicapped persons, substantive gains have been achieved by such means. Non-governmental and grassroots organisations (NGOs and GROs) have also grown and proliferated remarkably under neoliberalism, giving rise to the belief that opposition mobilized outside the state apparatus and within some separate entity called 'civil society' is the powerhouse of opportunistic politics and social transformation. 13 The period in which the neoliberal state has become hegemonic has also been the period in which the concept of civil society—often cast as an entity in opposition to state power—has become central to the formulation of oppositional politics. The Gramscian idea of the state as a unity of political and civil society gave way to the idea of civil society as a centre of opposition, if not an alternative, to the state.

From this account we can clearly see that neoliberalism does not make the state or particular institutions of the state (such as the courts and police functions) irrelevant, as some commentators on both the right and the left have argued. 14 There has, however, been a radical reconfiguration of state institutions and practices (particularly with respect to the balance between coercion and consent, between the powers of capital and of popular movements, and between executive and judicial power, on the one hand, and powers of representative democracy on the other).

But all is not well with the neoliberal state, and it is for this reason that it appears to be either a transitional or an unstable political form. At the heart of the problem lies a burgeoning disparity between the declared public aims of neoliberalism—the well-being of all—and its actual consequences—the restoration of class power. But beyond this there lies a whole series of more specific contradictions that need to be highlighted.

1. On the one hand the neoliberal state is expected to take a back seat and simply set the stage for market functions, but on the other it is supposed to be activist in creating a good business climate and to behave as a competitive entity in global politics. In its latter role it has to work as a collective corporation, and this poses the problem of how to ensure citizen loyalty. Nationalism is an obvious answer, but this is profoundly antagonistic to the neoliberal agenda. This was Margaret Thatcher’s dilemma, for it was only through playing the nationalism card in the Falklands/Malvinas war and, even more significantly, in the campaign against economic integration with Europe, that she could win re-election and promote further neoliberal reforms internally. Again and again, be it within the European Union, in Mercosur (where Brazilian and Argentine nationalism inhibit integration), in NAFTA, or in ASEAN, the nationalism required for the state to function effectively as a corporate and competitive entity in the world market gets to the way of market freedoms more generally.

2. Authoritarianism in market enforcement sits uneasily with ideals of individual freedoms. The more neoliberalism worked towards the former, the harder it becomes to maintain its legitimacy with respect to the latter and the more it has to reveal its anti-democratic colours. This contradiction is paralleled by a growing lack of symmetry in the power relation between corporations and individuals such as you and me. If 'corporate power stains your personal freedom' then the promise of neoliberalism comes to nothing. 15 This applies to individuals in the workplace as well as in the living space. It is one thing to maintain, for example, that my health-care status is my personal choice and responsibility, but quite another when the only way I can satisfy my needs in the market is through paying exorbitant

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premises to inefficient, gargantuan, highly bureaucratized but also highly profitable insurance companies. When these companies even have the power to define new categories of illness to match new drugs coming on the market then something is clearly wrong. Under such circumstances, maintaining legitimacy and consent, as we saw in Chapter 2, becomes an even more difficult balancing act that can easily topple over when things start to go wrong.

3. While it may be crucial to preserve the integrity of the financial system, the irresponsible and self-aggrandizing individualism of operators within it produces speculative volatility, financial scandals, and chronic instability. The Wall Street and accounting scandals of recent years have undermined confidence and posed regulatory authorities with serious problems of how and when to intervene, internationally as well as nationally. International free trade requires some global rules of the game, and that calls forth the need for some kind of global governance (for example, by the WTO). Deregulation of the financial system facilitates behaviors that call for re-regulation if crisis is to be avoided.

4. While the virtues of competition are placed up front, the reality is the increasing consolidation of oligopolies, monopoly, and transnational power within a few centralized multinational corporations: the world of soft-drinks competition is reduced to Coca Cola versus Pepsi, the energy industry is reduced to five large transnational corporations, and a few media magnates control most of the flow of news, much of which then becomes pure propaganda.

5. At the popular level, the drive towards market freedoms and the commodification of everything cast all too easily run amok and produce social incoherence. The destruction of forms of social solidarity and even, as Thatcher suggested, of the very idea of society itself, leaves a gaping hole in the social order. It then becomes peculiarly difficult to combat anomie and control the resultant anti-social behaviors such as criminality, pornography, or the virtual enslavement of others. The reduction of 'freedom' to 'freedom of enterprise' unleashes all those 'negative freedoms' that Polanyi saw as inextricably tied in with the

positive freedoms. The inevitable response is to reconstitute social solidarities, albeit along different lines—hence the revival of interest in religion and spirituality, in new forms of association (around questions of rights and citizenship, for example) and even the revival of older political forms (fascism, nationalism, localism, and the like). Neoliberalism in its pure form has always threatened to conjure up its own enemies in varieties of authoritarian populism and nationalism. As Schwab and Snajda, organizers of the once purely celebratory neoliberal annual jamboree at Davos, warned as early as 1996:

Economic globalization has entered a new phase. A mounting backlash against its effects, especially in the industrial democracies, is threatening a disruptive impact on economic activity and social stability in many countries. 'He who stood in these democracies is one of helplessmen and anxiety, which helps explain the rise of a new brand of populist politicians. This can easily turn into revolt.'

The Neocorporate Answer

If the neoliberal state is inherently unstable, then what might replace it? In the US there are signs of a distinctively neocorporate answer to this question. Reflecting on the recent history of China, Wang also suggests that, theoretically,
such discursive narratives as 'neo-authoritarianism', 'neocorporatism', 'classical liberalism', market expansion, national modernization ... all had close relationships of one sort or another with the constitution of neoliberalism. The successive displacement of these terms for another (or even the contradictions among them) demonstrate the shifts in the structure of power in both contemporary China and the contemporary world at large.

Whether or not this portends a more general reconfiguration of governance structures worldwide remains to be seen. It is, however, interesting to note how neoliberalization in authoritarian states such as China and Singapore seems to be converging with the increasing authoritarianism evident in neoliberal states such as the US and Britain. Consider, then, how the neocorporate
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answer to the inherent instability of the neoliberal state has evolved in the US.

Like the neoliberals that preceded them, the 'neos' have long been nurturing their particular views on the social order, in universities (Leo Strauss at the University of Chicago being particularly influential) and well-funded think-tanks, and through influential publications (such as Commentary). US neonconservatives favour corporate power, private enterprise, and the restoration of class power. Neoconservatism is therefore entirely consistent with the neoliberal agenda of elite governance, mistrust of democracy, and the maintenance of market freedoms. But it veers away from the principles of pure neoliberalism and has reshaped neoliberal practices in two fundamental respects: first, in its concern for order as an answer to the chaos of individual interests, and second, in its concern for an overarching morality as the necessary social glue to keep the body politic secure in the face of external and internal dangers.

In its concern for order, neoconservatism appears as a mere stripping away of the veil of authoritarianism in which neoliberalism sought to envelop itself. But it also proposes distinctive answers to one of the central contradictions of neoliberalism. If there is no such thing as society but only individuals' as Thatcher initially put it, then the chaos of individual interests can easily end up prevailing over order. The anarchy of the market, of competition, and of unbridled individualism (individual hopes, desires, anxieties, and fears; choices of lifestyle and of sexual habits and orientation; modes of self-expression and behaviours towards others) generates a situation that becomes increasingly ungovernable. It may even lead to a breakdown of all bonds of solidarity and a condition verging on social anarchy and nihilism.

In the face of this, some degree of coercion appears necessary to restore order. The neconservatives therefore emphasize militarization as an antidote to the chaos of individual interests. For this reason, they are far more likely to highlight threats, real or imagined, both at home and abroad, to the integrity and stability of the nation. In the US this entails triggering what Hofstadter refers to as 'the paranoid style of American politics' in which the nation is depicted as besieged and threatened by enemies from within and
of moral values. This immediately poses the question of which moral values should prevail. It would, for example, be entirely
feasible to appeal to the liberal system of human rights since, after
all, the aim of human rights activism, as Mary Kaldor argues, is
not merely intervention to protect human rights but the creation
of a moral community and the long history of civil rights activism
have certainly generated moral movements around issues such as civil rights, global
hunger, and philanthropic engagement, as well as missionary zeal.
But the moral values that have now become central to the neo-
conservatives can best be understood as products of the particular
cohesion that was built in the 1970s, between elite class and busi-
ness interests intent on restoring their class power, on the one
hand, and an electoral base among the "moral majority" of the
disaffected white working class on the other. The moral values
centred on cultural nationalism, moral righteousness, Christianity
(of a certain evangelical sort), family values, and right-to-life
issues, as well as on pride in the new social movements such as
feminism, gay rights, affirmative action, and environmentalism.
While this alliance was mainly tactical under Reagan, the domestic
disorder of the Clinton years forced the moral values argument to
the top of the agenda in the Republicanism of Bush the younger. It
now forms the core of the moral agenda of the neoconservative
movement.19

But it would be wrong to see this neoconservative turn as
exceptional or peculiar to the US, even though there are special
elements at work there that may not be present elsewhere. Within
the US this assertion of moral values relies heavily on appeals to
ideals of nation, religion, history, cultural tradition, and the like
and these ideals are by no means confined to the US. This brings
one of the more troubling aspects of neoliberalization more
sharply back into focus: the curious relationship between state and
nation. In principle, neoliberal theory does not look with favour on
the nation even as it supports the idea of a strong state. The umbil-
cical cord that tied together state and nation under embedded liber-
alism had to be cut if neoliberalism was to flourish. This was
particularly true for states, such as Mexico and France, that took a
corporatist form. The Partido Revolucionario Institucional in

Mexico had long ruled on the theme of unity of state and nation,
but that increasingly fell apart, even turning much of the nation
gainst the state, as a result of neoliberal reforms during the 1990s.
Nationalism has, of course, been a long-standing feature of the
global economy and it would have been strange indeed if had sunk
without trace as a result of neoliberal reforms, in fact it has revived
to some degree in opposition to what neoliberalization has been
about. The rise of right-wing fascist parties expressive of strong
anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe is a case in point. Even more
distressing was the ethnic nationalism that arose in the wake of
Indonesia’s economic collapse, which resulted in a brutal assault
upon the Chinese minority.

But, as we have seen, the neoliberal state needs nationalism of a
certain sort to survive. Forced to operate as a competitive agent in
the world market and seeking to establish the best possible business
climate, it mobilizes nationalism in its effort to succeed. Competi-
tion produces ephemeral winners and losers in the global struggle
for position, and this in itself can be a source of national pride as
of national soul-searching. Nationalism around sports competitions
between nations is a sign of this. In China, the appeal to nationalist
sentiment in the struggle to procure the state’s position (if not
hegemony) in the global economy is overt (as is the intensity of its
training programme for athletes for the Beijing Olympics).
Nationalist sentiment is equally rife in South Korea and Japan, and
in both instances this can be seen as an antidote to the dissolution
of former bonds of social solidarity under the impact of neoliberal-
ism. Strong currents of cultural nationalism are stirring within
the old nation-states (such as France) that now constitute the Euro-
pean Union. Religion and cultural nationalism, and the like,
left behind the Hindu Nationalist Party’s success in enhancing
neoliberal practices in India in recent times. The invocation of
moral values in the Iranian revolution and the subsequent turn to
authoritarianism has not led to total abandonment of market-based
practices there, even though the revolution was aimed at the
decadence of unbridled market individualism. A similar impulse
lies behind the long-standing sense of moral superiority that per-
vades countries such as Singapore and Japan in relationship to
what they see as the ‘decadent’ individualism and the shapeless
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multiculturalism of the US. The case of Singapore is particularly instructive. It has combined neoliberalism in the marketplace with draconian coercive and authoritarian state power, while invoking moral solidarities based on the nationalist ideals of a beleaguered island state (after its ejection from the Malaysian federation), Confucian values, and, most recently, a distinctive form of the cosmopolitan ethic suited to its current position in the world of international trade.²³ The British case is particularly interesting. Margaret Thatcher, through the Falklands/Malvinas war and in her antagonistic posture towards Europe, invoked nationalist sentiment in support of her neoliberal project, though it was the idea of England and St George, rather than the United Kingdom, that animated her vision—which turned Scotland and Wales hostile.

Clearly, while there are dangers in the neoliberal dalliance with nationalism of a certain sort, the fierce neocorporative embrace of a national moral purpose is far more threatening. The picture of many states, each prepared to resort to draconian coercive practices while each espousing its own distinctive and supposedly superior moral values, competing on the world stage is not reassuring. What seems like an answer to the contradictions of neoliberalism can all too easily turn into a problem. The spread of neocorporative, if not outright authoritarian, power (of the sort Vladimir Putin exercises in Russia and the Communist Party exercises in China), albeit grounded very differently in different social formations, highlights the dangers of descent into competing and perhaps even warring nationalisms. If there is an inevitability at work, then it arises more out of the neocorporate turn than out of eternal truths attaching to supposed national differences. To avoid catastrophic outcomes therefore requires rejection of the neocorporate solution to the contradictions of neoliberalism. This presumes, however, that there is some alternative and that question will be addressed later.

4 Uneven Geographical Developments

The Moving Map of Neoliberalization

A moving map of the progress of neoliberalization on the world stage since 1970 would be hard to construct. To begin with, most states that have taken the neoliberal turn have done so only partially—the introduction of greater flexibility into labour markets here, a deregulation of financial operations and embrace of monetarism there, a move towards privatization of state-owned sectors somewhere else. Wholesale changes in the wake of crises (such as the collapse of the Soviet Union) can be followed by slow reversals as the unpalatable aspects of neoliberalism become more evident. And in the struggle to restore or establish a distinctive upper-class power all manner of twists and turns occur as political powers change hands and as the instruments of influence are weakened here or strengthened there. Any moving map would therefore feature turbulent currents of uneven geographical development that need to be tracked in order to understand how local transformations relate to broader trends.¹

Competition between territories (states, regions, or cities) as to who had the best model for economic development or the best business climate was relatively insignificant in the 1950s and 1960s. Competition of this sort heightened in the more fluid and open systems of trading relations established after 1970. The general progress of neoliberalization has therefore been increasingly impelled through mechanisms of uneven geographical developments. Successful states or regions put pressure on everyone else to follow their lead. Leapfrogging innovations put this or that state (Japan, Germany, Taiwan, the US, or China), region (Silicon Valley, Bavaria, Third Italy, Bangalore, the Pearl River delta, or
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opposed to the stifling bureaucratic ineptitude of the state apparatus and oppressive trade union power. Such criticisms became widespread in Britain during the 1960s and became even more emphatic during the bleak years of economic stagnation during the 1970s. People then feared that Britain was becoming a corporatist state, ground down to a gray mediocrity. The undercurrent of thought represented by Hayek constituted a viable opposition and had its advocates in the universities and even more importantly dominoed the work of the Institute of Economic Affairs (founded in 1955), where Keith Joseph, later to be a key adviser to Margaret Thatcher, rose to public prominence in the 1970s. The foundation of the Centre for Policy Studies (1974) and the Adam Smith Institute (1976), and the increasing commitment of the press to neoliberalization during the 1970s, significantly affected the climate of public opinion. The earlier rise of a significant youth movement (given to political satire) and the arrival of a freewheeling pop culture in the ‘swinging London’ of the 1960s both mocked and challenged the traditional structure of networked class relations. Individualism and freedom of expression became an issue and a left-leaning student movement, influenced in many ways by the complexities of coming to terms with Britain’s entrenched class system as well as with its colonial heritage, became an active element within British politics, much as it did elsewhere in the movement of 68. Its distrustful attitude towards state privileges (whether of aristocrats, politicians, or union bureaucrats) was to ground the latest radicalism of the postmodern turn. Scepticism about politics was to prepare the way for suspicion of all metanarratives.

While there were many elements out of which consent for a neoliberal turn could be constructed, the Thatcher phenomenon would surely not have arisen, let alone succeeded, if it had not been for the serious crisis of capital accumulation during the 1970s. Stagnation was hurting everyone. In 1975 inflation surged to 26 per cent and unemployment topped one million (see Figure 1.1). The nationalized industries were draining resources from the Treasury. This set up a confrontation between the state and the unions. In 1972, and then again in 1974, the British miners (a nationalized industry) went on strike for the first time since 1926.
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The miners had always been in the forefront of British labour struggles. Their wages were not keeping pace with accelerating inflation, and the public sympathised. The Conservative government, in the midst of power blackouts, declared a state of emergency, mandated a three-day working week, and sought public backing against the miners. In 1974 it called an election seeking public support for its stew. It lost, and the Labour government that returned to power settled the strike on terms favourable to the miners.

The victory was, however, pyrrhic. The Labour government could not afford the terms of the settlement and its fiscal difficulties mounted. A balance of payments crisis paralleled huge budget deficits. Turning to credits in the IMF in 1975–76, it faced the choice of either submitting to IMF-mandated budgetary restraint and austerity or declaring bankruptcy and sacrificing the integrity of sterling, thus mortally wounding financial interests in the City of London. It chose the former path, and draconian budgetary cutbacks in welfare state expenditures were implemented. The Labour government went against the material interests of its traditional supporters. But it still had no solution to the crises of accumulation and stagflation. It sought, unsuccessfully, to mask the difficulties by appealing to corporatist ideals, in which everyone was supposed to sacrifice something for the benefit of the polity. Its supporters were in open revolt, and public sector workers initiated a series of crippling strikes in the ‘winter of discontent’ of 1978. Hospital workers went out, and medical care had to be severely rationed. Striking grave diggers refused to bury the dead. The truck drivers were on strike too. Only shop stewards had the right to let trucks bearing ‘essential supplies’ cross picket lines. British Rail put out a note notice ‘There are no trains today’... striking unions seemed about to bring the whole nation to a halt. The mainstream press was in full cry against greedy and divisive unions, and public support fell away. The Labour government fell, and in the election that followed Margaret Thatcher won a significant majority with a clear mandate from her middle-class supporters to tame public sector union power.

The commonweal between the US and the UK cases most obviously lies in the fields of labour relations and the fight against inflation. With respect to the latter, Thatcher made monetarism and strict budgetary control the order of the day. High interest rates meant high unemployment (averaging more than 10 per cent in 1979–84, and the Trade Union Congress lost 17 per cent of its membership in five years). The bargaining power of labour was weakened. Alan Budd, an economic adviser to Thatcher, later suggested that ‘the 1980s policies of attacking inflation by squeezing the economy and public spending were a cover to bash the workers’. Britain created what Marx called ‘an industrial reserve army’, he went on to observe, the effect of which was to undermine the power of labour and permit capitalists to make easy profits thereafter. And in an action that paralleled Reagan’s provocation of PLOCO in 1981, Thatcher provoked a miners’ strike in 1984 by announcing a wave of redundancies and pit closures (imported coal was cheaper). The strike lasted for almost a year, and, in spite of a great deal of public sympathy and support, the miners lost. The back of a core element of the British labour movement had been broken. Thatcher further reduced union power by opening up the UK to foreign competition, in which foreign competition denigrated much of traditional British industry in the 1980s—the steel industry (Sheffield) and shipbuilding (Glasgow) more or less totally disappeared within a few years, and with them a good deal of trade union power. Thatcher effectively destroyed the indigenous nationalized UK automobile industry, with its substantial unions and militant labour traditions, instead offering the UK as an offshore platform for Japanese automobile companies seeking access to Europe. These built on greenfield sites and recruited non-union workers who would submit to Japanese-style labour relations. The overall effect was to transform the UK into a country of relatively low wages and a largely compliant labour force (relative to the rest of Europe) within ten years. By the time Thatcher left office, strike activity had fallen to one-tenth of its former levels. She had radicalized inflation, curbed union power, tuned the labour force, and built middle-class consent for her policies in the process.

But Thatcher had to fight the battle on other fronts. A noble rearguard action against neoliberal policies was mounted in many a municipality—Sheffield, the Greater London Council (which