CHAPTER 6

Economic Development, Political Culture, and Democracy: Bringing the People Back In

A generation ago, Lipset (1959), Rostow (1960), Dahl (1971), and others argued that economic development leads to democracy. This claim was disputed by dependency school writers, who argued that development was more likely to lead to bureaucratic authoritarian than to democracy, and more recently, Arant (1988) and Goosick and Roth (1988) claimed to have disproven Lipset's thesis on the basis of empirical analysis. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that development is indeed conducive to democracy (Bollen, 1979, 1980, 1990; Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Buss, Caldera, and Lewis-Beck, 1987).

Figure 6.1 shows one piece of the evidence. It reveals that as of 1987, out of the 42 countries with per capita incomes at or above $5,000, only 1 country was poor country was under $2,000 (India) was democratic. Among countries with incomes between $500 and $1,000, only 6 out of 13 were democracies. In boom, among countries with incomes over $5,000, 20 of the 26 were democracies (the exceptions being East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Singapore). Although there is no one-to-one relationship between economic development and democracy, rich countries are much more likely to have democratic institutions than are poor countries. This relationship between democracy and economic development is not merely cross-sectional—it helps predict which countries are most likely to become democracies. Thus, during the wave of democratization that took place during the four years after 1967, most of the countries that began the transition to democracy were drawn from the upper middle-income group, with per capita incomes from $1,000 to $6,000. This includes such countries as Chile, Nicaragua, Turkey, South Korea, and most of Eastern Europe (including both Czechoslovakia and East Germany). By 1992, democracy remained very rare in low-income countries, but a majority of the countries in the upper middle-income group had governments that came to power through free elections.

Bukenot and Lewis-Beck (1994) have provided the most and most convincing demonstration of the fact that economic development is conducive to democracy, using more reliable time series data and more rigorous methodology than that of Arant (1988) or Goosick and Roth (1988), and finding that economic development is conducive to democracy, and (2) but democracy is not conducive to economic development. On the latter point, they confirm their own (1994) finding that despite the spectacular success the authoritarian model of development in East Asia, economic development is about 44 likely to take place in democratic as in authoritarian regimes.

These are important findings, but they leave a major question unanswered—why does economic development lead to democracy? Is the linkage between development and democracy due to wealth per se, or is it something about economic development that makes it conducive to democracy. We believe that the answer is mixed. In the long run, economic development is conducive to democracy because it makes societies more democratic, while also increasing the wealth of the society. Why does economic development lead to democracy? Is the linkage between development and democracy due to wealth per se? Apparently not. If democracy automatically resulted from simply becoming wealthy, then Kuwait and Libya would be model democracies. It is important to bear this point in mind: wealth alone does not automatically produce democracy. It seems clear that additional steps are involved. This chapter argues that economic development is conducive to democracy that provides a basis for understanding why democracies are more likely to be successful.
tured approach raised an important empirical question: whether given societies had political cultures that were relatively conducive to democracy. Some critics alleged that this approach was "elitist" in finding that some cultures were more conducive to democracy than others: any right-minded theorist should hold that all societies are equally likely to be democratic. The problem is that by tailoring one's theory to fit a given ideology, one may come up with a theory that does not fit reality, in which case, one's predictions will eventually go wrong, and the theory will provide misleading guidance to those who are trying to cope with democratization in the real world.

By the 1980s, though the concept of political culture was still unfashionable in American academic circles, observers in other countries, from Latin America to Eastern Europe to East Asia, were coming to the conclusion that cultural factors played an important role in the problems they were encountering with democratization. Thus Mikhail Gorbatchev observed, "We are, as now, as it were, going through the school of democracy afresh. We are learning. Our political culture is still inadequate. Our ability to respect the point of view of even our friends and comrades—even that is inadequate" (Gorbatchev, cited in Brezinski, 1989: 44). Even in Latin America, where the dependency perspective had been extremely influential, cultural factors are now being accorded a key role in democratization. Thus in 1990, a conference of leading politicians and intellectuals from throughout Latin America concluded that democracy and sustainable development will depend in large measure on the ability of individual societies to moderate from within... Changes in the practical exercise of power and the reorganization of systems of production give rise to changes not only in political, social and economic institutions, but also in culture and in the behavior of individuals molded by that culture. The other vital dimension of the challenge facing societies in the early stages of democratization is the forging of a democratic political culture. (Declaration of Montevideo, 1990, cited in Altheide Bertrand, 1992: 156-57)

Cultural factors have been omitted from most empirical analyses of democracy—partly because, until now, we have not had reliable measures of them from more than a handful of countries. When cultural factors are taken into account, as in Inglehart's (1990) and Putnam's (1993) work, they seem to play an important role.

We will briefly describe which factors are important to democracy and why, and discuss the nature of our dependent variable, democracy, in presenting the theory underlying this analysis. We claim that economic development leads to two types of changes that are conducive to democracy: it gives rise to social structural changes that mobilize mass participation; and cultural changes that help mobilize democracy.

Structural changes. Industrialization tends to transform a society's social structure, bringing urbanization, mass education, occupational specialization, growing organizational networks, greater income equality, and a variety of societal developments that mobilize mass participation in politics. Two aspects of this "Modernization" syndrome are particularly relevant to democracy: the institutionalization of government and the development of a media that provides information to citizens.

1. Rising educational levels, which provide more articulate public that is better equipped to organize and communicate, and
2. Rising occupational specialization, which shifts the workforce into more autonomous workforces, accustomed to thinking for themselves on the job.

Cultural changes. Economic development is also conducive to cultural changes that help stabilize democracy. We find two particularly central cultural factors:

1. A culture of trust. In authoritarian regimes, the usual way to handle opposition is to demonize democracy in the name of the "loyal opposition," instead of opposition is trusted to play by the rules of the democratic game. This means that opposition wins an election, the governing elite will turn power over (after a given time) the new elite will hold elections in which they can freely compete for power.

Cultural legitimacy. Legitimacy, or diffuse mass support, can help sustain democracy in any regime, but it is crucial to democracies. Democratic institutions can be supported by elites, but whether they survive depends on whether they take root among the public. With democratization, the public becomes a crucial political factor.

Political outputs from a political system can generate mass support for the political incumbents. In the short term, this support is based on calculations concerning "What have you done for me lately?" But if a given regime's output are seen as positive for a long time, the regime may develop "diffuse support" (Eston, 1963)—the generalized perception that the political system can endure even through difficult times. As we will demonstrate, a sense of social welfare among the public of a given society is an excellent indicator that these responses to direct questions about how strongly one supports democratic political institutions.

Three aspects of democracy: Stability, level at a given time, and short-term shifts.

Democracy is a multidimensional phenomenon. But to date, most empirical analyses have focused on a single aspect of democracy as the dependent variable: political participation. Inglehart (1990) analyzed the stability of democracy—operationally, the number of years that democratic institutions had functioned con-
Long-Term Stability of Democracy

Mass political culture's most crucial role concerns the long-term stability of democracy: political culture stabilizes democracy by providing an enduring base of mass support.

Democratic institutions can be implanted by a handful of elites or even imposed by foreign conquest, as they were in Germany and Austria at the end of World War I, and in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere at the end of World War II. Democracy can be imposed from above or from outside, but whether or not it survives good times and bad depends on whether its institutions have built up deep-rooted mass support to weather difficult times. Various writers have stressed the importance of this factor. Weber emphasized the importance of legitimacy; Easton spoke of "diffuse support"; Almond and Verba discussed the "Civic Culture"; Putnam (1993) showed how "Civic Orientations" contributed to the effectiveness of democracy in Italy; and in an analysis based on data from 24 societies surveyed in the 1981 World Values Survey, Inglehart (1990) demonstrated interpersonal trust and substantive well-being were closely linked with the long-term survival of democratic institutions.
den, democratic institutions have functioned much longer in Britain and Sweden than in Bulgaria or Slovenia—a fact that no prudent analyst would ignore in assessing the prospects for survival of democratic institutions in the respective societies. Stability and levels of democracy are two different things, and both are important.

Levels of democracy have risen repeatedly during the ninetieth and twentieth centuries. When modern democracy first emerged in Great Britain and the United States, suffrage was limited to the middle class, to subsequent waves, it was extended to the lower middle class, to the working class and to all; in the 1930s, it was extended to women; and in the 1970s, to 18-20-year-olds. In subsequent years, mass political participation has continued to become more active and more issue-specific, as increasingly educated electorates have expanded their repertoire of techniques designed to influence elite decision-making.

Jackman and Miller (1996) claim that this expansion of mass participation makes it impossible to reassert democratic stability: "One cannot count the number of years during which a given society has been "democratic" until it has become completely democratic by today's standards. In fact, this constitutes a problem only if one adheres to a one-dimensional concept of democracy. Dahl (1971) distinguishes between two key aspects of democracy: consultation and inclusion; and he argues that democracy is more likely to survive over time if consultation exceeds broad mass inclusion. Thus, in British history, elite consultation began with the Magna Charta, which forced the king to share power with the nobility, and which constitutional authorities accord an important role in introducing pluralism eats into the British political culture. Mass democracy began to emerge in the nineteenth century, and democratic norms had become widespread and generally accepted long before the latest major extension of the franchise, to 18-year-olds in the 1970s. It would be absurd to claim that British democracy began only in the 1970s (or even in the 1920s, when women obtained suffrage). These were indeed important stages in the extension of mass inclusion, but genuine consultation (in the form of freely contested elections) existed well before that time. To insist that democracy does not exist until the process of mass inclusion has been completed would be to define democracy as an empty cell; the process is probably not complete ever since, because levels of democratic participation will almost certainly continue to rise.

Shifts to (and from) Democracy

In contrast with its role in assuring democracy over the long run, political culture has a very different relationship to short-term changes in and from democracy. Indeed, the same cultural factors that stabilize and sustain democracy can also help stabilize authoritarian regimes. Thus, though high levels of legitimacy and trust are crucial to the survival of democracy, they would not explain short-term shifts toward democracy. Instead, one would expect low levels of legitimacy and trust to be linked with the collapse of authoritarian regimes, possibly opening the way for a transition to democracy. Thus, the short-term consequences of cultural factors are very different from their long-term function. Gradual cultural changes can give rise to conditions that become increasingly favorable to the rise of democratic institutions, but the immediate precipitating factor (is likely) to be some macroevent with an impact in the world or an intergenerational transfer of power from hard-line leaders to reform leaders. Accordingly, the literatures on transitions to democracy tends to focus on elite-level events rather than on underlying changes in culture or social structure (e.g., O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1989).

Levels of Democracy at a Given Point Time

Most empirical analyses of the factors conducive to democracy have used the level of democracy at a given point in time as the dependent variable. Although it is the most crucial function of cultural factors is their role in sustaining democratic institutions over time, they are also linked with the level of democracy found at given points in time. But clearly, the strength of this relationship will vary from one time point to another. In 1970, there were three democracies in the world. In 1990, there were about a dozen. In 1919, there were about two dozen. And by 1991, there were more than 60. After each wave of democratization, many of the new democracies failed to survive. Thus, the number of democracies declined sharply during the period between the two World Wars, and again in the 1990s. As a result, some of today's new democracies will probably not survive. Each major wave of democratization weakens the correlation between cultural factors and democracy, because a massive wave of democratization tends to bring into the "democratic" category a large new group of societies that have long deferred democracy to factors other than basic human rights. In this case, the correlation between culture and democracy would automatically drop to zero—but this would probably be a temporary situation. Unless the new democracies develop such cultural attributes as interpersonal trust and legitimacy, their democratic institutions will be unlikely to survive major economic or political crises; and the processes of cultural change and attrition would eventually bring back a correlation between civic culture and democracy. Thus (so we will demonstrate) the strength of the relationship between cultural factors and democracy differs sharply before and immediately after a major wave of democratization. This means that when one uses levels of democracy as a dependent variable, the time-point one chooses is crucial. The number of democracies in the world has been increasing steadily over the long run, but in the future, the trend will continue. It will do so because economic development tends to bring changes in social structure and culture that are favorable to democracy. Let us examine these processes in more detail.
CHAPTER 4

CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE: COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND THE RISE OF CITIZEN INTERVENTION

The literature on social mobilization has chronicled how industrialization and urbanization led to mass literacy, the rise of organized labor, mass political parties, and the emergence of universal suffrage (Lerner, 1958; Deutsch, 1964; Inkeles and Smith, 1974). These were profoundly important developments that brought previously parochial issues into political relevance. These processes increased mass political participation, but they did not necessarily bring about democracy. Instead, depending on the social and economic context of the given society, they could either give rise to mass democracy, or to fascism or communism. All three forms of government emphasized mass participation; indeed, both fascism and communism regularly attained higher levels of mass attendance at political rallies and higher voting turnouts than liberal democracies ever did. But with fascism and communism, it was almost entirely elite-led participation, designed to mobilize mass support for policies already chosen by the elites—and not participation through which the masses chose between competing elites and alternative elite policies.

Democratic theory emphasizes two central elements: elite competition and mass participation. In the first half of the twentieth century, democracy (unlike fascism and communism) was based on genuine elite competition; but mass participation was still largely orchestrated by elites even in the democracies. Democracy continues to evolve. In advanced industrial society, the process of cognitive mobilization gives rise to more active and more demanding types of mass participation. This makes it increasingly difficult for democracies to limit mass publics to an elite-directed role, and increasingly difficult for authoritarian systems to survive: they face rising mass pressure for liberalization.

The coming of advanced industrial society leads to a syndrome of intergenerational changes that bring significant further increases in citizen interventions in politics. A long-term rise in educational levels and in mass political skills has characterized all industrial societies. An extension of social mobilization beyond the transformations brought by urbanization and early industrialization, this process has been termed "cognitive mobilization" (Ing尔斯, 1977). While social mobilization manifested itself in visible changes of location and occupation, cognitive mobilization is based on invisible changes that upgrade individual skills. These changes have momentous political consequences.

Cognitive Mobilization reflects rising levels of education and changes in the nature of work, from simple routine operations to tasks requiring specialized knowledge and autonomous judgment. The publics of advanced industrial societies become accustomed to thinking for themselves in their everyday jobs; at the same time, they become more articulate and skilled at organizing people. The skills they learn through higher education and in their work life make them increasingly skillful political participants.

Democracies existed before the industrial era. But in politics that are too large for face-to-face interaction, political participation was limited to a minority of the population. Ancient Athens was a democracy by the standards of its time, but one that excluded a large slave population, a large foreign population, and all women. Even as recently as the eighteenth century, democracy in the United States was limited to a minority of the population which excluded blacks, women, and, in some states, those who fell below certain property-ownership thresholds. By contemporary standards, neither classical Athens nor the early United States would qualify as democracies. Mass mobilization is a prerequisite for the contemporary version of democracy.

Mass political participation develops in two major stages, one based on an older mode of elite-led political participation, and the other on a newer mode linked with cognitive mobilization. The institutions that mobilized mass political participation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century—labor union, church, and mass political parties—were hierarchical organizations in which a small number of leaders or bosses led masses of disciplined troops. These institutions were effective in bringing large numbers of newly enfranchised citizens to the polls in an era when universal compulsory education had just taken root and the average citizen had a low level of political skills. But while these elite-directed organizations could mobilize large numbers, they produced only a relatively low level of participation, rarely going beyond more voting.

By itself, voting is not necessarily an effective way for citizens to exert their control over national decisions. It can be, and sometimes is, manipulated by elites. The extreme example is the communist people's democracies which regularly attained far higher levels of electoral participation than any liberal democracy—but did so in an institutional framework that kept real decision making entirely in the hands of the elites. Voting can be an effective step toward empowering the citizens, but it is not a very discriminating one. In one-party states, it is nothing more than a way for the ruling elite to exact mass endorsement. And even when competing parties are present, it may only mean that the citizenry get to choose one set of elites or another, and then let them make the actual decisions for the next several years.

A newer elite-challenging mode of participation is emerging that expresses the individual's preferences with far greater precision than the old. It is issue-oriented and based on ad hoc groups rather than on established bureaucratic organizations. It seeks specific policy changes, rather than simply giving a blank check to the elites of a given party. This mode of participation requires relatively high skill levels.

The most readily available indicator of political skills is one's level of formal education. In part, participation levels reflect skill levels, and sheer literacy seems sufficient to produce voting. The citizens of most Western democracies reached this threshold generations ago. But while more literacy may be sufficient to produce high rates of voting, taking the initiative to seek specific policy changes at the national level seems to require higher education. This is particularly true of the more elite-challenging types of political behavior: as Barnes et al. (1979) demonstrate, high educational levels are closely associated with participation in elite-challenging forms of political action. But the
Barnes et al. study goes a step farther and develops measures of political skills; they prove to be even stronger predictors of unconventional political behavior than it education—and far stronger than social class. Educational statistics give a good indication of the progress of cognitive mobilization over time, since governments have kept records of the numbers of students enrolled at various levels for many decades. These statistics tell a dramatic story. Early industrial societies introduced universal primary education, bringing widespread literacy, and as industrial societies developed knowledge-based economies, enrollment in higher education has increased enormously. As a result of the explosive expansion of higher education during the past 50 years, younger cohorts have much higher educational levels than older ones, throughout advanced industrial society. In the United States, for example, only about a third of the cohort born during the decade before 1925 received any secondary or higher education. Among the cohort born from 1966 to 1972, over 50 percent of the oldest cohort, to almost 90 percent among the youngest. Because its educational attainment is a relatively stable attribute of a given birth cohort, intergenerational population replacement has foreseeable consequences. One can project the educational level of a given population 10 or 20 years into the future with considerable accuracy. And the consequences are significant. The rise of postindustrial society or information society (Bell, 1973, 1975) leads to a growing potential for citizen participation in politics. Increasingly, not only one's formal education but also one's job experience helps develop politically relevant skills. The assembly-line worker produced material objects, working in a hierarchical system that required (and allowed) very little autonomous judgment. Workers in the service and information sectors deal with people and concepts; operating in an environment where innovation is crucial, they need a great deal of power to develop. It becomes increasingly ineffective to attempt to prescribe innovation from above, in hierarchical fashion. Acclimated to working in less hierarchical decision-structures in their job life, people in the tertiary, or information or service, sectors are relatively likely to have both the skills and the inclination to take part in decision-making in the political realm as well. Inglehart (1990) presents evidence of a long-term rise in mass skills in coping with politics that is transforming the mass basis of politics in Western industrial societies. Throughout advanced industrial society, publics are becoming more apt to want democratic institutions, and more adept at applying pressure to get them. These changes in mass skills and values are not the only factors that matter. A determined elite can repress public demands for democratization for a long time. But as socioeconomic changes in societal culture mount, the costs of repression rise: it stultifies initiative, brings a demoralized, inefficient economy, and a technology that falls behind world standards.

BRINGING THE PEOPLE BACK IN

The new mode of political participation is far more issue-specific than voting, and more likely to function at the higher thresholds of participation. It is new in the sense that only recently has a large percentage of the population possessed the skills required for this form of participation. And it is new in that it makes the public less dependent on permanent, oligarchic organizations. Thus, as cognitive mobilization proceeds, the established organizations become progressively less effective. Possessing a wide range of alternative communication networks, such as labor unions, churches, and urban political machines. Both union membership rates and church attendance have been weakening. Western countries, and traditional political parties have also been weakening. This leads to depresturnout, which is heavily dependent on elite-directed mobilization, and may require little or no cognitive response to current events. High rates of vote turnout are a good turnout are a good thing, to be sure. But we should bear in mind that the one-party communist regimes regularly reported voting rates of 98 or 99 percent. Electoral turnout is desirable, elite-directed types of participation, aimed at influencing specific policy decisions, are becoming more widespread. The Iron Law of Oligarchy is being weakened. Advanced industrial society brings an increasingly educated and occupationally specialized public. At the tasks that require individual judgment and autonomy, they become less amenable to centralized hierarchical control.

CULTURAL CHANGE CONducive to DEmocracy

The spread of democracy reflects not only changes in social structure, but also cultural changes. The study of political culture grew out of the tragic events that led up to World War II. In the aftermath of World War I, democratic regimes were set up in Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and many other countries. But when they encountered the severe economic problems of the 1920s and 1930s, democracy failed to survive in many cases. Why did this happen? Great economic distress during the Great Depression, but democracy survived there; in contrast, democracy gave way to fascist regimes in Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Hungary, and elsewhere, preparing the way for the greatest bloodbath the world had ever known. The classic Civic Culture study (Almond and Verba, 1963) addressed the question "Why did democratic institutions survive in some countries but not in others?" Manifestly, it was not just a matter of constitutional engineering. The laws and constitution of the Weimar Republic were as democratic as those of any nation in the world—but they did not take root. An authoritarian out-
look remained widespread throughout German society, and when distress and insecurity became severe, the Germans voted Hitler into power in free elections. Facing comparable problems, the British, Americans, and various other peoples were relatively steadfast in their support for democracy. Democracy, apparently, is not just a matter of elite-level arrangements; the basic cultural orientations of the citizens also play a crucial role in its survival. Almond and Verba set out to measure the relevant orientations empirically, to determine whether there really were underlying differences in the political cultures of stable democracies, as compared with those of unstable democracies.

Ideally, to explain the role of cultural factors in the survival of democracy, Almond and Verba would have used data on cultural conditions from the period before the rise of fascism: a cause must precede its effect. But survey research techniques had not yet been developed in that period, and they would have needed a time machine in order to go back and collect such data. However, culture is by definition a relatively stable aspect of a society. If so, one would expect to find significant elements of the cultural differences that contributed to the survival of democracy in Britain and the United States, and to its failure in Germany and Italy, that were still visible in the orientations of the respective mass publics in 1959, when their fieldwork was carried out. Almond and Verba set out to determine whether such differences existed.

Democratic institutions had recently been transplanted to Germany, Italy, and Japan. Would they take root this time, or would they fail again?

This basic question is of far more than academic interest again today, when democratic institutions have recently been installed in scores of formerly authoritarian societies, from Argentina to Russia—and where their fate remains uncertain. Authoritarian forces seem to be making a comeback in a number of the Soviet successor states; and a protofascist party won more votes than any other party in the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections, which gives rise to the chilling question: Will Russia's fate be like that of the Weimar Republic?

The Importance of Societal Trust

Partly, the answer depends on the development of a culture of trust. Interpersonal trust plays a crucial role in democracy. Democratic institutions depend on trust that the opposition will accept the rules of the democratic process. One must view one's political opponents as a loyal opposition who will not imprison or execute you if you surrender political power to them, but can be relied on to govern within the laws, and to surrender power if your side wins the next election.

Banfield (1958) found that Southern Italian society had much lower levels of trust than Northern Italy; this severely hindered the large-scale cooperation between strangers that is essential to both economic development and successful democratic institutions. Almond and Verba (1963) also argued that a sense of interpersonal trust is a prerequisite for effective democracy. They found that the
B R I N G I N G T H E P E O P L E B A C K I N

immediately after World War I, a number of new democracies were established, many of which did not survive the stresses of the interwar era. The most tragic and instructive case was that of Germany. Democratic institutions were seen by many Germans as a foreign element that had been forced on them by the victorious powers. Authoritarian elites still held influential positions, and the underlying mass political culture was not congruent with democratic institutions (Richter, 1961, 1978). Democracy failed to develop the deep-rooted allegiance among the mass public that might have enabled it to weather difficult times. Formal democracy can be established by elites—but once politics is decided by free elections, the orientation of the masses becomes crucial. In Weimar Germany, Hitler became chancellor through free elections.

Weimar Germany never had a chance to develop this kind of legitimacy. Associated with defeat from its start, it even faced the hijacking of the 1920s. It was unstable and no internal order; it fell in the wake of the impact of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Several decades later, the Bonn regime did develop legitimacy, but it did so gradually. Throughout the first decade of its existence, a large proportion of the German public continued to agree with the statement that "the Nazi regime was a good idea, badly carried out." As recently as 1993, a plurality of the West German public still rated Hitler as one of Germany's greatest statesmen. 1967 was the first year in which an absolute majority of respondents rejected that claim (Cotranis, 1993: 51-72).

Democratic institutions gradually won acceptance. At first this acceptance was based on the postwar economic miracle; by the late 1950s, the Bonn republic had achieved remarkable economic success. The 1953 Civic Culture survey showed that while many British and American citizens expressed pride in their political institutions, few Germans did. But the West German GDR took pride in their economic successes (Almond and Verba, 1963). Most support for the democratic regime in Bonn continued to grow with consistent economic achievement, though economic success was not the only reason for its growing legitimacy. The institutions of the Federal Republic (unlike those of Weimar) maintained domestic order and provided for a peaceful transfer of political power from a hegemonic party to the opposition in the 1960s. By the late 1970s, the West German public was more apt to express satisfaction with the way their political system was functioning than were most other Western European peoples, including the British. Democracy had finally developed roots in West German society.
subjective well-being and legitimacy

Political economy research deals with similar processes leading to the development of mass support, but it normally has a short-term focus. If the economic cycle has been going well, support for the incumbent increases; if the economy has done poorly, support for the incumbent declines. In the short run, the response is "throw the rascals out" (Knutson, 1971; Lewis-Beck, 1986; Markus, 1988). Support for a democratic regime has similar dynamics but is based on deeper long-term processes. Recent economic success may enhance support for the individuals in office. But if, in the long run, people feel life has been good under a given regime, it enhances feelings of diffuse support for that regime. Thus, feeling of overall subjective well-being plays a key role in the growth of legitimacy. Legitimacy is, of course, helpful in any regime, but authoritarian systems can survive through coercion; democratic regimes must be legitimate in the eyes of their citizens, or, like the Weimar Republic, they are likely to collapse.

In preindustrial society, chronic poverty was taken for granted as a normal part of life. But in industrial society, acute poverty has become a significant contextual condition; high levels of subjective well-being therefore become a necessary condition for the legitimacy of democratic societies. With high levels of subjective well-being, citizens are more likely to have construct governments or to collapse in the face of mass demands for radical change. Satisfaction with one's life as a whole is one of the best available indicators of subjective well-being, and it has been surveyed regularly in the Euro-barometer surveys. A society's prevailing level of subjective well-being is a reasonably stable cultural attribute—and one that has important political consequences. If a society has a high level of subjective well-being, its citizens feel that their entire way of life is fundamentally good. Their political institutions gain legitimacy by association.

Surprising as it may seem at first glance, satisfaction with one's life as a whole is for some conducive to political legitimacy than is a favorable opinion of the political system itself. Mass satisfaction with the way the political system is currently functioning has only a modest linkage with stable democracy; but satisfaction with one's life as a whole is a strong predictor of stable democracy (Inglehart, 1990). On reflection, it makes sense that satisfaction with one's life as a whole is a stronger predictor of stable democracy than is satisfaction with the political system. For politics is a peripheral aspect of most people's lives; and satisfaction with this specific domain can rise or fall over time. But if one feels that one's life as a whole has been going well under democratic institutions, then it is likely that the citizens of that society will be more supportive of the regime. Such a regime has built up a capital of mass support that can help torende the regime weather bad times. Precisely because overall life satisfaction is deeply rooted and diffuse, it provides a more stable basis of support for those institutions. Such a regime has built up a capital of mass support that can help the regime weather bad times. Precisely because overall life satisfaction is deeply rooted and diffuse, it provides a more stable basis of support for the regime. Precisely because overall life satisfaction is deeply rooted and diffuse, it provides a more stable basis of support for the regime.

Figure 6.3 shows levels of subjective well-being in more than 40 societies, based on combined responses to questions about life satisfaction and personal happiness. It examines a broader range of societies than ever before, including a number of authoritarian societies and new democracies. As this figure shows, societies characterized by a relatively deep, diffuse, and enduring basis of support are far likelier to be stable democracies than societies characterized by a shallow sense of well-being, confirming earlier findings (Inglehart, 1990). The correlation (r = .35) is remarkably strong. Our interpretation is that, because
a sense of subjective well-being in diffuse and deep-rooted, it provides a relatively stable basis of support for a given type of regime.

When people are dissatisfied with politics, they may change the parties in office. When the people of a given society become dissatisfied with their lives, they may reject the regime—or even the political community, as in the case of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Only rarely does mass dissatisfaction reach this level.

Research on subjective well-being in many countries has virtually always found that far more people describe themselves as "happy" than as "unhappy" and far more people describe themselves as satisfied with their lives as a whole than as dissatisfied (see, for example, Andre, 1986). The data from the 1990 World Values Survey reveal the lowest levels of subjective well-being ever recorded in research on this subject. In the surveys carried out in Russia, Bulgaria, and Latvia, many people described themselves as "unhappy" or "happy"; and in as many as they were "dissatisfied" with their lives as a whole as they were "satisfied". Normally, people would describe themselves as at least fairly satisfied with their lives as a whole, even in very poor societies. But in 1990, these three societies ranked far below even the poorest countries such as India, Nigeria, or China. Subjective well-being had fallen to sub-levels. It seems significant that in all three societies, the system of government collapsed during the year following these surveys—and in the Soviet case, the political community itself collapsed, breaking up into successor states.

POSTMATERIAL VALUES, PEOPLE POWER, AND DEMOCRACY
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN MASS PUBLICS AND ELITES

Democratization is not something that automatically occurs when a society's people attain given skill levels and a given threshold of value change. The process can be blocked or triggered by societal events. For Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's ascension to power was important: he made it clear that the Red Army would no longer intervene to stop liberalization in these countries. This, together with economic failure, was a triggering event that explained why liberalization suddenly took place throughout the region (1989-92), rather than a decade earlier or later. But this catalyst would not have worked if underlying societal preconditions had not developed. These preconditions were not present earlier with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia (the most developed society), none of the Eastern European countries were stable democracies before World War II.

Ideally, an unintended consequence of the relative poverty and rising educational levels provided by four decades of communist rule is to make Eastern European publics less willing to accept authoritarian rule and increasingly accept at realizing it. Such cultural changes can be represented by domestic elites or by external military force. But by the late 1980s, such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany were ripe for democratization.

Once it became clear that the threat of Soviet military intervention was no longer present, mass pressures for democracy surfaced almost overnight. These forces interact with the elites in control of a given society. The most significant is the generation transition that brought Gorbachev to power could, conceivably, have brought some other less flexible leader to the top. This might have delayed the process of reform for some years, but it would not have held back the clock forever.

The impact of changing values on mass potential for unconventional political action is not limited to Western societies. East Asian countries, like China, are as likely to develop the same phenomenon; indeed, rising mass participation began to manifest itself in South Korea before the recent surge of democratization in Eastern Europe. In 1987, an unprecedented wave of democratization, which demanded direct elections of the president. The government yielded, and the nation's elections in December 1987 were the fairest in South Korea's history, with the opposition actually winning a clear majority of the vote. Only the fact that the two main opposition candidates split their vote almost evenly enabled the governing party's candidate to win. In the early 1990s, Taiwan, facing similar pressures from an increasingly educated and urbanized populace, also adopted freely contested elections.

China went through a somewhat similar crisis in 1989, but it ended with bloody repression of the demonstrators. This illustrates an important point: democratization is never automatic. It reflects the interaction of underlying social changes and specific historical events as much. A результат авторитаризмов elite can respond to demands for reform by slaughter the citizens involved. But in choosing this course, one pays a price; the loss of legitimacy and eventual cooperation. Therefore, the Chinese leadership's choice of this option was feasible because China was still at a considerably less advanced level of development than the other nations we have discussed. Its per capita income was only a fraction of that in South Korea, Taiwan, or most of Eastern Europe. China's pro-democracy movement, in 1989, was mainly based on the younger and more educated strata in the urban centers. Its repression brought little repression because of China's vast rural masses, which brought immense majority of the population.

Subjective well-being levels seem to have fallen throughout the socialist world during the 1980s. The most reliable evidence comes from the World Values survey, which was carried out in 1981 as well as 1990. Both happiness and life satisfaction fell by about 10 points from 1981 to 1990; in the former year, Hungary ranked at the top of the list and Mexico was at the bottom. In 1990, Italy had fallen to the level of India. A local survey was also carried out in one region (Czechoslovakia) of the Russian republic in 1981, using the World Values survey questionnaire. The panel results with those from the 1990 survey of Russia indicate that subjective well-being fell even more steeply in Russia than in Hungary.

A large decline in the subjective well-being of a given public is not necessarily a sign of impending major changes in the society. The decline in subjective well-being in Hungary and Russia probably was linked with the deepening economic and
political crises of the socialist world in the 1980s. In the Soviet case, it is clear that the decline of subjective well-being was not simply a mass reaction to elite-level events, for our findings of unreasonedly low subjective well-being among the Russian people were registered before the economic and political system broke down in August 1991. The decline of subjective well-being among mass publics preceded the collapse of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union.

We suspect that under the Weimar Republic, the German public also manifested low levels of subjective well-being. It is too soon to say whether the former Soviet Union will follow the path of Weimar or that of Bonn. The Russian economy is beginning to recover, but it is clear that in 1990-91 diffuse support was at alarmingly low levels; it would be rash to assume that democracy is safely installed in the former Soviet Union.

Although dependency theory itself has largely been abandoned, the heritage of its efforts to dissect political culture still lingers. Recent interpretations of democratization tend to focus on elite bargaining or on economic factors outside the individual, de-emphasizing the role of mass publics. This is one-sided. It is also ironic, because democracy is, by definition, a system in which mass preferences determine what happens. Mass political culture is certainly not the only factor; but, we argue, it plays a crucial role—particularly in consolidating democracy and enabling it to survive over the long term. It is time to reevaluate the role of political culture. We are in a better position to do so than ever before, because we now have a database that makes it possible to examine the linkages between mass belief systems and political institutions in global perspective.

**Empirical Analysis: Three Aspects of Democracy**

Let us summarize our key theoretical points. Our central claim is that economic development is linked with democracy because it tends to bring social and cultural changes that help democracy emerge and flourish. The assertion that cultural factors play an important role in sustaining democracy is the most controversial part of this claim, but we believe that social change is also important. These two types of change play quite different roles in relation to different aspects of democracy. Economic development may encourage democracy, but democracy does not emerge automatically. It emerges and flourishes not as economic growth produces the social and cultural changes we have just discussed. These factors impact differently on three different aspects of democracy: (1) the amount of change toward democracy in a given period, (2) the level (or extent) of democracy, and (3) the persistence of democracy over time.

Table 6.1 examines the impact of cultural factors on each of these three aspects of democracy, using multiple regression analysis. We have already seen (in figures 6.1 and 6.2) that well-being and trust are closely linked with the stability of democratic institutions. Table 6.1 demonstrates that (controlling for each other's effects) they both have powerful linkages with stable democracy.
showed the lower levels of subjective well-being. Thus subjective well-being shows strong relationships with all four dependent variables, but reverses its role in connection with short-term changes. While high levels of well-being are linked with stable democracy and high levels of democracy, low levels of well-being are linked with short-term shift away from authoritarian institutions. This finding supports our interpretation that subjective well-being is crucial to the legitimacy of political institutions: when it is absent, neither democratic nor authoritarian institutions are likely to endure.

Table 6.2 shows the linkages between democracy and our two indicators of cognitive mobilization, occupational structures, and educational level. As hypothesized, both variables have strong positive linkages with the stability of democratic institutions: societies with a large active service sector and societies in which a relatively large proportion of the grown cohort receives "tertiary" education (as defined by the World Bank) are much more likely to be stably democratic. These and other societies. Both variables are also linked with levels of democracy in both 1990 and 1995 (through the linkage with education falls below significance in the former year). But these two variables explain relatively little of the variance in the change in democratization between 1990 and 1995—here again, we find a reversal of polarity: the proportion of the economy in the service sector shows a rather strong negative relationship with change.

Let us now undertake a more comprehensive analysis of how culture and social structure relate to economic development, and to each of the three aspects of democracy. Table 6.3 shows the results of OLSE regression analysis measuring the impact of culture, social structure, and economic development on democratic stability. Model 3.1 includes all three types of independent variables.
Our model is robust and indicates that the impact of economic development on stable democracy seems to work mainly through its tendency to bring cultural and (to a lesser degree) social changes. Dropping GNP/p capita from the model reduces the explained variance by only five percentage points; though the linkage between development and democratic stability is very strong, most of its impact seems to pass through the cultural variables (and excluding them reduces the explained variance even more than does excluding GNP/p capita).

Burkhard and Lewis-Beck (1994) have argued convincingly that economic development leads to democracy, and not the other way around. Building on their analysis, we would conclude that the most plausible interpretation of these results is that economic development leads to stable democracy mainly (though not entirely) insomuch as it brings changes in political culture and social structure. This model could be depicted as follows:

CAN WE USE 1990 MEASURES OF TRUST AND WELL-BEING AS INDICATORS OF THEIR LEVELS AT AN EARLIER TIME?
THE STABILITY OF CULTURAL VARIABLES

Before we go any further, let us take up a basic problem involved in any endeavor to measure the impact of political culture on long-term democratic stability. Empirical measures of political culture from most of the world's societies have not been available until quite recently; consequently, any analysis of culture's impact on long-term stability must necessarily use recent measures to help explain events that took place in earlier years. Thus, the analysis in Table 6.3 uses cultural measures carried out in 1990 to explain democratic stability from 1920 to 1995. Although the individual country's level of subjective well-being can and does change over time, high or low levels are a relatively stable attribute of given societies. The correlation between a given country's level of life satisfaction at the first time point for which data are available, and its level in 1995 (the latest time point for which we have data), is .81: for most societies, this covers a 23-year time span, and it represents a truly impressive level of stability. Furthermore, as inspection of Figure 6.4 demonstrates, this stability maintains itself throughout the period from 1973 to 1995, and not just at the two endpoints: in every year for which we have data, the Dutch and the Danes always rank at the top, while the Italians, French, and Portuguese always rank near the bottom.

To provide a yardstick by which to evaluate the stability of this basic cultural orientation, let us ask: How does it compare with the stability of the most
frequently used of all economic indicators, per capita GNP. Relative levels of wealth are generally considered to be very stable. This assumption is well founded: with few exceptions, the relatively rich nations of 1900 were also the relatively rich nations of 1995, and most of the societies that were relatively poor in 1900 were still relatively poor in 1995. Accordingly, during the 20-year period from 1970 to 1990, GNP/capita was relatively stable, showing a correlation of .73 among the societies in the 1990 World Values Survey. But—surprising as it may seem to those who view economic data as “hard” and cultural data as “soft”—our cultural indicator shows even greater stability over time than does the economic indicator.

The data from the 1981 and 1990 World Values surveys enable us to test the stability of key cultural characteristics on a broader scale, using the data from the 24 societies on five continents included in both of these surveys. The results are impressive. Our index of subjective well-being (based on overall life satisfaction and reported happiness) shows a correlation of .86 between the levels measured in 1981 and the levels measured in 1990; this is even higher than the .81 correlation shown in figure 6.4. Moreover, interpersonal trust (as measured in the 1981 surveys) shows an astonishing high correlation of .91 with interpersonal trust in 1990. By comparison, the per capita GNP of these same societies in 1980 shows a correlation of .88 with per capita GNP in 1990: a stability level about as high as that of our two cultural indicators. All of these figures are high. When one speaks of “rich countries” versus “poor countries,” one is indeed dealing with a relatively stable attribute of societies. But this is equally true of two of our political culture variables. Relative levels of interpersonal trust and subjective well-being seem to be as stable attributes of given societies as are their economic levels.

Cultural variables are often thought of as vague and ethereal simply because we usually have only vague, impressionistic measures of them. When measured quantitatively, basic orientations such as these display impressive stability. This is an important finding, which supports the claim that cultural variables have an autonomy and momentum of their own. Moreover, it suggests that our measures of political culture carried out in the 1980s and 1990s may be reasonably good indicators of how these societies ranked in earlier decades: though we cannot go back in time and measure the orientations of these publics in the 1920s, we need not abandon the effort to understand how political culture correlates to the long-term survival of democratic institutions.

Let us examine this problem from another perspective. The question is “How well can data from 1990 be used to multivariate analysis, to stand in for data measuring the same variable at an earlier point in time?” In table 6.3 we

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
<td>Model 4.1</td>
<td>Model 4.2</td>
<td>Model 4.3</td>
<td>Model 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.36**</td>
<td>0.45**</td>
<td>0.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-being</td>
<td>(1.80)</td>
<td>(2.47)</td>
<td>(3.42)</td>
<td>(3.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
<td>0.67**</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
<td>0.72**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Sector</td>
<td>(1.98)</td>
<td>(1.79)</td>
<td>(2.09)</td>
<td>(1.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic GNP/capita, 1990</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP/capita, 1980</td>
<td>(3.91)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP/capita, 1970</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP/capita, 1957</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.22**</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent variable is the number of years for which democratic institutions survived continuously in the given society from 1920 to 1990. Entry = standardized OLS coefficient. Coefficient divided by standard error if it is significant.

Multivariate analysis indicates that several factors, including economic development, cultural variables, and political conditions, contribute to the stability of democracy. However, the importance of economic development cannot be underestimated. In particular, the relationship between economic development and democratic stability is robust across different societies. This finding aligns with the hypothesis that economic prosperity provides the necessary conditions for democratic institutions to flourish. 

In conclusion, the analysis suggests that while economic development plays a crucial role in the stability of democracy, cultural and political factors also significantly contribute to this stability. Further research is needed to explore the interplay between these factors and to understand the mechanisms through which they influence democratic survival.
of given societies and, although absolute levels of these vary from one year to the next, the relative positions of given societies are reasonably stable. Thus, our regression model yields virtually identical results when we use GNP/capita in 1990, as when we use GNP/capita from earlier times.

Table 6.4 shows the results of multiple regression analyses of democratic stability, using GNP/capita in 1990, 1980, 1970, and 1957, respectively, as our indicators of economic development levels. Although the coefficients vary slightly, the basic model emerges: GNP/capita, subjective well-being, and interpersonal trust are the key variables in every case. Moreover, our various models all explain approximately the same amount of variance, ranging from a low of 83 percent (using GNP/capita in 1957) to a high of 86 percent (using GNP/capita in 1990).

As we have seen, our two cultural variables are fully stable over time as is GNP/capita. Although we do not have measures of well-being and trust from earlier decades, we suspect that if we could obtain them our analysis would produce similar results, with the same basic model emerging. This, at any rate, is what happens when we use economic indicators from earlier periods in time.

Testing Additional Variables

Let us now examine the impact of a variety of additional variables that the literature suggests may play important roles in democracy. After preliminary discussion, each of these variables will be tested in multivariate analyses.

The Importance of Organizational Networks

Alexis de Tocqueville stressed the importance of networks of voluntary associations, arguing that democracy had emerged and flourished in America because its people participated in numerous and extensive networks of voluntary associations. This fostered cooperation and trust, which were essential to the success of functioning of democratic institutions. Putnam (1993) also emphasized this factor, arguing that Social Capital plays a crucial role in both political and economic cooperation. Social Capital consists of a culture of trust and tolerance, in which extensive networks of voluntary associations emerge. These networks provide contacts and information flows that are, in turn, supportive of a culture of trust and cooperation. Economics does not unjustly demean culture nor does culture determine economics. The two are intimately intertwined and mutually supportive in any society that flourishes for any length of time.

Putnam's work makes an important contribution to sorting out the causal linkages between economic and cultural factors, facilitated by his development of an exceptionally long time series of economic and cultural indicators. Analyzing Italian regional-level data from the nineteenth century to the 1980s, Putnam found that certain regions had relatively high levels of social capital, while others had much lower levels. These levels were fairly stable attributes of given regions, and they were strongly linked with the economic development level of those regions. But Putnam's analysis dispels any assumption that these regional cultural differences simply a consequence of their respective levels of economic development. Putnam found that levels of civic involvement around 1900 predicted civic involvement 60 or 70 years later far better than did economic factors. More strikingly still, he also found that levels of civic involvement around 1900 predicted subsequent levels of economic development even better than did economic variables. Putnam's analysis indicates that cultural factors help shape economic life, as well as being shaped by it.

The World Values surveys provide information about organizational memberships. The respective publics were shown or read a list of 16 types of voluntary associations and asked, "To which, if any, of these organizations do you belong?" The surveys cover the following types of organizations: labor unions, religious organizations, sports/recreation organizations, educational/cultural organizations, political parties, professional associations, social welfare organizations, youth groups, environmental organizations, health volunteer groups, community action groups, women's organizations, third-world development groups, animal rights groups, and peace movements.

Rats of organizational memberships vary greatly across societies. The lowest rate of membership was recorded in Argentina, where only a cumulative 13 percent belonged to any of the 16 types of organizations; the average rate of membership was slightly over 2 percent. The society with the highest rate of organizational membership was the Netherlands, where membership in these organizations averaged 16 percent.

These data underestimate the low-income societies. This is not the case in India or Turkey because many of these organizations scarcely existed there; it was not asked in Nigeria, but was stated to imply "Do you sympathize with these organizations?" Consequently, we do not have comparable data from these cases. These questions were asked in a number of relatively low-income countries, however, with particularly interesting results from China. Although China shows a lower rate of organizational memberships (has most advanced industrial societies), it has a high rate for a largely rural society.

These data enable us to examine the relationship between organizational membership and stable democracy in an unprecedented cross-country perspective. Figure 6.5 shows the overall relationship between rates of membership in these 16 types of organizations and the number of years for which democratic institutions have functioned in the given society. Our findings support the Tocqueville-Putnam hypothesis: membership in voluntary associations is strongly linked with stable democracy. The overall regression coefficient is .55, significant at the .0001 level. Societies with high
Figure 6.5, Democracy and voluntary associations.

N = 35, significant at .001 level. Number of years for which democratic institutions have functioned continuously in given nation since 1950, by cumulative percentage belonging to 16 types of voluntary associations (e.g., the Dutch public report a cumulative 25% percentage belonging to the 16 types of organizations, for a mean 15 percent belonging to each type). Source: 1990-93 World Values Study.

Inglehart (1990) used a political culture index composed of interpersonal trust, subjective well-being, and the percentage supporting evolutionary change to explain democratic stability, finding that societies characterized by relatively high levels of support for evolutionary change are less likely to be stable democracies than other societies. Muller and Soltis (1994) reanalyse Inglehart's data (plus six Central American countries), using support for gradual reform in their analysis instead of support for revolutionary change, arguing that the former provides a stronger explanation of shifts toward democracy than does the latter. Both of these variables show reasonably high levels of stability over time—though not as high as that found with subjective well-being and interpersonal trust. Among the 24 societies included in both the

BRINGING THE PEOPLE BACK IN

1981 and 1990 World Values surveys, the correlations between levels in 1981 and levels in 1990 for each of these four variables were:

- Interpersonal trust: .91
- Subjective well-being: .86
- Support for gradual reform: .80
- Support for revolutionary change: .74

These, although there is an enduring tendency for certain societies to be characterized by relatively high levels of support for revolutionary change, this is a less stable variable than interpersonal trust or subjective well-being. These variables will also be examined in multivariate analysis.

Income inequality

Much of the literature on democracy has emphasized income inequality as an important factor in connection with stable democracy. This literature points out that very high levels of income inequality lead to extremist politics in which the disadvantaged have nothing to lose and a great deal to gain by political change—and the privileged elite has enormous stakes in maintaining the status quo at almost any cost. This is a recipe for extremist politics. Conversely, a reasonable degree of income equality is conducive to the spirit of compromise and moderation that is crucial to democratic politics. Furthermore, a diverse economy with many attractive jobs in the tertiary sector makes the elite more willing to accept rotation out of office; in such a setting, government is not the only route to prosperity and power; one may even have greater opportunities to earn a high income out of office than in office. Cross-sectional evidence suggests that economic development tends to produce greater income equality—which could be one reason why economic development is linked with democracy. We would expect income equality to be positively correlated with democracy.

Ethnolinguistic fractionalization

Muller and Soltis (1994) used an Index of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization from Taylor and Jooke (1995) in their analysis. Finding that ethnic diversity makes democratization less likely. We will examine whether this finding holds up when tested in the context of the much broader database provided by the 1990 World Values Survey.

Empirical Results

As Table 6.5 demonstrates, none of these additional factors has a significant impact on stable democracy, and in no case does adding them to the regression analysis increase the percentage of variance explained. The basic model shown in Table 6.3 explains 80 percent of the variance in democratic stability, none
Table 6.5
Stability of Democracy: Multiple Regression Models Testing Impact of Support for Revolutionary Change, Support for Gradual Reform, Income Equality, and Organizational Memberships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 5.1 (Revolution)</th>
<th>Model 5.2 (Reform)</th>
<th>Model 5.3 (Income Equality)</th>
<th>Model 5.4 (Organizational Membership)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-being</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32*</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td>(2.03)</td>
<td>(1.96)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59.09**</td>
<td>56.45**</td>
<td>54.79**</td>
<td>49.44*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.01)</td>
<td>(2.88)</td>
<td>(2.27)</td>
<td>(2.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Revolutionary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>For Gradual Reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Service</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Higher</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Income to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 20%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership, 16 Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Organizations</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP/capita, 1990</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.47)</td>
<td>(3.42)</td>
<td>(3.18)</td>
<td>(3.31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>($)100</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-52.44</td>
<td>-35.01</td>
<td>-30.87</td>
<td>-51.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of years for which democratic institutions functioned continuously in the given society from 1990 to 1995. Entry is unstandardized OLS coefficients. Coefficients divided by standard error is in parentheses.

* Variables significant at .05 level
** Variables significant at .01 level

The results are not shown in table 6.5, we also examined the impact of ethnonational fractionalization, finding that it does not show a significant effect.
Table 6.6 analyzes the factors linked with level of democracy in 1990, using the five variables in our basic model. There are some interesting changes from the results in table 6.3. Subjective well-being has a highly significant linkage with levels of democracy in 1990, as it does with democratic stability. But social structure plays a more important role, and economic development a less important one, than did it with stable democracy. The percentage of the economy in the service sector is the most important single factor shaping levels of democracy in 1990.

Interpersonal trust does not have a significant impact on levels in 1990—indeed, it shows a weakly negative linkage with it. The same occurs with the percentage receiving higher education—though it has a strong positive zero-order relationship with democracy in 1990, it shows a weakly negative relationship in this regression analysis. The education finding seems to reflect a familiar phenomenon: education and the size of the service sector are highly correlated, and under certain conditions, including both of them in the regression causes a reversal of the signs on the variable with the larger measurement error—in this case, education (Achen, 1985).
large service sector and even more important) societies with a relatively well-educated population were likely to show high levels of democracy than those with lower levels of these variables.

Our indicators of political culture are virtually unrelated to levels of democracy in 1995. The positive number of new democracies washes out the linkage between culture and democracy: as we have argued, democratic institutions can be adapted to virtually any setting. But our interpretation implies that democracy is most likely to survive and flourish in societies that rank high on subjective well-being and interpersonal trust. A culture of trust and well-being will probably develop in some of the new democracies, and democracy may fall to survive in others that rank low on trust and well-being. In the long run, both processes tend to minimize the linkage between political culture and democracy.

As another analysis indicates, none of the additional variables examined in table 6.5 (support for revolution, support for gradual reform, income inequality, organizational membership, and ethnonational fractionalization) has a statistically significant impact on levels of democracy in 1995, although income inequality comes closest to the .05 level of significance: societies with relatively low levels of income inequality were more likely to have higher levels of democracy in 1995 than those with greater inequality.

ANALYZING RECENT CHANGES IN LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY

Ingholt (1988, 1990) argued that political culture plays a crucial role in sustaining democratic political institutions: economic development is linked with democracy, in large part, because it leads to changes in social structure and political culture that are conducive to democracy.

Muller and Segalow (1994) argue that Ingholt's political culture data were collected in 1984 and therefore could not be used to explain the persistence of stable democracy before that time (unless, of course, they tap stable cultural differences that were present even earlier). Consequently, they drop Ingholt's dependent variable and analyze changes in democracy at time 2 (the 1990s), controlling for democracy at time 1 (the 1970s). This means that they are not analyzing either the extent of democracy or the stability of democracy among the societies in their sample: they are analyzing recent changes (from the 1970s to the 1980s). The authors do not attempt to reconcile this fact: they refer to their dependent variable as "change in level of democracy." But their choice of recent change as a test of whether political culture is conducive to democracy has important implications that they seem to have overlooked. They use this dependent variable to address the question "Is political culture conducive to democracy?" But their analysis actually addresses the question "Is political culture conducive to the shift in levels of democracy observed.
### Table 6.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Generalized</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractralization</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income to Top 20%</td>
<td>-0.50**</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.10)</td>
<td>(-1.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Democracy</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s (1990)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insight</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Dependent variable is the level of democracy in 1970s (1995), controlling for level in 1970s (1990). Linearly standardized OLS coefficients. Coefficient divided by standard error is in parentheses.

**Variables significant at 0.05 level
**Variables significant at 0.01 level**

From one decade to another? It does not and cannot determine whether a given political culture is conducive to stable democracy or to high levels of democracy during a given period.

Table 6.8 replicates the Mueller-Seligman analysis, using their model to analyze shifts in levels of democracy from 1980 to 1995. Model 8.1, in table 6.8 shows the result they obtained, using the data from the 1981 World Values Survey (plus six Central American societies) to analyze shifts from the 1970s to the 1980s. In their analysis, they found that income inequality was the most important influence on democracy across the 1970s to the 1980s. Support for gradual reform, ethnolinguistic fractralization, and level of democracy at the earlier time point also had statistically significant effects. Their model explained fully 87 percent of the variance in democratization during this time period.

But their model is completely time t toward. The factors governing shifts in levels of democracy from one decade to the next are largely situation-specific (in the period they analyzed, such events as the death of Franco and Argentina's defeat in the Falklands War triggered democratization). Accordingly, their model does not hold up when used to analyze the shifts toward democracy in other time periods. As model 8.2 demonstrates, using the same variables with

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**See 1990 World Values Survey data, we get completely different results when we apply their model to analyze shifts toward democracy during the period from 1990 to 1995. Neither income inequality nor support for gradual reform had a statistically significant impact on the shifts that took place in this broader sample of countries from 1990 to 1995.**

Not surprisingly, level of democracy at time 0 does not have a significant linkage with level of democracy at time 2, but this is the only template of model that survives. And the proportion of variance explained by their model drops precipitously—from 87 to 27 percent. A completely different group of factors shifted toward democracy in the 1980s, from those that shifted toward democracy during the 1970s—and for two groups of countries were very different in social structure and culture.

In the breakdown of the Mueller-Seligman model due to the fact that we use a broader set of nations in the analysis in model 8.2. No. It is not. Table 6.9 replicates their analysis, using the same set of nations that they examined. The results demonstrate that their findings are indeed time bound. When we focus on the same set of nations that they examined, we get similar results (see model 9.1). But when we analyze shifts toward democracy among these same societies during other time periods, we get quite different results. Income inequality, support for gradual reform, and level of democracy at time 1 were the main factors, even on the shifts toward democracy that took place from the 1970s to the 1980s, in Mueller and Seligman's analysis (with ethnolinguistic fractralization appearing as the 0.05 level of significance). None of these variables consistently shows a significant impact on democratization during the other time periods. Level of democracy at time 1 has a significant effect in two of the four other time periods; income inequality has a significant effect in one of the four other time periods; and neither support for gradual reform nor ethnolinguistic fractralization has a significant effect in any of the four other time periods.

The factors that explain shifts toward democracy from the 1970s to the 1980s are not the same as those that explain shifts toward democracy in those same societies from the 1980s to the 1990s, or from the 1990s to the 2010s, or from the 1970s to the 1990s, or from 1990 to 1995. Situation-specific factors dominate structural factors. In explaining short-term change.

To understand why we get such volatile results, let's look more closely at the changes on which, the Mueller and Seligman analyses focus. Figure 5.6 shows which societies changed the most during the period. Mueller and Seligman analyzed fully 87 percent of the variance in democratization during this time period.
| | | | Gradual Reform | 0.62 (2.49)* | 0.16 (0.78) | Interpersonal Trust | 0.04 (0.20) | — | 0.19 (1.44) | — | GDP/capita | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| | | | Income Inequality | —0.01 (—0.05) | —0.07 (—0.72) | Income Inequality | —1.61 (—3.21)** | —0.20 (—0.44) | — | Income Inequality | —1.62 (—7.81) | 0.65 (0.89) | Intercept | 93.13 | 14.10 | Adjusted R² | .85 | .92 | Number of Cases | 25 | 25 |

| | | | Level, 1970s | 0.01 (0.07) | — | Level, 1980s | — | 0.53 (2.83)** | — | Level, 1990 | — | — | 0.15 (0.76) | — |
| | | | Gradual Reform | —0.13 (—0.47) | 0.50 (1.93) | —0.22 (—0.80) | — | Gradual Reform | —0.12 (—0.57) | 0.06 (0.35) | 0.13 (0.66) | — | Interpersonal Trust | 0.07 (0.46) | 0.03 (0.33) | 0.07 (0.45) | — |
| | | | Income Inequality | —1.20 (—2.00)** | —0.08 (—0.14) | —0.28 (—1.38) | — | Income Inequality | —0.39 (—0.39) | 0.08 (0.88) | —0.19 (—0.19) | — | Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization | —0.39 (—0.39) | 0.08 (0.88) | —0.19 (—0.19) | — |
| | | | Intercept | 144.47 | 76.57 | 125.45 | — | Intercept | 144.47 | 76.57 | 125.45 | — | Adjusted R² | .61 | .71 | .62 | — |
| Number of Cases | 25 | 25 | 25 |

Note: Entry is unstandardized OLS coefficients. Coefficients divided by standard error is in parentheses. Estimates are based on 25 cases. Greece and Luxembourg are excluded because data on income inequality is unavailable.
*Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level

Figure 6.6. Changes in level of democracy from 1970s to 1990s in 27 nations. Source: calculated from Müller and Seligson, 1994: 648 (Appendix A).

In this period, most of the variance on which Müller and Seligson's analysis is based reflects the contrast between six societies that, for various reasons, showed major changes in the 1980s—and a heterogeneous group of societies that did not. Their analysis ranks Spain and Argentina at the top of the scale, far above the Nordic countries or the English-speaking democracies, even though the latter countries rank much higher on both level of democracy and stability of democracy: for Spain and Argentina happen to be the societies that showed the most dramatic change during this period. Their analysis focuses on recent fluctuations that cultural differences would be unlikely to explain since culture is, by definition, relatively stable. Müller and Seligson's dependent variable is so volatile that any cultural variables that do explain the pattern they find in the 1980s could not very well explain the pattern found in the 1970s or 1990s: the societies that make a break-
through to democracy in one decade are not likely to be the same ones that make it a decade earlier or a decade later. For example, Spain falls at the high end of the scale in Muller and Seligson’s analysis, since it adopted democratic institutions during this period, South Africa falls at the opposite end of the scale. Nevertheless, shortly after 1960 South Africa began a transition to democracy; today it would rank near the high end of their scale, having gone through many steps and changes. Conversely, Spain and Argentina would now drop toward the low end of the scale, since they did not show large shifts toward democracy in the last few years but declined slightly in the Freedom House ratings. When applied to a different time period, their dependent variable becomes radically different from the one they examined in the 1980s.

Muller and Seligson present a thoughtful analysis that addresses a very real problem: causality precedes effects, which means that any attempt to analyze the contributions of political culture to democratic stability before 1960 (when political culture began to be measured empirically) faces difficult measurement problems. But their analysis has two flaws, either of which would be fatal to a test of political culture theory.

First, it is based on a dependent variable that does not address the question of whether cultural factors are responsible for the long-term survival or failure of democracy—instead, it focuses on the fluctuations from the 1970s to the 1980s. By their very nature, cultural differences are relatively stable aspects of given societies and have little ability to explain fluctuations in a given society’s level of democracy from one decade in the next. Muller and Seligson’s analysis controls for the long-term component of democracy and analyzes only the recent fluctuations. This gives their a dependent variable that was measured after the 1981 surveys were carried out, but it is clearly the wrong dependent variable to test the role of culture. Their analysis is further distorted by an artifact of the data they use. The Freedom House codings of levels of democracy for the stable democracies to define the top level of their scales: from the start, they have been assigned the maximum possible score. This means that they cannot assign the highest scores on their dependent variable. This explains the bizarre pattern that is visible in figure 6.3. In virtually every case, the stable democracies get scores near (or exactly at) zero, reflecting no change. Muller and Seligson nevertheless argue that the cultural characteristics associated with stable democracy should be linked with large amounts of change on this measure. Their model specifications virtually guarantee that they will not find it, and they don’t.

It is perfectly legitimate and useful to analyze short-term changes in levels of democracy as Muller and Seligson have done; but when one does so, it is important to be aware that this is a very different dependent variable from either levels of democracy or stability of democracy—and one that is mainly shaped by situation-specific factors.

Table 6.1. Shifts in Levels of Democracy from 1990 to 1995: Multiple Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1.1</th>
<th>Model 1.2</th>
<th>Model 1.3</th>
<th>Model 1.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture - Well-being</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td>-0.107*</td>
<td>-0.08*</td>
<td>-0.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.49)</td>
<td>(-3.68)</td>
<td>(-2.56)</td>
<td>(-2.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>-1.90</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-1.37</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.41)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(-0.37)</td>
<td>(-0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Structure</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.99)</td>
<td>(-2.50)</td>
<td>(-0.97)</td>
<td>(-0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic GNI ($/1000)</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>8.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dependent variable is the shift from 1990 to 1995 on the Freedom House combined index of Press Freedom and Civil Liberties. Entity = Standardized OLS coefficient. Coefficient divided by standard error to get significance. ** = Significant at 0.01 level.
TABLE 6.11
suits from 1990 to 1995 (change scores): Multiple Regression Models Testing Impact of Support for Revolutionary Change, Support for Gradual Reform, Income Inequality, and Organizational Memberships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1.1 (Revolutions)</th>
<th>Model 1.2 (Income Inequality)</th>
<th>Model 1.4 (Organizational Membership)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-being</td>
<td>-07</td>
<td>-08*</td>
<td>-09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.91)</td>
<td>(-1.99)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>-60</td>
<td>-148</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.01)</td>
<td>(-2.29)</td>
<td>(-1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.68)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siv Revolutionary Change</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.73)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Gradual Reform</td>
<td>-02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service bureau</td>
<td>-03</td>
<td>-07</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-33)</td>
<td>(-83)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.83)</td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income to Top 20%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-13</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership, 16 Types of Organisations</td>
<td>03*</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP/GDP, 1990</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($1000)</td>
<td>(.32)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>8.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dependent variable is the change in level of democracy from 1990 to 1995. Query is an understated ULS coefficient. Coefficients divided by standard error is t-statistic. *Significant at .05 level. **Significant at .01 level.

societies in which the mass publics had low levels of subjective well-being. When well-being and trust are dropped from the analysis, the percentage of variance drops to 20 percent (see model 10.2). When this is done, the role of the organizational structure becomes significant: societies with a relatively low proportion of the economy in the tertiary sector are most likely to have shifted. But when the social structure variables are dropped and well-being and
sponsored effect of economic determinism, in which economic development gives rise to a specific type of culture, and democratic institutions, without culture being an intervening variable. This interpretation does not hold up in the light of the analyst we have just carried out: economic development is indeed important, but its effect needs to come mainly through changes that it brings in culture and social structure.

Another interpretation that might explain the relationships we have observed between culture and democracy could be termed institutional determinism. This interpretation would argue that the linkages between culture and democracy exist because democratic institutions determine the underlying culture.

This model contains a grain of truth: institutions do help shape their society’s culture—along with many other factors. But the plausibility of the interpretation that institutional determinism is the main explanation is severely undermined by the findings of Burkart and Low-St-Rbeck (1994) that economic development does not determine democracy. In other words, democracy does not bring economic development. The causal process seems to run from economic factors to institutions, rather than the other way around—and, as we have seen, the economic factors work mainly through changes in culture and social structure.

Institutions influence politics and economics. But they do not explain them by themselves, and the importance of their role varies greatly according to the kind of behavior in question. For example, institutions have a major impact on relatively narrow and highly formalized behavior such as voting patterns. Voting in an election is an example of behavior that is clearly institutionalized. But when it comes to social change or behavior, institutions have a much more indirect impact. In other words, we cannot simply explain voting turnout to vote for women or 18-20-year-olds. Or by applying severe sanctions against economic misuse, one can produce extremely high levels of turnout. Thus, the economic determinist argument regularly replaces voting turnout rates of 51 or 59 percent, and the political determinist argument, of course, has to hold up in those cases where we do have major election results. For example, the vote in the 1992 presidential election for Bush is one of the highest in American history. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Northern Italy, which is one of the few countries in the world that have never held a presidential election, has a turnout rate of over 90 percent. So the point is that voting turnout is relatively easily manipulated by aliens in a country that does not necessarily reflect any real choice or deep-rooted preferences in the part of the citizens.

Stable democracy, by contrast, depends on a deeply rooted sense of legitimacy among the people. Simply increasing the rate of the vote does not produce governmental legitimacy or a society of trust.

Trust and legitimacy are much more diffuse characteristics than voting turnout, and much harder to assess in institutional manipulation. They reflect the entire historical heritage of the given society, with the political institutions being only one of many relevant factors. Similarly, economic growth does not stem from merely getting the right institutions; societies with a wide variety of institutions have failed to attain it. And once-steady, high rates of economic growth have been achieved by societies with institutions ranging from democratic to authoritarian ones, with market economies or state-run economies, and with small-scale enterprises or large industrial conglomerates.

The same is true of stable democracy: if it were simply a question of getting the right institutions, the world would not be much different. One could simply copy the U.S. Constitution and mail it out to all the governments of the world. Unfortunately, reality is not that simple: the fact that each society has a distinctive economic and social structure and cultural heritage can have a decisive impact on whether or not democracy survives in that society.

Thus, the former Soviet Union had one of the most democratic constitutions in the world (on paper), guaranteeing high levels of civil rights and political freedom, together with referenda, recall of judges, and other constitutional guarantees. Great Britain, on the other hand, has no written constitution; the basic rules of democracy exist only as unwritten norms. But in the Soviet Union, the constitutional guarantees had no real effect, whereas in Britain, they were generally observed—much to the regret of those who were as different as day and night. The current debate between advocates of an institutional approach and the advocates of a behavioral approach wrongly assumes that the two are mutually exclusive. They are not. Political institutions and political culture have a symbiotic relationship, with institutions becoming a behavioral reality only insofar as they become a part of the political culture.

An institutional determinist interpretation of these findings would argue that a society’s level of interpenetration of the state is determined by how long it has lived under democratic institutions. Our position, by contrast, is that interpenetration of the state is a society’s entire historical heritage, with its political institutions being merely one of the contributing factors. Although we lack sufficient time series data for a conclusive test, the institutional determinist model fails to hold up in those cases where we do have substantial time series. For example, the peoples of Northern and Southeastern Italy have lived together under the same political institutions since unification 125 years ago. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Northern Italy is a country that has managed to keep much higher levels of interpenetration than Southern Italy—clearly, these differences in trust levels are not something else than the presence or absence of democratic institutions. The United States furnishes an even stronger refutation of the institutional determinist view. It is one of the oldest democracies in the world and enjoys relatively high levels of interpenetration (though by no means the highest in the world). But are these high levels of trust due to democratic institutions? Apparently not, as we have seen, government has shown a sharp decline among the American public during the past few decades; in 1954, only 24 percent of the American public expressed distrust in the national government; in 1992, fully 80 percent expressed distrust. But this collapse of trust in government went hand in hand with a collapse of trust, which was relatively stable, declining only slightly. Intergovernmental trust apparently moved in a different direction, which suggests that institutional trust was not determined by the American people’s experience in the political sphere. Moreover, it is per-
The latter proposition simply is not plausible. To assume that a society’s subjective well-being is determined by its political institutions is to assume that the tail is wagging the dog. Andrews and Withey (1976) have dramatically demonstrated that among the American public, subjective well-being is determined by one’s level of satisfaction with one’s family life, one’s marriage, job, home, friends, and leisure time—with politics making only a relatively minor contribution to overall subjective well-being. This accords with a large body of evidence that politics plays only a peripheral role in most people’s lives.

Findings from the 1990 World Values Survey demonstrate that this holds true not only in America but in the world as a whole: politics is only of relatively minor subjective importance to most people. When asked how important various things were in their lives, the following percentages of the publics of our 43 societies rated the six following domains “very important”:

1. Family 83%
2. Work 59%
3. Friends 38%
4. Leisure 33%
5. Religion 28%
6. Politics 13%

Politics ranked dead last, with only one person in eight considering it very important. Six times as many people emphasized the family, as emphasized politics. This may be dismaying to political scientists, but it seems to be a global reality. Politics was rated least important in almost every country.

Unlike totalitarian systems, democracies make only modest efforts to reshape their underlying cultures: the very essence of democracies is that they reflect the preferences of their citizens, rather than attempting to dictate them. It seems highly unlikely that the powerful correlation we have observed between culture and democracy exists because democratic institutions somehow create a new culture. Democratic institutions probably encourage feelings of interpersonal trust to some extent and may have some tendency to enhance subjective well-being, but the process seems to work mainly in the opposite direction: mass well-being and trust are crucial to the viability of democratic institutions.

Postmaterialist Values and the Future of Advanced Industrial Society

In advanced industrial society, prolonged prosperity and the welfare state contribute to an increasingly widespread sense that survival can be taken for granted, giving rise to another cultural factor conducive to democracy: the spread of Postmaterialist values. This is a relatively recent development, and it may be a major reason why, although early industrial societies were almost equally likely to mobilize their citizens into democratic, fascist, or communist
terms of political participation, advanced industrial societies give rise to
democracy almost exclusively, rather than to either of the two other forms of
modern political regimes.

Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that Postmaterialist values did
not become a significant factor in politics until about two decades after World-
War II, certainly. Postmaterialist values cannot explain the stability of democ-
racies throughout the period since 1920. Moreover, even today these values are
widespread only in advanced industrial societies; they could not very well be
the main factor explaining the levels of democracy found throughout the
world. No reason, therefore, to believe that they are conducive to
democracy in advanced industrial societies, contributing to a growing demand
for higher levels of mass participation in politics.

Our theory implies that a shift toward Postmaterialist values should occur
in any nation that develops high levels of economic security. As we have seen,
this process seems to be at work not only in the West but also in East Asia (gds
of which have now attained Western levels of prosperity) and even in some ex-
cept to Eastern Europe.

Postmaterialist values are conducive to democracy for three reasons: (1)
They entail an emphasis on self-expression and participation that is inherently
conducive to political participation, and, as we will see, Postmaterialists are
relatively likely to act in such democracy. (2) Postmaterialists view demo-
cracy as something that is intrinsically attractive—and just as a possible
means to become wealthy and successful. Thus, their support for democracy is
more secure than that of Materialists, many of whom were initially attracted
to democracy simply because it was associated with being rich. (3) In addition
to these emphasis on participation and free speech, Postmaterialists tend to
hold a wide range of basic democratic norms, as recent research demonstrates.
Thus, RohRSknecht (1969) finds that Postmaterialist values are an important
factor accounting for the presence or absence of democratic attitudes among
the elites of both the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Rep-
ublic of Germany.

Recent studies Gibson and Dethh in the former Soviet Union also demonstrate
this point. Gibson and Deth (1969) developed a broad-based scale of support
for democratic values. This scale integrates seven subscales measuring (1)
valuation of democracy, (2) support for democratic norms, (3) right to un-
ions, (4) support for dissent and opposition, and (5) support for independent
press media. (6) support for competitive elections, and (7) political tolerance.
In their 1980 survey of the European Soviet Union, Gibson and Deth find that

one who held Postmaterialist values was very likely to support these demo-
cratic values. In the European USSR data the percentage high in support for
democratic values ranged from 14 percent for the Materialists to 80 percent for the
Postmaterialists, a very noticeable difference. This is quite strong support for Epstein’s study; Postmaterialists are much more likely to support core democratic values such as
independence, competitive elections, etc. to some degree, though, are these findings

If so, are they a function of other factors that contribute to the develop-
ment of both democratic and Postmaterialist values? We can consider the effects
of Postmaterialism on democratic values controlling for a number of attributes of
the respondents that might well account for both sets of values. We find that Post-
materialism has a substantial impact on democratic values beyond the effect of these
demographic attributes. Those who are more highly educated, and who are younger
are more likely to support democratic processes and institutions, and these variables
alone can account for a considerable portion of variance in the dependent variable.
Yet when the Postmaterialism index is added to the equation, an additional 10
percent of the variance can be explained. Even while controlling for age, education,
social class, etc., Postmaterialists are consistently more supportive of democratic
values than are Materialists. (Gibson and Deth, 1949: 20-23)

Since Postmaterialists emphasize individual freedom and self-expression, it is
not surprising that Postmaterialist values correlate with democratic values,
but Gibson and Deth’s finding is far from obvious. By demonstrating the
connections between democratic values and Postmaterialist values, Gibson and

Deth help integrate democratic theory and the theory of value change. Their
findings imply that we should find an independent trend toward increasing
support for basic democratic values in societies that experience economic
growth and attain higher levels of mass security.

The Growth Role of Mass Political Action

Value change has important behavioral implications. In one survey, Postmat-
erealists and Materialists were relatively equal to act to attain their political
goals—but in authoritarian systems, they are the most likely to act in order to attain
democracy.

Representative samples of the public surveyed in the World Values sur-
veys were asked about their readiness to take part in four forms of political ac-
ction: (1) joining in boycotts, (2) attending lawful demonstrations, (3) joining
unlawful strikes, (4) occupying buildings or factories. Using similar questions
in eight Western democracies, Barro et al. (1979) demonstrated that Macro-
materialist Postmaterialist values are strongly related to one’s willingness to partic-
ate in unconventional political activities such as these, in order to press for
some political goal.

The spread of citizen activism is not merely a Western phenomenon. Post-
materialist values show the same linkage with unconventional political
protest potential in Eastern Europe and East Asia as they do in Western coun-
tries. The data from the World Values surveys reveal that in country after coun-
try, Postmaterialists are two to four times as likely to engage in unconventional
political action, as are Materialists. Figure 5.7 shows the percentage of the
male political public who said (in 1990-91) that they have done “or might do” all
four of these activities.
The spread of Postmaterialist values seems to be increasing the degree to which mass publics engage in elite-challenging political action. From 1981 to 1990, public readiness to engage in these activities became more widespread in the great majority of societies for which we have data, as we will see in chapter 10. In nondemocratic regimes, unconventional political action may play an even more important role than it does in the West: It may serve as the proximate cause by which the public obtains democratization. From Seoul to Warsaw and Budapest to East Berlin, mass participation in strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts—precisely the activities examined here—played a crucial part in the transitions to democracy launched throughout Eastern Europe in 1989, and in recent moves toward democratization in East Asia and Latin America.

People power has become an unprecedentedly important factor in politics. It proved its effectiveness again six months after these surveys, in August 1991, when hard-liners in the Soviet Union attempted to seize power, arresting Gorbachev and rolling tanks into Moscow. But to widespread surprise, this time the Russian people did not resign themselves to authoritarian rule. Instead, citizens poured into the streets, defying the reactionaries’ leaders, and had barricades around the Russian Parliament building where Yeltsin had organized resistance. Crowds of citizens brought armored columns to a halt. Miners went on strike. And entire units of tanks and para troopers went over to the resistance.

Both economic and noneconomic motives played a part in motivating mass resistance to communism. Its economic failures contributed to its downfall.

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**Figure 6.7:** Readiness to undertake unconventional political action, by value type: Russia, 1990–91.

Percentage saying they “have done” or “might do” all four of the following: (1) join in boycotts, (2) attend lawful demonstrations, (3) join unofficial strikes, and (4) occupy buildings or factories.


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**The Impact of Mass Values on Democratization, Political Culture, and Stable Democracy**

But it is equally important that the desire for freedom of speech and self-determination have become high-priority goals, for more people, than ever before in history. Postmaterialists are far likelier than Materialists to have taken part in the strikes, demonstrations, and other unconventional protest actions which brought down the communist regimes (or helped maintain the reform regime, in the Soviet case). As the younger, better-educated, and more Postmaterialist birth cohorts replace the older, less-educated ones in the adult population, we would expect elite-challenging political action to increase. Does it? In virtually all societies for which we have time series data, the answer is yes. In almost every country included in both waves of the World Values surveys, we find the predicted shift.

The proportion of people who have actually done elite-challenging political actions during the past five years rose substantially from 1981 to 1990, as we will see below. One frequently reads journalistic accounts that mass publics have become politically apathetic, citing evidence that voter turnout has stagnated or declined. These accounts are accurate about voting, but miss the point that people display a rising potential for elite-challenging action. Voting turnout statistics convey a misleading impression of political apathy. Mass publics are becoming less likely to vote, which is a relatively elite-controlled form of participation; but throughout industrial society they are becoming more likely to engage in elite-challenging behavior.

Do individual-level values have an impact on the societies in which people live? The evidence we have just examined suggests that democracy should be more likely to emerge (and survive) in societies with relatively large numbers of Postmaterialists than elsewhere. Is this the case?

The horizontal axis on figure 6.8 reflects the balance between Materialists and Postmaterialists in each country. The pattern is clear. Nations with relatively high proportions of Postmaterialists are much more likely to have had continuously functioning democratic institutions than other societies. Those with heavily Materialist publics tend to be not democratic, or to be recent (and possibly unstable) democracies. All but one of the countries that were not yet democratic in 1990 show scores below +10 on the Materialist/Postmaterialist values index on figure 6.8 (the sole exception being Mexico). All but one of the democracies had scores above that level (the sole exception being India).

One consequence of this cultural transformation is rising mass pressure for more democratic and participatory institutions. Although mass preferences alone do not determine when democratization takes place, there is a remarkably strong correlation between the ratio of Postmaterialists to Materialists and the existence of stable democracy (r = .71). Correlation is not causation. But the evidence of a causal link between Postmaterialist values and stable democ-
BRINGING THE PEOPLE BACK IN

Conclusions

The evolution of industrial society makes democracy more likely. It brings gradual cultural changes that make mass publics increasingly likely to want democratic institutions and more supportive of them once they are in place. This transformation does not come easily or automatically. Determined elites, in control of the army and police, can resist pressures for democratization. But the emergence of prosperous welfare states leads to gradual long-term changes in mass publics that are increasingly high priority to autonomy and self-expression in all spheres of life including politics. And as they mature, industrial societies develop increasingly specialized and educated input forces, which become increasingly adept at exerting political pressure. It becomes more difficult not only to repress demands for political liberalization. Moreover, economic development is also linked with relatively high levels of subjective well-being and interpersonal trust, which also seem to play a crucial role in democracy. With rising levels of economic development, cultural patterns emerge that are increasingly supportive of democracy, making mass publics more likely to want democracy, and more skilled at getting it.

Although rich societies are much likelier to be democratic than poor ones, wealth alone does not automatically bring democracy. But the process of industrialization does have an inherent tendency to produce changes that are conducive to democracy. In the long run, the only way to avoid the growth of increasingly articulate and effective mass demands for democratization would be to reject industrialization. Very few ruling elites in the contemporary world are willing to do so. Those societies that do move onto the trajectory of industrial society will eventually face increasingly powerful pressures for democratization.

Our findings suggest that political culture plays a much more crucial role in democracy than the literature of the past two decades would indicate. Although it does not seem to be the immediate cause of the transitions to democracy, political culture does seem to be a central factor in the survival of democracy. In the long run, democracy is not attained simply by making institutional changes or through clever elites-level maneuvering, its survival also depends on what ordinary people think and feel.