Manufacturing the Attack on Liberalized Higher Education

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I. The PC Debate

So far as the general reading public knew, the PC debate burst suddenly onto the American scene toward the end of 1990. News-magazine readers learned about "political correctness" in the academy from feature stories in *Newsweek* and *Time*, while higher-brow readers encountered it somewhat earlier in 1990, perusing Richard Bernstein's "The Rising Hegemony of the Politically Correct" in the *New York Times*, John Searle's "The Storm over the University" in the *New York Review of Books*, and a forum in the *New York Times* on "Opening Academia without Closing It Down." Business readers of the *Wall Street Journal* may have noticed early warnings of PC sounding throughout 1990—in, for instance, Gerald Sirkin's "Multiculturalists ... the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), Chairman William J. Bennett's "The Shattered Humanities" (1982), and *To Reclaim a Legacy* (1984), on the decline of humanities teaching and research, drew mainly defensive comments printed in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*. But Chairman Lynne V. Cheney's barrage of reports—*The Humanities and the American Promise* (1987), *Humanities in America* (1988), *50 Hours* (1989), *Tyrannical Machines* (1990), and *Telling the Truth* (1992)—on the fallen state of the humanities, elicited many thoughtful articles and a pamphlet issued by the American Council of Learned Societies.

In 1987, when Cheney's first report was published, mass-market books attacking liberalized higher education began to appear at the impressive rate of two per year: e.g., E. D. Hirsch, Jr.'s *Cultural Literacy* (1987), Allan Bloom's *Closing of the American Mind* (1987), Charles Sykes's *Profscam* (1988) and *The Hollow Men* (1990), Page Smith's *Killing the Spirit* (1990), Roger Kimball's *Tenured Radicals* (1990), and Dinesh D'Souza's *Illiberal Education* (1991). By 1991, the Right had hyped the failings of liberalized higher education in numerous conservative and mainstream periodicals. The *New Republic*, *Commentary*, and *Academic Questions* had forums on the subject, syndicated columnist George Will fired off columns for the *Washington Post* and *Newsweek*, and D'Souza published in a half-dozen venues, including the *Atlantic Monthly*, *Forbes*, and the *American Scholar*.

Progressive academics who responded to the attack made the proverbial mistakes of too little and too late. By and large, they replied to the conservative arguments, ignoring the issue of how so many of them had suddenly appeared in print. Limited by their training, they came to the attack through texts and focused on its textual features—the rhetoric, the ideas, the validity of claims—not realizing that once the attack was textualized so widely it was a fait accompli. Moreover, since most of them were not reading right-wing periodicals in the mid-1980s, they did not notice the strategy for the attack percolating there and later spreading to mainstream periodicals. The strategy involved producing criticisms that demonized liberal and left types, an anticommunist technique used by the Old Right in the 1950s, and targeting these criticisms to particular audiences, a direct-mail technique developed by the New Right in the early 1980s.

Chairman Cheney, for instance, tried the strategy out during a talk at a 1988 meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS):

> When I become most concerned about the state of the humanities in our colleges and universities is not when I see theories and ideas fiercely competing, but when I see them neatly converging, when I see feminist criticism, Marxism, various forms of poststructuralism, and other approaches all coming to bear on one concept and threatening to displace it. I think specifically of the concept of Western civilization, which has come under pressure on many fronts, political as well as theoretical. Attacked for being elitist, sexist, racist, and Eurocentric, this central and sustaining idea of our educational system and our intellectual heritage is being declared unworthy of study.

Cheney's conceit—that a new academic "gang of four" (feminists, Marxists, multiculturalists, and theorists) was betraying the national cultural heritage—was not just the idiosyncratic rhetoric of an outspoken public official. Rather, it was taken from an already crafted conservative political discourse. As early as 1986, right-wingers had laid out the argument that "tenured radicals" had embarked on a wholesale demolition of the Western cultural tradition and the U.S. universities charged with preserving it. Raising the specter of 1950s communism and 1960s
radicalism, such articles as Stephen H. Balch and Herbert London's "The Tenured Left" (1986), Russell Jacoby's "Radicals in Academia" (1987), Chester E. Finn's "The Campus: An Island of Repression in a Sea of Freedom" (1986), and John P. Roche's "Academic Freedom: The New Left Vigilantes" (1989) portrayed the activities of progressive academics as at once McCarthyite and revolutionary. Conservatives were the most prolific in attacking academic feminism in academic periodicals and feminist positions on such issues as abortion, rape, and sexual harassment in academic and general periodicals. While their discussions of feminism ranged from the serious, though not always accurate (e.g., Virginia R. Hyman's "Conflict and Contradiction: Principles of Feminist Scholarship") to the vitriolic (Carol Iannone's "Literature by Quota"), most differentiated an acceptably moderate equal-rights feminism, which has been embraced by a large part of the public, from lesbian, Marxist, and poststructuralist feminisms, which they linked to academic radicalism.

They were less successful in the battle against academic theory because they had, by and large, to rely upon conservative academics to conduct it. Those who supported traditional kinds of theory were reluctant to condemn the whole enterprise, and those who criticized particular theoretical trends found it harder work (and certainly less fun) to enter these complex discourses than to demonize types. While Peter Shaw's "Declining Discourse" (1988) denounced Marxist criticism without meaningfully engaging it and Joseph Epstein's "Academic Zoo: Theory and the Cultural Revolution," and "The Academic Left Strikes Back." revolution Abroad, the Cultural Revolution at Home," "Post-Communist Radicalism and the Cultural Revolution," and "The Academic Left Strikes Back." The attack on multiculturalism has been the broadest because the opening of the curriculum to previously excluded races and cultures overlaps with other efforts in the academy and society that conservatives oppose: for instance, African-American and gay activism, affirmative action, and hate-speech codes. During the past four years, they have published dozens of articles critical of multiculturalism, Afrocentrism, and alleged reverse racism on campus in Commentary, National Review, New Republic, and other periodicals. Most bear provocative titles that ridicule these projects (e.g., Andrew Sullivan's "Racism 101." D'Souza's "New Segregation on Campus," and Thomas Short's "New Racism on Campus?"). Honors for the most obfuscating rhetoric go to Nathan Glazer's attack on multiculturalism titled "In Defense of Multiculturalism.""18

The many publications that could be listed in a comprehensive bibliography on this subject omit two dimensions of the attack: first, thousands of criticisms voiced by conservatives in television and radio interviews, op-ed pieces, letters to the editor, and newsletters; and second, numerous actions taken by citizens and government officials to regulate liberalized higher education. For instance, the former Secretary of Education attempted to regulate accrediting associations and prohibit scholarships for minority students, the former NEA acting chairman rejected grants for artworks with erotic content, the former NEH chairman directed the flow of funding into traditional scholarship and away from the new critical discourses, and the National Association of Scholars (NAS) has been soliciting and referring to legal centers cases of alleged infractions against conservatives on college and university campuses.17 I emphasize actions in order to point out that most academics have thus far mistakenly assumed that the debate is the attack. The debate, however, is only part of the attack.

The purpose of this chapter is not to survey the debate, even though it has been far more extensive than the American public and academics know.18 Nor is it to enter into the debate, though its claims are vital as so many academics have pointed out. Rather, the purpose is to show that the Right has manufactured the attack on liberalized higher education by means of a right-wing apparatus dedicated to making radical cultural change. Making radical cultural change is essential to a conservative movement determined to impose its vision of America on all of us.

II. The Conservative Movement and Cultural Production

After the triumph of Roosevelt and the New Deal, conservatives described themselves as "the Remnant"; they were, in the words of one, "obscure, unorganized, inarticulate."19 The establishment of the National Review by William F. Buckley, Jr. in 1955 "laid the foundations for everything that followed."20 This magazine provided conservatives with "a recognized forum for conservative ideas"21 and helped them make the transition to an interventionist approach to American politics. Also founded under Buckley's auspices in 1960, the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) gave young conservatives practical experience in organizing: it held rallies, founded clubs on college campuses, and "mobilize[d] support among American youth for conservative political candidates and legislation."22 The Goldwater campaign in 1964 produced a new generation of conservative campaign workers as well as the list that served as the basis for Richard Viguerie's subsequent work of direct-mail fundraising.23 By 1970, the National Review had a circulation of 100,000 and YAF had 50,000 members.24 These mobilizing and direct-mail skills spurred the further development of conservative infrastructure during the 1970s, in particular the proliferation of conservative interest groups, the formation of PACs, and the rise of the Christian Right culminating with the founding of the Moral Majority (1979) by Robert Billings, Jerry Falwell, Ed
McAteer, Howard Phillips, Richard Viguerie, and Paul Weyrich. Less known, however, was another development during this same period: the founding of New Right institutions such as the Heritage Foundation by Edwin Feulner, Jr., Phillip N. Truluck, and Weyrich (1973), the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (now the Free Congress Foundation) by Paul Weyrich (1974), the National Journalism Center by M. Stanton Evans (1977), and the Leadership Institute by Morton Blackwell (1979).25

Thus, between 1975 and 1980, the Right became a powerful political movement. It had built a coalition of conservative strains (Old Right, neoconservative, New Right, Christian Right, libertarian, free-market and supply-side economics, etc.) and an infrastructure of national organizations, interest groups, churches, and corporate councils. Despite rifts in ideologies and priorities among its various constituencies,26 the coalition became a political force by organizing cadres of campaign workers, PACs, lobbying groups, and eventually the dominant faction of the Republican Party. Today the conservative movement, the term now preferred by many of its members, is intent on strengthening the coalition by training the “Third Generation” and organizing the grass roots.27 During these same decades, the Right also enlarged its infrastructure with foundations, think tanks, and an infrastructure of national organizations, interest groups, churches, and corporate councils. Despite rifts in ideologies and priorities among its various constituencies,28 the coalition became a political force by organizing cadres of campaign workers, PACs, lobbying groups, and eventually the dominant faction of the Republican Party. Today the conservative movement, the term now preferred by many of its members, is intent on strengthening the coalition by training the “Third Generation” and organizing the grass roots.27 During these same decades, the Right also enlarged its infrastructure with foundations, think tanks, media, training institutes, and legal centers that began to focus their resources on cultural change.

Conservative Agendas for Education

With the election of President Reagan in 1980, conservatives were finally in a position to use the government to make national cultural change, and they began with education. Their interventions took the form not of critiques, which imply academic analysis, but of agendas, which imply political action. Initially, they produced two agendas for education. The centrist agenda, formulated by neo-conservatives, traditional liberals, and policy analysts at the American Enterprise Institute, charged that “federal intervention to promote educational equity was excessive” both in placing equity before excellence and in pursuing it with little regard for the costs involved. The agenda called for a reordering of public-education goals so as first to “promote economic growth for the nation,” next to “help preserve a common culture by teaching students the basic values upon which American capitalism is based,” and only then to support educational equity.29 By contrast, the radical Right agenda, formulated by conservative Christians and policy analysts at the Heritage Foundation, charged that a liberal-humanist monopoly of universities and federal agencies had brought about a decline “of quality teaching and academic standards.” Its more drastic aim was to reverse progressive change by defederalizing education (abolishing the Department of Education, eliminating the federal funding of education, and reducing equity regulations and enforcement) but at the same time increasing the regulation of university research sponsored by federal agencies.30

The themes of the radical Right agenda were sketched out in A New Agenda for Education, a booklet that followed the format of Heritage’s other agendas, such as The Attack on Liberalized Higher Education.

Mandate for Leadership, by combining analysis and action recommendations to the Reagan administration. In the introduction, Eileen M. Gardiner, an education policy analyst at Heritage, argued that America’s traditionally local system of education had given way to a centralized system beset by various ills (increased costs, decreased quality, corruption by special interests) that defederalization would reverse.31 The five essays on primary-secondary education criticized teacher tenure, teachers’ unions, state certification, affirmative action and equal opportunity programs, value-neutral (i.e., secular-humanist) education, denial of federal funding to private and religious schools, and compensatory, handicapped, and bilingual education. The one essay on higher education argued that the mission of universities had been perverted by the postwar growth and liberalization of higher education. Universities, rather than pursuing truth and providing liberal-arts education, now were designed “to remedy social inequalities.”32 The author concluded that “the federal government cannot help universities pursue their educational tasks; democratic government is not, and should not be, an appropriate sponsor for liberal arts training. But while it cannot help, the government can certainly hurt.”33

The list of recommendations in the last chapter was devised to make government helpful in implementing the radical Right agenda and continues to guide conservatives today as, for instance, they lobby for state school-choice plans and a federal voucher system, litigate reverse-discrimination cases, promote standardized testing, and propose restrictions on teachers’ unions and accrediting associations. Though the agenda recommended radical changes in education, it did not tackle the larger matter of cultural production. How, then, did the Right get from a recommendation to defederalize education to a theoretically driven transformation of cultural production?

Cultural Conservatism

In the mid-1980s, a group of conservatives associated with Paul Weyrich, president of the Free Congress Foundation (FCF), undertook a project called “cultural conservatism,” which was to be the template for a new American politics. Turning away from the conservative preoccupation with economics, FCF designed cultural conservatism as a response to “activist movements built around values, life-styles, and other non-economic issues.” Recognizing these movements as “the vanguards of a profound political change,” it predicted that “the politics that carry us into the twenty-first century will be based not on economics, but on culture.”34 FCF read the issues raised by the vanguard movements as evidence “that America has been suffering from cultural drift...[a] gradual emptying of a nation’s values of their content, not by some violent overturning, but by slow evaporation in which the form is left—in rhetoric and often in manners—but the substance disappears.”35 The symptoms of drift included conspicuous consumption, a “me-first” ethic, demands to eliminate racism and homophobia, scientific proposals to achieve zero-population growth and eliminate male aggression as the source of cultural change.36
war, decreased religious and parental influence, deterioration of school education, women's and critical-legal studies, and rock videos. Blamed for it were the 1960s cultural radicals and a newer cast of characters, such as yuppies and welfare recipients, produced by liberal largesse.15

Eager to cast off "the negative public image of the 'New Right,'" Weyrich distinguished the strains of postwar conservative orthodoxy (Cold Warriors, fundamentalists, libertarians, free-market economists) from cultural conservatism. Whereas they had defined themselves in terms of what they opposed (they were anticommunist, anti-Hoover, antiregulation), cultural conservatism would define itself in terms of what it stood for against the forces of the Left.26 It would promote, for instance, conservative ideas of environmental stewardship and philanthropy to the poor because it recognized these ideas as part of a longstanding Western tradition.27 This shift would produce a deeper understanding of conservatism by finding ways to affirm those values it had inherited.28

Cultural conservatives, according to Weyrich advisor William S. Lind, "seek to conserve traditional Western culture" because it "is functionally true"; that is, "it is necessary if our society is to be successful, in terms of what it provides its citizens."29 They believe in a necessary, unbreakable, and causal relationship between traditional Western, Judeo-Christian values, definitions of right and wrong, ways of thinking and ways of living ... and the secular success of Western societies: their prosperity, their liberties, and the opportunities they offer their citizens to lead fulfilling, rewarding lives. If the former are abandoned, the latter will be lost. The essence of cultural conservatism can be reduced further, to a single phrase: traditional values are functional values. If we want a society where things work—where students learn in schools, where products are competitive, where our homes and our persons are safe from crime, etc.—we must, as a society, follow traditional Western values.40

Functionality carries five meanings, according to Michael Schwartz, an FCF vice president. First, what is functionally true for society is not the market but culture. Secondly, if cultural values are functionally true, cultural conservatives do not need to convince people that they are good, but only that empirically they work. Moreover, functional values lead to coalition building because everyone wants a society that works. Functionality also allows the Right to appropriate the ideas of government; for instance, FCF recommendations would increase the federal regulation of institutions, while reassigning some federal functions to individuals. For instance, FCF recommendations that the federal government require public schools to teach the basics, those students and teachers, and impose discipline, while at the same time that it legalize school choice, which would give parents tax vouchers to pay for the education of their children in private, religious, or public schools.

Breaking the Liberal Monopoly of Higher Education

To break what they perceived as the liberal monopoly of higher education, conservatives needed to establish a cultural presence in the conservative policy-oriented think tanks and also a conservative presence in the liberalized academic institutions. T. Kenneth Cribb, president of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI), which promotes cultural conservatism to students and faculty, put it astutely in a lecture to the Heritage Foundation:

We must thus provide resources and guidance to an elite which can take up anew the task of enculturation. Through its journals, lectures, seminars, books, and fellowships, this is what ISI has done successfully for thirty-six years. The coming of age of such elites has provided the current leadership of the conservative revival. But we should add a major new component to our strategy: the conservative movement is now mature enough to establish a contemporary presence for conservatism on campus, and contest the Left on its own turf. We plan to do this by greatly expanding the ISI field effort, its network of campus-based programming.46

Conservatives realized that the move would not succeed if they used outsiders to force change upon an academy whose independence from external political interference is traditionally acknowledged (though not always observed in practice) in this country. Rather, the move had to occur both within and against the academy. The organization initially most successful in moving the attack into the academy is the Madison Center for Educational Affairs (MCEA), formed from a 1990 merger of the Institute for Educational Affairs (IEA) and the Madison Center.47 It has achieved success largely through its Student Journalism Program, which sponsors the Collegiate Network of seventy conservative student newspapers on sixty-six campuses across the country. "With a combined circulation of more than 600,000," the MCEA writes, "Collegiate Network publications remain the most
potent catalyst for debate on college campuses." In this assessment, it is correct. Most of the well-known debates on race, gender, sexuality, and leftism in the academy were catalyzed by these newspapers, as the particularly virulent example of the *Dartmouth Review* attests. Less known, however, is that most of the newspapers have published curriculum surveys, the first appearing in the *Brown Spectator*, *Harvard Salient*, *Dartmouth Review*, and *Federalist Paper* (Columbia) in 1988, and have attacked curricular innovations, such as the University of Texas composition course.50

Generously supporting the Collegiate Network, MCEA makes direct grants to the newspapers (nearly $200,000 in 1991); provides editorial and technical assistance; maintains a toll-free hotline for advice; publishes *Newlink*, a monthly newsletter; distributes free of charge the publications of CN Friends, a group of more than eighty conservative policy organizations and magazines (including the Heritage Foundation, *National Review, American Spectator*, and *American Conservative*); gives monthly cash awards for student writing; holds regional conferences for newspaper staffs; distributes free of charge the "book of the month" (past books include Sykes's *Hollow Men*, D'Souza's *Illiberal Education*, and Chester L. Finn, It's We Must Take Charge); and makes referrals to the Washington Legal Center and the Center for Individual Rights (on CIR, see below). Through another program, Editorial Internships, it provides summer, semester, and year-long internships for college students at federal offices (NEH, Department of Commerce, Office of the Vice President), conservative organizations (Bradley Foundation, Freedom House), and conservative publications (New Republic, National Interest, Public Interest, *Aca­demic Questions, Policy Review*).

Fueling the attack, MCEA publishes the *Common Sense Guide to American Colleges*, which evaluates the academic and political climate at colleges and universities. Its questionnaires ask administrators, faculty, and students specifically about aggressive affirmative action programs, need-blind admissions and need-based scholarships, abortion counseling, special-interest organizations ("women, Asian, homosexual, etc."), campus controversy about Eurocentrism, opposition to a core curriculum, "courses used for political indoctrination," speech and behavior codes, and "an ideologically diverse mix of speakers." The slant, highlighting issues provocative to conservatives, is more apparent in the faculty and student questionnaires, perhaps because they are mailed to NAS members and conservative student-newspaper staffs, than in the content of the questionnaires themselves.

Finally, MCEA provides grants to scholars working on books—among them, D'Souza for *Illiberal Education* and a new book on "the political, moral, and cultural contributions of Western civilization"; Paul Hollander for a book on "the sources of disillusionment with Communist systems"; and Tamara Iacoby for a book on "American race relations" (see note 7). MCEA's interest in "race relations" informs its Diversity Program, which holds national meetings for minority students, featuring such speakers as Clarence Thomas and Linda Chavez, formerly of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and publishes *Diversity: A Criti­cal Journal of Race and Culture*, a quarterly magazine written "for people who don't remember the 60's." Diversity and the Collegiate Network newspapers re­formulate and circulate the vanguard-movement issues that FCF believes conservatives must appropriate.

The roster of MCEA associates suggests how movement reticulation is used to bring cultural conservatism into the academy. The founders, officers, and board members all are affiliated with other right-wing organizations. Long-time IEA president Leslie Lenkowsky is now president of the Hudson Institute (a right-wing think tank) and an NAS member. Madison Center founder William J. Bennett was the NEH chairman, is a fellow at the Hudson Institute and the Heritage Foundation, and recently was appointed the chairman of National Empowerment Television, a Free Congress Foundation project. The Madison Center's first president, John Agresto, and MCEA's first president, Chester Finn, are NAS members and former Bennett associates respectively at the NEH and the Department of Education. With such reticulation across right-wing organizations and the federal government, it is no surprise that then NEH Chairman Cheney wrote a feature article, "Depoliticizing the Academy," for *Newlink* (the Collegiate Network's newsletter), provided summer internships at the NEH, and spoke at MCEA conferences. Board members are similarly affiliated: John Bunzel (Hoover Institution and NAS member), T. Kenneth Cribb (president of ISI), Irving Kristol (NAS member and see note 3), Harvey Mansfield, Jr. (NAS member and NEH National Council member; see below), and Jeremiah Milbank (JM Foundation). MCEA associates, together with representatives from other right-wing organizations, serve on the advisory boards of Collegiate Network newspapers. The *Dartmouth Review* advisory board—which includes Martin Anderson (Hoover Institution), Patrick Buchanan, William Lind (FCF), William Rusher (National Review), R. Emmett Tyrrell (American Spectator), and the "Old Right" intellectuals M. E. Bradford, George Gilder, and Russell Kirk—is more illustrious than most, but even the *Fenwick Review* (College of the Holy Cross) advisory board includes Buchanan, Rusher, D'Souza, and Michael Novak (AEI). Though newspapers lacking advisory boards do not lack supporters; the *Wake Forest Critic* gives special thanks to MCEA, Joseph A. Shea, Jr. (Center for Individual Rights; see below), and the Heritage Foundation.

The attack on the academy from without and within is only half of the strategy to break what conservatives believe is a liberal monopoly of higher education. The immediate goal is to transform the higher-education system into a free-market economy by weakening liberal institutions and strengthening conservative ones. These moves are supposed to work together to create a marketplace of competing institutions—public and private, Christian and secular, conservative and liberal. If all institutions are placed in a market economy, their viability can be determined by those who, through their individual choices, can reorient the market. That conservatives have reasonable hopes of creating and reorienting the market is expressed by Michael P. McDonald, president of the Center for Individual
Rights (see below). He is opposed to litigation requiring academic institutions to be hostile to a diversity of opinion on their campuses because a sounder view would emphasize not the diversity within each institution but the diversity among them. The goal should be to maximize the range of choices, particularly with regard to educational mission. Instead of having courts superintend higher education, we should rely on contractual remedies and informed individual choice to safeguard against political zealotry and oppression. A private university with a reputation for and a record of intolerance will not for long retain good scholars—or motivated students. Administrators and faculty at the diminishing number of institutions that value traditional scholarship should concentrate on building and preserving their academic programs, not on opening them up to every passing fad. The simple exhortation to "build and preserve" and keep the courts at bay may sound harsh to the victims of PC zealotry. But the Supreme Court and Congress have already breached the walls of institutional academic freedom in cases involving claims of racial discrimination and sexual harassment. By doing so, they have opened a Pandora's Box of litigation; any academic who is denied an appointment or a promotion or tenure—and who happens to be female or a minority—can march into court with a prima facie legal case.36

The obvious rationale against litigation to achieve a stronger conservative presence on campuses—that it is a double-edge sword—is not the one I want to emphasize. Rather, the implicit rationale informing McDonald's position is that conservatives can use the free-market economic model as a strategy for seizing at least some means of cultural production and then competing effectively in that market. How will they do so? On one hand, they will "build and preserve" conservative institutions, as McDonald suggests, and, on the other hand, they will weaken liberal ones. Already, as education activists, they have won seats on school and university boards, pressured textbook publishers, and formed groups (i.e., Accuracy in Academe) that monitor education in order to make its content more conservative. As education lobbyists, they promote school-choice legislation in order to shift the decision-point for funding education from the federal government, which has refused to support private and religious schools, to parents, who would be free to do so. Their claim that not only conservatives but also inner-city minorities would be to depopulate and thereby defund public schools. While higher-education funding is a more complicated situation, a number of conservative proposals—such as reducing student aid, prohibiting minority scholarships, permitting competitive accreditations, and awarding federal funding to conservative institutions—would weaken the liberalizing trends in the academy and redirect resources to conservative institutions. Such projects, I will argue next, are products of the same right-wing apparatus that produced the PC debate.

III. The Right-Wing Apparatus

Given its agenda for cultural conservatism and its free-market strategy, we should see conservatism not merely as a reticulated movement, but as a massive apparatus consisting of several institutional systems variously articulated to produce cultural change. The systems, which I review next, are think tanks, training programs, foundations, grassroots organizations, and legal centers.

The Think-Tank System

While some conservative think tanks existed before 1975, notably the Hoover Institution (1919), the American Enterprise Institute (1943), and the Heritage Foundation (1973), dozens of national ones were established by the mid-1980s and have been augmented in recent years by some fifty-five state-level think tanks. The state think tanks, regional legal centers, and National Rifle Association belong to the Madison Group, which was launched by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), an organization of 2,400 conservative state officeholders that "hopes to wrest control of state government from what it sees as Leftist domination."37 Although state think tanks vary in their projects, they strongly support free-market enterprise and privatization of everything from education to garbage. Modeled on the Heritage Foundation (which holds annual training meetings for state policy activists), the state think tanks aggressively market their policy recommendations and themselves to state governments (for Heritage marketing, see below).38

National think tanks were originally conceived as "planning and advisory institutions" on government policy that would influence "the nation's formal political processes,"39 by publishing policy studies, holding seminars for political and business leaders, and banking the resumes of potential conservative appointees to government and judicial positions. The most influential ones during the Reagan and Bush administrations were AEI and Heritage. In 1983, for instance, AEI "had 176 people on staff, ninety adjunct scholars, and a budget of $12.6 million. Thirty-four people from AEI were named to administration posts,"40 and, more important, their ideas were being turned into policy.41 Heritage had "a staff of 105, a budget of $10.5 million, and thirty-six of its people had been appointed to administration jobs."42 The traffic also has flowed the other way, with Reagan administration officials becoming think-tank staff and fellows. Among the Distinguished Fellows now at Heritage are Richard V. Allen, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; William J. Bennett, former NEH Chairman and Secretary of Education; and Edwin Meese III, former Attorney General.43

Although AEI subsequently was defunded and retrenched because its right-wing backers judged it too centrist,44 Heritage has continued to expand. In 1991, it had 145 people on staff, 22 fellows and scholars, more than 50 adjunct scholars, and a budget of $19.3 million,45 which is remarkable for its wide base of support: 50 percent of its income was contributed by 170,000 individual donors solicited through direct mail, 25 percent by foundations, and 13 percent by corporations, with the remaining 12 percent derived from investments and sales. Among the foundations supporting Heritage (as well as other right-wing organizations) are Lynde and Harry Bradley, Adolph Coors, Samuel Roberts Noble, John H. Olin, Reader's Digest, and Sara Scaife.46
To produce and distribute its ideas, Heritage draws on the experts listed in The Annual Guide to Public Policy Experts and its own nearly 200 publications a year. In 1990, the Annual Guide listed "1,500 conservative scholars whose expertise was catalogued in 70 subfields," and in 1992 it listed 2,000 scholars whose expertise was catalogued in 77 subfields. Beginning in 1993, the Annual Guide will be available on CD-ROM, and all Heritage publications will be available on a subscription computer network. As these numbers suggest, Heritage has been as effective in distributing as in producing its ideas. Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., president of the Heritage Foundation, explains: "We don't just stress credibility. . . . We stress an efficient, effective delivery system. Production is one side; marketing is equally important." The delivery system consists of four marketing divisions; Public Relations markets ideas to the media and the public; Government Relations to Congress, the Executive branch, and government agencies; Academic Relations to the university community, Resource Bank institutions (including state think tanks), and the international conservative network; and Corporate Relations to businesses and trades. Division marketing is coordinated at twice-weekly meetings of the senior management, but policy research drives the marketing process.

How the marketing works, according to Blumenthal's research, is that "every congressional staffer is in the Heritage computer. So are about 3,500 journalists, organized by specialty. Every Heritage study goes out with a synopsis to those who might be interested; every study is turned into a news clip, distributed by the Heritage Features Syndicate to newspapers that publish them." The goal is to get the message to the media and the public, who, in turn, get it to policymakers. Feulner's comments are not fanciful capitalist rhetoric. Through the Heritage marketing model, adopted by other organizations, the Right has deployed, in the cultural arena, "bombs and bucks" (i.e., foreign and economic policy), it launched several cultural projects in the late 1980s at the behest (and through the funding) of conservative foundations that it should pay attention to the breakdown of families, communities, and values. These projects include the Bradley Scholars, the Conservative Curriculum, the Salvatori Center for Academic Leadership, and the Cultural Policy Studies Program. The purpose of the latter project is "to bring cultural issues into the mainstream of political debate, and to articulate the traditional values that should more fully influence American culture." William J. Bennett, recently named Distinguished Fellow in Cultural Policy Studies, is "examining how federal policies and programs affect American culture, and, in turn, how American culture affects federal policies and programs." The members of its bimonthly Working Group represent other conservative organizations: think tanks (AEI, Hudson Institute, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Center for Educational Policy), media (Media Research Center, WABC Radio, National Review), grass roots organizations (Eagle Forum, Citizens Democracy Corps, Traditional Values Coalition [TVC]), and the federal government (staff from the offices of former Vice President Dan Quayle, Senator Jesse Helms, Representative William Dannemeyer, and HHS). The Working Group provided the former vice president with resource materials on Murphy Brown's single motherhood and the Los Angeles riots, helped to raise the congressional debate on speech codes on campus, and, through the TVC, was instrumental in Justice Clarence Thomas's confirmation. The structure and work of the Cultural Policy Studies Program indicate that Heritage has applied its research-and-marketing advocacy model in the cultural arena.
This brief summary shows that cultural conservatives have used think tanks to produce the "expert" knowledge they could not generate from within the academy. They have done so by conflating "expertise" as pertains to knowledge produced by scholarly methods and "expertise" as pertains to the aura of authority surrounding those who produce this knowledge. In this way, the think tanks have constituted an "academicized" aura of authority upon which conservatives have capitalized to advance their political agenda. In actuality, as one writer remarks, most national think tanks grew from "the ideological combat and policy confusion of the past two decades" and "are geared toward political activism and propaganda, rather than toward scholarship," but they market their ideas through a scholarly apparatus of journals and seminars as if they were the products of scholarship. The result is not merely the misrepresentation of think-tank knowledge as scholarly knowledge but also a deterioration in the value of academic disciplines. Peter Weingart explains that when "scientific" knowledge is produced in these other institutions, science loses "a common frame of value-orientations and beliefs as well as a common basis of interests among scientific and technical experts. Their involvement in politics, which has been interpreted as a 'scientification' of politics, turns out to be the 'politicization' of [academic] science at the same time. The professional status of [academic] science with its sharp delineation from other social institutions, its self-governance with respect to quality standards, criteria of relevance and a code of ethics becomes subject to political conflicts." Although Weingart stresses the changes to academic science (the erosion of its self-governance and in turn its standards), I wish to stress the changes in the economy of knowledge production. When "scientific knowledge," which has been produced by academic institutions, also seems to be produced by think tanks, the likely result is competition among "scientific" knowledges in policy-making and public arenas. Since science is generally regarded as having great authority, the competing "scientific" knowledges are likely to be readily consumed by policymakers and other publics without much critical analysis to differentiate them.

Although think tanks can be used to break the academic monopoly on the production of "expert" knowledge, they do not have the capacity to produce the "experts" themselves. Indeed, when Patrick Buchanan recommended establishing the Heritage Foundation, he argued in a 1972 memo to President Nixon "that the most pressing need" for conservatives "was to create a new cadre of Republican governmental professionals who can survive this Administration and be prepared to take over future ones." As Buchanan saw it, one of the main difficulties was "credentiaлиз." Think tanks do not produce "experts" because they do not control the training and credentialing practices that early in this century moved within the purview of the higher-education system. Consequently, conservatives have appropriated these practices by establishing training institutes.

The Training-Program System

Next, I will discuss two training institutes, the Leadership Institute and the National Journalism Center, that overlap in their ideologies, goals, and programs.

The purpose of the Leadership Institute (LI), founded by Morton Blackwell in 1979, is to increase the number and effectiveness of conservative activists, which it does through nine schools that offer training programs in youth leadership, grass roots organizing, organizational leadership, direct-mail fundraising and mobilization, preparation for the Foreign Service examination, Capitol Hill staffing, legislative management, broadcast journalism, and student publications. Notice that four schools train conservatives for the movement and five train them for the professions. LI pursues the double strategy of strengthening the conservative movement by putting professionals into it and weakening the liberal professions by putting conservatives into them. This strategy is reflected in its recruitment of students through conservative organizations and publications and its Job and Talent Bank that places "philosophically sound, technically proficient" conservatives in public-policy positions. Can the strategy succeed? LI offered thirty-three training programs in 1992 and graduated a record 1,002 students in 1991, for a total of 3,950 from 1987 through 1991. Its 1990 estimated income was $1,116,180, and its wide base of support resembles that of the Heritage Foundation: sixty-one percent of its income is from individual donors, twenty-five percent from foundations, seven percent from restricted contributions that of the Heritage Foundation: sixty-one percent of its income is from individual donors, twenty-five percent from foundations, seven percent from restricted contributions, and the remaining seven percent from school income and interest.

The purpose of the National Journalism Center (NJC), founded in 1976-77 under the auspices of the Education and Research Institute (ERI), is to "help talented young people break into the media." NJC, which believes that media training should occur "within the framework of traditional educational values," provides six weeks of training in journalism and "common-sense economics" (students write weekly "spot news" stories, attend Friday seminars, and complete a magazine story), followed by six-week internships at NJC's four dozen outlets. The program is designed to correct what NJC sees as the liberal bias of journalism as it is taught in universities and practiced in the media, and to supply college graduates with the experience they lack when they apply for entry-level journalism jobs. Offering the program four times a year to a total of sixty to eighty students, NJC estimated in 1990 that "500 of our alumni are working in media and media-related posts in AIR, ABC, CBS, CNN, C-SPAN, Copley News Service, the Washington Post, Washington Times, Wall Street Journal, Detroit News, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Seattle Times, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Phoenix Gazette, a number of magazines, and virtually every conservative periodical."

The Internal Revenue Service has granted these two institutes the tax-exempt status of educational organizations. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code allows exemption to "corporations and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes" and denies exemption to organizations in which "a substantial part of the activities" consists of "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation" or "participating in, or intervening in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office." An organization not operated exclusively for tax-exempt purposes and engaging in the proscribed activities is termed an "action" organization, whether, for instance, it attempts itself to influence legislation or "urges the public to contact, members of a legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation," or even "advocates the adoption or rejection of legislation." The term "legislation" includes action by Congress, state legislatures, local councils, and public referendum, initiative, constitutional amendment, or a similar procedure.

While claiming to be nonpartisan in that they support no parties, candidates, or legislation, LI and NIC are not nonpolitical. Their political work is not, insofar as I have observed, to directly influence legislation and elections but rather to influence those who mediate these processes—the media, political organizers and activists, and conservative citizens. For instance, in a direct-mail letter asking for a tax-deductible contribution to LI, Representative Dick Armey plays on conservative fears about the liberal media and professionalizing practices in journalism:

"...While you read this letter, left-wing journalism professors are preparing their new crop of media radicals. ...College journalism departments in every single state graduate a steady stream of young left-wingers. And send them out to manage the news. ...Upon graduation, these young liberals move to professional journalism. That's how they perpetuate the Left's dominance of the media."

By contrast, LI, he writes, "trains young conservative activists to lead the fight against big media liberal bias on and off campus." In other words, LI's function is to produce conservative activists who will influence the media and through them influence political processes. While one might argue that Representative Armey's rhetoric may not reflect LI's practice, my observation of LI's Broadcast Journalism School suggests that it does.

In practice, the Broadcast Journalism School insisted on the liberal bias of mainstream media and the need to counter it. The book, one third of the readings packet, and some of the handouts given to the students asserted only one point of view—that the media have a liberal bias. While the term "bias" appeared in the title of only one of the sessions, the presenters in several sessions promoted this point of view. For instance, in the "Interviewing" session, Tim Goeglein, Press Secretary to Senator Dan Coats, explained that media bias occurs not because liberals get together and decide how to run the country, but rather because the kind of people the media attract—those from broken homes and with social problems—have liberal interests. When a student asked whether conservatives are trying to change media coverage or trying to change the profession, Goeglein replied that if you do the second, the first will follow.

Video newscasts shown at the school were used to reinforce the claim of media bias rather than to critically evaluate it. For instance, Brent Baker, Executive Director of the Media Research Center, showed a newscast on the Earth Summit in Rio and argued that it represented only one point of view. Most scientists, he asserted without any supporting evidence, do not believe that increased levels of CO₂ are caused by environmental pollution; rather they believe that increased CO₂ is occurring naturally and that the resulting warmup has some good consequences, such as extending the growing season in Alaska. "Fair and balanced" news coverage, he argued, would report that liberal environmentalists have one opinion concerning the effects of CO₂ and scientists have another. His argument rests on a rhetorical slippage: it implicitly portrays liberal environmentalists as political activists who have opinions and pits them against scientists who have facts. This argument not only is partial in that it fails to present full and fair coverage of the positions and the facts pertinent to them, but also is part of the depoliticization strategy pursued by LI and NIC (see below).

While "fair and balanced coverage" is a phrase I heard frequently at the Broadcast Journalism School, it did not characterize the session on "Office Politics" conducted by Amy Noble, Special Projects Manager at the Federal News Service. Her session consisted almost entirely of a role-playing exercise. Giving the students a script from a McLaughlin show on the Webster case, Noble had them play out conservative strategies that local news teams might use in responding to the pro-choice position. The strategies—defending the pro-life position, attacking the pro-choice position, etc.—all asserted the pro-life position. Missing were "fair and balanced coverage" and critical analysis of both positions, so that in actuality the exercise was political, not educational, training.

My observation of the NIC's Friday seminar on "common-sense economics" reporting confirms this institute's similarly conservative political practice. While NIC staff stress that reporting should deliver accurate, balanced, and complete information, the seminar I attended belied this standard. Jeff Tucker, associate editor of the Free Market (a newsletter published by the Ludwig Von Mises Institute) and an NIC alumnus, cited poll results (whether actual or fictive, I could not tell) on the "fairness" of wage-and-price decisions: e.g., in response to the question, "Is it fair for vendors to raise flower prices on a holiday?" he reported that sixty percent of Moscovites and eighty percent of New Yorkers said it was unfair. Ridiculing New Yorkers as more socialist than Moscovites, Tucker's explicit point was to equate liberal and socialist economics, and his implicit point was to convey their inferiority to conservative free-market economics. As the FCE has observed elsewhere, "Liberals have been perceived as people concerned primarily with fairness, with seeing that the fruits of prosperity were shared by all segments of society. Conservatives were seen as those concerned mainly with economic freedom and with increasing the common prosperity by spurring economic growth."

Thus, in the second part of his talk, Tucker asserted that in a free market the price system "equilibrates" consumer desires with what is being produced. "Fairness," he argued, has to do not with pricing decisions that may prevent some consumers from buying products but rather with the freedom of parties to contract on the market. Rhetorically, his appropriation stripped "fairness" of its liberal moral considerations and made it an operating condition of the conservative free-market system. Substantively, his simplistic account of conservative free-market economics was...
unaccompanied by critical analysis or alternative economic models, and student questions, rather than challenging the account, only elicited further elaboration of it. 73

These brief examples suggest that LI and NJC are not primarily educational organizations and should not have tax-exempt status. The Internal Revenue Code stipulates that "an organization may be educational even though it advocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion. On the other hand, an organization is not educational if its principal function is the mere presentation of unsupported opinion."

Army's opinion on left-wing dominance of the media, Baker's opinion on the effects of CO2, and the status of liberal environmentalists, Noble's profile role-playing exercise, Tucker's "common-sense economics," as well as many other instances that could have been cited—all exemplify the presentation of unsupported opinion and the failure to give full and fair exposition that, according to the Internal Revenue Code, disqualify an organization for educational status and tax exemption. LI and NJC are, in actuality, political organizations engaged in political contest. As William Forrest, then an LI vice president put it, "The outcome of political contest over time is determined by the number and effectiveness of the activists on either side. ... To some extent, what we do at this Institute is to try to increase the number and effectiveness of the activists who are conservative."

LI, he added, does what is not done by higher-education institutions; conservatives believe that these institutions serve only certain political views and not others. That's what the fight is about.

LI and NJC are also professionalizing institutions intent on breaking the academic monopoly of professionalization. Paradoxically, they use antiprofessional critique both to attack academic professionalization and to advance their own brand. How do they manage this sleight-of-hand? Speaking at a Friday seminar, Ralph Bennett, senior Washington editor of Reader's Digest, warned NJC students not to think of journalism as a profession; there isn't much about journalism, he explained, that you can't learn during two weeks on the job. As an editor, he is less interested in potential employees' training in a journalism school than in their grounding in literature, history, and the Bible. Without such grounding, he opined, journalists are the slaves of whoever gives them information. 74

Chris Warden, an NJC editor, likewise added that journalism is not a profession but a craft. A profession has a body of knowledge unique to its practice, whereas journalism does not. Aspiring journalists "can learn the techniques, skills, tricks of the trade" easily because they are almost formulaic. What they need is general and common-sense knowledge. 75

The general knowledge, it would seem, is conservative, and the common-sense knowledge is the free-market economics explained by Tucker.

By describing journalism as an easily learned craft and thus depersonalizing it, LI and NJC delegitimize university training (no need for universities to train students in what are only technical skills) and legitimate their own training (superficial skills can be learned in a few weeks). At the same time that they attack academic professionalization, they use their superficial programs to professionalize cadres of young conservatives by giving them credentials to move into the professions. Moreover, their goal of breaking the liberal monopoly of professions articulates to the larger conservative goal of breaking the liberal monopoly of higher education. Such articulation is enabled not only by rhetoric and practices, but also by the flow of money that supports them.

The Foundation System

In the mid-1980s, conservative foundations put their resources behind the shift to cultural and academic change. 76

This shift can be seen by examining recent funding patterns. One way to look at funding patterns is in terms of a range of grantees and grantors. Here is a grantees sampling for 1989 of some of the organizations mentioned in this chapter.

American Spectator: total $24,000—Bradley, $39,000; Coors, $10,000; Noble, $10,000; Olin, $25,000; Scaife, $15,000; Smith Richardson, $45,000

National Review: total $342,000—Bradley, $200,000; Olin, $42,000; Scaife, $100,000

New Criterion: total $245,000—Newhouse, $20,000; Olin, $100,000; Scaife, $125,000

Center for Individual Rights (before MCEA merger): total $55,000—IM, $25,000; Smith Richardson, $20,000; (for 1990): total $65,000—Bradley, $25,000; Olin, $50,000; Smith Richardson, $90,000

Free Congress Foundation: total $710,000—Bradley, $330,000; Coors, $150,000; DeMoss, $90,000; McKenna, $15,000; Noble, $100,000; Olin, $25,000

Institute for Educational Affairs (before MCEA merger): total $811,902—Achelis, $20,000; Bodman, $50,000; Bradley, $18,000; Coors, $12,000; Kirby, $25,000; Olin, $121,402; Ryder, $15,000; Scaife, $60,000; Warner-Lambert, $10,000

Madison Center (before MCEA merger): total $55,000—Bradley, $525,000; Olin, $30,000

Leadership Institute: total $115,000—Bradley, $45,000; Coors, $25,000; Murdock, $45,000

National Association of Scholars: total $612,000—Coors, $10,000; Olin, $125,000; Smith Richardson, $175,000; Scaife, $100,000

National Journalism Center: total $110,000—Coors, $35,000; O'Donnell, $25,000; Olin, $25,000; Reader's Digest, $35,000

National Endowment for the Humanities Jefferson Lecture: total $30,000—Bradley, $15,000; Olin, $15,000

The obvious pattern is that a handful of right-wing foundations—particularly Bradley, Coors, IM, Noble, Olin, Scaife, and Smith Richardson—support those publications and organizations that have been instrumental in the attack on liberalized higher education.

But the grantees are only part of the story. The particular cultural projects funded, Paul Gottfried explains in a book chapter appropriately titled "Funding an Empire," are those that carry out the agenda of foundations controlled by...
Gottfried, himself a traditional conservative, writes:

"Without the administrative staffs of Bradley, Olin, Smith Richardson, and Sara Scaife, there would be no operative agenda of "cultural conservatism" being implemented in New York and Washington. While cultural conservatives—i.e., critics of modern society—would undoubtedly still have a forum, there would be no organized activity for positions that foundation heads have decided to call "cultural conservatism."...

The shaping of cultural conservatism is now bringing economic benefits to political activists who have discovered a market for "values." For example, the head of the Free Congress Foundation, Paul Weyrich, receives hundreds of thousands of dollars annually from the Bradley, Olin, and Roe foundations. In return, Weyrich goes beyond functioning as a mere congressional lobbyist and serves as a spokesman for an activist political agenda based on "Judeo-Christian values." Breaking with the traditional conservative emphasis on limited government, he calls for governmental programs to promote cultural conservatism across the country.105

Gottfried adds, "In their own view, neconservatives and their allies have seized foundations to influence culture and in turn shape politics. Observing the Left's march, producing official positions on educational, religious, and aesthetic questions, the Olin Foundation has generously funded conservative academic projects—for instance, conservative institutes (e.g., the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University, the Center for the Study of Social and Political Change at Smith College, and the Olin Center for Inquiry into the Theology of Work), a more comprehensive listing: Boston University, $817,352 (some to Peter L. Berger); George Mason University, $558,502 (some to James C. Miller III and Walter L. Williams); Harvard University, $1,261,745 (some to Harvey Mansfield and Samuel P. Huntington); Yale University, $2,118,598 as four three-year grants; University of Chicago, $1,495,914 (some to Allan Bloom); Stanford University, $1,190,533; and University of Rochester, $2,583,000 as a seven-year grant. 106

To cite a longitudinal example, "between 1986 and 1989," Allan Bloom, neconservative with these academic projects have trained, or otherwise supported, many of those making the well-supported claim that the neoconservative professors associated with these academic projects have trained, or otherwise supported, many of those...

Moreover, detailing the "sumptuous lifestyle" enjoyed by recipients of foundation largesse, he points out that "neoconservative academics endowed by the four sisters [Bradley, Olin, Scaife, Smith Richardson] complain of their suffering at the hands of left-wing faculties, but few humanities scholars on the Left dispose of comparable financial resources. There can be no doubt that the widely published socialist scholar Judith Shklar received less financial support in the late eighties than her neoconservative colleagues in the same political science department at Harvard."109

A third way to look at funding patterns is in terms of the range of grantees to one grantee. Significant annual donors to the Heritage Foundation are classified in two categories: Associates, who give an annual gift of $10,000 or more, and Founders, who give an annual gift of $100,000 or more. For 1991, its 141 Associates include: corporations (Abbott, Amway, Ashland Oil, Bristol-Myers, Chase Manhattan Bank, Chevron, Dow, DuPont, Exxon, Ford, General Motors, Johnson and Johnson, Lilly, Lockheed, Mobil, Nestle, Pfizer, Philip Morris, Procter & Gamble, Quaker Oats, RIR Nabisco, Sears, Sears Roebuck, Squibb, Winn-Dixie Stores); corporate foundations (Alcoa, Amoco, FMC, GE, Hilton, Merck, Sunbank, UPS); other foundations (Anschutz, Brady, Gerstacker, JM, Kirby, Lauder, Lennnon, Martin, McKenna, Pope, Taylor, Van Andel, Walker); and many individuals. For 1991, its twenty-five Founders included the usual right-wing foundations (Bradley, Coors, Noble, Olin, Pew, Reader's Digest, Scaife), as well as individuals and corporations associated with them. Donations from Coors, for instance, came from the Adolph Coors Company, the Adolph Coors Foundation, Mr. Joseph Coors, and Mrs. Holland Coors.110

Finally, funding patterns are telling in terms of the academic programs they support, such as two new ones at Heritage. The Bradley Resident Scholars Program, funded by the Bradley Foundation and established in 1987, brings young scholars who are "fully committed to an academic career" to Heritage "for periods of from five to ten months to conduct research, teach seminars, deliver public lectures, and learn firsthand about the policy process." They are usually selected from those working in the social sciences and humanities because the program "has a special interest in research on American political, social, and cultural institutions and the relationship of these to politics."

A 1991-92 Bradley Scholar, Laurence Jarvik, launched the conservative campaign to privatize public television not only through Heritage lectures and papers but also through Comint: Journal of the Committee on Media Integrity, a quarterly newsletter published by the right-wing Center for the Study of Popular Culture in Los Angeles, which, under the direction of David Horowitz and Peter Collier, also promulgates its ideas through monographs and Heterodoxy, the new right-wing scandal-sheet attacking the academy. The Center is supported by the Bradley, JM, Olin, and Scaife foundations, as well as the National Association of Scholars, one of whose most vocal members, Christina Hoff Sommers, serves on the editorial board of Comint and contributes to Heterodoxy.112
The purpose of the Salvatori Center for Academic Leadership, established in 1991 through a five-year $1 million grant from the Henry Salvatori Foundation, is to train conservatives as academic leaders. The Center selects "twenty-five young faculty and doctoral candidates in the social sciences and the humanities" to be Salvatori Fellows for two years. They participate in a summer colloquium and a spring Leadership Conference, which brings together "scholars, administrators, and leaders of organizations working for the renewal of American higher education." Through such training, the leaders are expected to define the issues that, according to conservatives, higher education needs to address.

To define higher-education issues, Heritage employs the inside/outside strategy of raising the debate in academic venues, such as *Academic Questions* (the NAS journal) and its own Leadership Conference, and also through journalists and legislators. Among the issues Heritage is defining are those listed in the Salvatori Center's Statement of Purpose: "the wholesale abandonment of our Western heritage," "the attack on standards today ... from the 'tenured radicals' on the faculty," and "those principles of free enterprise, of civil and religious liberty, and of human excellence that have lifted America to its present eminence." The Leadership Conference held in March 1992 featured, among others, Professors Abraham Miller, Peter Shaw, and Alan Gribben (all NAS members) on a panel titled "PC vs. Academic Freedom: Do Universities Know the Difference?"; and Edwin Meese III, Hadley Arkes (a Heritage Bradley Resident Scholar), and Michael Greve (Executive Director, Center for Individual Rights) on another titled "PC and Civil Liberties: Is Litigation the Answer?"

Increasingly using the conservative legal centers that have sprung up across the country, conservatives are turning to the courts to change higher education. For instance, the Center for Individual Rights (CIR) was founded in 1989 by two former staff members of the conservative Washington Legal Foundation: Michael P. McDonald, CIR's president, and Michael S. Greve, its executive director. It differs from the Washington Legal Foundation, the Landmark Foundation, and other conservative legal centers by specializing in academic cases and entering them in the early stages rather than at the appeals level. By the time a case reaches the appeals level, Joseph A. Shea, Jr., a CIR counsel explained, it is "set"; the case has been crafted and the mistakes made. CIR, by contrast, helps to resolve a case before it reaches litigation or to craft it for litigation. To that end, it advises its clients on the rules of evidence and how to frame a case so that it can "get to the truth." The second is to respond to all accusations; confront all accusers, get the accusations in writing, and appear on talk shows so the public can see the accused as a person with an opinion. The third rule is to document everything, thereby preparing to go to court even if the case is unlikely to end up there.

CIR focuses on academic cases where university administrators or influential department members are hostile to conservative faculty perspectives or to conservative student organizations, views, and acts. Most of its clients, according to Greve, CIR's executive director, are "live white males" targeted by the Left as politically incorrect, and many have been referred by the NAS and MCEA. Perhaps best known are two of the cases the CIR has won: *Levin v. Harleston*, in which Professor Michael Levin, an NAS member who has published "articles suggesting
that blacks, on average, are less intelligent than whites," sued City College for creating a "shadow section" to steer students away from his course; and *Wide Awake v. University of Virginia*, which challenged the University of Virginia's refusal to allow student activity fees to fund a religious magazine.

But more important for understanding CIR's activism are cases settled out of court. Among the faculty cases cited by Shea is a professor at the University of Alaska who was criticized as racist for observing in a public speech that she was under equity pressure to graduate unqualified Native American students. The CIR newsletter explains it this way. When "someone, somewhere, filed a Title VI civil rights complaint" against the professor with the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), the CIR argued that the professor's "utterance constituted pure speech that could not possibly give rise to a Title VI violation," but OCR investigated the complaint. "Only after a lot of undignified foot-stomping and the usual threat of a lawsuit on our [CIR's] part, OCR concluded that an 'exchange of views' addressing issues of race or discrimination was not a violation of federal civil rights laws. Due to our vociferous protests, OCR reached this difficult conclusion in a mere twelve weeks." Among the student cases is a conservative student group at Portland State University that refused membership to a lesbian-feminist student, who with her friends attended meetings and, according to Shea, attempted to "overwhelm the membership and change the group."

When the group refused membership to the student, she charged it with discrimination and the university, according to CIR, threatened to deregister and defund it. CIR and a "cooperating attorney" took up the case: "For several months, the University refused to budge, and we were looking forward to bringing [sic] this matter to the attention of a federal court. Regrettably, we never got a chance; after mulling things over, University officials and the State AG [Attorney General] got round heels and keeled over. We take them any way we get them." She was frank about litigation: "Court is not something to be avoided; it may be the forum where truth comes out. Remember that academic 'goons' (repressors on campus) don't respond well to attorneys, who don't take facile answers. Remember, too, that educators and administrators are loath to get on the stand; when they do, they tend to give convoluted answers rather than factual ones." He returned to this point at a later date: "When you put some of these people on a witness stand and you ask questions for as long as you want to and you can demand truthful answers (or the witness goes to jail for contempt), that is a very enlightening experience for all involved." As his comments and the CIR's newsletter suggest, both litigation and its threat are powerful weapons, though differently so. The threat of litigation is a powerful weapon for a university's out-of-court settlement with a CIR client because universities are reluctant to incur the costs of litigation. But the threat is even greater in the courtroom because there the attorney, not the administrator, knows how to speak the authorized discourse of simple, factual "truth" and thereby is able to strip the university of its authority to explain what are complex academic matters. The de-authorization of the university that would occur in a CIR-type case where a court rules for a plaintiff alleging discrimination would seem to contradict the authorization of the university that has occurred in numerous cases where courts ruled against plaintiffs alleging discrimination against a class (i.e., of women). In the former, a court would find that the university has discriminated against an individual; in the latter, the courts have found that the university, as a decentralized aggregation of departments, by definition could not discriminate against a class. While the two situations appear to be essentially different, what actually happens is similar. In both, the authority of the court, whether denying or affirming the university's position, supersedes the authority of the university and does so by failing to come to grips with the complexity of academic process.

The CIR has an annual income of $450,000, mostly supplied by the Bradley, JM, Olin, Scaife, Smith Richardson, and Wiegand foundations, and a staff of five. However, its reach is more extensive than its budget suggests, because it arranges for attorneys, many from prestigious law firms, to represent its clients on a pro bono basis and obtains amicus curiae briefs from prominent organizations, such as the American Association of University Professors and the New York Civil Liberties Union. The CIR strategy of establishing judicial precedents for cultural conservatism is likely to be successful in a federal court system now packed with Reagan and Bush appointees.

To cite one more example of the conservative use of regulation to leverage change on liberalized higher education, then Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander, with the help of conservative appointees to his National Advisory Committee on Accreditation (in particular NAS members Christina Hoff Sommers and Martin Trow), attacked the diversity standards of the Middle States Association. Alexander recommended that Middle States be de-authorized, that accrediting agencies be federally regulated, that credentialing be provided by a number of competitive agencies from which institutions may choose, and that institutional eligibility for federal student aid not be contingent upon accreditation. When Middle States agreed under pressure to make diversity standards optional for institutions, some commentators saw this "compromise" as the beginning of a federalization of peer accreditation. In light of cultural conservatism's agenda, the attempt to reconstruct higher education through judicial precedent and government regulation must be seen not as responses to left-wing political correctness but as steps in the implementation of the right-wing agenda.
work student newspaper) when it stole and quoted from private correspon-
dence of gay students. Next he was an editor of Prospect, a magazine funded by
servative Princeton alumni, when it attacked women's studies and described
ce of gay students. Next he was an editor of
![Graph](image.png)

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**IV. The Future of Cultural Conservatism**

My field research in conservative organizations indicates that the Right will intensify its attack on liberalized higher education in three areas. It will continue to manufacture conservative victim stories, such as those that have already appeared in NAS publications, the Collegiate Network newspapers, *Heterodoxy,* and the columns of conservative journalists. From print, the stories will progress to legal cen-
ters and conservative courts, not only constituting a media reality but also chang-
ing case law and thereby relocating some of the academy's authority over academic matters in judicial and governmental institutions.

Moreover, the Right will attempt to revert liberalized curricula to conservative ones. Besides the Collegiate Network newspapers' curriculum surveys and the Heritage Foundation's "Conservative Curriculum" program, conservatives have launched several projects, including a curriculum study undertaken, according to President Balch, by the NAS research division; attacks on liberalized curricula published in Academic Questions and traditional journals, which in turn can be used to (re)constitute individuals as subjects and agents of a conservative society.
Town Hall, a national computer subscription network established jointly by the National Review and the Heritage Foundation, which links individuals and groups through such features as news bulletins, discussions, and on-line publications; and (3) National Empowerment Television (NET), aired by the Free Congress Foundation to some sixty state affiliates and currently broadcasting four monthly programs—"Family Forum Live" on family-values issues, "Campus Connection" on higher-education issues, "A Second Look Live" on African-American issues, and "Empowerment Outreach" on conservative issues. The local groups and national technologies are the conservative infrastructure for performing those horizontal articulatory practices that early feminists performed in consciousness-raising groups, where, by sharing their experiences and feelings, they bound themselves together in sisterhood. Through horizontal practices, the Right can (re)constitute both traditional conservatives and newly targeted populations as grassroots agents of conservative change, thereby doing two things necessary to sustain the movement. It will be able to diffuse conservative consciousness more widely throughout society, and it will be in a position to make wide-ranging interventions. For instance, it will be able to lobby state legislatures, alumni, and interested local publics on the failings of particular universities and colleges, thereby using these groups to leverage changes on the institutions by withholding funds from them and demanding their further regulation.

The continued success of conservatives in attacking and reforming liberalized higher education depends upon their ability to gain more control over all aspects of the higher-education system—universities and colleges, academic publishing, public and private academic funding sources, state and federal government. The signs that they have gained some control at the national level have been scattered and ominous. The appointment of Carol Iannone, who joined Lynne Cheney, son International Center; the firing of NEA chair John Frohnmayer and the appointment of NEA acting chair Anne-Imelda Radice, who rejected projects recommended for funding by peer-panels; the recent appointments of several NAS members to the NEH National Council; the appointment of conservatives to the board of IPSE; the appointments of Carol Iannone Reid Wallace and Christina Hoff Sommers to positions at the Department of Education—all of these show NAS and other conservative leaders gaining more control over the national apparatus that can force radical changes on liberalized higher education. The election of President Clinton may slow but will not stop conservatives because they can still use the growing grassroots movement and their own organizations to make change through legislatures, courts, and local bodies.

Doing so, they use academic rhetoric and professionalizing practices to hide their politics, but their politics, make no mistake about it, consist in courses of practical activity to impose a right-wing America—political, economic, and cultural—on all of us. Any effective response from those who are unwilling to live with the right-wing regime will also require practical action: coalition-building across the Left and the moderate center; effective presentation of progressive higher-education values to other communities; electoral politics supporting progressive liberal and moderate candidates; restaffing of government agencies; and the acquisition of legislative, lobbying, media, and fundraising skills. In short, to have a hand in determining the future of cultural conservatism, progressive academics must engage less in debate, which we have been trained to believe is decisive in the academic world, and more in activism, which the Right has shown us is decisive in the political and cultural world.

NOTES

I am grateful to James Maertens, Larry T. Shillock, and the editors of Social Text for their helpful comments on this chapter.


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6. For an excellent article on this point, see Charles A. Radin, "Conservatives Send Their Agenda to Colleges," Boston Globe, 12 November 1990, section 3, 1.


10. Lynne V. Cheney, Scholars and Society: a speech to the American Council of Learned Societies, New York, 15 April 1988; printed in the ACSL Newsletter 1, no. 3 (Summer 1988), 5-7; quotation, 6.


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Press, 1989); and David Lehman, Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man (New York: Poseiden, 1991).


21. Himmelstein, To the Right, 68.

22. Ibid., 66-67.

23. Ibid., 67-69.

24. Ibid., 69-70.

25. Perle, in Revival and Reaction, does a good job of differentiating the Old Right, neoconservatives, New Right, Christian (or religious) Right, and other constituencies. By the term neoconservatives, I refer to a loose group of intellectuals—both academic and nonacademic, many centered in New York City, many of them Jewish or Catholic, many self-assigned liberals until disaffected by the left movements of the 1960s and/or Great Society programs of the 1970s—who publish in such journals as Commentary, Public Interest, New Republic, and New Criterion. By the term New Right, I mean a populist and at the same time professionalizing movement that formed interest groups, founded right-wing institutions, established political and campaign organizations, and employed new technologies, such as direct-mail solicitation. A number of those involved in these activities might also be described as the Religious Right—including fundamentalist and orthodox (e.g., Catholic, Jewish, and Mormon) denominations. The term New Right was often used, from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, for all conservative constituencies, but seems to be giving way now to the terms "conservatism" and "conservative movement" in the discourse of conservatives themselves.


29. Ibid., "Introduction."
gram Officer, Madison Center for Educational Affairs, Washington, D.C., 2 April 1992. For one example, see the interview of Professor Bruce Nelson in 'The Dartmouth Review,' June 1991, 10-11.

51. Information from Madison Center for Educational Affairs 1991 Annual Report, 6-9, 16-
17; Madison Center for Educational Affairs 1990 Annual Report, 4-8, 9-10; and author’s interviews of Patty (Caroline J.) Plyott and Robert L. Lukof in, Jr., 2 April 1992.


55. Lynne V. Cheney, “Depoliticizing the Academy,” Newslink 6, no. 6 (February 1991), 1.


57. See “Burgeoning Conservative Think Tanks,” a special issue of Responsive Philan­thropy (Spring 1991), 20 and elsewhere.


61. Ibid.


70. See Smith, The Idea Brokers.


73. According to a Heritage Foundation list, twenty newspapers, five syndicated columnists, and four magazines endorsed the plan by name and another sixteen newspapers agreed with it in principle (Cheryl A. Rubin, list sent to author, 2 July 1992).

74. Author’s interview of Cheryl A. Rubin, 11 June 1992.

75. Author’s interview of John M. Slye, Research Assistant, Cultural Policy Studies Pro­gram, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., 11 June 1992. See also “Building the New Es­tablishment” (Feulner interview), 9.


77. Information on the Cultural Policy Studies Working Group, as well as a list of its members, came from the author’s interview of John Slye.


81. All information, unless otherwise noted, from author’s interview of William Forrest, Vice President for Programs, Leadership Institute, Springfield, Va., 9 June 1992; assorted program announcements from William Forrest; and The Leadership Institute Prospectus (Springfield, Va.: Leadership Institute, n.d.).

82. Author’s interviews of William Forrest, 9 June 1992; and at the Broadcast Journalism School, Leadership Institute, held at the Free Congress Foundation, Washington, D.C., 13 June 1992.

83. Direct-mail letter, Lisa M. Kruska, Job and Talent Bank Director, Leadership Insti­tute, n.d. (Spring 1992), 2.

84. Representative Dick Armey, direct-mail letter, Leadership Institute, 8 June 1991, 5; and Building Leadership: The Newsletter of the Leadership Institute 6, no. 1 (1992), 1, 5.

85. The Leadership Institute Prospectus, 22-23.

86. Date of founding and second quotation, author’s interview of Chris Warden, Editor, National Journalism Center, Washington, D.C., 3 April 1992; quotation and other informa­tion from author’s interview of Mal Klein, Associate Editor, National Journalism Center, Washington, D.C., 3 April 1992.


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70. Armey, direct-mail letter, 8 June 1991. 3 (all quotations).
71. Ibid., 6 (italics).
73. "Bias in Broadcast News," seminar conducted by Brent Baker, Executive Director of the Media Research Center, an organization devoted to exposing the liberal bias of the media.
75. Author's observation of the Broadcast Journalism School, 13-14 June 1992.
76. Cultural Conservatism: Toward a New National Agenda, 1.
77. All information, unless otherwise noted, is from the author's observation of the seminar on common-sense economics, National Journalism Center, Washington, D.C., 3 April 1991.
80. Ralph Bennett, Senior Washington Editor, Reader's Digest, from author's observations of the Friday Seminar on Journalism, National Journalism Center, Washington, D.C., 3 April 1992.
81. Author's interview of Chris Warden, 3 April 1992.
85. Gottfried, The Conservative Movement, 124. For an account of the neoconservative takeover of the foundations, see 128-31; and for an account of the neoconservative takeover through foundation funding, of think tanks and other organizations, see 131-38.
86. Ibid., 125.
91. All quotations from the Bradley Resident Scholars Program application form, 1992-93 academic year. Additional information from The Heritage Foundation 1991 Annual Report, 18.
93. Quotation and information from The Heritage Foundation 1991 Annual Report, 19; and the Salvatori Center for Academic Leadership application brochure, 2-4.
95. The attack on liberalized higher education is from author's observation of the Conference Program, Second Annual Leadership Conference for Academic Excellence and Salvatori Awards Dinner, Washington, D.C., 27-28 March 1992, which also contains the Statement of Purpose.
97. From income and expense statements drawn up by the NAS.