theory of alienation. Nevertheless, both Lukács and Rubín were heavily attacked as ‘Hegelians’ and ‘idealists’ by the official representatives of the Third International.

The publication of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts was a great support for the kind of interpretation of Marx begun by Lukács, but this was fully recognized only after the second world war. Although the discussion of alienation never became as extensive and intense as that about alienation, a number of outstanding Marxists such as Goldmann, J. Gabel and K. Kosik have made valuable contributions to it. Not only have the works of Marx and Lukács been discussed afresh, but also Heidegger’s Being and Time, which concludes with the following remarks and questions: ‘That the ancient ontology works with “thing-concepts” and that there is a danger “of reifying consciousness” has been well known for a long time. But what does reification mean? Where does it originate from? ... Why does this reification come again and again to domination? How is the Being of consciousness positively structured so that reification remains inadequate to it?’ Goldmann maintained that these questions are directed against Lukács (whose name is not mentioned) and that the influence of Lukács can be seen in some of Heidegger’s positive ideas.

A number of more substantial questions about reification have also been discussed. There has thus been much controversy about the relation between reification, alienation, and commodity fetishism. While some have been inclined to identify reification either with alienation or with commodity fetishism (or with both), others want to keep the three concepts distinct. While some have regarded alienation as an ‘idealist’ concept to be replaced by the ‘materialist’ concept of ‘reification’, others have regarded ‘alienation’ as a philosophical concept whose sociological counterpart is ‘reification’. According to the prevailing view alienation is a broader phenomenon, and reification one of its forms or aspects. According to M. Kanguz ‘reification is a higher, that is the highest form of alienation’ (1968, p. 18), and reification is not merely a concept but a methodological requirement for a critical study and practical ‘change, or better the destruction of the whole reified structure.’ (Ibid. p. 82).

Reading


relations of production. See forces and relations of production.

religion Marx and Engels began their thinking about society in a Germany where, as Engels said later, straightforward political activity was scarcely possible, and progressive aspirations found vent largely in criticism of orthodox religion, that buttress of the social and political order (Feuerbach, sect. 1). Hegel’s evolutionary approach to history showed that the simple materialism of the eighteenth-century philosophers was inadequate; it was not enough to suppose that CHRISTIANITY and all the other religions had been hatched by impostors (Engels, ‘Bruno Bauer and Early Christianity’). What was needed, Marx wrote in his ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction’, was an analysis of the human conditions and relations that made them indispensable to mankind. Religion was an expression of man’s imperfect self-awareness; not man as abstract individual, but social man, or the human collective. It was a distortion of man’s being, because society was distorted. In some of Marx’s most celebrated words it was the heart of a heartless world, the opium – or painkiller.
of the suffering masses. The way to real happiness was for men to free themselves from the kind of life that made them crave this substitute. Self-emancipation, Marx added, was not sreely desirable: it was man’s duty to realize his highest potential by throwing off everything that kept him imperfect and degraded.

In one of the Theses on Feuerbach (4th thesis) Marx complained that while that liberal critic of religion recognized its earthly roots, he failed to see that it could only be uprooted by a reorganization of society. Feuerbach was not in fact destined of getting rid of it, Engels wrote in his later study (Feuerbach, sect. 3), but only of re-constructing it; he viewed history as a succession of religious transformations, instead of material, social changes with religious accompaniments. In their youth at least Marx and Engels were over-optimistic about the speed or completeness with which such changes could bring enlightenment. Even industrialism in capitalist guise, they were ready to believe, could deliver those whose lives were shaped by it from religious illusions, well in advance of socialism. By commercializing all relationships, they wrote in The German Ideology (pt. 1, sect. 1), industry was doing its best to wipe out both religion and morality, or reduce them to a transparent lie. (Possibly a century and a half later it may be said to have made good progress in that direction.) They were too confident that religious belief could take no hold on the working class, which they were inclined to think of as more of a tabula rasa than it really was. All such unrealities, they held, would be dispelled by experience, rather than by argument, but the new proletarians had never suffered from them, or had by now long since shed them.

A still more striking token of trust in history’s waterpaper-basket was the assertion in Marx’s early essay ‘On the Jewish Question’ that it Jews could be relieved of the burden of their present life of huckstering, Judaism would quickly fade away. More deliberately in Capital (ch. 1, last sect.) Marx repeated his conviction that religious delusions have no function but to throw a veil over the irrationalities of the system of production, and will cease to an end when men enter into rational relations with one another and cure the social whole of its distempers.

Marx thought about religion most systematically in his youth; Engels came back to the subject repeatedly, perhaps an after-effect of a religious upbringing from which he had extricated himself not without some pang. As a historian he found plente of scope in his book on the Peasant War of 1524–25 in Germany to discuss the interplay of politics and religion during a revolutionary crisis. In the so-called religious wars of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, he argued, as in medieval collisions between Church and heresy, the reality to be explored was class struggle, waged over competing material interests; whereas the academic German mind could discern nothing but theological disputes, thus taking the illusions of past epochs about themselves at their face value (ch. 2). This may seen a purely negative approach to religion, but it allows for the possibility that deviant trends arising in protest against official cults are inspired by new, progressive social currents. This was so above all in the case of the Reformation.

In the last chapter of Anti-Dühring Engels returned to the theme of religion as a linkshaken projection of the forces overshadowing human existence. These were at first the powers of nature, generating a vast mythology, and later, no less alien and until lately as mysterious, the social order. He thought of the single deity of monotheism, in whom the attributes of all earlier divinities came to be gathered together, as a personification of the abstract idea of humanity. This emergence of monotheism was traced afresh in Feuerbach (sect. 2). Here Engels was facing the fact that religious concepts appear to stand further apart than any others from material life, and to be the most completely detached from it; also that they have not sprung directly from contemporary life, but are borrowed from a distant past. His answer was that every ‘ideology’, to fulfil its purpose—to satisfy us with ideas to the exclusion of reality—must necessarily develop out of inherited, long-cherished materials. But the changes the
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religious ideas go through respond to shifts in social conditions and class relations.
Early socialists in Eastern Europe were surrounded by a vast peasant population, steeped most deeply in Russia in religiosity of a peculiarly superstitious sort which had always been very much at the service of the tsars. A diversity of ethnic Christian cults and non-Christian religions in the marit empire helped to complicate the situation. A determined struggle against all religious seemed essential for progress. Henri Mckhans’ uncompromising stand on the sincerest materialism, and his admiration for what he called the freest flowering of materialistic thought, in the writings of the eighteenth-century philosophs, he fully agreed with an early dictum of Engels that religion had exhausted all its possibilities (Materialismus Mitteleuropas, pp. 12, 20). But his environment made it easier for him to see that it could still have a strong retrogressive influence on working-class strata, not yet fully class-
conscious. He was indignant at the drift of some prominent progressives, after the failure of the revolution of 1905, into a sort of mysticism brought on by laisserie and disillusion, which took the form of the “God-building” associated especially with
I.anchovskyi.
This was a matter of still more serious concern to Lenin. Engels had warned against the folly of trying to abolish religion by compulsion, as some Blanquists members of the Paris Commune had wanted to do (Programme de la Blanquist Commune Réfugiés). Lenin agreed, but he was aware that religious infection was not limited to recent intellectualis but could be found among some workers, unprovided by the bleak energies of capitalism which chronically mired them with unforeseeable calamities. Religion should be a private matter, he wrote (26 May 1909), so far as the state was concerned; it could not be so for a socialist party, but this did not mean that believers were barred from membership if they were also bona fide socialists. Atheism had no place in the party programme. Since the hold of religion rested in the play of economic forces, the working class could not be promoted against it by declarations, but only by the
struggle against capitalism, and unity in this way of far more moment than unanimity over the affairs of heaven (“The Antithesis of the Workers’ Party to Religion”, CW 15). There may be a certain difference of emphasis in Stalin’s statement in 1913 that the party should defend the free exercise of their faiths by all communities, but must denounce all religion as an obstacle to progress (Marxism and the National Question, sect. 6).
When the party came to power in Russia this obstacle was felt more concretely. In his Historical Materialism Boikarkin took a forceful line on it, theoretical and practical. He dismissed, as Marxism may have been too ready to do, the alternatives or supplementary derivation of religion from man’s condition as individual, his rite of death as well as his life, and, in early times, of departed spirits (p. 172). It was only logi-
atical, Bukharin argued, for a young and revolutionary working class to be materialist in outlook, just as it was for a serene ruling class to sink into religious torpor (p. 58). He ridiculed the celibate hierarchy of the Orthodox Church as a close parallel to the tsarist bureaucracy, with St Michael as commander-in-chief of the angelic hosts (p. 176). But religion must be opposed actively, there was no room in waiting for anything to die out of its own accord (p. 240). Inevitably a tendency grew for believers to be considered of dubious loyalty to the new order, and unfit for responsible positions.
Tentative explorations of the religious past by Marx and Engels were soon being followed up by their successors, notably by Kautsky in the field of early Christian history. Patro-koek (1918, pp. 26-7) among others made much of the brevity of the bourgeois’ attachment to materialism, its philosophy during its period of coming to the front; it was scared off by the eclipse of man domineering during the French Revolution, and fell back on religion as a means of keeping the masses in their place. Such a vortice face, Marxists held, was something that their dialectical view of history could explain, as the old simple materialist outlook could not. They were looking further back too, into the beginnings of religion as well as of a particular religion like Christianity. In the early part of his work
(1906) on the evolution of ethics, Kautsky was intrigued as Engels had been by the coming of monomothism and moralizing creeds out of the cults of the old amoral deities. In this field of prehistory or anthropology Marxian has since made a decided mark. It has been observed that the Durkheim school has paid much more attention to it, but that instead of taking the social structure as a given fact Marxian thinks in terms of developing processes of interaction between men and their environment. The same commentator adds that in practice both schools have allowed for more autonomy of religious evolution than their stricter formalist might seem to admit (Roberson 1972, pp. 19, 21).

Marx and Engels were led by their growing interest in the world outside Europe to speculate about other cults than the Christian. Oriental history, Marx noted, often seemed to wear the appearance of a history of religions (letter to Engels, 2 June 1853). In one of his articles on India (10 June 1853) he made a suggestive point by saying that primitivity in India of luxurious wealth and absent poverty was reflected in Hinduism with its medley of "casual exuberance" and "self-forming asceticism." He remarked to that helpless dependence on Nature could find expression in worship of nature-gods or animals. Large Marxists have followed up this interest in the character of other religions, particularly Islam.

Some regions outside Europe have now for a good many years had Marxian of their own to examine their record. In India these have often been drawn to the study of ancient times, and of both Brahmanism and Buddhism. A thoroughgoing Panegisic Marxian made Kautsky (1962, p. 17) use the country's best-loved and immemorial influential scripture, the Gita, with 'desirey in order to reconcile the irreconcilable', and slippery opportunism'. Chatterpadhyaya (1969) emphasizes the strong marxist tradition that was part of India's thinking in its best times, and criticizes Jainism and Buddhism as in origin heretical philosophers, overlaid in course of time by the superstitions with which India was always rife. More Marxian investigation of later times might have been expected, but communal tensions have made this delicate ground. It must be confessed that the Indian communists before the partition in 1947 failed, like the equally secularist Nehru, to cope adequately with the enormous destructive force of religious animosity. In China the path-finding Marxian historian Kuo Mo-chio associated ancestor-worship with filial piety in the advent of private property, and the worship of a supreme deity with that of a central political authority which required heaven's warrant (Dulz 1978, pp. 150, 156). It may indeed be said that, like Marx at the outset of his intellectual life, Marxian has found in the historic secularity of religion one of its most stimulating tasks.

Reading


Renner, Karl. Born 14 December 1870, Unter-

Tannow, Moravia, died 31 December 1955, Vienna. After completing his secondary school education Renner joined the army in order to support himself until he could continue his studies, and subsequently studied law at the University of Vienna. As a student he became involved in social democratic politics and participated in the great May Day demonstration of 1893. His military service acquainted him with the great variety of nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and aroused his strong interest in the problem of nationality, on which one of his earliest