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Text: The claim of the author’s “intention” upon the critic’s judgment has been challenged in a number of recent discussions, notably in the debate entitled The Personal Heresy, between Professors Lewis and Tillyard. But it seems doubtful if this claim and most of its romantic corollaries are as yet subject to any widespread questioning. The present writers, in a short article entitled “Intention” for a Dictionary(1) of literary criticism, raised the issue but were unable to pursue its implications at any length. We argued that the design or intention of the author is neither avafiable nor desirable as a standard for judg- ing the success of a work of literary art, and it seems to us that this is a principle which goes deep into some differences in the history of critical attitudes. It is a principle which accepted or rejected points to the polar opposites o{ classical “imitation” and romantic expression. It entails many specific truths about inspiration, authenticity, biography, literary history and schol arship, and about some trends of contemporary poetry, especially its allusiveness. There is hardly a problem of literary criticism in which the critic’s approach will not be qualified by his view of “intention.” |
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“Intention,” as we shall use the term, corresponds to what he intended in a formula which more or less explicitly has had wide acceptance. “In order to judge the poet’s performance, we must know what he intended.” Intention is design or plan in the author’s mind. Intention has obvious affinities for the author’s attitude toward his work, the way he felt, what made him write. We begin our discussion with a series of propositions summarized and abstracted to a degree where they seem to us axiomatic. 1. A poem does not come into existence by accident. The words of a poem, as Professor Stoll has remarked, come out of a head, not out of a hat. Yet to insist on the designing intellect as a cause of a poem is not to grant the design or intention as a standard by which the critic is to judge the worth of the poet’s performance. 2. One must ask how a critic expects to get an answer to the question about intention. How is he to find out what the poet tried to do? If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the poem itsel/shows what he was trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the poem is not adequate evidence, and the critic must go outside the poem-for evidence of an intention that did not become effective in the poem. “Only one caveat must be borne in mind,” says an eminent intentionalist in a moment when his theory repudiates itself; “the poet’s aim must be judged at the moment of the creative act, that is to say, by the art of the poem itself.”
II
The Madonna of Gimabue is still in the Church of Santa Maria Novella; but does she speak to the visitor of to-day as to the Florentines of the thirteenth century? Historical interpretation labours... to reinterprate in us the psychological conditions which have changed in the course of history. It enables us to see a work of art (a physical obiect) as its author saw it in thhe moment of production.(4) The first italics are Croce’s, the second ours. The upshot Croce’s system is an ambiguous emphasis on history. With such passages as a point of departure a critic may write a nice analysis of the meaning or “spirit” of a play by Shakespeare or Corneille-a process that involves close historical study but mains aesthetic criticism-or he may, with equal plausibility, produce an essay in sociology, biography, or other kinds of non-aesthetic history.
I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts.... I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them....Will you believe me? ... there is hardly a person present who would not have talked bertter about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration. That reiterated mistrust of the poets which we hear from Socrates may have been part of a rigorously ascetic view in which we hardly wish to participate, yet Plato’s Socrates saw a truth about the poetic mind which the world no longer commonly sees-so much criticism, and that the most inspirational and most affectionately remembered, has proceeded from the poets themselves. Certainly the poets have had something to say that the critic and proúessor could not say; their message has been more exciting: that poetry should come as naturally as leaves to a tree, that poetry is the lava of the imagination, or that it is emotion recollected in tranquillity. But it is necessary that we realize the character and authority of such testimony. There is only a fine shade of difference between such expressions and a kind of earnest advice that authors often give. Thus Edward Young, Carlyle, Walter Pater: I know two golden rules from ethics, which are no less golden in Composition, than in life. 1. Know thyself; 2dly, Reverence thyself. This is the grand
secret for finding readers and retaining them: let him who would move
and convince others, be first moved and h convinced himself. Horace’s
rule, Si vis me fiere, is applicable in a wider sense than the literal
one. To every poet, to every writer, we might say: Be true, ff you would
be believed. Having drunk a pint of beer at luncheon-beer is a sedative to the brain, and my afternoons are the least intellectual portion of my lffe-I would go out for a walk of two or three hours. As I went along, thinking of nothing in particular, only looking at things around me and following the progress of the seasons, there would flow. into my mind, with sudden and unaccountable emotion, sometimes a line or two of verse, sometimes a whole stanza at once. This is the logical terminus of the series already quoted. Here is a confession of how poems were written which would do as a definition of poetry just as well as “emotion recollected in tranquillity”-and which the young poet might equally well take to heart as a practical rule. Drink a pint of beer, relax, go walking, think on nothing in particular, look at things, surrender yourself to yourself, search for the truth in your own soul, listen to the sound of your own inside voice, discover and express the vraie verite. It is probably true that all this is excellent advice for poets. The young imagination fired by Wordsworth and Carlyle is probably closer to the verge of producing a poem than the mind of the student who has been sobered by Aristotle or Richards. The art of inspiring poets, or at ]east oú inciting something like poetry in young persons, has probably gone further in our day than ever beúore. Books d creative writing such as those issued úrom the Lincoln School are interesting evidence of what a child can do.(5) All this, however, would appear to belong to an art separate from criticism-to a psychological discipline, a system of self-development, a yoga, which the young poet perhaps does well to notice, but which is something different from the public art of evaluating poems. Coleridge and Arnold were better critics than most poets have been, and if the critical tendency dried up the poetry in Arnold and perhaps in Coleridge, it is not inconsistent with our argument, which is that judgment of poems is different from the art of producing them. Coleridge has given us the classic “anodyne” story, and tells what he can about the genesis of a poem which he calls a “psychological curiosity,” but his definitions of poetry and of the poetic quality “imagination” are to be found elsewhere and in quite other terms.
Moving o[ th’
earth brings harmes and feares, He touches the emotional pulse of the situation by a skillful allusion to the new and the old astronomy ... Of the new astronomy, the moving of the earth” is the most radical principle; of the old, the “trepidation of the spheres” is the motion of the greatest complexity. . . . The poet must exhort his love to quietness and calm upon his departure; and for this purpose the figure based upon the latter mo-tion (trepidation), long absorbed into the traditional astronomy, fttingly suggests the tension of the moment without arousing the "harmes and feares” implicit in the figure of the moving earth.(9) The argument is plausible and rests on a well substantiated thesis that Donne was deeply interested in the new astronomy and its repercussions in the theological realm. In various works Donne shows his familiarity with Kepler’s De Stella Nova, with Galileo’s Siderius Nuncius, with William Gilbert’s De Magnete, and with Clavius’ commentary on the De Sphaera of Sacro-bosco. He refers to the new science in his Sermon at Paul’s Cross and in a letter to Sir Henry Goodyer. In The First Anniversary he says the “new philosophy calls all in doubt.” In the Elegy on Prince Henry he says that the “least moving of the center” makes “the world to shake.”
V If the distinction between kinds of evidence has implications for the historical critic, it has them no less for the contemporary poet and his critic. Or, since every rule for a poet is but another side of a judgment by a critic, and since the past is the realm of the scholar and critic, and the future and present that of the poet and the critical leaders of taste, we may say that the problems arising in literary scholarship from the intentional fallacy are matched by others which arise in the world of progressive experiment. The question of “allusiveness,” for example, as acutely posed by the poetry of Eliot, is certainly one where a false judgment is likely to involve the intentional fallacy. The frequency and depth of literary allusion in the poetry of Eliot and others has driven so many in pursuit of full meanings to the Golden Bough and the Elizabethan drama that it has become a kind of commonplace to suppose that we do not know what a poet means unless we have traced him in his reading-a supposition redolent with intentional implications. The stand taken by F. O. Matthiessen is a sound one and partially forestalls the difficulty.
The sound of horns
and motors, which shall bring “Cf. Day, Parliament of Bees:” says Eliot, When of a sudden,
listening, you shall hear, The irony is completed
by the quotation itself; had Eliot, as is quite conceivable, composed
these lines to furnish his own background, there would be no loss of
validity. The conviction may grow as one reads Eliot’s next note: “I
do not know the origin of the ballad from which these lines are taken:
it was reported to me from Sydney, Australia.” The important word in
this note-on Mrs. Porter and her daughter who washed their feet in soda
water-is "ballad.” And if one should feel from the lines themselves
their “ballad” quality, there would be little need for the note. Ultimately,
the inquiry must focus on the integrity of such notes as parts of the
poem, {or where they constitute special information about the meaning
of phrases in the poem, they ought to be subject to the same scrutiny
as any o{ the other words in which it is written. Matthiessen believes
the notes were the price Eliot “had to pay in order to avoid what he
would have considered muffling the energy of his poem by extended connecting
links in the text itself.” But it may be questioned whether the notes
and the need for them are not equally muffling. F.W. Bateson has plausibly
argued that Tennyson’s “The Sailor Boy” would be better if half the
stanzas were omitted, and the best versions of ballads like “Sir Patrick
Spens” owe their power to the very audacity with which the minstrel
has taken for granted the story upon which he comments. What then if
a poet fin& he cannot take so much for granted in a more recondite
context and rather than write informatively, supplies notes? It can
be said in favor of this plan that at least the notes do not pretend
to be dramatic, as they would if written in verse. On the other hand,
the notes may look like unassimilated material lying loose beside the
poem, necessary for the meaning of the verbal symbol, but not integrated,
so that the symbol stands incomplete. The Hanged Man, a member of the traditional pack, fits my purpose in two ways: because he is associated in my mind with the Hanged God of Frazer, and because I associate him with the hooded figure in the passage of the disciples to Emmaus in Part V ....The man with Three Staves (an authentic member of the Tarot pack) I associate, quite arbitrarily, with the Fisher King himself. And perhaps he is to be taken more seriously here, when off guard in a note, than when in his Norton Lectures he comments !~! ! on the difficulty of saying what a poem means and adds playfully that he thinks of prefixing to a second edition of Ash Wednesday some lines from Don Juan: I don’t pretend
that I quite understand If Eliot and other contemporary poets have any characteristic fault, it may be in planning too much. Allusiveness in poetry is one of several critical issues by which we have illustrated the more abstract issue of intentionalism, but it may be for today the most important illustration. As a poetic practice allusiveness would appear to be in some recent poems an extreme corollary of the romantic intentionalist assumption, and as a cntical issue it challenges and brings to light in a special way the basic premise of intentionalism. The following instance from the poetry of Eliot may serve to epitomize the practical impncations of what we have been say ing. In Eliot’s “Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” toward the end, occurs the line: “I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each,” and this bears a certain resemblance to a line in a Song by John Donne, “Teach me to heare Mermaides singing,” so that for the reader acquainted to a certain degree with Donne’s poetry, the critical question arises: Is Eliot’s line an allusion to Donne’s? Is Prufrock thinking about Donne? Is Eliot thinking about Donne? We suggest that there are two radically different ways of looking for an answer to this question. There is (1) the way of poetic analysis and exegesis, which inquires whether it makes any sense if Eliot-Prufrock/s thinking about Donne. In an earlier part of the poem, when Prufrock asks, “Would it have been worth while, . . . To have squeezed the tmiverse into a ball,” his words take haft their sadness and irony from certain energetic and passionate lines of Marvel “To His Coy Mistress.” But the exegetical inquirer may wonder whether mermaids considered as “strange sights” (to hear them is in Donne’s poem analogous to getting with child a mandrake root ) have much to do with Prufrock’s mermaids, which seem to be symbols of romance and dynamism, and which incidentally have literary authentication, if they need it, in a line of a sonnet by Gerard de Nerval. This method of inquiry may lead to the conclusion that the given resemblance between Eliot and Donne is without significance and is better not thought of, or the method may have the disadvantage of providing no certain conclusion. Nevertheless, we submit that this is the true and objective way of criticism, as contrasted to what the very uncertainty of exegesis might tempt a second kind of critic to undertake: (2) the way of biographical or genetic inquiry, in which, taking advantage of the fact that Eliot is still alive, and in the spirit of a man who would settle a bet, the critic writes to Eliot and asks what he meant, or if he had Donne in mind. We shall not here weigh the probabilities-whether Eliot would answer that he meant nothing at all, had nothing at all in mind -a sufficiently good answer to such a question-or in an unguarded moment might furnish a clear and, within its limit, irrefutable answer. Our point is that such an answer to such an inquiry would have nothing to do with the poem “Prufrock”; it would not be a critical inquiry. Critical inquiries, unlike bets, are not settled in this way. Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle.
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