Ross's criticisms of consequentialist moral theories:

• ethical egoism (the moral theory that says that an action is right if and only if it is in the long-term interests of the person who performs it):
        A "great part of duty" consists in respecting the rights and serving the       interests of others "whatever the cost to ourselves may be."
• hedonistic utilitarianism:
        Pleasure is not the only thing that we recognize as being intrinsically good;       we recognize other things--e.g., "the possession of a good character," and
        "an intelligent understanding of the world"--as also having intrinsic value.
• ideal utilitarianism (the moral theory that says that an action is right if and only if the net amount of intrinsic value it brings into the world is at least as great as that that any other possible action in the situation would bring into the world):
        "[P]roductivity of maximum good is not what makes all right actions
         right. . . ."

Why does Ross think that producing maximum intrinsic goodness is not always what makes actions right?

• Common sense tells us in some situations that an action (e.g., keeping a promise) is right, not because of its consequences, but because of what has happened in the past (e.g., the making of the promise).
• Common sense also tells us in some situations that we have more than one duty and that one duty (e.g., relieving distress) may be "more of a duty" than another duty (e.g., fulfilling a promise).
• In a situation in which two alternative actions producing equal net amounts of intrinsic goodness differ only in that one would fulfill a promise and the other would not, one's moral obligation would be to perform the action that would fulfill the promise.

What should we look for in a moral theory, according to Ross?

• A moral theory should "fit the facts" (even if this means that the theory becomes less simple).
• The "facts" that a moral theory should "fit" are "the moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people."
• In case there are inconsistencies among "the moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people," we should keep those that "stand better the test of reflection" and discard the others.

Elements of Ross's Moral Theory:

• A variety of relations among individuals are morally significant--including potential benefactor-potential beneficiary, promiser-promisee, creditor-debtor, wife-husband, child-parent, friend-friend, fellow countryman-fellow countryman, and others.
• Each of these relations is the foundation of what Ross calls a "prima facie duty."
• A prima facie duty (also called "conditional duty") is a "characteristic . . . which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind . . . , of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant."
• A prima facie duty is fundamentally different from "a duty proper or actual duty."  (By "duty proper," Ross means what we have been referring to as "moral obligation.")
• Whenever I have to make a moral decision in a situation in which more than one prima facie duty applies, I must "study the situation as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent than any other. . . ."  The prima facie duty I judge to be "more incumbent than any other" in the situation is probably my "duty proper" or actual moral obligation.
• There are a few general "rules of thumb" to follow in judging which prima facie duties are "more incumbent" than others in various situations--e.g., nonmaleficence is generally more incumbent than beneficence.  (See below.)  However, there is no ranking among the prima facie duties that applies to every situation.  Each situation must be judged separately.
• We apprehend our prima facie duties in much the same way that we apprehend the axioms of mathematics or geometry: we do so by reflecting on "the self-evident prima facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type."
• "The moral order expressed in [the principles of prima facie duties] is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe . . . as is the . . . structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic."

Ross's (incomplete) list of prima facie duties:

• Duties stemming from one's own previous actions:
       1. fidelity - duty to fulfill (explicit and implicit) promises/agreements into          which one has entered
       2. reparation - duty to make up for wrongful acts previously done to          others
• Duties stemming from the previous actions of others:
       3. gratitude - duty to repay others for past favors done for oneself
• Duties stemming from the (possibility of) a mismatch between persons' pleasure or happiness and their "merit":
       4. justice - duty to prevent or correct such a mismatch
• Duties stemming from the possibility of improving the conditions of others with respect to virtue, intelligence, or pleasure:
       5. beneficence - duty to improve the conditions of others in these respects
• Duties stemming from the possibility of improving one's own condition with respect to virtue or intelligence:
       6. self-improvement - duty to improve one's own condition in these          respects
• Special duty to be distinguished from the duty of beneficence:
       7. nonmaleficence - duty not to injure others
  

Possible objections to Ross's theory (considered by Ross):

   1. Ross's list of prima facie duties is unsystematic and follows no logical        principle.

• Ross's reply - The list is not claimed to be complete; it is claimed only to be accurate as far as it goes.

    2. Ross's moral theory provides no principle for determining what our actual         moral obligations are in particular situations.

• Ross's reply - There is no reason to assume that the basic reasons why we have the moral obligations that we have are the same in every situation.

    3. Ross's moral theory assumes, without adequate justification, that the list of         prima facie duties we recognize, is accurate and is not in need of critical         examination:

• Ross's reply -
  a) In recognizing something as a prima facie duty, we are apprehending     what is self-evident--i.e., that to be an action of a certain kind (e.g.,
      promise-keeping) is morally significant.
  b) The only "data" for a moral theory that are available to us are the     moral convictions we arrive at via serious thought and reflection.
  c) To overturn our basic moral convictions just because they conflicted     with some moral theory would be like people's "repudiating their     actual experience of beauty" because they conflicted with some     theory of beauty.